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LEVIATHAN GOES TO WASHINGTON: HOW TO
ASSERT THE SEPARATION OF POWERS IN
DEFENSE OF FUTURE GENERATIONS
Joshua J. Schroeder†
ABSTRACT‡
The separation of powers was originally drawn from the common law of England, vindicated during the American Revolution as a
fundamental bulwark against tyranny, and constitutionalized in the
† Joshua J. Schroeder is owner and founder of SchroederLaw in Oakland, CA where
he practices immigration law, constitutional law, and intellectual property law. He holds a
J.D. from Lewis & Clark Law School, and is admitted to practice in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the United States District Court for the Southern District
of California, the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, the State Bar of
California, and the Oregon State Bar.
‡ The spelling, grammar, punctuation, and capitalization of some source quotations
in this article are updated and modernized for clarity. Bluebook citation standards are
conformed to throughout this article. The Bluebook does not include citation forms for
original revolutionary tracts or speeches printed after the fact according to Seventeenthand Eighteenth-Century print culture among other specific source classifications. This
article thus adopts its own forms where the Bluebook is silent under the overriding
principle that citations are made for the purpose of helping future researchers locate the
information cited. In order to not overly encumber the text, only difficult to find letters,
laws, or tracts cite to the book, collection, or website that contain the information cited. This
article prefers citation and pagination directly to original tracts that are now easily found
and broadly available in digital databases. For original tracts the article uses this form:
Author’s Name, Title of Tract pagination [Year Printed]. The same form is used for poems,
plays, and songs without pagination sometimes with the year first performed in brackets
where appropriate. In the case of epic poems and plays like Milton’s Paradise Lost and
Goethe’s Faust, book.act.line numbers are given separated by periods instead of pagination.
The article also adopts the ordinary form for citing to classics like Cicero or Plato of Author’s
Name, Title of Tract book.section.line separated by periods. For speeches and sermons
printed after the fact, the article uses the citation form in Bluebook Rule 16 for periodical
materials giving the full date the speech was given and indicating the year it was printed in
brackets. Short cites are not used for original tracts not printed as books, speeches,
manifestos, classics, plays, songs, poems, movies, TV show episodes, documentaries, or
twitter posts. While Bluebook whitepages rule 18.7.1 may be used when a specific sound
recording is relevant; where a musical source is a song, a general citation to the song is
preferred. Presidential proclamations and other official executive orders and statements
issued prior to modern codification practices are cited as found in the UCSB Presidency
Project, where the full documents are freely available and searchable online. In general,
brackets are used to indicate the year a source was likely printed or performed for the first
time, the actual author, or other historical information not expressly included in the
original print. By contrast, parentheses are generally used to contain the dates, editions,
and editorial staff of particular sources or collections that are expressly indicated in the
work to locate pagination to accurately pinpoint the information cited.
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first three articles of the U.S. Constitution. It was adopted as an assurance that the present generation would not assert dead-hand control
over the future of American society for mere efficiency, vanity, or greed.
The separation of powers, therefore, exists to empower future generations to contend for their rights of life, liberty, and property.
Both the long history of the separation of powers and the recent,
controversial practices of multinational government contractors guide
debate on this topic to the origin and ends of the patent and copyright
laws in the United States. For the first legitimate intellectual property
(IP) law and antitrust law, which was the Case and Statute of Monopolies, was also a nascent defense of the separation of powers. In America,
the primary champions of this law were James Otis and Phillis
Wheatley.
Most living legal academicians and members of the federal
bench are unaware of the common law root of the separation of powers.
Most do not know what impact James Otis or Phillis Wheatley had on
the founding generation. To successfully litigate under the separation of
powers, one must ordinarily teach his or her judges of this paramount,
constitutionalized, common law.
At the same time, it comes to no surprise that those who want to
preserve white, male superiority are presently attempting to abandon
the separation of powers. For absent a swift and robust unconstitutional contravention of the separation of powers, younger generations of
Americans will grow up in a diverse society that is not majority-white
and they will not generally appoint misogynistic or racist men to rule
the land. This is, therefore, a time of intense fearmongering, lying,
greed, and white fragility—usually unleashed as an attempt to preserve
or reignite a dying system of racism, misogyny, and injustice in America
without the separation of powers.
To younger generations: It is my hope that you keep cool, guard
your own integrity, and avoid the embarrassments of your elders who
are presently in power. It is my wish that you overcome when those entrusted with power are filled with anger, when they act out and
embarrass themselves by violating your rights, when they act illegally
out of ignorance of the law. My intention is to help you find a way to
reassert the separation of powers to rescue the nation for our children
who will otherwise suffer in the bed made by the old, dead hand of
Boomer vanity, ambition, and greed. I believe in you, and I believe that
you can do this.
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GOVERNMENT LEGITIMACY

In England they say that Parliament is omnipotent and that
the crown is the fountain of justice.1 They also say the Queen may unilaterally write and rewrite the constitutions of her colonies.2 The
constitution of England itself, the supreme and reigning superpower
over all English dominions, is and has always been unwritten and involves many traditions regarding its tripartite style of government
with its Crown, Lords, and Commons.3
These traditions are perhaps most pleasing to observe in the
recent Netflix smash The Crown, which offers a unique look into the
current British monarch’s ideas of government form and its proper
sources of power.4 Many changes were made over the centuries to mod1. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *149–51, *156–57, *257.
2. R. v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Ex parte Bancoult
[2008] UKHL 61, ¶¶ 32, 36, 81–84, 87, 125, 146–49 (Eng.) (citing Campbell v. Hall [1774] 1
Cowp. 206, 204–05 (Eng.)).
3. James Wilson, Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative Authority
of the British Parliament 2 [1774] (the English constitution may also be styled the “British
constitution”). See 1 J.S. BUCKINGHAM, THE PARLIAMENTARY REVIEW, AND FAMILY MAGAZINE
268 (J.S. Buckingham ed., 1833) (“This British constitution is certainly a very Proteus in its
changes.”).
4. The Crown: Scientia Potentia Est 1:49–3:41 (Netflix release Nov. 4, 2016).

R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\F\FAM\15-1\FAM101.txt

4

unknown

Seq: 4

FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW

10-JAN-22

10:23

Vol. 15:1:1

ernize and update the English system.5 The legitimacy claimed by
England for its form of government, however, still arises from the continued domination of the English people symbolized by the Norman
Conquest.6
When William the Bastard conquered the peoples of England he
subjected them to feudal slavery.7 The Bastard King invented the English property system upon feudal compacts premised on the idea that
“all land is held ultimately of the king,” so that he could oppress the
people with onerous taxes.8 The new Bastard King, William I, took his
share of these taxes directly from his Lords, who became “the sovereign
auditors [i.e., tax collectors] of the kingdom.”9
The King’s feudal property system was so unjust that the heirs
of the Bastard’s Lords eventually took their stand at Runnymede.10
There they demanded that their rights as Lords be protected by contract from the arbitrary government of the wicked King John, heir of
the Bastard Crown.11 The contracts the Lords extorted from King John
are known as the Magna Carta and Carta Foresta, and are the first
known concessions from the crown to the Rule of Law and public
trust.12
5. See, e.g., Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873, 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66 (Eng.); Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1875, 38 & 39 Vict. c. 77 (Eng.); Appellate Jurisdiction Act
1876, 39 & 40 Vict. c. 59 (Eng.).
6. Sir Henry Vane the Younger, A Healing Question 4–5 [1656] (Vane observed many
weaknesses in the English form of government, “that . . . rose in and with the Norman
Conquest” and stated that there “were never so many fair branches of liberty planted on the
root of private and selfish interest”). See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *94, *103;
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *242–43 (“What we call purchase . . . the feudists
called conquests . . . the Norman jurists . . . styled the first purchaser. . . the conqueror or
conquereur.”); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 317 (A.R. Waller ed., 1904) [1651]. But see Jeremiah Dummer, A Defence of the New-England Charters 8 [1715] (the Americans, by
contrast, vindicated the title of Native American peoples to their lands, and claimed their
property rights in America from the common law ownership and sale of them from the Natives to the English transplants as the basis of the colonist’s property rights; not the letters
patent or charter powers of the crown through conquest or dominion).
7. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *296–97. See J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 12 (4th ed., 2002) (The Norman Conquest was “a
catastrophe that determined the whole future of English law.”).
8. BAKER, supra note 7, at 224–25; 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *313–14; 2
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *242–43.
9. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 282 (1856)
(citing 4 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *115).
10. Magna Carta [1215].
11. Id. See Jill Lepore, The Rule of History, NEW YORKER (Apr. 20, 2015), https://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/04/20/the-rule-of-history
12. Magna Carta [1215]; Carta de Foresta [1217]; 2 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES a
proeme (“a King cannot avoid his charter”).
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King John soon thereafter had the first Magna Carta annulled
by the Pope.13 Then in 1217 a second version was acquiesced to, but it
remained for all its glory, a mere ornament of government.14 During
this time, some brave jurists began inferring common law rights into
the king’s first tort statute in order to ensure rights to wholesome food
and drink for the people.15 They also began to develop the jurisprudence of the Great Writ known as habeas corpus as a fundamental law
of the realm.16
These common law sources of justice were no mere ornament.17
Over the years, the Houses of Lords and Commons also developed a
kind of separation of power from the royal executive powers, but only
as a check upon the king.18 It was not until English common law was
united with the ideals in the Magna Carta by the unwritten British
constitution that the English ideals in government began to take a uniform, active role in British society.19

13. Lepore, supra note 11.
14. Id.
15. Rattlesdene v. Grunestone [1317] YB 10 Edw II (54 SS) 140 (Eng.) (despite the
king’s tort statute, which expressly limited judges to hearing only trespass vi et armis and
contra pacem the court made a legal fiction that the wine was adulterated with “force and
arms, namely with swords and bows and arrows” even though it was almost certainly an
accident), in J.H. BAKER & S.F.C. MILSOM, SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY: PRIVATE
LAW TO 1750, at 341, 391, 562, 564, 566–67, 572 (2013) (Baker and Milsom gave numerous
examples of the Court’s inherent, unqualified common law jurisdiction that appeared to
stem from Rattlesdene, to make safe the public from the sale of unwholesome food and drink
without a warranty—for example James Hales’ Reading on Costs [1532] said “if someone
sells me unwholesome beef or mutton, without a warranty, I shall nevertheless have an
action”; Judge Babington in Caunt’s Case [1430] said, “If I go into a tavern to eat, and the
taverner gives and sells me unwholesome drink or meat, whereby I am made extremely
sick, I shall clearly have an action on my case; and yet he made no warranty to me.” In
Lupus v. Chandler [1606], Judge Goldsmith wrote that, “wine, which is corrupt victual prohibited by the law to be sold, know it to be thus corrupt, so that even if it is not warranted,
and the vendee does not put his trust in him, nevertheless an action on the case lies.”).
16. See, e.g., John Sarger’s Case [1481] Y.B. Pas. 21 Edw. IV, fo. 22, pl. 6 (Eng.), in
BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 15, at 565–66.
17. BAKER, supra note 7, at 60–64, 196–202.
18. JAMES OTIS, COLLECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JAMES OTIS 39 (Richard Samuelson
ed., 2015) (“The English government by some indeed considered as democratical, others
have not scrupled to call it an anarchy; but the best opinion is, that the true British constitution, as settled by the glorious revolution, is a mixed monarchy, or a composite of the
three famous kinds, viz. of monarchy, supplied by the King, aristocracy, supplied by the
lords, and of democracy, supplied by the commons. This when the checks and balances are
preserved, is perhaps the most perfect form of government, that in its present depraved
state, human nature is capable of.”); Cf. BAKER, supra note 7, at 167–69.
19. Dr. Bonham’s Case [1610] 8 Co. Rep. 107a, 118a (Eng.) (opinion of Lord Coke)
(“when an Act of Parliament is against Common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the Common Law will control it, and adjudge such Act to be void”).
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Lord Coke was the first person to champion an application of
the principles of the Magna Carta uniformly in court as paramount
law.20 Coke created, for the first time, a common law doctrine that all
positive laws against the English constitution or natural equity are
void.21 His decision in Dr. Bonham’s Case gave rise to a progeny of
common law that held violations to the English unwritten constitution,
including violations of the rights embodied in the Magna Carta, as
void.22
If there is any justice in overruling unjust laws, it did not flow
from the kings and queens of England.23 For taking on the crown in
open court, on behalf of the common people, Lord Coke was removed
from the bench and tried in the infamous Star Chamber.24 The progeny
of cases that began with Dr. Bonham’s Case, now taken for granted by
most U.S. judges,25 were the first to hold laws unconstitutional, defying the arbitrary attempts of the king to silence and control Lord
Coke.26

20. Id.; see 2 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *19–27; cf. Lepore, supra note 11 (“Edward
Coke, the person most responsible for reviving interest in Magna Carta in England, described it as his country’s ‘ancient constitution.’”).
21. Dr. Bonham’s Case [1610] 8 Co. Rep. 107a, 118a (Eng.).
22. See Day v. Savadge [1614] Hob. 85, 87 (Eng.) (“an act of parliament, made against
natural equity, as to make a man a judge in his own case, is void in itself”) (extending Dr.
Bonham’s Case [1610] 8 Co. Rep. 107a, 118a (Eng.)); William Wetmore, Wetmore’s Minutes
of the Trial, Essex Inferior Court, Newburyport, Oct. 1773, Caesar v. Greenleaf [1773], in 2
JOHN ADAMS, LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 67 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds.,
1965) [hereinafter ADAMS, LEGAL PAPERS] (the freedom cases in Massachusetts that occurred just before the revolution arose directly from Lord Coke’s ideas).
23. 2 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES a proeme (King John attempted to avoid the Magna
Carta, but to no avail—for the king cannot repeal the charter that created him—thus some
have called the king a corporation to explain the phrase the king is dead, long live the king);
Petition of Right 1628, 3 Car. 1, c. 1 (Eng.) (this document, like Magna Carta remained a
mere ornament, it was authored by Coke in the House of Commons, but it did not restrain
the king’s power to violate the laws, as confirmed by the feudal sovereign and qualified
immunity asserted in The Bankers Case).
24. 1 JOHN LORD CAMPBELL, THE LIVES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 290–97
(1849) (Though his enemies conspired to revenge the crown against him, “Coke’s energy and
integrity triumphed.”); EDWARD COKE, THE SELECTED SPEECHES AND WRITINGS OF SIR EDWARD COKE lvii (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003). Cf. Millar v. Taylor [1769] 4 Burr. 2303, 2373
(Eng.) (Yates, J., dissenting) (The Star Chamber is “a Court the very name whereof is sufficient to blast all precedents brought from it.”).
25. See George P. Smith, II, Marbury v. Madison, Lord Coke And Dr. Bonham: Relics
Of the Past, Guidelines For The Present—Judicial Review In Transition, 2 U. PUGET SOUND
L. REV. 255, 267 (1979).
26. Lepore, supra note 11 (Coke “was rumored to be writing a book about Magna Carta;
Charles I forbade its publication.”).
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Lord Coke’s precedents continued to grow and develop in England despite royalist politics.27 His precedents were doubted and
rejected by the fatalism of Hobbes and Selden.28 The Precedents were
wholly disdained by the Cromwellian Puritans.29 They were entirely
abandoned by William & Mary in their so called Revolution of 1688.30
Nevertheless, Coke’s claims of English legitimacy based upon an overruling English constitution survived, and at length crossed the
Atlantic to inspire the American Revolution.31
King George III’s failure to follow Coke’s precedents lost him
the Empire.32 In 1761, James Otis, inspired by Coke, declared in open
Colonial Court that “an Act against the Constitution is void: an Act
against natural Equity is void: and if an Act of Parliament should be
made, in the very words of this Petition, it would be void.”33 Otis repeated this argument in tracts he published in England, where he was
“the acknowledged head of the opposition.”34
After Otis rose up and his loving sister, Mercy, sung out his
praises in the public fray calling him “the first champion of American

27. Day v. Savadge [1614] Hob. 85, 87 (Eng.) (extending Dr. Bonham’s Case [1610] 8
Co. Rep. 107a, 118a (Eng.) (opinion of Lord Coke)).
28. HOBBES, supra note 6, at 98–99, 193 (expressly rejecting Lord Coke’s ideas); id. at
61 (praising John Selden’s works); JOHN SELDEN, THE TABLE-TALK OF JOHN SELDEN 61 (Samuel Harvey Reynolds ed., 1892) [hereinafter SELDEN, TABLE-TALK] (rejecting equity itself
as “roguish” and arbitrary, and thus opposing the basis of Coke’s opinion in Dr. Bonham’s
Case that laws against natural equity are void).
29. Lepore, supra note 11 (Oliver Cromwell was rumored to have called the Magna
Carta the “Magna Farta” and Coke’s Petition of Right the “Petition of Shite”).
30. Raoul Berger, Doctor Bonham’s Case: A Statutory Construction or Constitutional
Theory?, 117 U. OF PENN. L. REV. 521, 523 (1969).
31. OTIS, supra note 18, at 175 (repeating Otis’s argument from Paxton’s Case, the citizens of Massachusetts Bay expounded the basis of every American written constitution to
come, “that acts of parliament against natural equity are void. That acts against the fundamental principles of the British constitution are void”) (extending Dr. Bonham’s Case [1610]
8 Co. Rep. 107a, 118a (Eng.)); PARKER P. SIMMONS, JAMES OTIS’S SPEECH ON THE WRITS OF
ASSISTANCE 1761., at 2, 5, 18 (Albert Bushnell Hart & Edward Channing eds., 1906) (the
remedy for disposing of unjust laws adopted by the Americans was “to confer on the judiciary the power to declare unconstitutional statutes void”). See Laura K. Donohue, National
Security Law and Privacy, C-SPAN (Sept. 15, 2015), https://www.c-span.org/video/?3280034/laura-donohue-balancing-national-security-privacy-concerns [hereinafter Donohue, National Security].
32. Letter from Thomas Hutchinson to Richard Jackson (Sept. 12, 1765), in JOSIAH
QUINCY, JR., REPORTS OF CASES 441 (1865) (“Our friends to liberty take advantage of a
maxim they find in Lord Coke that an act of Parliament against Magna Charta or the peculiar rights of Englishmen is ipso facto void.”).
33. SIMMONS, supra note 31, at 5 (from the report of John Adams).
34. WILLIAM TUDOR, THE LIFE OF JAMES OTIS 180 (1823).
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freedom,”35 Sir William Blackstone stared back across the Atlantic to
the rising glory of America and frowned.36 Blackstone betrayed his
Lord Coke by saying of Parliament, “what they do, no authority upon
earth can undo.”37 Thus, as Thomas Jefferson observed, “Blackstone
and Hume have made tories of all England.”38
William Blackstone’s notion of parliamentary omnipotence ironically helped Jeremy Bentham demolish the Blackstonian defense of
the English Separation of Powers.39 However, by then parliamentary
omnipotence was already tried in the American Revolution and proven
unequivocally false.40 In the place of English government, the Americans vindicated the existence of an “infinitely good and gracious
Creator of the universe” as “the only one who is omniscient as well as
omnipotent.”41
After the American Revolution, the royalist utopian philosopher, Jeremy Bentham, renewed calls to make the English government
omnipotent through the implementation of The Panopticon.42 Inspired
by the Puritans, Jeremy Bentham told the rulers of the world that
35. 1 MERCY OTIS WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE RISE, PROGRESS, AND TERMINATION OF
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 47 (1805) (James Otis had “the honor of laying the foundation of
a revolution.” – “He was the first champion of American freedom, who had the courage to
put his signature to the contest between Great Britain and the colonies.”); TUDOR, supra
note 34, at 180–83.
36. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *206 (regarding us as “zealous Republicans,” whose ideas were tantamount to anarchy, “or total dissolution of the government”).
37. Id. at *156–57.
38. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Horatio G. Spafford (Mar. 17, 1814) (Jefferson
advised that we should be careful not to substitute “Blackstone for my Lord Coke, as an
elementary work.”).
39. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *156–57; JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT
ON GOVERNMENT xxxiv–xxxv n. s, 141 (2d ed., 1823) [1776] [hereinafter BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT]; M. DUMONT, PRINCIPLES OF LEGISLATION: FROM THE MS. OF JEREMY BENTHAM 300
(John Neal trans., 1830) (“Why did he [Blackstone] not perceive that without changing his
argument, one might draw from it a conclusion diametrically opposite, and altogether as
fair: namely, that the British constitution ought to unite all the peculiar vices of democracy,
of aristocracy, and of monarchy?”). See also [Jeremy Bentham,] Short Review of the Declaration [1776], in [JEREMY BENTHAM & JOHN LIND,] AN ANSWER TO THE DECLARATION OF THE
AMERICAN CONGRESS 131–32 (1776) [hereinafter BENTHAM & LIND] (Bentham emphatically
agreed with Blackstone that Parliamentary law should be unchallengeable, and so he
wanted to crush the Americans for defying English law.).
40. King George III, The King’s Speech of Nov. 30, 1774 [1775] (this speech, published
in the colonies, declared parliamentary omnipotence and Parliament’s support of the king’s
efforts to bring the Americans to heel); THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1–2 (U.S.
1776).
41. OTIS, supra note 18, at 123–25.
42. Letter from Jeremy Bentham to Crecheff in White Russia, 1787 [Letter I], in 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, PANOPTICON 2–3 (1791) [hereinafter BENTHAM, PANOPTICON] (Jeremy
Bentham argued that a Panoptic tower was required to make worldly rulers omniscient and
omnipotent like gods.).
THE
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their governments may not be omnipotent now, but they could be.43 He
argued that using Panopticon prisons to destroy all human privacy
could manipulate the masses to believe that their rulers were omniscient and thereby perceived as omnipotent.44
Though Bentham had a profound effect on Latin America and
Russia, he had very little, if any, effect in the United States.45 He vigorously attempted to influence the founders, but his influence was
stifled by his counterrevolutionary tract condemning the American
Revolution.46 Bentham also repelled Americans when he demoralized
the French Declaration of Rights as “nonsense upon stilts,” befriended
Aaron Burr in exile, and petitioned President Andrew Jackson to abandon the separation of powers.47
If the American Revolutionaries noticed him (and there is little
evidence they did), they would have recognized the utopian artifice of
Bentham’s panoptic madness as a perfected version of feudalism.48
Just as Otis argued, “the origin of deifying princes . . . was from the
trick of gulling the vulgar into a belief that their tyrants were omniscient, and that it was therefore right, that they should be considered as

43. Letter from Jeremy Bentham to the Duke of Wellington (Dec. 12, 1828), in 11 JERBENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 9 (John Bowring ed., 1843) [hereinafter
BENTHAM, THE WORKS]; Letter from Jeremy Bentham to Andrew Jackson (Apr. 26, 1830), in
11 SMITH COLLEGE STUDIES IN HISTORY 215 (Sidney Bradshaw Fay & Harold Underwood
Faulkner eds., 1926) [hereinafter 11 SMITH].
44. 1 BENTHAM, PANOPTICON, supra note 42, at i, 139–40; MIRIAM WILLIFORD, JEREMY
BENTHAM ON SPANISH AMERICA 102–03, 127–28 (1980).
45. Jeremy Bentham, Anti-Senatica: An attack on the U.S. Senate, sent by Jeremy Bentham to Andrew Jackson, President of the United States 60–61 [1830], in 11 SMITH, supra
note 43, at 264–65 (failing to convince President Jackson to make an attempt to disband the
U.S. Senate); id. at 218 (in his forward, Charles Warren Everett explained why Bentham’s
utopian fantasies of a single representative assembly had little effect on President Jackson,
or anyone in America).
46. [Jeremy Bentham,] Short Review of the Declaration [1776], in BENTHAM & LIND,
supra note 38, at 120 (calling the U.S. Declaration of Independence a “cloud of words”).
47. Jeremy Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies [1796], reprinted in 2 BENTHAM, THE
WORKS, supra note 42, at 501; 21 BENTHAM, THE WORKS, supra note 42, at 432–33; DUMONT,
supra note 39, at 300 (advocating a unity of powers in the style of Turgot and Condorcet);
Letter from Jeremy Bentham to Andrew Jackson (Apr. 26, 1830), in 11 SMITH, supra note
43, at 215 (“If I do not mistake you, you are embarked, or about to embark, on a civil enterprise, which Cromwell, notwithstanding all his military power, failed in,—I mean the
delivery of the people from the thralldom in which, everywhere, from the earliest recorded
days, they have been held by the harpies of the law.”).
48. BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT, supra note 39, at xxxiv–xxxv n. s, 141 (advocating for the
destruction of the Court’s power to declare unjust laws against natural equity or against the
constitution void—a total demolition of the principles of Lord Coke. The Americans purposely accomplished the opposite, confirmed permanently by Chief Justice Marshall when
he decided Marbury v. Madison.).
EMY
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omnipotent.”49 Thus, Bentham’s Panopticon was directly preempted by
James Otis.50
The Americans abolished the English Navigation Acts, which
were the invention of the notorious American Puritan George Downing.51 They vindicated the peaceful resistance of Roger Williams and
Anne Hutchinson by establishing a separation of church and state,
abolishing religious tests, and ordaining First Amendment freedoms.52
They turned away from Cromwellian Imperialism and created a government based upon the holding in Dr. Bonham’s Case.53
In the years preceding the American Revolution, King George
III affirmed the omnipotence of his Parliament in Blackstonian style,
his Parliament affirmed the unbounded powers of the crown, and both
were humiliated by defeat.54 Despite the English government’s pretention of god-like omnipotence, Dr. Bonham’s Case was affirmed in
America.55 A new nation founded by social compact was established
upon a fiery resistance to English domination.56
49. OTIS, supra note 18, at 125.
50. BENTHAM, PANOPTICON, supra note 42, at 2–3; Sarah E. Spengeman, Saint Augustine and Hannah Arendt on Love of the World (June 2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation)
(on file with the University of Notre Dame) (“Totalitarianism actually believes that human
beings can become omnipotent only if they are properly organized.”).
51. Letter from John Adams to William Tudor (July 14, 1818). See also SIMMONS, supra
note 31, at 22 (“He was not only not received, but ill treated, which he resented on his return
to England, by proposing an act of navigation, which was adopted, and has ruined Holland,
and would have ruined America, if she had not resisted.”).
52. Isaac Backus, An Appeal to the Public for Religious Liberty 25–26 [1773] (“How
weighty are these arguments against confounding church and state together? Yet this author’s appearing against such confusion, was the chief cause for which he was banished out
of the Massachusetts colony.”); ROGER WILLIAMS, THE BLOUDY TENENT OF PERSECUTION 435
(Edward Bean Underhill ed., 1848) [1644] [hereinafter WILLIAMS, THE BLOUDY] (This is regarded as the first expression of the “wall of separation” between church and state—
appearing years earlier than Sir Henry Vane the Younger’s advocacy of this separation in
his anonymously published tract Zeal Examined.); ROGER WILLIAMS, THE HIRELING MINISTRY NONE OF CHRIST’S 23–25 (1652) [hereinafter WILLIAMS, THE HIRELING] (“[It is] against
the testimony of Christ Jesus, for the civil state to impose upon the souls of the people, a
religion . . . . CHRIST JESUS NEVER CALLED FOR THE SWORD OF STEEL TO HELP THE SWORD OF
SPIRIT.”) (emphasis added). See also Thomas Jefferson, Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom [1777] (“truth is great and will prevail if left to herself”); Isaac Backus, Truth is Great,
and Will Prevail 3–5 [1781].
53. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803); see SIMMONS, supra note 31, at 2, 5, 18.
54. King George III, The King’s Speech of Nov. 30, 1774 [1775]; DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1–2 (U.S. 1776).
55. OTIS, supra note 18, at 175; THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1–2 (U.S.
1776).
56. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1–2 (U.S. 1776); Marbury, 5 U.S. at
177; see OTIS, supra note 18, at 241 (the bases of English imperialism upon fraud and force
were recognized as illegitimate “Hobbesian maxims” by the founders).
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Finding a peculiar agreement with Baron de Montesquieu and
Edward Coke, the founders turned away from Hobbesian fatalism and
set out to establish a government upon the separation of powers.57
John Adams published a tract in 1776 entitled Thoughts on Government, which firmly advocated a separation between the Legislative,
Executive, and Judiciary branches.58 This system was copied into the
U.S. Constitution for the purpose of avoiding the arbitrary powers of
tyranny in government.59
Part I of this article will give a broad overview of the separation
of powers. Part II will define the problem of internet flux and convergence and explore how it causes old distinctions to appear
meaningless, which was used to merge war and peace powers and the
laws of land and sea. Finally, Part III examines the origin and ends of
antitrust and public interest federal jurisdiction as grounds to dispute
and counter violations of the separation of powers in court.

57. 1 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 3–4 (Thomas Nugent trans.,
1899) [1748] (“Man, in a state of nature . . . would feel nothing in himself, at first, but
impotency and weakness: his fears and apprehensions would be excessive. . . . In this state,
every man, instead of being sensible of his equality, would fancy himself inferior: there
would, therefore, be no danger of their attacking one another; peace would be the first law of
nature.”) (citing and refuting HOBBES, supra note 6, at 64–65); Milborn’s Case [1572] 7 Co.
Rep. 6b, 7a (Eng.) (“ratio legis est anima legis, et mutata legis ratione, mutatur et lex” – the
reason for a law is the soul of the law, and if the reason for a law has changed, the law is
changed); Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 385 (1933) (The maxim that cessante ratione
legis, cessat ipsa lex “means that no law can survive the reasons on which it was founded. It
needs no statute; it abrogates itself.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699 (2001) (“(‘Cessante ratione legis cessat ipse lex’) (the rationale of a legal
rule no longer being applicable, the rule itself no longer applies)) (quoting 1 EDWARD COKE,
INSTITUTES *70b). But see John Adams, Thoughts on Government 6 [1776] (disagreeing with
Montesquieu’s idea that fear is the emotion that causes men and women to see in each other
an equal); OTIS, supra note 18, at 64 (Otis confirmed that the origin of U.S. liberty and peace
is natural human love, referring to Terence’s verse “homo sum: humani nihil âne alienum
puto” (Otis’s English translation above) to justify his comments: “Let not the Poor envy the
Rich, nor the Rich despise the Poor: But let us remember we are all of one Flesh and Blood:
and that the Good of the whole is closely and intimately connected with the Welfare and
Prosperity of each Individual. The Love of our Neighbour is an evident Principle of natural
as well as revealed Religion.”)
58. John Adams, Thoughts on Government 21 [1776].
59. U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, & III; see THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison); John
Adams, Thoughts on Government 22 [1776] (among the direct influences that Adams’ tract
had over the development of the U.S. Constitution, his view that judges should hold their
offices “during good behavior” was adopted verbatim into the U.S. Constitution). Cf. THE
FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison) (defending the good behavior requirement).
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POWERS

The principles of natural equity, the common law, and the
rights of man inspired by Edward Coke pervade the U.S. social compact.60 There are many examples of the underlying principles of the
social compact in the resolves,61 declarations of rights,62 and constitutions63 ordained by the people prior to and during the Revolutionary
War; and so the principles of the compact was unanimously and vigorously reaffirmed in Marbury v. Madison.64 However, the clearest and
most universal embodiment of these principles is found in the Declaration of Independence.65
60.
61.

SIMMONS, supra note 31, at 2, 5, 18; OTIS, supra note 18, at 175.
Patrick Henry et al., The Virginia Resolves (May 30, 1765), in JOURNALS OF THE
HOUSE OF BURGESSES 1761–1765, at 360 (John Pendleton Kennedy ed., 1907) (“[T]he first
adventurers and settlers of His Majesty’s colony and dominion of Virginia brought with
them and transmitted to their posterity [and to all later settlers] . . . all the liberties, privileges, franchises, and immunities that have at any time been held, enjoyed, and possessed
by the people of Great Britain.”); John Ashley et al., The Sheffield Resolves (Jan. 12, 1773)
(“That Mankind in a state of nature are equal, free, and independent of each other, and have
a right to the undisturbed enjoyment of their lives, their liberty and property,” and that
these rights were “transmitted to us by our worthy and independent ancestors, at the most
laborious and dangerous expense.”); Joseph Warren et al., The Suffolk Resolves (Sept. 9,
1774).
62. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). See infra note 63 (most of
the state constitutions were placed within their original constitutions).
63. VT. CONST. OF 1777, ch. 1, arts. 1–19 (“all men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and unalienable rights, amongst which are the
enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and
pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety”—after this text the first Vermont constitution expressly abolished slavery); N.J. CONST. OF 1776, art. 4 (“That ALL INHABITANTS [i.e.,
including women and black folk] of this Colony, of full age, who are worth fifty pounds proclamation money, clear estate in the same, and have resided within the county in which they
claim a vote for twelve months immediately preceding the election, shall be entitled to vote
for Representatives in Council and Assembly; and also for other public officers, that shall be
elected by the people of the county at large.”) (emphasis added); MD. CONST. OF 1776 pt. 1,
art. 3 (expressly reserving the privilege to all its inhabitants of the English Common Law,
which included the holding from Somerset v. Stewart); MASS. CONST. pmbl. & pt. 1 (1780);
VA. CONST. OF 1776 art. 1, § 1 (“all men are by nature equally free and independent”); GA.
CONST. OF 1777 pmbl., arts. 58, 60–61.
64. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803); see OTIS, supra note 18, at 175; Levi
Hart, Liberty Described and Recommended, EBEN. WATSON, Sept. 20, 1774, at 16–17, 20
[1775]; Lemuel Haynes, Liberty Further Extended [1776], in Ruth Bogin, “Liberty Further
Extended”: A 1776 Antislavery Manuscript by Lemuel Haynes, 40 THE WM. & MARY Q. 85, 95
(1983) (Asserting the common law rule from Dr. Bonham’s Case as a reason to end American Slavery: “Every privilege that mankind enjoy[s] have their origin from God; and
whatever acts are passed in any Earthly Court, which are Derogatory to those edicts that
are passed in the Court of Heaven, the act is void.”); TUDOR, supra note 34, at 272.
65. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1–2, 11, 14–15, 19–20, 22–24 (U.S.
1776).
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To understand and appreciate the American ideal of the separation of powers, it is important to first understand the compact by which
the separation of powers was established.66 Reaching this understanding requires recognition of the English common law precedent that
began with Dr. Bonham’s Case and how it inspired the revolution.67 It
also requires a working knowledge of the governmental legitimacy that
Edward Coke proposed, and James Otis championed, as the everlasting cornerstone of the American Union.68
This understanding begins with an explanation of the triad of
founding documents, which includes the Declaration of Independence,
the U.S. Constitution, and the Judiciary Act of 1789.69 Each of these
documents were meant to function in conjunction with one another, to
foster a vibrant and flourishing society.70 As now retired Justice Sandra Day O’Connor explained,
The Judiciary Act marked the last great event in our Nation’s
founding and formed the genesis of our Nation’s continuing constitutional revolution. It is the last of the triad of founding documents,
along with the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution
itself. The Declaration of Independence made clear that our revolution sought to defend our Nation’s most basic liberties and values:
the Constitution gave form to the government that would protect
those liberties and the common good. That government would succeed, and those liberties would be protected, only through the
Nation’s commitment to the legal process and the rule of law. The
Judiciary Act fulfilled that commitment.71

Justice O’Connor, though correct in her description of the triad, was
prone to presume the perfection of the operation of these documents
through a colorblind lens she used on the constitution; a way of seeing
66. Id. (the complaints in many of the Declaration’s paragraphs allude to matters expressly resolved by the firm adoption of the separation of powers).
67. SIMMONS, supra note 31, at 2, 5, 18; OTIS, supra note 18, at 175.
68. OTIS, supra note 18, at 175 (finding “that acts of parliament against natural equity
are void. That acts against the fundamental principles of the British constitution are void.”).
69. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1–32 (U.S. 1776); U.S. CONST. arts. I,
II, & III; Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73.
70. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 414–15 (1821) (interpreting the U.S. Constitution
and the Judiciary Act under the objects of the U.S. social compact to exercise supreme authority of the federal courts over the state courts on the basis of the public interest/trust
purposes of the U.S. Constitution as required by our compact saying, “We think that, in a
government acknowledgedly supreme, with respect to objects of vital interest to the nation,
there is nothing inconsistent with sound reason, nothing incompatible with the nature of
government, in making all its departments supreme so far as respects those objects and so
far as is necessary to their attainment.”); THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1–32
(U.S. 1776); U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, & III; Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73.
71. Sandra Day O’Connor, The Judiciary Act of 1789 and the American Judicial Tradition, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1990).
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the founding documents that was in vogue for her time.72 More recently, however, Michelle Alexander and Harper Lee produced a sea
change in American culture against the idealization of good intentioned race-blindness—for social justice will not come from blindness,
but from seeing.73
Our founding documents do not have the magic properties Justice O’Connor assumed they did, because just as Judge Hand warned
us, “Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no
constitution, no law, no court can save it.”74 Thus, people must actively
engage in the revolution in our government, to which Justice O’Connor
referred, and not passively regard it from the sidelines.75 The legiti72. See Jennifer R. Byrne, Toward a Colorblind Constitution: Justice O’Connor’s Narrowing of Affirmative Action, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 619, 619–20 (1998); Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306, 310 (2003) (noting Justice O’Connor’s bias toward a colorblind America when
she said, “[t]he Court takes the Law School at its word that it would like nothing better than
to find a race-neutral admissions formula and will terminate its use of racial preferences as
soon as possible,” and also stated “[t]he Court expects that 25 years from now, the use of
racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.”); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 356–57 (2003) (noting Justice O’Connor’s characterization of
cross-burnings as if they could be legitimate, First Amendment protected expressions of
speech—when to the Union and to all black folk cross burnings are synonymous with fighting words. Her First Amendment dream was not for truth, but for a pluralism that condones
race hatred and violence.). Individuals among those whose speech was protected by
O’Connor’s opinion in Black to advertise a coming race war in America seem to have caused
a coninuing escalation of race based violence including the Charlottesville protests that
claimed Heather Heyer’s life, the police murder of George Floyd and several other murders
like it, the Charleston church massacre, and many other instances of race based hatred; all
of these taken together are a strong reason to believe that O’Connor’s suggestion in the year
2003 that the court should overrule its former constitutional protections of racial minorities
in the United States after the year 2028 was premature. See Debbie Elliot, 5 Years After
Charleston Church Massacre, What Have We Learned, NPR (June 17, 2020, 1:39 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/06/17/878828088/5-years-after-charleston-church-massacrewhat-have-we-learned. See also Nicholas Lemann, Can Affirmative Action Survive?, NEW
YORKER (July 26, 2021), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/08/02/can-affirmativeaction-survive.
73. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 228–29 (2010) (“‘What a tragedy! Millions of Negroes have been crucified by conscientious blindness. . . . Jesus was right about
those men who crucified him. They knew not what they did. They were inflicted by a terrible
blindness.’”) (quoting MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., STRENGTH TO LOVE 45–48 (1963)); HARPER
LEE, GO SET A WATCHMAN 181–82 (2015) (“Blind, that’s what I am. I never opened my eyes.
I never thought to look into people’s hearts, I looked only in their faces. . . . I need a watchman to lead me around and declare what he seeth every hour on the hour.”) (referring to
Isaiah 21:6).
74. Hon. Learned Hand, Speaker at I am an American Day: Spirit of Liberty Speech
(1944); see Letter from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 24, 1815) (The Revolutionary
War was “only an Effect and Consequence of” the Revolution, for “The Revolution was in the
Minds of the People, and this was effected, from 1760 to 1775, in the course of fifteen Years
before a drop of blood was drawn at Lexington.”).
75. MD. CONST. OF 1776 pt. 1, art. 4 (“The doctrine of non-resistance, against arbitrary
power and oppression, is absurd, slavish, and destructive of the good and happiness of man-
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macy of the U.S. Government is thus continuously secured by the
common people.76
The legitimacy of the U.S. Government exists in the revolutionary moment of time.77 It exists when injured parties are vindicated in
court, when a judge makes equitable orders to secure their freedom,
the fidelity of their vote, and their health and safety at work; the legitimacy of the U.S. Government consists in its active assertion of the
equality of every person’s rights regardless of race, gender, nationality,
religion, or any other classification.78 Our natural liberty and equality
is vindicated in public demonstrations in which the participants proclaim—all power to all the people!79
When functioning properly, the triad of founding documents
empowers the U.S. Government to breathe in the revolutionary fire of
the people through peaceful processes.80 The founding fathers and
kind.”). Cf. Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549, 561 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“The
law knows no finer hour than when it cuts through formal concepts and transitory emotions
to protect unpopular citizens against discrimination and persecution.”).
76. Frederick Douglass, What to the Slave is the 4th of July? (July 5, 1852), in 1 AMERICAN SPEECHES 533 (Ted Widmer ed., 2006) (quoting Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, A Psalm
of Life [1838]); Letter from Susan Brownell Anthony to Clara Bewick Colby (Dec. 17, 1898).
77.
See, e.g., Phillis Wheatley, To the University of Cambridge [1767] (exhorting us to
“redeem each moment, which with haste / Bears upon its rapid wing Eternal bliss”);
Susanna Wright, On Time, in Milcah Martha Moore’s Book 135 (Catherine La Courreye
Blecki & Karin A. Wulf eds., 1997) [hereinafter MILCAH] (“Enjoy the present & be bless’d, /
While yet they’re in your power, / Nor place your happiness or rest, / On any future hour.”).
78. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (requiring the equal protection of the law). See generally Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368
(1963); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (Justice O’Connor helped to gradually overrule this
case to destroy its affirmation of habeas corpus protection mandated by the U.S. Constitution.); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S.
209 (1977) (this precedent was recently frayed by the court, leaving it not necessarily overruled or distinguished, but undermined with holes and backdoors for judges to plausibly
ignore it—then it was overruled in Janus v. American Federation).
79. See generally SELMA (Paramount Pictures 2014); Fred Hampton, Sr., Speech at Olivet Baptist Church in Chicago: Power Anywhere There’s People (1969); Dr. Martin Luther
King Jr., leader of the Civil Rights Movement, Speaker at March on Washington: I Have a
Dream (Aug. 28, 1963); Alicia Garza, Founder of BLM, Keynote Address at 2015 Law for the
People Convention in Oakland (Oct. 23, 2015).
80. Samuel Cooper, Sermon on the Commencement of the Constitution, T. & J. FLEET,
& J. GILL, Oct. 25, 1780, at 3 [1780] (we are like Moses’ vision of “‘a bush burning and yet
not consumed’”). See, e.g., Susan B. Anthony, Address of Susan B. Anthony (1873), in ANON.,
AN ACCOUNT OF THE PROCEEDINGS ON THE TRIAL OF SUSAN B. ANTHONY, ON THE CHARGE OF
ILLEGAL VOTING 178 (1874) [hereinafter ANON., AN ACCOUNT] (Had the U.S. Judiciary properly taken in the revolutionary fire of the people through peaceful process in this case,
women would have had the right to vote in 1873.); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963)
(It took all the way until 1963 for the U.S. judiciary to finally get the picture that it might
have a role to play in securing the voting rights of the people according to the principles of
the compact of 1776: “The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth
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mothers believed that power itself corrupts and human nature is not
itself to blame for failures in government form.81 Thus, with Montesquieu the founders departed from Hobbesian fatalism, declared that
the state of nature is liberty and peace, and established the separation
of powers.82
The separation of powers found in the first three articles of the
U.S. Constitution gives form to the U.S. Government and exists as part
of the spirit of our laws.83 This spirit originated in a paramount and
superintending U.S. social compact represented by the Declaration of
Independence.84 Americans know this view is correct and proper because of the U.S. Constitution’s preamble, which states its purposes
and objects, including the formation of “a more perfect union”; a Union
born on July 4, 1776.85
Amendments can mean only one thing—one person, one vote.”); see Ida B. Wells-Barnett,
Lynch Law in America, 23 THE ARENA 15, 20–21 (1900) (If the Courts properly engaged with
Ida B. Wells’ revolutionary motions in her time, Plessy v. Ferguson would have had a much
different outcome—instead the Court allowed the “unwritten law” of racial prejudice and
hatred to control the written laws.). Cf. LUCY STONE, WOMAN SUFFRAGE IN NEW JERSEY 12
(Mar. 6, 1867) (“In New Jersey, women and negroes voted from 1776 to 1807, a period of
thirty-one years.”).
81. Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams (Mar. 31, 1776) (“Remember all Men
would be tyrants if they could.”); John Adams, Thoughts on Government 17–18 [1776] (the
separation of powers is meant to keep men in power from devolving into “ravenous beasts of
prey”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (“The accumulation of powers, legislative,
executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of
tyranny.”).
82. John Adams, Thoughts on Government 21 [1776]; THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James
Madison); Phillis Wheatley, Liberty & Peace [1784]; 1 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 57, at 3–4
(Arguing that Hobbes mistakenly “attributes to mankind, before the establishment of society, what can happen but in consequence of this establishment, which furnishes them with
motives for hostile attacks and self-defense[.]”).
83. U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, & III.
84. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1–32 (U.S. 1776).
85. U.S. CONST. pmbl. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1, 32 (U.S. 1776)
(forming the “United States” for the first time—before this declaration they were mere colonies). See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 459–60 (“The importance of examining the preamble, for the purpose of expounding the
language of a statute, has been long felt, and universally conceded in all juridical discussions. It is an admitted maxim in the ordinary course of the administration of justice, that
the preamble of a statute is a key to open the mind of the makers, as to the mischiefs, which
are to be remedied, and the objects, which are to be accomplished by the provisions of the
statute. We find it laid down in some of our earliest authorities in the common law; and
civilians are accustomed to a similar expression, cessante legis prœmio, cessat et ipsa lex. . . .
There does not seem any reason why, in a fundamental law or constitution of government,
an equal attention should not be given to the intention of the framers, as stated in the
preamble. And accordingly we find, that it has been constantly referred to by statesmen and
jurists to aid them in the exposition of its provisions.”) (citing Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S.
419, 474–75 (1793) (Opinion of Jay, C.J.)). See also Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S.
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The objects of the Union (i.e., the ultimate purpose or spirit of
the laws), that are referred to in the U.S. Constitution’s preamble, are
embodied by the Declaration of Independence.86 They are the founders’
best estimation of what the legitimacy of any government upon the
earth depends.87 The legitimacy of the separation of powers consists in
its protection of preexisting natural human rights, voting rights, and
the right to amend constitutions, to secure the consent of the
governed.88
The objects of the Union, thus, consist in the preservation of at
least four elements: A legitimate voting system;89 the ideal of Our Federalism! reflected in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments;90 the idea that
all men and women are equal by law and by birth;91 and finally the
sovereign right and duty of the people to amend or abolish their constitutions, when they are arbitrary or tyrannical, in order to replace them
with a form of government that better secures their safety and
happiness.92

304, 311 (1795) (referring to the U.S. social compact as accepted by Pennsylvania to protect
property rights).
86. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1–32 (U.S. 1776). See Matilda Joslyn
Gage, The United States on Trial, not Susan B. Anthony (1873), in ANON., AN ACCOUNT,
supra note 80, at 179 (“Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. That is the axiom of our republic. . . . The first principles of government are founded
on the natural rights of individuals; in order to secure the exercise of these natural, individual rights our government professed to be founded.”); Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371,
385 (1933) (The maxim that cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex “means that no law can
survive the reasons on which it was founded. It needs no statute; it abrogates itself.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Milborn’s Case [1572] 7 Co. Rep. 6b, 7a (Eng.) (“ratio legis est
anima legis, et mutata legis ratione, mutatur et lex” (the reason for a law is the soul of the
law, and if the reason for a law has changed, the law is changed)).
87. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1–2 (U.S. 1776). See [Mercy Otis Warren,] Observations on the New Constitution 6 [1788] (“All writers on government agree, and
the feelings of the human mind witness the truth of these political axioms. . . .”).
88. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
89. Id. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963); John Adams, Thoughts on Government 10 [1776] (“Great care should be taken to effect this, and to prevent unfair, partial,
and corrupt elections.”).
90. U.S. CONST. amends. IX & X; Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, Co., 491 U.S. 1, 25, 27
(1989) (Stevens, J., concurring).
91. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). See OTIS, supra note 18, at
120 (“Are not women born as free as men? Would it not be infamous to assert that the ladies
are all slaves by nature?”); JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1, 10 (1788) [hereinafter ADAMS, A DEFENCE] (“In
America, the right of sovereignty resides indisputably in the body of the people, and they
have the whole property of land. There are no nobles or patricians—all are equal by law and
by birth.”).
92. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1–2 (U.S. 1776).
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The legitimacy of the separation of powers must, therefore, be
vindicated under the Declaration’s principles or else it ought to be cast
aside for a more just form of government.93 There are many reasons to
doubt the legitimacy of the U.S. Government, including the existence of
the absolute enslavement of black folk that the U.S. Government oversaw prior to the Civil War.94 Misogyny laws and unwritten lynch law
also indicated the insufficiency of the separation of powers to secure
the consent of the whole people.95
Not only these deficiencies, but the most infamous Taney Court
opinion, Dred Scott, was reaffirmed in The Slaughterhouse Cases, as an
arbitrary rationale to block the natural rights and liberties of every
person.96 Thus, the question that plagues us after Slaughterhouse does
not necessarily regard the construction of the Thirteenth Amendment.97 For as Frederick Douglass preemptively observed, the U.S.
Constitution cannot legitimately be interpreted to justify slavery under
the original U.S. social compact.98
Whenever the U.S. Constitution is interpreted to justify the unequal protection of the laws against women, black folk, and foreigners
it violates the U.S. social compact.99 The lack of integrity and deficiency of character that caused U.S. courts to contradict our founding
compact after the Civil War is largely inspired by the rationale of Dred

93. Id.
94. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404 (1856).
95.
See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 178 (1874); Wells-Barnett, supra note 80.
96. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 73 (1872) (failing to overrule “the celebrated
Dred Scott case,” and maintaining Dred Scott’s holding that African Americans were meant
to be excluded from the rights vindicated by the U.S. social compact, even after slavery was
ended under the Thirteenth Amendment) (citing Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 393).
97. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. Cf. 13TH (Netflix 2016) (presenting the argument that the
Thirteenth Amendment’s language is the real problem).
98. Frederick Douglass, What to the Slave is the 4th of July? (July 5, 1852), in 1 AMERICAN SPEECHES 530 (Ted Widmer ed., 2006) (the principles of the Declaration of
Independence are “saving principles” that require the U.S. Constitution to be interpreted as
“A GLORIOUS LIBERTY DOCUMENT” that includes African Americans in its promises); see THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
99. Letter from John Adams to Massachusetts Militia (Oct. 11, 1798) (“We have no
government armed with power capable of contending with human passions unbridled by
morality and religion. Avarice, ambition, revenge, or gallantry, would break the strongest
cords of our constitution as a whale goes through a net.”); Levi Hart, Liberty Described and
Recommended, EBEN. WATSON, Sept. 20, 1774, at 20 [1775]. See Lemuel Haynes, Liberty
Further Extended [1776], in Bogin, supra note 64, at 94 (“it cannot be tho’t impertinent for
us to turn one eye into our own breast, for a little moment, and see, whether thro’ some
inadvertency, or self-contracted spirit, we do not find the monster lurking in our own
bosom.”).
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Scott.100 The false idea from Dred Scott, that the U.S. social compact
was only meant to include white propertied men, directly inspired Minor, Downes, and Plessy.101
All of this unjust case law should be overruled at common law
as an obvious misreading of the U.S. social compact.102 Under Dred
Scott and the ever-expanding body of case law that derives from
Slaughterhouse, the U.S. Courts administered the laws under a false
version of the founding compact.103 If the actual founding compact is
regarded once more, these same courts would be required to administer equal rights and equal protection of the laws for everyone.104
The Declaration of Independence says “all men are created
equal,” and asserts that every one of us is endowed by our creator, with
100. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 73 (1872) (refusing to say that Dred Scott
was wrongly decided, and so it impliedly adopted Dred Scott’s reading of the U.S. social
compact as exclusive to white men) (citing Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 393); id. at 95 (Field, J.,
dissenting) (Justice Field also appeared to accept Chief Justice Taney’s holding in Dred
Scott as if the Fourteenth Amendment was not a referendum on the Court’s misreading of
the U.S. social compact as excluding black folk, but only a reversal of an otherwise legitimate reading of the U.S. social compact) (quoting Dred Scott, 60 U.S., at 419 (Opinion of
Taney, C.J.)).
101. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 166 (1875); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,
542, 543 (1896); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 274–76 (1901); Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45, 53 (1905); Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954) (only
overruling Plessy regarding public schools; in all other matters, including the U.S. social
compact, Plessy and Slaughterhouse are still controlling law); Tuaua v. United States, 788
F.3d 300, 304 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Dred Scott, 60 U.S., at 404–05).
102. See, e.g., Blanche Bong Cook, Johnny Appleseed: Citizenship Transmission Laws
and a White Heteropatriarchal Property Right in Philandering, Sexual Exploitation, and
Rape (the “WHP”) or Johny and the WHP, 31 YALE J. L. FEMINISM 57, 64 n.27, 133–34 (2019)
(Making the case that Dred Scott needs to be overruled with these words: “Power is neither
natural nor inevitable. It is made. And it can be unmade.”).
103. Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S., at 73 (citing Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 393). See also Tuaua v.
United States, 788 F.3d 300, 304 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Dred Scott, 60 U.S., at 404–05),
extended in Fitisemanu v. United States, Nos. 20-4017 & 20-4019, slip op. at 21–22, 25 (10th
Cir. 2021) (quoting The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 72–73 (1872)) (citing Dred Scott,
60 U.S., at 404–05) (“the Supreme Court concluded in Dred Scott v. Sandford that African
Americans couldn’t become citizens even if they had been born in the United States”—the
Court cited to numerous postbellum cases like Elk v. Wilkins that repeated this rule from
Dred Scott as the presumptive rule, that remained after the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, to justify withholding Samoan citizenship rights—in other
words, the rule from Dred Scott is used as the baseline rule of no rights despite the fact that
Dred Scott gave a false reading of the U.S. social compact that did not exist at the founding
and also despite the fact that the common law disagrees with Dred Scott and was recently
reaffirmed in Boumediene v. Bush).
104. See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 325, 347, 373–74 (1816); Calder v.
Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1789) (Opinion of Chase, J.); Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S.
304, 310 (1795) (Opinion of Paterson, J.); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 468 (1793) (Opinion of Cushing, J.) (“the great end and object” of U.S. governments is to “secure and support
the rights of individuals”); THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1–2 (U.S. 1776).
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equal, unalienable rights.105 It does not say that American liberty and
equality are exclusive to only white propertied men; the Declaration of
Independence was actually meant to include “apple women and orange
girls,” and black people too; for it was asserted at that time, in the face
of British cruelty, that “the colonists, black and white, born here, are
free born British subjects, and entitled to all the essential civil rights of
such.”106 If the U.S. Supreme Court administered the laws under the
actual U.S. social compact embodied by these words, the Civil War
might have been avoided, and the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause would not have been necessary.107
The plain and clear meaning of the text of the Declaration of
Independence is also confirmed by the writings of James Otis and Phillis Wheatley prior to the ratification of the Declaration.108 For James
Otis, a white Harvard educated property owner and one of the most
famous of the New England elite, repeatedly and vigorously contended
for the rights of all men and women, “white, brown and black.”109 This
was no mere pretense, for when Phillis Wheatley, an enslaved African
American poet, asserted herself as a representative of the sovereign
dignity of the peoples of America before King George III, she wondrously prevailed against him.110
Thus, the first application of the U.S. social compact in Massachusetts was used to set all slaves free in Mumbet’s Case.111 Even
before Elizabeth Freeman (i.e., Mumbet) won her case, the U.S. social
compact did a wonder in New Jersey, for “In New Jersey, women and
105. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
106. OTIS, supra note 18, at 122, 147.
107. See Alexander Hamilton, The Farmer Refuted 24 [1775] (“It is therefore, evident to
a demonstration, that unless every free agent in America be permitted to enjoy the same
privilege, we are entirely stripped of the benefits of the constitution, and precipitated into
an abyss of slavery.”). The Equal Protection Clause is an express requirement of the Rule of
Law, because the U.S. Government’s failure to administer an equal protection of the laws
sunk the nation into Civil War. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
108. OTIS, supra note 18, at 147; Phillis Wheatley, On the Affray at King’s Street [1770]
(evidence of Wheatley’s likely leadership and participation in the marches and demonstrations against the British occupation were printed in the papers vindicating those who fell in
the Boston Massacre including Crispus Attucks, a black man, named in this poem).
109. OTIS, supra note 18, at 265–66.
110. See, e.g. Phillis Wheatley, To the King’s Most Excellent Majesty [1768]; Phillis
Wheatley, To His Excellency General Washington [1776]; Phillis Wheatley, Liberty & Peace
[1784].
111. Mumbet’s Case [also known as Brom & Bett v. Ashley], Court Decision, Aug. 1781,
reprinted in ROGER BRUNS, AM I NOT A MAN AND A BROTHER 468–70 (1977) (I refer to this as
Freeman’s case because Mum Bett’s full name was Elizabeth Freeman). See Catherine
Sedgwick, Slavery in New England [1853], in 34 BENTLEY’S MISCELLANY 421 (1853) (Referring to Freeman’s case as the first application of the Declaration of Independence in
Massachusetts.).

\\jciprod01\productn\F\FAM\15-1\FAM101.txt

2021

unknown

Seq: 21

LEVIATHAN GOES TO WASHINGTON

10-JAN-22

10:23

21

negroes voted from 1776 to 1807, a period of thirty-one years.”112 Thus,
as in the Bible, “all men” is intended to include women, and the Suffragettes’ contribution of the Declaration of Sentiments was thus
originally confirmed by Phillis Wheatley’s revolution of Miltonic poetics, by drawing on religious sources.113
However, the social compact became broken and the natural,
God-given rights of women, black folk, and poor folk were stolen from
them after the revolution through deceit, infidelity, and cowardice.114
Thousands of black folk, like Lemuel Haynes, fought in the Revolutionary War and earned their freedom; but their marvelous words and
deeds forgotten.115 Black folk never lost their citizenship in Massachusetts, but Dred Scott was decided based upon the false idea that free
black people in Massachusetts never existed.116

112. STONE, supra note 80, at 12.
113. OTIS, supra note 18, at 119–20 (recognizing men and women both free and equal
from birth); PAULA LOSCOCCO, PHILLIS WHEATLEY’S MILTONIC POETICS 54 (2014) (witnessing
Wheatley’s one woman revolution, i.e., her revision of Milton’s woman); THE DECLARATION
OF SENTIMENTS para. 2 (U.S. 1848) (asserting the place at the table that Phillis Wheatley
originally claimed, saying “all men and women are created equal”). See Samuel Sewall,
Talitha Cumi [1724], reprinted in EVE LAPLANTE, SALEM WITCH JUDGE 305 (2007) [hereinafter LAPLANTE, SALEM] (quoting Galatians 3:28); Genesis 5:2 (“He created them male and
female, and He blessed them and named them Man in the day when they were created.”).
Men like James Wilson and John Quincy Adams nevertheless continued to hold problematic
views of women when they appeared to ignore Phillis Wheatley and drew their views directly from Milton. See, e.g., 1 JAMES WILSON, THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES
WILSON 35 (Bird Wilson ed., 1804) [hereinafter WILSON, THE WORKS] (quoting John Milton,
Paradise Lost IV.298, VIII.488–89, VIII.601–03 [1667]); JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, SOCIAL COMPACT 25 (1842) [hereinafter QUINCY ADAMS, SOCIAL] (quoting John Milton, Paradise Lost
IV.304–11 [1667]). John Adams was, perhaps, the worst betrayer of women. See Letter from
John Adams to James Sullivan (May 26, 1776).
114. Instead of uniformly applying the principles of the U.S. social compact, which requires the equal protection of the laws in support of the presumptive freedom of every
person, the antebellum U.S. Supreme Court arbitrarily supported the ongoing, illegal slave
trade by allowing its district courts to determine the slavery of black folk BY CASTING LOTS.
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, ARGUMENT . . . IN THE CASE OF THE UNITED STATES, APPELLANTS, VS.
CINQUE, AND OTHERS, AFRICANS, CAPTURED IN THE SCHOONER AMISTAD 82–83 (1841) [hereinafter QUINCY ADAMS, ARGUMENT].
115. See, e.g., Lemuel Haynes, The Battle of Lexington [1775]; Lemuel Haynes, Liberty
Further Extended [1776], in Bogin, supra note 64, at 94–95 (“Liberty is a jewel which is
handed down to man from the cabinet of heaven, and is coeval with his existence. . . . Therefore we may reasonably conclude, that liberty is equally as precious to a black man, as it is
to a white one . . . .”); FOR LOVE OF LIBERTY: THE STORY OF AMERICA’S BLACK PATRIOTS, part 1
(PBS 2010).
116. Compare Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 416 (1857), with QUINCY ADAMS,
SOCIAL, supra note 113, at 8 (“It has been repeatedly and most righteously adjudicated, by
the highest judicial tribunal of Massachusetts, that slavery cannot exist within the borders
of the commonwealth, under the present Constitution. There is and can be no social compact
between the master and the slave.”).
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Chief Justice Taney degraded the U.S. social compact by undermining the American Revolution itself.117 A slick of unjust slavery and
misogyny laws grew like fungus under Taney’s banal, forgetting of the
very bases of U.S. Government.118 Under a Taney-esque brand of unthinking banality, women and black folk lost their voting rights in New
Jersey by a mere law that directly conflicted with the word and spirit
of the Constitution of New Jersey; a direct disregard for the principle
in Marbury v. Madison.119
In the South, the Virginia Declaration of Rights, and the Maryland guarantee of common law rights under Somerset’s Case became
mere ornaments and free black folk like, John Marrant and Benjamin
Banneker, became legend.120 The Taney Court’s feudal ornamentation
of what was meant to be fundamental law led to the American Civil
War.121 The Taney Court thus degraded Lord Coke’s effect in America,
117. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 408–09 (1857) (including an index of feudal, colonial laws supporting slavery and general discrimination against black folk, and
resolving to interpret the U.S. Constitution and state constitutions according them, as if the
American Revolution had no real effect on American law).
118. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 150 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487) (Opinion of
Taney, C.J.) (arguing that the Fifth Amendment was a mere copy of the British unwritten
constitution, overriding the Declaration of Independence). Cf. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 210–17 (“The Declaration of
Independence has accordingly always been treated as an act of paramount and sovereign
authority, complete and perfect per se,” and therefore it should be considered “not merely as
a practical fact, but in a legal and constitutional view of the matter by courts of justice.”)
(emphasis added).
119. STONE, supra note 80, at 14 (“Thus, in defiance of the letter of the Constitution and
of the Statutes and uniform practice of a generation, women and negroes were disfranchised
by an arbitrary act of the Legislature, without discussion and almost without comment.”).
120. MD. CONST. OF 1776 pt. 1, art. 3 (The constitution of Taney’s home state contained
a Declaration of Rights that expressly secured in its third article to “the inhabitants of Maryland” an entitlement “to the common law of England, and the trial by Jury, according to
that law.”). At any point after 1772, the English common law required the abolishment of
slavery according to Somerset’s Case. Somerset v. Stewart [1772] 98 ER 499, 510 (Eng.)
(Slavery is “so odious, that nothing can be suffered to support it, but positive law. Whatever
inconveniences, therefore, may follow from a decision, I cannot say this case is allowed or
approved by the law of England; and therefore the black must be discharged.”); VA. CONST.
OF 1776 pt. 1, § 1 (“all men are by nature equally free and independent”); GA. CONST. OF
1777 pmbl., arts. 58, 60–61 (citing directly to the Declaration of Independence as the basis of
its legitimacy and refusing “to exclude any person from the inherent privilege of every freeman, the liberty to plead his own cause”).
121. The three cases that caused the most dysfunction leading up to the Civil War were
Luther, Dred Scott, and Ableman—and Taney claimed his place as direct cause of the Civil
War in Ex parte Merryman by blocking President Lincoln’s attempts to resolve the disputes
between North and South through peaceful judicial processes. See, e.g. Luther v. Borden, 48
U.S. 1, 46–48 (1849); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404 (1856); Ableman v. Booth, 62
U.S. 506, 519–21 (1858); Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 150 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No.
9,487) (Opinion of Taney, C.J.). See Joshua J. Schroeder, The Body Snatchers: How the Writ
of Habeas Corpus was Taken From the People of the United States, 35 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1,
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unsettled Marbury v. Madison, and called into question the foundations of the United States upon natural law.122
The U.S. Supreme Court recently showed interest in helping
the nation overcome these challenges. For example, in Obergefell,
Chief Justice Roberts dissented, “The Court first applied substantive
due process to strike down a statute in Dred Scott v. Sandford.”123
Then he drew an inference from Dred Scott to Lochner.124 Drawing
from the dissents of those cases, Chief Justice Roberts implied that
Obergefell’s protection of marriage rights for gay men must also violate
the separation of powers.125
The question of whether Obergefell violated the Rule of Law, as
Dred Scott and Lochner did, is contingent on whether it vindicates the
equal protection of the laws for every person.126 The question is not
dependent on whether the Court restrains its use of substantive due
5 n.19 (2016) [hereinafter Schroeder, The Body] (my considered opinion on these cases as to
why they are a direct cause of the Civil War). Cf. Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV.
L. REV. 379, 410 n.179 (2011) (noting Dred Scott as a cause of the Civil War); Seth Barrett
Tillman, Merryman Redux: A Response to Professor John Yoo, 22 CHAPMAN L. REV. 1, 12–13
(2019) (noting and disagreeing with Professor John Yoo’s opinion that President Lincoln’s
defiance of Chief Justice Taney seemed to cause the Civil War—like Professor Tillman, I
disagree with Professor Yoo, but for different reasons than Tillman). But see Seth Barrett
Tillman, Ex Parte Merryman: Myth, History, and Scholarship, 224 MILITARY L. REV. 481,
492 (2016) (disagreeing with my reading of Ex parte Merryman).
122. See supra note 121. Cf. William Wetmore, Wetmore’s Minutes of the Trial, Essex
Inferior Court, Newburyport, Oct. 1773, Caesar v. Greenleaf [1773], in 2 ADAMS, LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 22, at 67 (citing Day v. Savadge [1614] Hob. 85, 87 (Eng.) (extending Lord
Coke’s decision in Dr. Bonham’s Case)); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (“The
very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the
protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government
is to afford that protection.”).
123. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2616–17 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(citing Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 432 (1857)). The U.S. Supreme Court is in unanimous agreement that the Court may correct past injustices resulting from our failed
reconstruction. See Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 688–89 (2019) (noting the Black Codes
that the South used to essentially re-enslave black folk after the Civil War as reason to
incorporate the Eight Amendment rule against excessive fines against the states).
124. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2617 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45, 60–61 (1905)).
125. Id. at 2616–17 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“‘we are under a government of individual men, who for the time being have power to declare what the Constitution is, according to
their own views of what it ought to mean’”) (quoting Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393,
621 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting)).
126. The Rule of Law, as Cicero and the founders conceived it, consists in the idea that
the law rules over human beings equally, and that no human being rules over the law. 1
WILSON, THE WORKS, supra note 113, at i (The inscription on the title page reads, “‘Legum
omnes servi sumus, ut liberi esse possimus.’” We are all slaves to the law so that we might be
free.) (quoting Cicero, Pro Cluentio 53.146). Letter from Francis W. Gilmer to Thomas Jefferson (July 10, 1816) (“what Cicero says, ‘Legum denique idcirco omnes servi sumus, ut
liberi esse possimus,’ has never been contradicted”) (quoting Cicero, Pro Cluentio 53.146)).
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process.127 Although Dred Scott was not the first case to apply a broad
protection of rights beyond the words of the U.S. Constitution, it did
however attempt a novel demolition of the U.S. social compact, through
Fifth Amendment due process.128
By reaffirming Dred Scott’s novel abandonment of the U.S. social compact through the Fifth Amendment (which makes no sense),
the U.S. Supreme Court developed a progeny of unconstitutional case
law after the Civil War, beginning with The Slaughterhouse Cases.129
The commonality among each of these cases, including Downes, Plessy,
Minor, Buck, and Lochner, is the abandonment of natural human
rights.130 They subverted the guarantee of natural liberty that arises
from the U.S. social compact.131
The U.S. social compact was created with the intention to include each and every person in the United States.132 It was a promise
that the state governments and the United States Government would
protect each person’s natural rights, including their rights to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”133 The problem with the Dred Scott
decision, therefore, is its endorsement of the idea that Fifth Amendment due process can be properly interpreted without considering the
promises of the U.S. social compact.134
127. See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2616–17 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (contending
that the court had to learn to restrain its use of the “strong medicine” of substantive due
process). But see John Adams, Thoughts on Government 17–18 [1776] (positing that if the
court removes itself as a check in the balance of powers then the other branches may become like ravenous beasts).
128. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 450; The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 73 (1872).
129. Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. at 73.
130. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 542–43 (1896) (affirming state separate but equal
laws based on its understanding of The Slaughterhouse Cases); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S.
244, 274–76 (1901) (adopting treasonous Dred Scott dicta that people in U.S. territories
have no constitutional or natural rights); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 165–66, 178
(1875) (arbitrarily revoking each woman’s rights of citizenship); Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (the Lochner decision flowed from Slaughterhouse’s presumption from
Dred Scott, that the Court is impotent to vindicate natural human rights under the U.S.
social compact—thus giving manmade rights through employment contracts more weight
than natural human rights).
131. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). See, e.g., Vanhorne’s
Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304, 311 (1795) (asserting to the U.S. social compact to protect
Pennsylvania property); THE CASE OF ELIZABETH RUTGERS VERSUS JOSHUA WADDINGTON 28
(Henry B. Dawson intro., 1866) [1784] (Opinion of James Duane, J.) [hereinafter THE CASE
OF ELIZABETH RUTGERS] (The doctrine of federal supremacy arose from the “very great force
. . . arising from the federal compact,” under the Law of Nations prior to the ratification of
the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.).
132. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1–2 (U.S. 1776).
133. Id.
134. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 450 (1857).
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The Dred Scott decision violated the Rule of Law and the separation of powers by giving an arbitrary construction of the U.S.
Constitution.135 Chief Justice Taney’s arbitrary construction of due
process was not a new strategy, however, for it was deployed over a
hundred years prior by the Puritan witch hanging judges of Salem,
Massachusetts.136 The idea of substantive versus procedural due process referred to by Chief Justice Roberts is a contrived distinction that
was not considered in Dred Scott, nor does it help explain Dred Scott’s
departure from the U.S. social compact.137
The decision in Obergefell, by great contrast, approaches an
equal application of the law, appears to defend a natural human right,
and thus vindicates the separation of powers by applying the Rule of
Law.138 Therefore, to vindicate the legitimacy of his Court, Chief Justice Roberts should have seized the opportunity presented in Obergefell
to overrule the racist holding in Osborn v. Nicholson for violation of the
U.S. social compact.139 For the U.S. social compact is the seat of U.S.
governmental legitimacy.140
The U.S. system of the separation of powers successfully
avoided a reign of terror as occurred in France during their revolu135. Id. at 621 (Curtis, J., dissenting). See John Adams, Thoughts on Government 8
[1776] (the separation of powers exists to preserve the Republic, which is defined as a government of laws, and not of men); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
136. See Nathaniel Ward, The Body of Liberties passim [1641] (witches were given “due
process” under this unjust Puritan code of laws that named witchery, gay sex, and promiscuity as crimes punishable by death).
137. Jamal Greene, The Meming of Substantive Due Process, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 253,
270–71 (2016).
138. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2591 (2015).
139. Id. (affirming the right to marry as a fundamental human right); Osborn v. Nicholson, 80 U.S. 654, 662 (1871) (refusing to give legal force to African American marriages as a
natural right that preexists the Thirteenth Amendment—giving an example of how Dred
Scott’s false version of the U.S. social compact continued to have harmful legal effects on
black folks in the United States after the Civil War); Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 413, 416,
599–600 (based in part upon numerous laws that criminalized marriages between white
folk with non-white folk, and the laws of Missouri that apparently prohibited marriages of
African slaves, in order to destroy the bid of Scott’s wife and children for freedom).
140. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1–32 (U.S. 1776) (naming the “united
States” as a legitimate government entity for the first time in history and carefully naming
the basic reasons why the United States is legitimate—this is recognized internationally as
the summation of the U.S. social compact). See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 210–17 (meticulously showing that all thirteen original
states drafted and ratified their constitutions concurrently with or after the Declaration,
because prior to the Declaration they were colonies and not legitimized as states; Story
carefully addressed the historical issue of how the chronology and content of the original
state constitutions strongly confirmed the primacy of the Declaration as the statement of
each state’s legimacy under a federal Union, such that each former colony was now independent from England and united with each other as states).
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tion.141 French Revolutionaries, such as Condorcet and Turgot,
opposed the American separation of powers, favoring a Unity of Powers
in France.142 They expressly disputed American bicameralism and federalism, and thus the French powers were all gathered in one National
Assembly in the style of the Puritan Government advocated by
Marchamont Nedham in England.143
The National Assembly of the First French Republic ended in a
bloodbath, known as the “French Reign of Terror.”144 The French Declaration of Rights never achieved any real application in French
government through judicial review and the present day government of
France is its Fifth Republic.145 The still living First U.S. Republic continues to distinguish itself from the Unity of Powers that doomed the
First French Republic by adhering to its principle of the separation of
powers.146
Justice O’Connor offered evidence of the comparative difference
in American government to that of the French, by noting its relative
stability and peaceful progress.147 The distinctive American separation
of powers, especially its independent judiciary that helped the United
States avoid a Reign of Terror, is worthy of note.148 However, Justice
141. O’Connor, supra note 71, at 5.
142. JOHN ADAMS, DISCOURSES ON DAVILA 82 (1790) [hereinafter ADAMS, DISCOURSES]
(criticizing Condorcet, Lettres d’un bourgeois de New Haven à un citoyen de Virginie [1787]
for supporting a government without a separation of powers); 3 ADAMS, A DEFENCE, supra
note 91, at 213 (responding to Turgot’s opinion that there should be no separation of powers
in government, and tracing the project back to the Puritan Revolution under the influence of
Marchamont Nedham, showing that the same idea that destroyed England destroyed
France).
143. Letter from John Adams to Thomas Boylston Adams (Apr. 7, 1796).
144. O’Connor, supra note 71, at 4–5 (“During the same period, the United States was in
comparison a tranquil place.”).
145. DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN arts. 1–17 (Fr. 1789). See O’Connor, supra
note 71, at 4–5. See also HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 134, 148–49 (1990) (noting that
the French idea of the rights of man was a pre-government idea of rights, and thus, following the worthwhile criticisms Edmund Burke, Arendt revealed how the French idea of
rights itself may have exploded the French government or at least precluded the French
Revolutionaries from succeeding in “the task of foundation” by establishing a government
upon which the rights named in the French Declaration could be carried into practical effect); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958) (adopting Arendt’s idea of a “right to have
rights” and demonstrating that the foundation of the United States under a compact of
rights carried out a practical effect in the real world on a case-by-case basis, as Justice
O’Connor illuminated on a more broad and sweeping basis in her University of Cincinnati
speech).
146. John Adams, Thoughts on Government 7–8 [1776]; U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, & III.
147. O’Connor, supra note 71, at 4.
148. Id. at 2–3. Cf. 3 ADAMS, A DEFENCE, supra note 91, at 213 (giving a lengthy exposition and rejection of the English Puritan Marchamont Nedham’s tract The Excellency of a
Free State); ADAMS, DISCOURSES, supra note 142, at 82 (“A legislature in one assembly, can
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O’Connor underestimated and even appeared ignorant of the American
Terror, and so she trivialized its hideous existence in America.149
The American Terror, while it never succeeded in taking over
and ending the government thus far, continues to cause innumerable
instances of pain and suffering.150 Its confederate flags still fly in the
South, representing the slavery and oppression of African Americans.151 Nevertheless, Justice O’Connor clung to false hopes that a new
American utopia might soon arrive and so she softly and smilingly
eroded the protection of American rights from the bench.152
have no other termination than in civil dissention, feudal anarchy, or simple monarchy.”).
But see Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 356–57 (2003).
149. O’Connor, supra note 71, at 4–5; Black, 538 U.S. at 356–57 (O’Connor decided KKK
cross burnings were a legitimate expression of free speech as if there is any context in which
it might not mean clear and present danger for black folk: “For its own members, the cross
was a sign of celebration and ceremony. During a joint Nazi-Klan rally in 1940, the proceeding concluded with the wedding of two Klan members who ‘were married in full Klan regalia
beneath a blazing cross.’”). See Letter from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson (June 30,
1813) (“what think you of Terrorism, Mr. Jefferson?”). Compare Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Stephens Smith (Nov. 13, 1787), and Letter from John Adams to Thomas
Jefferson (Sept. 17, 1823), with Samuel Cooper, Sermon on the Commencement of the Constitution, T. & J. FLEET, & J. GILL, Oct. 25, 1780, at 20 [1780] (rebuking those who would
“attempt to water American soil with human blood”).
150. See Joe Heim, Recounting a day of rage, hate, violence and death, WASH. POST (Aug.
14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/local/charlottesville-timeline/
(“The marchers took off at a brisk pace and immediately began yelling slogans: ‘Blood and
soil!’ ‘You will not replace us!’ ‘Jews will not replace us!’ . . . Some made monkey noises at
the black counterprotesters. Then they began chanting, ‘White lives matter!’ . . . At 9:30 am,
about 30 clergy members clasped arms and began singing ‘This Little Light of Mine.’
Twenty feet away, the white nationalists roared back, ‘Our blood, our soil!’”).
151.
Javonte Anderson, Capitol riot images showing Confederate flag a reminder of
country’s darkest past, USA TODAY (Jan. 7, 2021, 8:58 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/2021/01/07/capitol-riot-images-confederate-flag-terror/6588104002/; Barbara Combs,
The Confederate Battle Flag Is a Symbol of Intimidation, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2015, 2:22
PM), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/06/19/does-the-confederate-flag-breedracism/the-confederate-battle-flag-is-a-symbol-of-intimidation. The idea of Terrorism began
in France, where it was endorsed by Thomas Jefferson as a legitimate government policy by
stating: “[t]he tree of liberty must be refreshed form time to time with the blood of patriots
and tyrants.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Stephens Smith (Nov. 13, 1787).
Jefferson’s quote about the tree of liberty was ever since cited by homegrown American
Terrorists including the Southern Rebels, Timothy McVeigh, and the insurrectionists of
January 6, 2021. See Thompson Smith, The Patriot Movement: Refreshing the Tree of Liberty with Fertilizer Bombs and the Blood of Martyrs, 32 VALPARAISO U. L. REV. 269, 269–71
(1997) (noting the connection of Jefferson’s comments endorsing the French Terror with
American terrorism including the Civil War and the Oklahoma City bombing); Franita Tolson, Op-Ed: Why the Mob Thought Attacking the Capitol was Their ‘1776 Moment’, L.A.
TIMES (Jan. 21, 2021, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2021-01-21/insurrection-capitol-attack-patriotism-1776 (noting how Jefferson’s line about refreshing the tree of
liberty helped the Capitol Building insurrectionists justify their attempted coup d’etat).
152. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–69 (1992) (affirming Roe v. Wade
on the very thin basis of stare decisis—a common law doctrine recently unsettled by many
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Americans can be sure by the light of recent experience that
Justice O’Connor’s prophesy of an emerging post-racial, post-gender,
and post-hate utopia was false.153 Americans can also be sure by a candid read of history that the same sort of smiling, well-meaning erosion
of rights by those that clung to false, utopian hopes enabled both the
French and Puritan Reigns of Terror.154 Vigorous action should, therefore, be taken by each branch of government to contend against the
American Terror in defense of the equal rights and liberties of the
people.155

recent U.S. Supreme Court opinions); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 356–57 (2003);
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 356–57 (2003). See Stephen E. Gottlieb, Sandra Day
O’Connor’s Position on Discrimination, 4 U. OF MD. L.J. OF RACE, RELIGION, GENDER &
CLASS 241, 249–50, 256 (2004) (Perhaps too kind, Gottlieb concluded, “Doctrinally,
O’Connor has barely gotten past the questions of explicit, facial, de jure discrimination of
1954.”); Earl M. Maltz, Ignoring the Real World: Justice O’Connor and Affirmative Action in
Education, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 1045, 1057–58 (2008) (O’Connor hoped that by 2028 we
would “be living in an equal-opportunity utopia. Of course, we were all soon disabused of
that notion.”).
153. See Heim, supra note 150; Gene Demby, Dylann Roof and the Stubborn Myth of the
Colorblind Millennial, NPR (June 20, 2015, 8:49 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/
codeswitch/2015/06/20/415878789/dylann-roof-and-the-stubborn-myth-of-the-colorblindmillennial; ALEXANDER, supra note 73, at 228–29; LEE, supra note 73, at 181–82. However,
there is more work to be done exposing and dismantling the colorblindness and genderblindness of the liberal giants of a now bygone era—especially Rawls’ “veil of ignorance”—which
is a horrible theory that justice should come from blindness instead of seeing. JONATHAN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118–23 (1991); ISAIAH BERLIN, LIBERTY: FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 188 (2002).
154. See Letter from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 10, 1812) (noting Dr.
Priestley “believed upon the Authority of Prophesy, that the French Nation would establish
a free Government and that The King of France who had been executed, was the first of the
Ten Horns of the great Beast and that all the other Nine Monarks [sic] were soon to fall off
after him”); see also 1 BENTHAM, PANOPTICON, supra note 42, at 122–23 (Bentham’s utopic
madness was in full bloom in France during the French Revolution, by which he claimed a
magical utopia would emerge by his theories, “Morals reformed, health preserved, industry
invigorated, instruction diffused, public burdens lightened, economy seated as it were upon
a rock, the Gordian knot of the Poor-laws not cut but untied—all by a simple idea in architecture[!]” Instead, a Reign of Terror erupted.). Justice O’Connor’s sanguine pronouncement
in Grutter that a post-racial, post-discrimination utopia might emerge in 2028 may also
cause, or at least coincide with, eruptions of violence in America. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 310 (2003).
155. U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, III, & IV, § 4. U.S. government officials may draw particular
inspiration from Elizabeth Freeman’s peaceful resistance against the terrorism of Shays’
Rebellion. Catherine Sedgwick, Slavery in New England [1853], in 34 BENTLEY’S MISCELLANY 423–24 (1853) (chronicling “‘You call me ‘wench’ and ‘nigger,’ and you are not above
rummaging my chest. You will have to break it open to do it!’ . . . ‘He turned,’ she said, ‘and
slunk away like the whipped cur that he was!’”) (statements of Elizabeth Freeman). Thomas
Jefferson’s encouragement of the Shays’ rebels and the American Terror in general was
refuted by Elizabeth Freeman’s power. Cf. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Stephens Smith (Nov. 13, 1787).
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Part I will describe the breadth and limits of the powers of each
branch of government, their role in U.S. Government, and the proper
bounds in which each is meant to secure the legitimacy of the whole.156
It begins with a look into the raid at La Placita Park in Los Angeles,
before it expounds the separation of Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary powers.157 Ultimately, this part will show how the separation of
powers creates the Republican legitimacy of the U.S. Government typified by the Rule of Law.158
The Raid at La Placita Park
There is a delusion in our society that the rational system of
government set out by the U.S. Constitution will automatically secure
justice.159 It will not.160 For if the separation of powers magically secured justice in the land, President Herbert Hoover would not have
been able to surreptitiously oversee a program of Mexican repatriation
that unconstitutionally deported 2 million natural born U.S. citizens,
naturalized U.S. citizens, and legal immigrants of Mexican ancestry in
the 1930’s.161
It was the middle of the great depression, and the people of the
United States overwhelmingly felt that jobs should be reserved for U.S.
citizens, i.e., white men.162 The raids, deportations, the ironic degradation of the status of U.S. citizenship itself, were all wildly popular
156. U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, & III.
157. Id.
158. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; John Adams, Thoughts on Government 2 [1776]; 1 WILSON,
THE WORKS, supra note 113, at i (The inscription on the title page reads, “‘Legum omnes
servi sumus, ut liberi esse possimus.’” We are all slaves to the law so that we might be free.)
(quoting Cicero, Pro Cluentio 53.146). Cf. Letter from Francis W. Gilmer to Thomas Jefferson (July 10, 1816) (referring to the ancient idea of the Rule of Law, “what Cicero says,
‘Legum denique idcirco omnes servi sumus, ut liberi esse possimus,’ has never been contradicted”) (quoting Cicero, Pro Cluentio 53.146).
159. Hand, supra note 74.
160. To name one person whose life and death proves this—Kalief Browder. Jennifer
Gonnerman, Kalief Browder, 1993–2015, NEW YORKER (June 7, 2015), https://
www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/kalief-browder-1993-2015.
161. Apology Act for the 1930’s Mexican Repatriation Program, West’s Ann. Cal. Gov.
Code §§ 8720–23 (Around 1.2 million of the deported were natural born U.S. Citizens:
“Throughout California, massive raids were conducted on Mexican-American communities,
resulting in the clandestine removal of thousands of people, many of whom were never able
to return to the United States, their country of birth.”); Alex Wagner, America’s Forgotten
History of Illegal Deportations, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2017/03/americas-brutal-forgotten-history-of-illegal-deportations/517971/
[hereinafter Wagner, America’s].
162. FRANCISCO E. BALDERRAMA & RAYMOND RODRÍGUEZ, DECADE OF BETRAYAL: MEXICAN REPATRIATION IN THE 1930S 57–60, 75 (1995) (“employers everywhere not only acceded
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among a suffering white underclass who were willing to degrade their
own citizenship to hurt others based on racial and religious
prejudices.163 The ironies of the eugenics ideology in America took
centerstage at La Placita.164
Simple, Protestant white folk, undermined the very basis of
their religion on Paul’s appeal to his Roman citizenship as a Jew born
in Tarsus.165 In the 1930’s a generation of common Americans desecrated their own religious beliefs to banish brown bodies from the
land.166 The racist, self-destruction of the lowly white and brown folk
to government restrictions but heeded the hue and cry of patriotic groups and organizations
to save all jobs for ‘real Americans’”—as if Mexico isn’t in America).
163. Id.
164. See Id. at 320; Immigration Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 153 (this law, advocated for by
Eugenicists, created the U.S. Border Patrol to police the U.S.–Mexico Border, to exclude
those who were not of Northern European heritage in violation of the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo, which ceded California from Mexico to the United States); Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement (Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo), Mex.-U.S., arts. VIII & IX, Feb. 2, 1848,
9 Stat. 922 (Mexicans living in California had the choice to become “citizens of the United
States,” and those that did “shall be incorporated into the Union of the United States, and
be admitted at the proper time (to be judged of by the Congress of the United States) to the
enjoyment of all the rights of citizens of the United States, according to the principles of the
constitution.”); Apology Act for the 1930s Mexican Repatriation Program, CAL GOV. CODE
§ 8720 (West 2006); California Values Act, 2017 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 495, § 7284.2 (SB 54)
(West) (“Immigrants are valuable and essential members of the California community. Almost one in three Californians is foreign born and one in two children in California has at
least one immigrant parent. A relationship of trust between California’s immigrant community and state and local agencies is central to the public safety of the people of California.”).
See also Justin Wise, Documents: Anne Frank’s family tried to immigrate to the US, THE
HILL (July 6, 2018 9:40 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/395769-documents-anne-franksfamily-tried-to-immigrate-to-the-us [hereinafter Wise, Documents] (Anne Frank was denied
asylum based upon her genetic inferiority according to the Eugenic Immigration Act of
1924); Cf. HARRY H. LAUGHLIN, EUGENICAL STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 445–61
(1922) (containing Laughlin’s Model Eugenical Sterilization Law, which was enacted by
many state legislatures and upheld in the U.S. Supreme Court case Buck v. Bell); Gesetz
zur Verhütung erbkranken Nachwuchses [Nazi Sterilization Law], July 13, 1933, REICHSGESETZBLATT, TEIL I [RGB? I] at 529 (Ger.) (this law among others leading to the Final
Solution was modelled closely after Harry Laughlin’s Model Eugenical Sterilization Law).
165. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 769 (1950) (“Citizenship as a head of
jurisdiction and a ground of protection was old when Paul invoked it in his appeal to Caesar.”); id. at 798 (Black, J., dissenting) (citing Acts 25:16).
166. See Antonio Olivo, Ghosts of a 1931 Raid, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2001, 12:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2001-feb-25-me-30223-story.html; Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 575–76, 579 (1840) (Opinion of Taney, C.J.) (When asked whether the
government of Vermont could extradite a U.S. citizen to Canada to stand trial there, Chief
Justice Taney refused and the State of Vermont complied with his decision: “[i]t was one of
the main objects of the Constitution to make us, so far as regarded our foreign relations, one
people and one nation, and to cut off all communications between foreign governments, and
the several state authorities. The power now claimed for the states is utterly incompatible
with this evident intention, and would expose us to one of those dangers, against which the
framers of the Constitution have so anxiously endeavored to guard.” Thus, unofficial sys-
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in U.S. society was organized by federal government elites, but it was
carried out like an unwritten lynch law without any official color of
legitimacy.167
There is, therefore, no unjust federal law to overturn, no official
presidential order to dispute, and there is not even a specific California
law or state order to examine.168 Basicially every level of the American
government was violating the laws, the U.S. Constitution, and the U.S.
social compact with a sheer disrespect for natural human rights.169
Turning to the separation of powers at such a time and place as La
Placita in the 1930’s is to raise “false hopes,” and so Americans must
take care not to fall into such a delusion.170
The raid of La Placita Park was the most public facing raid of
the 1930s Mexican Repatriation Program and is the public symbol of
the deluge of “massive raids” that were secretly “conducted on Mexican-American communities” in the United States.171 The symbol of La
Placita is important to remember when one considers asserting an
Arendtian “right to have rights” vindicated in Trop v. Dulles.172 La Placita should be remembered when one attempts to reassert the rights of
due process for immigrants in removal proceedings upheld in Padilla v.
Kentucky, or as one asks federal courts to remain committed to the

tems like Doak’s that secretly license state authorities to do their dirty work under state
police powers are unconstitutional.).
167. BALDERRAMA & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 162, at 57–60, 94–99; Abraham Hoffman,
Stimulus to Repatriation: The 1931 Federal Deportation Drive and the Los Angeles Mexican
Community, 42 PAC. HIST. REV. 205, 206–18 (1973) (“Doak’s anti-alien drive not only failed
to solve the unemployment problem; it created new tensions and accelerated hostile attitudes.”); Wells-Barnett, supra note 80, at 15 (Lynch law “represents the cool, calculating
deliberation of intelligent people who openly avow that there is an ‘unwritten law’ that justifies them in putting human begins to death without complaint under oath, without trial by
jury, without opportunity to make defense, and without right of appeal.”). See Diane Bernard, The time a president deported 1 million Mexican Americans for supposedly stealing
U.S. jobs, WASH. POST (Aug. 13, 2018,7:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/2018/08/13/the-time-a-president-deported-1-million-mexican-americans-forstealing-u-s-jobs/ (there were notable collusions between the federal government and local
authorities and major businesses—including reimbursements for laying off Mexican American workers).
168. BALDERRAMA & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 162, at 121–22; Wagner, America’s, supra
note 161.
169. See Wagner, America’s, supra note 161.
170. Hand, supra note 74 (explaining that once liberty dies in the “hearts of men and
women no constitution, no law [and] no court can save it”).
171. Apology Act for the 1930’s Mexican Repatriation Program, West’s Ann. Cal. Gov.
Code § 8721. See Olivo, supra note 165.
172. Trop v. Dulles, 358 U.S. 86, 101–02 (1958).
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Reno v. Flores settlement.173 For none of this, no law or judgment, however eloquently put, would have stopped the raid at La Placita.174
California since apologized for its part in the La Placita raid,
but the Mexican repatriation program’s existence in our history stands
for the fact that the abstraction of liberty into the papers of government is not liberty.175 At their very best, laws, constitutions, and court
judgements are only a mirror of natural, God-given liberty.176 Without
the action of ordinary people to secure fidelity with the laws, the mere
existence of law cannot prevent “the savage few” from overthrowing
liberty with their “ruthless . . . unbridled will.”177
Thus, it is exceedingly practical to acknowledge the existence of
the American Terror.178 Americans should remember, as John Adams
and Thomas Jefferson remembered, “the Terrorism of a former day.”179
Adams and Jefferson remembered “the Terrorism, excited by Genet, in
1793 when ten thousand People in the Streets of Philadelphia, day after day, threatened to drag Washington out of his House, and effect a

173. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374–75 (2010) (“The severity of deportation—
‘the equivalent of banishment or exile,’—only underscores how critical it is for counsel to
inform her noncitizen client that he faces a risk of deportation.”) (quoting Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 390–91 (1947)); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 348 (1993) (the federal
courts should overrule this settlement and adopt Stevens’ dissent).
174. BALDERRAMA & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 162, at 57–60 (revealing that federal officials have been willing to betray the constitution and take advantage of the racism of
ignorant locals, sheriffs, and police). Cf. Kevin Liptak et al., Trump Pardons Former Sheriff
Joe Arpaio, CNN, Aug. 27, 2017, https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/25/politics/sheriff-joe-arpaiodonald-trump-pardon/index.html.
175. CAL. GOV. CODE § 8720 (West 2006).
176. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 455 (1793) (Opinion of Wilson, J.) (“Man, fearfully
and wonderfully made, is the workmanship of his all perfect Creator. A state, useful and
valuable as the contrivance is, is the inferior contrivance of man, and from his native dignity derives all its acquired importance.”).
177. Hand, supra note 74. See [Mercy Otis Warren,] Observations on the New Constitution 4 [1788] (“Self defence is a primary law of nature, which no subsequent law of society
can abolish; this primeval principle, the immediate gift of the Creator, obliges every one to
remonstrate against the strides of ambition, and a wanton lust of domination, and to resist
the approaches of tyranny, which at this day threatened to sweep away the rights for which
the brave sons of America have fought with an heroism scarcely paralleled even in ancient
republics.”).
178. Cicero, Pro Milo 10–11 (when we say that during the clash of arms the laws fall
silent, we do not mean to justify martial law or anarchy, but like Cicero we are vindicating
the natural law—our natural right to defend ourselves from intruders trying to deport us or
strip us of our legal and natural citizenship—the laws that a legitimate court should observe during or after such a struggle takes place). See, e.g., [Mercy Otis Warren,]
Observations on the New Constitution 7 [1788] (showing us how to acknowledge the limits of
our idealistic systems).
179. Letter from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson (June 30, 1813).
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Revolution in the Government, or compel it to declare War in favour of
the French Revolution.”180
The idealized system of separated and limited powers survived
these terrors and more, but it only survived.181 The separation of powers is designed to contend with the reality that power itself corrupts,
but it is not the key to utopia; it cannot bring about the end of time.182
As founder Mercy Otis Warren advocated during our revolution,
though the gates of Eden are locked and its fruits barred to humankind
for now, the separation of powers can make an imperfect defense for
America.183
As such, the separation of powers can help Americans check
government actors through the courts whenever government actors try
to transcend the proper bounds of their powers.184 For example, when
former President Trump announced he might try to put an end to
birthright citizenship for immigrants, the courts are empowered to disagree and state that he was proposing an unconstitutional violation of
the separation of powers.185 They are also empowered to strike down
the laws of Congress, if they supported such a Trumpian reversal,
under the express language of the Fourteenth Amendment.186
180. Id.
181. U.S. CONST. art. I, II, & III.
182. John Adams, Thoughts on Government 17–18 [1776]; Letter from John Adams to
Samuel Adams (Oct. 18, 1790).
183. Mercy Otis Warren, Simplicity [1779].
184. I mean to say is that as long as the judiciary helps individuals resist illegal and
unconstitutional government acts, that the government will be resigned, like Secretary
Doak was during the raids at La Placita, to carry out their actions in secret, without acknowledging them openly. Cf. Margaret Raymond, Penumbral Crimes, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1395, 1400 (2002).
185. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 654 (1898) (quoting U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1); Joel Rose, FACT CHECK: 14th Amendment on Citizenship Cannot Be
Overwritten by Executive Order, NPR (Oct. 30, 2018, 7:04 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/
30/662335612/legal-scholars-say-14th-amendment-doubt-trump-can-end-birthright-citizenship-wit [hereinafter Joel Rose].
186. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the States
wherein they reside.”). The extension of legal citizenship to all those born in the United
States (all of whom are natural citizens) goes back to Cicero, Paul of Tarsus, and the use of
citizenship as the way to end a person’s slavery—it consists in the revolutionary sentiment
that all are born equal and free. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776);
George Mason, Virginia Declaration of Rights (draft) [1776], reprinted in BRUNS, supra note
111, at 389–90 (“When Mason wrote that all men are ‘born equally free,’ Virginia conservatives were noticeably alarmed.”); Samuel Cooper, Sermon on the Commencement of the
Constitution, T. & J. FLEET, & J. GILL, Oct. 25, 1780, at 14 [1780] (“We want not, indeed, a
special revelation from Heaven to teach us that men are born equal and free; that no man
has a natural claim of dominion over his neighbors, nor one nation any such claim upon
another; . . . . These are the plain dictates of that reason and common sense with which the
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Courts are not entirely effective, however, because lies can conceal executive abuses from judicial review.187 Even while actual
government policy is shrouded in presidential lies, local police officers
and sheriff departments are free to turn away from federal injustices,
to vindicate “Our Federalism!,” and to sing out like Johnny Cash at the
White House “What is Truth.”188 Local state actors and artists can be
common parent of men has informed the human bosom.”); Jonathan Edwards, Jr., The Injustice and Impolicy of the Slave-Trade, John Carter, Sept. 15, 1791, at 5 (“It is a principle,
the truth of which hath in this country been generally, if not universally acknowledged, ever
since the commencement of the late war [i.e., the Revolutionary War], that all men are born
equally free. If this be true, the Africans are by nature equally entitled to freedom as we are;
and therefore we have no more right to enslave, or to afford aid to enslave them, than they
have to do the same to us.”). See Amy H. Kastely, Cicero’s De Legibus: Law and Talking
Justly Toward a Just Community, 3 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 15 (1991) (“‘All natives of Italian towns have two fatherlands, one by birth and the other by citizenship . . . one fatherland
which was the place of his birth and one by law; . . . But that fatherland must stand first in
our affection in which the name of republic [rei publica] signifies the common citizenship of
all of us.’”) (quoting Cicero, De Legibus 2.2.5); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 769
(1950) (“Citizenship as a head of jurisdiction and a ground of protection was old when Paul
invoked it in his appeal to Caesar.”); id. at 798 (Black, J., dissenting) (citing Acts 25:16).
187. Exec. Order No. 13841, 83 Fed. Reg. 29435 (June 22, 2018); Sarah Stillman, The
Five-Year-Old Who was Detained at the Border and Persuaded to Sign Away Her Rights,
NEW YORKER (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-five-year-oldwho-was-detained-at-the-border-and-convinced-to-sign-away-her-rights; Sarah Stillman,
Migrants Say they are Still Being Threatened with Child Separation, NEW YORKER (June 26,
2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/migrants-say-they-are-still-beingthreatened-with-child-separation. See Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (@AOC), TWITTER (June 18,
2019, 9:03 AM), https://twitter.com/aoc/status/1140968240073662466?lang=EN (“This administration has established concentration camps on the southern border of the Untied
States for immigrants, where they are being brutalized with dehumanizing conditions and
dying. This is not hyperbole, It is the conclusion of expert analysis.”) (citing Jack Holmes,
An Expert on Concentration Camps Says That’s Exactly What the U.S. Is Running at the
Border, ESQUIRE (June 13, 2019), https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/a27813648/concentration-camps-southern-border-migrant-detention-facilities-trump/); Interview by Brooke
Baldwin with Warren Binford, CNN (June 21, 2019), https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/cnr/
date/2019-06-21/segment/06 (prior to this report, many believed that child separations were
ended or ending according to federal court orders directing the government to reunite children with their families); Memorandum from Jennifer L. Costello on Management Alert –
DHS Needs to Address Dangerous Overcrowding and Prolonged Detention of Children and
Adults in Rio Grande Valley (July 2, 2019), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2019-07/OIG-19-51-Jul19_.pdf. Cf. Hannah Arendt, Lying in Politics [1972], in HANNAH
ARENDT, CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC 5 (1972) [hereinafter ARENDT, CRISES].
188. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971); Johnny Cash, What is Truth [1970] (performed at the Nixon White House right before the Watergate scandal broke). See Nina
Mariah Donovan, Nasty Woman [2016] (a viral spoken word poem performed by famed actress Ashley Judd at the 2017 Women’s March in Washington, D.C.—largely seen as a
referrendum on the election of Donald Trump). See also Michael Cohen, Michael Cohen compares GOP lying for Trump to his lying for Trump, C-SPAN (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.cspan.org/video/?c4782564/michael-cohen-testimony (poets and artists like Cash and Donovan, following in the footsteps of Phillis Wheatley, fulfill the role of inviting and inspiring
repentence by men like Michael Cohen for their participation in corruption).
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the first line of defense to the rights of immigrants.189
While local government actors might help, La Placita requires
us to doubt their resolve.190 For the Trump Administration laid pretextual grounds for another La Placita raid in border states, openly
defying state and local sanctuary laws that defend the Article III warrant requirement.191 The separation of powers remains, however, a
fundamentally imperfect defense against the Jeffersonian Terror, empowering Americans to defend their rights, as the Black Panthers so
nobly advocated in the spirit of American written constitutions by any
means necessary.192
Article I: The Legislative Power
The Legislative power, which is the power to make laws, is
vested by the U.S. Constitution in Congress.193 The Congress is composed of “a Senate and House of Representatives.”194 The
Representatives of the House must be at least twenty-five years old,
serve short two year terms, and represent equal districts of people ap189. 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. 7284.2 (West) (“Immigrants are valuable and essential members of the California community. Almost one in three Californians is foreign born and one
in two children in California has at least one immigrant parent. A relationship of trust
between California’s immigrant community and state and local agencies is central to the
public safety of the people of California.”), aff’d United States v. California, 921 F.3d 865,
891 (9th Cir. 2019) (states can “choose to discriminate against federal immigration authorities by refusing to assist their enforcement efforts” under the “Tenth Amendment and the
anticommandeering rule”); San Francisco Administrative Code, ch. 12H.1–2 (1989), available at https://sfgov.org/oceia/sanctuary-city-ordinance-0; Corey Brettschneider, Local and
State Government Can Protect the Constitution From Trump, TIME (Nov. 30, 2016, 3:48 PM),
https://time.com/4584803/donald-trump-states-rights/.
190. BALDERRAMA & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 162, at 57–60.
191. David Post, Let’s call them ‘constitutional cities,’ not ‘sanctuary cities,’ okay?, WASH.
POST (Mar. 30, 2017, 1:36 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/
wp/2017/03/30/lets-call-them-constitutional-cities-not-sanctuary-cities-okay/ (the controversy over ICE detainers is that they are not valid warrants, they are Admin Law searches
and seizures, and thus they violate the separation of powers by working around Article III
Courts).
192. THE HATE U GIVE (20th Century Fox 2018) (presenting the Black Panther Party’s
idea of fighting for justice by any means necessary); Tolson, supra note 151 (analyzing the
events of January 6, 2021 in light of Thomas Jefferson’s infamous endorsement of the
French Reign of Terror commemorated by his reference to refreshing the tree of liberty with
blood). Compare generally ADAMS, A DEFENCE, supra note 91 (advocating for the separation
of powers in response to the Frenchmen Turgot and Condorcet who advocated a Unity of
Powers that demolished France in a Reign of Terror), with Letter from M. Turgot to Dr.
Price (Mar. 22, 1778), in JAMES MUNSON BARNARD, A SKETCH OF ANNE ROBERT JACQUES
TURGOT WITH A TRANSLATION OF HIS LETTER TO DOCTOR PRICE (Hellen Billings Morris trans.,
1899).
193. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
194. Id.
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portioned by census every ten years.195 Senators must be at least thirty
years old, serve six year terms, and there are two Senatorial seats for
each state in the Union.196
If a bill passes a majority vote in both houses, the bill is taken to
the president, who can either sign it into law; or, if he or she chooses, it
can be vetoed.197 A presidential veto can only be overridden by a twothirds vote in both the House and Senate.198 If either the veto is overridden, or if the president signs the bill into law, or if the president
ignores it for ten days while Congress is in session; then a law has been
successfully created.199
The system of two legislative bodies in Congress is called bicameralism.200 Bicameralism was created to embody complimentary and
countervailing ideals of the Republic.201 The House embodies the ideal
of democracy by its frequent elections, and its members matching the
population by census.202 Since the House is the best approximation of
the will of the people at any given time, the Constitution requires that
all bills introducing new taxes must originate in the House.203
The Senate, on the other hand, represents the equal sovereignty
of each state in the Union regardless of the exact population.204 It has
195. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1–3.
196. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. Cf. Jane Chong, This Is Not the Senate the Framers
Imagined, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/
01/not-senate-framers-imagined/605017/ (noting the changes to the Senate brought about
by the Seventeenth Amendment).
197. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2–3 (the veto replaces the English system’s assent of the
monarch, which is a subtle but meaningful reversal of feudal law—i.e., in America Congress
has the power to make laws and the Executive only has a check on that power, whereas in
England the Crown constitutionally still possesses the legislative power and the Parliament
only exercises it by the Crown’s grace and assent).
198. Id.
199. Id. (if the President fails to sign the law in ten days, Congress can “by their adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law”). See Pocket Veto Case,
279 U.S. 655, 673–75 (1929) (“adjournment” means that Congress is not in session—and is
taken as an indication of Congress’s implied choice to prevent the law’s return—so the term
pocket veto is a bit of a misnomer, because it is created by Congress’s implied choice to block
the creation of the law by adjournment rather than merely by the President’s inaction).
200. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 948–51 (1983). See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, §1; id.
at § 7, cl. 2–3.
201. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); THE FEDERALIST NO. 22
(Alexander Hamilton) (“The fabric of American empire ought to rest on the solid basis of
THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE. The streams of national power ought to flow immediately
from that pure, original fountain of legitimate authority.”).
202. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1–3.
203. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (“All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the
House of Representatives . . . .”).
204. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, and § 8, cl. 1 (this ideal also requires that federal taxes be
uniform throughout the states—this does not mean that all laws must be uniform). See
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less members and longer terms so that it is more stable and represents
the sovereignty of each state united.205 Thus, the president is required
to submit his or her nominations for the Judiciary Branch and various
other administrative bodies, as well as treaty proposals, to the advice
and consent of the Senate.206
Congressional powers are mostly domestic in nature, but the
Senate has a quasi-international role regarding advice and consent on
the ratification of treaties and the nomination of U.S. ambassadors.207
The Senate’s role in giving advice and consent is a check on the president’s power; it is not a power to clog.208 The Senate cannot
constitutionally clog the president’s power to make nominations or
treaty proposals;209 nor can the state governments clog or supplant the
treaty making process.210
Therefore, the U.S. Senate violated the separation of powers
when it clogged President Obama’s Supreme Court Justice nominee,
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 477 (1793) (Opinion of Jay, C.J.) (finding it more important
to the concept of equal sovereignty that individuals have the power to sue their states in
federal court, than that states should be able to avoid suits in the style of King Charles II).
Administering the equal sovereignty of the states without respecting the equal sovereignty
of individual people led to grave injustices. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 544
(2013) (eviscerating the Voting Rights Act based upon equal state sovereignty; the same
rationale was cited in Dred Scott to destroy human rights); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S.
393, 406–07, 416–17 (1857) (Daniel, J., concurring); id. at 527 (Catron, J., concurring) (“He
secures his equality through the equality of his State by virtue of that great fundamental
condition of the Union—the equality of the States.”); The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66, 122–23
(1825) (drawing a presumption of slavery from “the equality of nations” to nullify U.S. antislavery statutes).
205. THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) (“great injury results from an unstable government”).
206. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
207. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; id. at art. VI.
208. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320–21 (1936) (quoting President George Washington, Message to the House Regarding Documents Relative to
the Jay Treaty, Mar. 30, 1796).
209. Id.; THE FEDERALIST NO. 76 (Alexander Hamilton) (“But might not his nomination
be overruled? I grant it might, yet this could only be to make place for another nomination by
himself.”) (emphasis added); THE FEDERALIST NO. 75 (Alexander Hamilton) (“To have intrusted the power of making treaties to the Senate alone, would have been to relinquish the
benefits of the constitutional agency of the President in the conduct of foreign negotiations
. . . While the Union would, from this cause, lose a considerable advantage in the management of its external concerns, the people would lose the additional security which would
result from the co-operation of the Executive.” Hamilton finally concluded that if “a body
more numerous than the Senate,” as it existed in 1790 with 26 Senators came to pass by the
addition of many more States to the Union, that the Senate “would be very little fit for the
proper discharge of the trust.” Thus, the founders planned for a more numerous Senate by
precluding them a greater role in the treaty making and nominating processes.).
210. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 574 (1840) (Opinion of Taney, C.J.).
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Merrick Garland, by refusing to hold advice and consent hearings.211
Equally violative of the separation of powers was the U.S. Supreme
Court’s attempt to control the president’s power of appointment by advisory opinion in NLRB v. Noel Canning.212 Indeed, president Obama
may have properly followed the example of president George Washington by recess appointing Garland in the face of the Senate’s arbitrary
attempt to clog his powers.213
The president has no legislative power, and while it is now commonplace among our presidents to accompany the signing of bills into
law with signing statements, when these statements attempt to create
or mold the law the statements are improper.214 If a president ignores
a law for ten days, the law would go into effect with or without his or
her signature.215 The use of the veto is a check on legislative power,
but not an exercise of legislative power, and presidential signing statements are thus not law.216
The House holds the ultimate power of impeachment, and the
Senate the sole power to try all impeachments.217 The House may im211. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Cf. Martha Minow & Deanell Tacha, US needs a
government of laws, not people, BOSTON GLOBE (Mar. 21, 2016, 10:05 PM), https://
www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2016/03/21/needs-government-laws-not-people/
34oNmHmUH3TYEIbtXCQylM/story.html?s_campaign=8315.
212. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 548–49 (2014). Cf. Schroeder, The Body,
supra note 121, at 68 (identifying Noel Canning as an impermissible advisory statement);
Joshua J. Schroeder, America’s Written Constitution: Remembering the Judicial Duty to Say
What the Law Is, 43 CAPITAL U. L. REV. 833, 843, 851, 869 (2015) [hereinafter Schroeder,
America’s] (offering further commentary on the illegitimacy of Noel Canning as an impermissible advisory statement).
213. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (“The President shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions which shall
expire at the end of their next session.”); Message from President George Washington to the
Senate (Dec. 10, 1795) (recess appointing John Rutledge to be Chief Justice of the U.S.
Supreme Court). See THE FEDERALIST NO. 67 (Alexander Hamilton).
214. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 1 (“All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested
in a Congress” and therefore no legislative powers were vested in the President.); Marc N.
Garber & Kurt A. Wimmer, Presidential Signing Statements as Interpretations of Legislative Intent: An Executive Aggrandizement of Power, 24 HARV. J. OF LEGIS. 363, 366 (1987).
Cf. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448–49 (1998) (invalidating the Line Item
Veto Act for violating bicameralism and presentment).
215. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
216. Id.; Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of California, 512 U.S. 298, 330
(1994) (Presidential signing statements “lack the force of law”) (citing Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)). But see Curtis A.
Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and Executive Power, 23 CONST.
COMMENT. 307, 308 (2006) (defending the constitutionality of President George Bush’s claim
of a unitary executive power to make signing statements that appear to dismiss the law
itself) (citing Statement on Signing the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization
Act of 2005, 42 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 425 (Mar. 9, 2006)).
217. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5, and § 3, cl. 6.
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peach any member of government, including a sitting Senator or
Representative, the president or vice president, or a Justice of the U.S.
Supreme Court, by a simple majority vote.218 Then, the Senate retains
adjudicatory power of trying and finally removing the impeached officer from the government if convicted by “two thirds of the members
present.”219
Ordinarily the vice president, who is the president of the Senate, acts as the Chief Judge in Senate impeachment trials.220 However,
in the case of the impeachment of a president, the Chief Justice of the
U.S. Supreme Court holds that duty.221 The Senate may try “all civil
officers” including the president and vice president for “treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.”222 In the case of the
impeachment of federal judges they must be removed on grounds of
bad behavior.223
The federal legislative powers are vested and limited by the
eighteen clauses under Article I, § 8 of the U.S. Constitution.224 Of
these powers, perhaps the most significant is Congress’s sole powers to
declare war and to raise and support armies and navies.225 In the
eighteenth clause of § 8 in Article I, Congress is granted the open-ended power to make laws “necessary and proper” to the execution of the
legislative powers, “and all other powers vested by this Constitution in
the government of the United States.”226
Thus, Congress can make laws to help in the necessary and
proper execution of executive and judicial powers, not expressly vested
218.
219.
220.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
Id.; 1 SAMUEL H. SMITH & THOMAS LLOYD, TRIAL OF SAMUEL CHASE, AN ASSOCIATE
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, IMPEACHED 14 (1805) (President of the Senate Aaron Burr presiding).
221. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6; 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE IN THE
IMPEACHMENT TRIAL OF PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON 39–40 (1999) [hereinafter
PROCEEDINGS] (Chief Justice Rehnquist as President pro tempore of the Senate presiding).
222. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4; 105 CONG. REC. H11774 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1998) (The
House of Representatives impeached President Clinton on charges of obstruction of justice
and perjury, which illustrates the breadth of what is impeachable under “other crimes or
misdemeanors.” The House’s successful inclusion of crimes considered by many to be small
or petty in the ambit of impeachable charges highlights the fundamentally political nature
of the act of impeachment.).
223. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; 1 SMITH & LLOYD, supra note 220, at 132–33, 145 (“the
tenure by which a judge holds his office, is good behaviour, therefore that he is removable
for misbehavior”).
224. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1–18.
225. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11–12.
226. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.

\\jciprod01\productn\F\FAM\15-1\FAM101.txt

40

unknown

Seq: 40

FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW

10-JAN-22

10:23

Vol. 15:1:1

in the Congress and non-legislative in nature.227 In McCulloch v. Maryland, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed this broad power, allowing
Congress to charter a national bank even though Congress has no express charter power.228 As long as a law is necessary and proper, the
enactment of law is not limited by § 8, for under McCulloch Congress is
ordinarily allowed its “choice of means.”229
The quality of Congress’s laws vary according to the objects
Congress’s laws intend to effect.230 While Congress often legislates on
matters Congress solely may regulate, where Congress’s laws are tantamount to directives, there are matters of foreign affairs and justice
that Congress may only seek to guide, to which Congress’s laws do not
hold the final say.231 For example, Congress may expand or limit the
jurisdiction of the U.S. Courts through the Judiciary Act, but Congress
cannot subsume or clog the judicial power itself.232
The laws of Congress are also limited by “Our Federalism!” acknowledged in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.233 The Tenth
Amendment reserves all powers not delegated by the U.S. Constitution
to Congress, and not prohibited by the U.S. Constitution “to the States
respectively, or to the people.”234 The Ninth Amendment states that

227. Id.
228. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 409–25 (1819) (expounding U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 18).
229. Id. at 424 (“the choice of means implies a right to choose a national bank in preference to State banks, and Congress alone can make the election”).
230. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 327 (1936)
(deciding that there is a marked difference in the effect of Congress’s laws regarding domestic versus foreign affairs).
231. Id. at 319 (The President “alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate
cannot intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.”).
232. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 961–62 (1983) (“One abuse that was prevalent during
the Confederation was the exercise of judicial power by the state legislatures. The Framers
were well acquainted with the danger of subjecting the determinations of the rights of one
person to the ‘tyranny of shifting majorities.’ . . . It was to prevent the recurrence of such
abuses that the Framers vested the executive, legislative, and judicial powers in separate
branches.”) (quoting Edward Hirsch Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM.
L. REV. 371, 375 (1976)); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 329–30 (1816) (“The judicial power must, therefore, be vested in some court by Congress; and to suppose that it was
not an obligation binding on them, but might, at their pleasure, be omitted or declined, is to
suppose that, under the sanction of the Constitution, they might defeat the Constitution
itself, a construction which would lead to such a result cannot be sound. . . . If, then, it is a
duty of Congress to vest the judicial power of the United States, it is a duty to vest the whole
judicial power.”) (emphasis added).
233. U.S. CONST. amends. IX, X; Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, Co., 491 U.S. 1, 25, 27
(1989) (Stevens, J., concurring).
234. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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the enumeration of rights “in the Constitution . . . shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”235
As McCulloch repeatedly held, the U.S. Constitution did not
limit Congress’s “choice of means.”236 For the U.S. Constitution is “a
Constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently to
be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.”237 Thus, the U.S.
Constitution is designed without express limitations on “the minor ingredients” of government, because those limitations were meant to be
“deduced from the nature of the objects themselves.”238
The U.S. Constitution’s “great outlines should be marked, its
important objects designated,” so that the Court can determine the
proper limits of Congress’s powers from it.239 The primary objects or
purposes of the Union are referred to in the preamble and Article IV,
§ 4.240 Thus, while Congress can charter a corporation for a legitimate
purpose, it cannot do anything in support of an illegitimate purpose,
like causing domestic violence, subverting domestic tranquility, or obstructing the administration of justice.241
235. U.S. CONST. amend. IX (this amendment does not mention the states in any capacity). But see Lessee of Livingston v. Moor, 32 U.S. 469, 551–52 (1833) (refusing to use the
Ninth Amendment to modify or overrule state laws that may violate it—it is an open quandary whether the Supreme Court’s antebellum refusal to secure the natural human rights
recognized by the Ninth Amendment itself violated the Ninth Amendment).
236. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 415 (1819).
237. Id.
238. Id. at 407. This actually traces back to the common law itself, which was also a
peculiar agreement that Lord Coke had with Montesquieu’s idea of the Spirit of the Laws
that was always applied to U.S. Constitutional law. See Milborn’s Case [1572] 7 Co. Rep. 6b,
7a (Eng.) (“ratio legis est anima legis, et mutata legis ratione, mutatur et lex” (the reason for
a law is the soul of the law, and if the reason for a law has changed, the law is changed)); 1
MONTESQUIEU, supra note 57, at 7–8; Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 385 (1933) (explaining the maxim that cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex “means that no law can
survive the reasons on which it was founded. It needs no statute; it abrogates itself”) (internal quotation marks omitted); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES §§ 459–60 (“The importance of examining the preamble, for the purpose of
expounding the language of a statute, has been long felt, and universally conceded in all
juridical discussions. It is an admitted maxim in the ordinary course of the administration
of justice, that the preamble of a statute is a key to open the mind of the makers, as to the
mischiefs, which are to be remedied, and the objects, which are to be accomplished by the
provisions of the statute. We find it laid down in some of our earliest authorities in the
common law; and civilians are accustomed to a similar expression, cessante legis prœmio,
cessat et ipsa lex. . . . There does not seem any reason why, in a fundamental law or constitution of government, an equal attention should not be given to the intention of the framers,
as stated in the preamble. And accordingly we find, that it has been constantly referred to
by statesmen and jurists to aid them in the exposition of its provisions.”) (citing Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 474–75 (1793) (Opinion of Jay, C.J.)).
239. McCulloch, 17 U.S., at 407.
240. U.S. CONST. pmbl.; id. art. IV, § 4.
241. U.S. CONST. pmbl.; id. art. IV, § 4.
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The most commonly used power of Congress is its Commerce
Power.242 The objects of the Commerce Clause are found within the
clause itself, for it says that Congress has the power to regulate commerce, an object of peace, not war.243 The framers’ configuration of a
presumptive power to regulate commerce rather than honor or glory in
wars between the states reflects the framers’ hope that “a nation of
merchants would scarcely reach to its weapons at slight
provocations.”244
The pro-commerce aspect of the Legislative Power is also preemptive in nature, as the U.S. Supreme Court found in its dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence.245 According to the dormant Commerce Clause, no state can enact protectionist measures that block or
hinder the commerce or trade of the other states.246 Aside from Congressional authorization and market participation exceptions, the
states cannot create laws or issue orders that restrain interstate
trade.247
The concepts of dormant commerce and privileges and immunities are related.248 Indeed, both overlap so well that they sometimes
appear to eclipse each other in federal jurisprudence.249 Therefore,
where a state law fits under the exceptions to the dormant Commerce
Clause, the law may still fail under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, which provides, “The citizens of each state shall be entitled to
all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.”250
However, the Commerce Clause is far more expansive because
it includes commerce with foreign nations and with Native American
242. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
243. Id.
244. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 768–69 (1986) [hereinafter Carol Rose] (“In comparison
to the typical aristocratic (but violent) pursuits of honor and glory, commerce was thought to
spring from calmer passions; a nation of merchants would scarcely reach to its weapons at
slight provocations. Indeed, some thought the whole regime of private property and commercial enterprise aimed at disarming social conflict.”).
245. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
246. Id.at 145; New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273–74 (1988).
247. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 233 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring) (invalidating a
New York State granted Livingston-Fulton steamboat patent saying “the abstract right of
commercial intercourse . . . is common to all”); W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 653 (1981) (acknowledging the Congressional authorization exception);
United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 219–20 (1984) (acknowledging the market participation exception).
248. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
249. United Bldg. & Constr., 465 U.S. at 222–23.
250. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; United Bldg. & Constr., 465 U.S., at 221–23.
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Tribes.251 Thus, the dormant Commerce Clause also strikes down state
laws that restrain or interfere with international commerce and/or
trade with Native Americans.252 By great contrast, presidential statements and orders “lack the force of law,”253 and they may be grounds
for impeachment for the crime of obstruction of commerce if the the
president “obstructs, delays, or affects commerce . . . by . . .
extortion.”254
The preemptive quality of federal laws and treaties as supreme
laws of the land is recognized in the Supremacy Clause.255 However,
the supremacy of federal laws and treaties predates the ratification of
the U.S. Constitution and ultimately arises out of the original U.S. social compact.256 Federal preemption is either express or implied,
however, there is no consistent standard of implied preemption, for the
mere “complexity” of a federal enabling law was recently held enough
to imply federal preemption.257
The objects of the Patent & Copyright Clause are also built directly into the Patent & Copyright Clause, for this clause says that the
laws it authorizes Congress to pass must protect “inventors” and “authors,” instead of the crown or head of state.258 This is a ringing
251. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
252. Id.; Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dept. of Revenue & Fin., 505 U.S. 71, 81 (1992);
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 453–54 (1979). Cf. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 570 (1840) (Opinion of Taney, C.J.) (“All the powers which relate to our
foreign intercourse are confided to the general government.”).
253. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of California, 512 U.S. 298, 330 (1994)
(Presidential statements are not preemptive of state laws).
254. Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951; United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53, 65 (7th Cir.
1975) (“‘The statute seems to be read as not only prohibiting the obstruction of commerce by
extortion, but also prohibiting extortion by any threat, the carrying out of which would obstruct commerce.’”) (quoting United States v. Pranno, 385 F.2d 387, 389 (7th Cir. 1967)). Cf.
McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2362 (2016) (involving the successful prosecution of former Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell for violating the Hobbs Act); David
Jackson, Donald Trump, Venting Fury Over Budget Fight, Threatens to Close U.S.-Mexico
Border, USA TODAY (Dec. 28, 2018, 8:17 AM) (this was an underdiscussed ground for impeachment during the Trump Administration).
255. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
256. See, e.g., THE CASE OF ELIZABETH RUTGERS, supra note 131, at 8–9, 28 (citing THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1–32 (U.S. 1776)).
257. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 575, 609–10 (2009) (the two general areas of implied
preemption recognized by the Court are known as conflict and field preemption, but their
application in Court is hardly separate or uniform); Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr.,
Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 327–29 (2015) (“The sheer complexity associated with enforcing §30(A),
coupled with the express provision of an administrative remedy, §1396c, shows that the
Medicaid Act precludes private enforcement of §30(A) in the courts.”).
258. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *410 (describing the king’s “prerogative copyright subsisting in certain books” that violates the freedoms
of religion and speech among other fundamental bases of the U.S. Government); id. at
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endorsement of Edward Coke and John Milton’s principled defense of
the separation of powers.259 Copyrights and patents may also be secured for only “limited times,” reflecting a public goods rationale that
private rights in creative works are taken from and must eventually
return to the public domain.260
The Patent & Copyright Power is related to Congress’s power
“to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high
seas.”261 The relationship of copyright and patent infringement to
piracy, traces back to the development of feudal copyright and patent
law.262 The rhetoric of peer-to-peer filesharing websites like The Pirate
Bay, the founder of Silk Road, Dread Pirate Roberts, and the European

*406–07 (describing the origins of patent and copyright protection in statute law as an attempt to limit the times by which the crown could award a patent or copyright). Cf. Lydia
Loren, The Pope’s Copyright? Aligning Incentives with Reality by Using Creative Motivation
to Shape Copyright Protection, 69 LA. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2008).
259. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 538–39 (2013) (quoting 1 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *223); JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA passim (James Russell Lowell,
intro. 1890) [1644] [hereinafter MILTON, AREOPAGITICA] (defending the rights of the author
to print freely against the copyrights of the crown).
260. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See The Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jac. 1 c. 3 [1624]
(introduced by Lord Coke); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13,
1813). Cf. Carol Rose, supra note 244, at 768; Millar v. Taylor [1769] 4 Burr. 2303, 2365
(Eng.) (Yates, J., dissenting) (“If the author will voluntarily let the bird fly, his property is
gone; and it will be in vain for him to say ‘he meant to retain’ what is absolutely flown and
gone.”).
261. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. Phillis Wheatley’s right of attribution published in
the attestation of her book was enforced against printers in America to protect her right to
make a living on the sale of her books imported from printers in England. This right may be
extended once more from the same rationale under a recent case applying the common law
limits on the restraint of alienation of chattels (a precursor to antitrust and IP law) to the
importation of books. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 538–39 (2013)
(quoting 1 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *223). Common law copyright was adjudged to apply
to creations made outside of the nation, including upon the high seas. See Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619–22 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436) (Opinion of Story, J.) (No one has
the “right to publish a map taken substantially and designedly from the map of [another]
person, without any such exercise of skill, or labor, or expense. If he copies substantially
from the map of the other, it is downright piracy.” This definition of copyright piracy was
not mere infringement but included the reverse-passing off of someone else’s work “as his
own composition.”). Justice Story’s definition of copyright piracy as reverse-passing off in
Emerson was captured in § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, but that claim is now considered repealed by the right of attribution extended in the Visual Artists Rights Act in Dastar, a
decision that can be distinguished or reversed by extending Kirtsaeng. Dastar Corp. v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 30, 34–35 (2003).
262. Millar v. Taylor [1769] 4 Burr. 2303, 2313–15 (Eng.). See, e.g., MPAA Press Release, Donuts & the MPAA Establish New Partnership to Reduce Online Piracy, MOTION
PICTURE ASS’N (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.mpaa.org/press/donuts-and-mpaa-establish-newpartnership-to-reduce-online-piracy/.
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political “Pirate” Parties reveal the extent to which the word piracy lost
its former meaning in the present day.263
However, the problem with the infringement-as-piracy idea in
terms of the U.S. Constitution is that it could render the limitation of
piracy laws to the “high seas” superfluous.264 Judicial interpretation of
Article I, § 8, clause 10 of the U.S. Constitution, which patrols the
fringe of Congressional war powers, found that pirates were at “war
with the whole world” to justify government acts of war upon pirates
on the high seas.265 The idea of a global internet service was unimaginable at the time this limitation was framed.266
However, Jefferson especially feared to see a civil forfeiture system “on any other element than the water,”267 and many of the
founders, including Jefferson, proudly violated the English copyright
law as an infringement of their natural human right of free speech.268
In the founding era, nations attempted to keep the waters of the oceans
“free” by granting licenses for privateering, including to censor

263. Ernesto Van der Sar, The Pirate Bay Turns 15 Years Old, TORRENT FREAK (Aug. 10,
2018), https://torrentfreak.com/the-pirate-bay-turns-15-years-old-180810/; Ben Jones, Pirate Party Enters the German Parliament, TORRENT FREAK (June 21, 2009), https://
torrentfreak.com/pirate-party-enters-the-german-parliament-090621/; Alex Hern, Five stupid things Dread Pirate Roberts did to get arrested, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 3, 2013), https://
www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/oct/03/five-stupid-things-dread-pirate-roberts-didto-get-arrested.
264. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
265. Id.; see The Malek Adhel v. United States, 43 U.S. 210, 228 (1844).
266. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe (Aug. 11, 1786).
267. Id (“Every rational citizen must wish to see an effective instrument of coercion, and
should fear to see it on any other element than the water. A naval force can never endanger
our liberties, nor occasion bloodshed; a land force would do both.”).
268. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 541, 552 (2013). See Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813); THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 208
(1801) [hereinafter JEFFERSON, NOTES] (levelling an attack against Phillis Wheatley, the
mother of copyright law, saying, “Among the blacks is misery enough, God knows, but no
poetry. Love is the peculiar œstrum of the poet. Their love is ardent, but it kindles the
senses only, not the imagination. Religion indeed has produced a Phillis Whately [sic.]; but
it could not produce a poet. The compositions published under her name are below the dignity of criticism.”). Jefferson wrote his Notes to the French, so it is of particular interest that
Voltaire disagreed with Jefferson regarding the quality of Phillis Wheatley’s poetry. Letter
from Voltaire to A M. Le Baron Constant de Rebecque (Apr. 11, 1774), in 16 VOLTAIRE,
œUVRES COMPLÈTES DE VOLTAIRE 594–95 (1882) (praising Wheatley’s work).
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speech.269 Privateers violently seized pirate vessels, towed them to a
prize court, and sued the property itself.270
In the United States, the power to attack and seize a pirate vessel is strictly limited to the laws that Congress passes under art. I, § 8,
cl. 10 of the U.S. Constitution.271 The president holds no unbounded, or
undefined power to carry on acts of war on the high seas beyond what
Congress legislates.272 For example, when President John Adams attempted to license a ship’s capture without authorization from
Congress, the U.S. Supreme Court found that it was a “plain trespass”
suable in court.273
Congressional attempts to regulate the border of national war
powers to preserve peace and free trade were defied by such characters
as Citizen Genêt, William Eaton, and Aaron Burr.274 Citizen Genêt
opened a French Prize Court in Philadelphia, began enlisting Americans as French privateers in the French war against England, and
seized numerous English merchant ships in America without authorization.275 He defied President Washington’s Proclamation of
Neutrality and Congress’s decision not to declare war on England.276
269.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. Compare CHARLES ROBERT RIVINGTON, THE RECORDS
WORSHIPFUL COMPANY OF STATIONERS 25–26 (1883) (English copyright and patent
was first developed as a royal strategy to police speech—especially religious speech), with
Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969) (finding that First Amendment free speech rights extend to the right to access the speech of others occurring over
telecommunications networks—this was an extension of the same rights the founders asserted in regard to hard copies of books and letters distributed through overseas networks
using ships), and Radio Act of 1912, Pub. L. No. 264, 37 Stat. 302 (repealed 1927) (the first
telecom act was enacted in response to the sinking of RMS Titanic to protect our right to
access the speech of others through postal service networks to obtain hard copies of the
speech of others).
270. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1, 11–13, 17–18 (1827) (“The strict rules of the common law
as to criminal prosecutions have never been supposed by this Court to be required in informations of seizure in the admiralty for forfeitures, which are deemed to be civil proceedings
in rem.”).
271. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
272. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 16 (considering the behavior of a privateer “in the just
exercise of his instructions from the President, UNDER THE ACTS OF CONGRESS”) (emphasis
added).
273. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170, 179 (1804).
274. William R. Casto, The Early Supreme Court Justices’ Most Significant Opinion, 29
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 173, 174–78 (2002); ROGER G. KENNEDY, BURR, HAMILTON, AND JEFFERSON: A STUDY IN CHARACTER 125–26, 322–23, 386–88 (1999) (Kennedy offers a fair
assessment of the conspiracy that consumed Jefferson and Burr); CHIPP REID, TO THE
WALLS OF DERNE: WILLIAM EATON, THE TRIPOLI COUP, AND THE END OF THE FIRST BARBARY
WAR 175 (2017) [hereinafter CHIPP REID].
275. Casto, supra note 274, at 176.
276. Id. at 176; President George Washington, Proclamation 4—Neutrality of the
United States in the War Involving Austria, Prussia, Sardinia, Great Britain, and the
OF THE
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When questioned about his actions, Genêt blamed the U.S. Government for violating its treaty with France and appealed from the
president to the people.277
William Eaton went rogue in the pirate war the U.S. waged
with the Ottoman Empire.278 Suffering insurmountable losses at sea,
Eaton defied U.S. neutrality and Congress’s decision not to declare war
on Tripoli by going ashore in North Africa.279 He hired a mercenary
army to install Hamet Caramelli to the throne of Tripoli, took over the
city of Derne, and betrayed Caramelli in exchange for favorable terms
for U.S. trade routes into the Mediterranean Sea.280
Finally, Aaron Burr allegedly attempted to revolutionize Mexico, which defied U.S. neutrality and Congress’s decision not to declare
war on Spain.281 President Thomas Jefferson was fed intelligence from
the notorious General Wilkinson, who may have entrapped Burr.282
This evidence led to Burr’s extradition from the Mississippi Territory,
Burr’s federal prosecution and acquittal, and Burr’s eventual banishment to Europe.283 William Eaton testified against Burr at his treason
trial.284
Despite similarly defying the limitations of U.S. war powers,
Eaton was treated as a hero, Burr as a traitor, and Genêt as almost

United Netherlands Against France (Apr. 22, 1793) (colloquially referred to as Washington’s
Proclamation of Neutrality).
277. Casto, supra note 274, at 178; Letter from Edmund Charles Genet to Thomas Jefferson (July 4, 1797); Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Rufus King (Aug. 13, 1793)
(setting forth “[t]he facts with regard to Mr. Genet’s threat to appeal from the President to
the People”); Letter from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson (June 30, 1813). See Alexandre
Deleyre, Opinion D’Alexandre Deleyre, Depute par le Departement de la Gironde, Contre
l’appel au peuple, sur le jugement de Louis XVI 1 [1793]. After the Gironde appealed to the
people in France, the country was “glutted with blood,” ultimately disempowering Genêt
and causing him to live out the rest of his life as a refugee in the United States. 3 WARREN,
supra note 35, at 407–08 (“The guillotine was glutted with the blood of innocent victims,
while the rapidity of execution, and their jealousy of each other, involved the most guilty,
and cut down many of the blackest miscreants, as well as the most virtuous characters in
the nation.”).
278. CHIPP REID, supra note 274, at 122–23.
279. Id. at 173–74.
280. KENNEDY, supra note 274, at 266–74.
281. Id. at 266–68, 273.
282. Id. at 273–82. See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75, 130–33 (1807) (Swartwout, a party
in this case, later wrote a treatise defending his name, and lambasting Wilkinson’s
character.).
283. KENNEDY, supra note 274, at 333–34. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 201
(C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694).
284. KENNEDY, supra note 274, at 273–74; Burr, 25 F. Cas., at 199–200.
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insane.285 It appears that Genêt’s incendiary deeds were just a
pregame of more to come, for U.S. politics never arrived at a principled
way of handling those defiant to the limitations of U.S. war powers.286
In fact, the Adams Administration confused these matters all the more
when it signed the Logan Act and the Alien & Sedition Acts into law.287
Under the heads of these laws the president’s presumed power
to do horrific things in the name of national security began to grow—
and this growth of power never stopped, indeed, the Alien Enemies Act
and Logan Act are still good law.288 Today the U.S. President can imprison those he or she deems an enemy of the state in the infamous
Guantanamo Bay military prison without a trial regardless of U.S. citi-

285. CHIPP REID, supra note 274, at 273–77; KENNEDY, supra note 274, at 313; Casto,
supra note 274, at 179–80.
286. See, e.g., James Roger Sharp, What Benjamin Netanyahu could learn from Citizen
Genet, SYRACUSE (Feb. 27, 2015), https://www.syracuse.com/opinion/2015/02/what_benjamin_netanyahu_should_learn_from_the_1793_citizen_genet_affair_commenta.html.
287. Alien Enemies Act of 1798, 50 U.S.C. §§ 21–24 (still a good law); Logan Act, 18
U.S.C. § 953 (also still a good law). See James Madison, The Virginia Resolution [Dec. 24,
1798] (declaring the Alien & Sedition Acts were unconstitutional, and redeclaring the basis
of the Union on the liberty of the press—though the state has no power to declare the law
overruled for being unconstitutional, it is free to make the observation that it should be);
Thomas Jefferson, The Kentucky Resolutions [Nov. 10, 1798 & Dec. 3, 1799] (Jefferson’s Oct.
4, 1798 draft was far more radical that the drafts adopted by Kentucky, because it claimed
that the state was nullifying the federal laws outside of the federal courts, whereas the ones
adopted only said they should be nullified or be considered nullified by the states—but they
both condemn the Alien & Sedition Acts as violations of the U.S. social compact. Violating a
law is one of the ways to get a law overruled in the federal court—a proper case should have
been taken up in a federal court to overrule these laws following these resolutions.); Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal., 1984) (overturning Korematsu’s
conviction under the Alien Enemies Act—a law which remains on the books from 1798, and
empowered the President to intern Japanese Americans); Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50
U.S.C.A. § 4212(b) (apologizing for and remunerating Japanese internment—but not repealing the Alien Enemies Act that was used to imprison them); CONG. COMM. ON
STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT, 102D CONG., ETHICS MANUAL FOR MEMBERS, OFFICERS,
AND EMPLOYEES OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 254 n.32 (1992) (“This statute,
which appears to have been a reaction to the attempts of one citizen to engage in private
diplomacy [i.e., Dr. Logan], has never been the basis of a prosecution, and this Committee
has publicly questioned its constitutionality. . . . Members should be aware, however, that
the law remains on the books.”); CMT Staff, President Comments on Dixie Chicks, CMT
(Apr. 25, 2003), http://www.cmt.com/news/1471528/president-comments-on-dixie-chicks/
(“Bush stated, ‘I mean, the Dixie Chicks are free to speak their mind. They can say what
they want to say,’” but the Logan Act is so broad it could have been used to charge them.).
288. Proclamation No. 2525, 7 Fed. Reg. 329 (Jan. 17, 1942) (citing Alien Enemies Act of
1798, 50 U.S.C. §§ 21–24); Daniel Hemel & Eric Posner, Why the Trump Team Should Fear
the Logan Act, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/hemel-andposner-explain-why-trump-team-should-fear-logan-act (attempting to show that the Logan
Act is not the paper tiger it appears to be).
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zenship.289 He or she can also, apparently, imprison U.S. citizens by
racial classification indefinitely, en masse, without a trial.290
President Adams transgressed President Washington’s legitimate use of presidential power in Washington’s Proclamation of
Neutrality by signing the unconstitutional Alien & Sedition Acts into
law.291 These acts allowed the U.S. President to access war powers
without a declaration of war.292 The Alien Enemies Act, which remains
active, allows the president to unilaterally deport all enemy aliens regardless of legal status in the United States under the mere pretense of
a national emergency.293
Congress also attempted to criminalize all speech by U.S. citizens in foreign nations that might affect presidential negotiations with
the Logan Act.294 This act was designed to stifle Dr. Logan’s efforts to
bring about peace through private negotiations in France during the
XYZ Affair.295 Dr. Logan considered the Act, “[m]ore honored in its
289. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107–40, 115 Stat. 224 (Sept 18,
2001) (allowing the President to define who are “terrorists”; all such people can, on the face
of this and related laws, be detained without a trial); National Defense Appropriations Act
for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–81, 125 Stat. 1298 (Dec. 31, 2011). See Joseph
Tanfani, Judge pushes U.S. to explain why it’s holding an American citizen in secret in Iraq,
L.A. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2017, 3:30 PM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-detaineehabeas-20171130-story.html. The Amistad is worth considering in relation to the topic of
Guantanamo Bay. QUINCY ADAMS, ARGUMENT, supra note 114, at 15 (“This is what the
Spanish minister demanded, that the vessel should be set at liberty, and the negroes sent to
Cuba to be tried. And he is so confident in the disposition of the United States in favor of
this demand, that he even presumes the President of the United States had already immediately dispatched an order to the Court in Connecticut, to stay its proceedings and deliver
up the negroes to the Government of Spain.”).
290. Proclamation No. 2525, 11 F.C.A., titl. 50, § 21 (citing Alien Enemies Act of 1798,
50 U.S.C. §§ 21–24); Executive Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (1942). See Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223–24 (1944). Chief Justice Roberts’ held Korematsu overruled by history, and yet affirmed the president’s Muslim travel ban and left the Enemy
Aliens Act untouched. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (appearing to believe
that this opinion formally repealed Korematsu, while leaving intact all the ways the president may intern people based on their race) (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 248 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting)).
291. President George Washington, Proclamation 4—Neutrality of the United States in
the War Involving Austria, Prussia, Sardinia, Great Britain, and the United Netherlands
Against France (Apr. 22, 1793); Alexander Hamilton, Defense of the President’s Neutrality
Proclamation [May 1793].
292. Alien Enemies Act of 1798, 50 U.S.C. §§ 21–24; Logan Act, 18 U.S.C. § 953.
293. Alien Enemies Act of 1798, 50 U.S.C. § 21. Cf. Proclamation No. 9844, 84 Fed. Reg.
4,949 (Feb. 15, 2019). (Trump repeatedly tried to characterize this emergency of asylum
seekers on the Southern Border as an invasion that fits the limitations required by the
Alien Enemies Act).
294. Logan Act, 18 U.S.C. § 953.
295. Id.
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breach than in its observance,” and so it came to pass that the Logan
Act never supported a single prosecution.296
The Logan Act is a peculiar act because its enforcement requires an officer of the executive department to do something
impractical, i.e., to initiate legal action against a private citizen in
court.297 The president need not ask the court for help when he or she
has the sole power in foreign affairs and is more than equipped to dispose of any such matter with more ease and justice than the Judicial or
Legislative Branches.298 The Logan Act was, is, and, therefore never
should be used to support a prosecution.299
Logan Act enforcement by a judge would be a violation of the
separation of powers because “the president alone has the power to
speak or listen as a representative of the nation” in foreign affairs.300 A
private U.S. citizen’s word or deed in a foreign country may or may not
help or hurt the president’s negotiations, but it is up to the president to
decide the appropriate action with respect to such a citizen’s speech
abroad.301 Neither Congress nor the Court may intrude upon this Executive Power.302
Article II: The Executive Power
The executive power is vested by Article II of the U.S. Constitution in the president.303 He or she must be at least thirty-five years old
and elected in four year terms, with a two term limit.304 The presidential election is decided by the states, such that most states cast all their
electoral votes for the candidate that gets the majority popular vote of
the state.305 When a candidate fails to win a majority of electoral votes,
the president is chosen by the House of Representatives.306
296. DEBORAH NORRIS LOGAN, MEMOIR OF DR. GEORGE LOGAN OF STENTON 87, 99 (Frances A. Logan ed., 1899); CONG. COMM. ON STANDARDS OF OFF. CONDUCT, MEMORANDUM FOR
ALL MEMBERS AND OFFICERS n.34 (Sept. 29, 2006) (“[T]he Logan Act . . . has never been the
basis of a prosecution . . . .”).
297. Logan Act, 18 U.S.C. § 953.
298. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
299. See LOGAN, supra note 296, at 87, 99.
300. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319.
301. See LOGAN, supra note 296, at 89–93 (an open letter Dr. Logan published in the
papers to defend himself); CMT Staff, supra note 287.
302. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319 (“Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot
intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.”).
303. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
304. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1, 5.
305. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2–3; id. amend. XII.
306. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
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Electoral college votes—meant to vindicate the sovereignty of
the states—are determined by a calculation accounting for the population of each state.307 Throughout U.S. history, the electoral college
system produced six notable anomalies.308 The most recent of these
anomalies—the election of Presidents Bush and Trump in which the
electoral college winner was not the winner of the popular vote—stand
out from the previous four because they stem directly from judicial
intervention.309
307. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 68 (Alexander Hamilton). But see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2,
cl. 3, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (the three fifths compromise made only three
fifths of the slave populations count toward seats in Congress, a controversial topic prior to
the Civil War).
308. John Ferling, Thomas Jefferson, Aaron Burr and the Election of 1800, SMITHSONIAN
MAG. (Nov. 1, 2004), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/thomas-jefferson-aaronburr-and-the-election-of-1800-131082359/ (explaining that in the Election of 1800 there was
no popular vote taken—Burr and Jefferson tied in the Electoral College and Jefferson only
won when Electors that would have voted Burr abdicated in Jefferson’s favor, this led to the
adoption of the Twelfth Amendment); Letter from Andrew Jackson to Henry Lee (Oct. 7,
1825) (explaining that in 1824, no presidential candidate won a majority of electoral votes
and the House of Representatives chose John Quincy Adams even though he had less of the
popular vote than Jackson); RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA AFTER THE CIVIL WAR hr. 2 (PBS
television broadcast April 9, 2019) (explaining that in the Compromise of 1877, also known
as the Great Betrayal of 1877, the North compromised with the South exchanging 20 disputed electoral votes to go to President Hayes who lost the popular vote for Hayes’
assurances that he would end reconstruction by removing federal troops from the South);
Henry F. Graff, Grover Cleveland: Campaigns and Elections, UVA: MILLER CENTER, https://
millercenter.org/president/cleveland/campaigns-and-elections (last visited June 11, 2021)
(explaining that in 1888, Grover Cleveland ran on a tariff policy that won the popular vote
but lost the election—this is the only apparent example prior to Gore and Hillary where the
popular vote went the opposite way of a straight electoral college vote); Gregory Krieg, It’s
Official: Clinton Swamps Trump in Popular Vote, CNN (Dec. 22, 2016, 5:34 AM), https://
www.cnn.com/2016/12/21/politics/donald-trump-hillary-clinton-popular-vote-final-count/
index.html.
309. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110–11 (2000) (per curiam) (stopping the recount in
Florida in President Bush’s favor by a margin of 537 votes and deciding the election); Shelby
County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 554 (2013) (overruling the Voting Rights Act). Shelby
County gutted the Voting Rights Act with enough time for Republican controlled states to
make good use of the gutting in the 2016 Presidential Election. Id. See Ari Berman, Welcome to the First Presidential Election Since Voting Rights Act Gutted, ROLLING STONE (June
23, 2016, 3:40 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/welcome-to-the-firstpresidential-election-since-voting-rights-act-gutted-179737/; Jennifer G. Hickey, Republicans Build on Their Dominance in State Legislatures, FOX NEWS (Nov. 18, 2016), https://
www.foxnews.com/politics/republicans-build-on-their-dominance-in-state-legislatures
(“Republicans control both chambers in 32 states, while Democrats now have total control of
just California, Delaware, Hawaii, Oregon and Rhode Island.”); David A. Lieb, AP Analysis
Shows how Gerrymandering Benefited GOP in 2016, PBS NEWS HOUR (June 25, 2017, 3:01
AM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/ap-analysis-shows-gerrymandering-benefitedgop-2016 (“extreme Republican advantages in some states were no fluke”); Keesha Gaskins,
Tying Presidential Electors to Gerrymandered Congressional Districts Will Sabotage Elections, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 22, 2013), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/
analysis-opinion/tying-presidential-electors-gerrymandered-congressional-districts-will (a
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President George Washington established the traditional two
term limit when he declined to seek a third term and retired to his
Virginia estate instead.310 This two term tradition was observed by
every president until the Roosevelts refused to abide by it.311 Thereafter, the U.S. Constitution was amended to expressly prevent a repeat
of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s controversial third and fourth presidential
terms.312
The powers of the president are by nature executive and come
second in rank to the Legislative Power.313 Domestically, the president
is required to guide the debates in Congress by presenting the State of
the Union every year.314 The president nominates all major roles in the
Cabinet, Judiciary, and Administrative councils with the advice and
consent of the Senate, and the president must take care to execute the
laws of Congress in a reasonable manner.315
If the president or their officers fail to execute the laws properly
or exceed the powers delegated to them by Congress, they have acted
few public interest groups called out possible ways that Republican controlled states could
ensure a gerrymandered result in the 2016 election); Electoral College Chaos: How Republicans Could Put a Lock on the Presidency, FAIR VOTE (Dec. 13, 2012), https://
www.fairvote.org/electoral-college-chaos-how-republicans-could-put-a-lock-on-thepresidency.
310. Letter from George Washington to Jonathan Trumbull (July 21, 1799) (denying the
invitation to run for a third term). Cf. James H. Hutson, John Adams’ Title Campaign, 41
THE NEW ENG. Q. 30, 33–34 (1968) (noting Adams’ attempt to endow President Washington
with royal titles).
311. Theodore Roosevelt, Acceptance Speech at 1912 Progressive National Convention
(Aug. 6, 1912) (accepting a nomination to run for a third term); Andrew Glass, Democrats
Nominate FDR for Third Term, July 18, 1940, POLITICO (July 18, 2018, 12:02 AM), https://
www.politico.com/story/2018/07/18/democrats-nominate-fdr-for-third-term-july-18-1940724615.
312. U.S. CONST. amend. XXII.
313. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (the U.S. Constitution requires the president to report to
Congress and to request that it set policies the president thinks are expedient, and Congress may or may not oblige). See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
587–88 (1952) (stating that “the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall
make the laws which the President is to execute” and overruling a presidential order that
“does not direct that a congressional policy be executed in a manner directed by Congress”
but unconstitutionally “directs that a presidential policy be executed in a manner prescribed
by the President”).
314. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
315. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; id. art. II, § 3. Advice and consent of the Senate is not
required for “inferior officers” as designated by Congress “as they think proper.” See, e.g.,
Pro. Air Traffic Controllers Org. v. Fed, Lab. Rel. Auth., 685 F.2d 547, 576,77 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (explaining how the violation of the Civil Service Reform Act by conducting a strike
was enough to justified the president’s firing of over 11,000 air traffic controllers, breaking
their Union, and banning them from future civil service; the court did not broach the question of whether the president’s removal power was unconstitutional for violating public
safety, by backing the overworking of air traffic controllers—the reason for their strike).
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ultra vires.316 In such cases, the U.S. Judiciary can take corrective action to ensure that the law as applied conforms to the requirements of
the law.317 The courts’ capacity to correct the executive is embodied by
the equitable power to issue injunctions and the power to appoint private attorneys to prosecute criminal contempt.318
The president’s power of removal is not expressly addressed in
the Constitution.319 This power took center stage in the foundational
case Marbury v. Madison, which was a showdown between the powers
of all three branches of government involving the powers of removal
and appointment.320 The Marbury Court ruled that even though President James Madison’s withholding of William Marbury’s commission
was illegal, the Court was powerless to force his hand by writ of mandamus, overruling the Judiciary Act of 1789.321
In Parsons v. United States, the Court considered Marbury in
light of the decision of 1789 and found that the president has the power
to remove a U.S. Attorney before his or her statutory four-year term
limit is over.322 In Myers v. United States, the Court found that limitations on the president’s power of removal by the Senate was
unconstitutional.323 Then, in Humphrey’s Executor, the Court found

316. See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 297–98 (2013) (explaining that
every federal agency’s “power to act and how they are to act is authoritatively prescribed by
Congress, so that when they act improperly, no less than when they act beyond their jurisdiction, what they do is ultra vires”; i.e., whenever an agency acts beyond its enabling
legislation it may be challenged in the court).
317. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 638 (1950).
318. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 173 (1803); FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a)(2). See also
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 44–454 (1932) (demonstrating that one of the first acts that
convinced the U.S. Supreme Court to allow the growth of what is now referred to as the
administrative state was a provision that expressly allowed the Court to preside over “injunction proceedings . . . brought by any party in interest against the deputy commissioner”
in order to set aside or suspend agency orders that are “not in accordance with law”; the
very foundations of the administrative state is based upon Crowell’s presumption of Article
III judicial review of ultra vires cases).
319. See U.S. CONST. art. II; cf. EDMUND RANDOLPH, A VINDICATION OF MR. RANDOLPH’S
RESIGNATION 9 (1795).
320. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 157 (“Some point of time must be taken when the power of the
Executive over an officer, not removable at his will, must cease. That point of time must be
when the constitutional power of appointment has been exercised. And this power has been
exercised when the last act required from the person possessing the power has been performed. This last act is the signature of the commission.”).
321. Id. at 173.
322. Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324, 343–44 (1897).
323. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 226 (1926) (extending Parsons, 167 U.S. at
343–44).
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that the president can only remove an officer of a quasi-judicial or
quasi-legislative agency “for cause.”324
After the Watergate Scandal broke, President Richard Nixon
ordered the Attorney General to remove Special Prosecutor Archibald
Cox.325 Rather than remove Cox, Attorney General Elliott Richardson
and Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus both resigned—
then Solicitor General Robert Bork was sworn in as acting Attorney
General and fired Cox for President Nixon.326 This event, known as the
“Saturday Night Massacre,” resulted in a federal court finding that the
removal of Cox was illegal that followed an attempted cover up by
President Nixon.327
The U.S. Supreme Court reshaped the balance between Myers
and Humphrey’s Executor in Bowsher v. Synar and Morrison v. Olson.328 After these cases, Myers’ characterization of the president’s
removal power of any officer as “illimitable” was struck down, but Myers’ holding that Congress cannot involve itself in the removal of
government officers remains good law.329 A lasting holding from these
cases is that the president may remove “inferior officers” at his or her
discretion.330
President Ronald Reagan took this discretion to an extreme
when he fired over 11,000 air traffic controllers for violating the Civil
Service Reform Act (CSRA) by going on strike.331 PATCO v. FLRA de324. Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627–32 (1935) (confining the
president’s illimitable power of removal to exclusively executive officers).
325. Dylan Matthews, Richard Nixon also fired the person investigating his presidential
campaign, VOX (May 10, 2017, 12:40 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/5/
10/15603886/saturday-night-massacre-explained-nixon-watergate-archibald-cox.
326. Id.
327. Id.; Jeffrey Frank, Comey’s Firing is—and isn’t—Like Nixon’s Saturday Night
Massacre, NEW YORKER (May 10, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/
comeys-firing-is-and-isnt-like-nixons-saturday-night-massacre; Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp.
104, 108 (D.C. Cir., 1973) (“The firing of Archibald Cox in the absence of a finding of extraordinary impropriety was in clear violation of an existing Justice Department regulation
having the force of law and was therefore illegal.”); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,
694–96 (1974).
328. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 720 (1986); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 686
(1988).
329. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 726; Morrison, 487 U.S. at 685–87 (“Congress cannot reserve
for itself the power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by
impeachment.”).
330. United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 484–85 (1886), cited with approval in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 161–64 (1926), Morrison, 487 U.S. at 689 n.27, and Free
Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 483–84 (2010).
331. Bryan Craig, Reagan vs. Air Traffic Controllers, UVA: MILLER CENTER, https://millercenter.org/reagan-vs-air-traffic-controllers (last visited Aug. 9, 2021) (the President fired
11,345 or so of the nearly 13,000 that went on strike). Cf. Hassan A. Kanu, Labor Board
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cided the legality of this removal and did not broach the question of
whether the president’s discretion to fire an entire fleet of federal employees was unconstitutional.332 Years later in 2012, the U.S. Supreme
Court unsettled Marbury v. Madison by jurisdictionally insulating the
CSRA from constitutional challenge.333
During the Trump era, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the
unitary executive theory in a majority opinion for the first time in Seila
Law v. CFPB, which decided that Congress cannot insulate an officer
from removal.334 Prior to Seila Law, the unitary executive theory existed in Justice Scalia’s dissent in Morrison v. Olson, but was not
generally accepted as law.335 Following Seila Law, however, the Court
decided in United States v. Arthrex, Inc. that inferior officers may act
as principle officers without the president nominating them with advice and consent of the Senate as long as they are reviewable by a
principle officer nominated by the president with advice and consent of
the Senate based on the unitary executive theory idea that “[t]hrough
the President’s oversight, ‘the chain of dependence [is] preserved.’ ”336
President Donald J. Trump triggered new controversies over
the removal power and the presidential duty to execute the laws by
riveting the presidential chain of dependence that was venerated in

Pick Litigated Reagan’s ‘Watershed’ Air Traffic Case, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Sept. 19, 2017, 3:58
PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/labor-board-pick-litigated-reaganswatershed-air-traffic-case (from 2017 to 2021, Peter Robb served as General Counsel of the
NLRB after being the lead attorney in the controversial PATCO v. FLRA case.).
332. PATCO v. FLRA, 685 F.2d 547, 578 (D.C. Cir., 1982).
333. Elgin v. Dep’t of Treasury, 567 U.S. 1, 5 (2012) (blocking the Court’s original jurisdiction to review constitutional challenges to the CSRA).
334. Seila Law v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2203 (2020) (“The resulting constitutional
strategy is straightforward: divide power everywhere except for the Presidency, and render
the President directly accountable to the people through regular elections.”). But see U.S.
CONST. art. II, cl. 2 (the constitution does not force the states to hold popular elections for
the president).
335. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 729 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The President
is directly dependent on the people, and, since there is only one President, he is responsible.”). But see U.S. CONST. art. II, cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors . . . .”; the states are not constitutionally required to hold popular elections for president).
336. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 729 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The President
is directly dependent on the people, and, since there is only one President, he is responsible.”). But see U.S. CONST. art. II, cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors . . . .”; the states are not constitutionally required to hold popular elections for president).
May, if it so chooses, select the electors itself” regardless of the popular vote, “which indeed
was the manner used by state legislatures in the several States for many years after the
framing of our Constitution”) (citing McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 365 (1892)).
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Seila Law to create unprecedented upheaval in U.S. Government.337
First, Trump removed hundreds of officers without nominating new
ones, operating much of the government through acting officers.338 Second, Trump pocket vetoed a spending bill that caused a government
shutdown raising serious questions of whether the president can force
government employees, including the same class of air traffic controllers, to work without pay as indentured servants.339
There are also similarities between acting Attorney General
Matthew Whitaker and acting Attorney General Robert Bork.340 The
litigation over acting AG Bork surrounded the legality of firing special
counsel Archibald Cox.341 There was also litigation involving acting AG
Whitaker, who was put into place instead of Deputy AG Rosenstein,
while special counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation into the 2016 election was ongoing.342
337. See, e.g., David A. Graham, The Strangest Thing About Trump’s Approach to Presidential Power: Many presidents have pushed the limits of their authority. But not like this.,
THE ATLANTIC (June 7, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/06/thestrangest-thing-about-trumps-approach-to-presidential-power/562271/.
338. Transcript: President Trump on “Face the Nation,” February 3, 2019, CBS (Feb. 3,
2019, 7:31 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/transcript-president-trump-on-face-the-nation-february-3-2019/ [hereinafter Transcript: President]; Kristina Davis, Prominent private
litigator Brewer picked for San Diego U.S. attorney nomination, SAN DIEGO TRIBUNE (June
20, 2018, 5:05 PM), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/courts/sd-me-usatty-nomination-20180620-story.html; Jan Diehm et al., Who has left Trump’s administration and
orbit?, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2017/08/politics/trump-admin-departurestrnd/ (last updated Oct. 21, 2019).
339. NTEU v. United States, Nos. 19–50, 19–51, 19–62, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9305, at
*3 (D.D.C. 2019), aff’d, 444 F. Supp. 3d 108 (D.D.C. 2020).
340. Kevin Johnson & Bart Jansen, Two Republican former AGs raise questions on
Trump’s naming Matthew Whitaker to lead Justice Department, USA TODAY (last updated
Nov. 11, 2018, 4:01 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/11/09/two-former-attorneys-general-questioning-propriety-whitaker-appointment/1946855002/ (“ ‘Even
Richard Nixon didn’t put in somebody as acting attorney general who had not been confirmed,’ Mukasey said . . . .”—Bork was confirmed to be Solicitor, so he was confirmed
though not for the AG role.)
341. See Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104, 108 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 694–97 (1974).
342. Andrew Prokop, Is Rod Rosenstein fired, resigning, or staying? The drama, explained., VOX (Sept. 24, 2018, 2:30 PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/9/24/17896140/rodrosenstein-resigns-fired-mueller-trump-russia (“On Friday [Sept. 21, 2018], Fox’s Laura Ingraham tweeted that ‘Rod Rosenstein must be fired today,’ but Fox’s Sean Hannity notably
urged the president not to fire anyone. (Ingraham later deleted her tweet.)”); Brett Samuels,
Trump formally nominates Jeffrey Rosen to replace Rosenstein at DOJ, THE HILL (Mar. 26,
2019, 4:58 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/435931-trump-formally-nominates-jeffrey-rosen-to-replace-rosenstein-at-doj (for all intents and purposes Rosenstein was
officially being fired when Trump nominated Jeffrey Rosen to fill his job). Cf. John Yoo,
Whitaker’s Appointment is Unconstitutional, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 13, 2018), https://
www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/11/whitaker-cant-take-officeand-that-helps-muel-
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The question of whether the president can remove officers when
he has no immediate, viable replacement for them appears to be ripe
for review.343 It first became an issue when former President Trump
signed Executive Orders 13769 & 13780, effecting a travel ban on
seven Muslim majority nations.344 Former President Obama holdover
Attorney General Sally Yates refused to enforce the Executive Orders
and declared them unconstitutional; then former President Trump
fired her without an alternative AG ready to swear into office.345
Not only did former President Trump remove AG Yates to fill
the office with an acting AG who reversed Yates’s order, but Trump
also purged forty-six U.S. Attorneys en masse without alternate
picks.346 Trump initially did not refill these spots, allowing them to be
filled by questionable interim appointments not anticipated by the
law.347 He did the same thing with other positions, including members

ler/575770/ [hereinafter Yoo, Whitaker’s] (the nomination of Whitaker was so out of order
that even John Yoo, author of the Bush era Torture Memos, declared it unconstitutional).
343. Aaron Blake, Sally Yates is now a martyr for the anti-Trump movement. But legally
speaking, it’s more complicated., WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2017, 11:49 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/31/sally-yates-is-now-a-martyr-for-theanti-trump-movement-but-legally-speaking-its-more-complicated/ (including an interesting
video exchange between Jeff Sessions and Sally Yates at her Senate confirmation hearing,
which appeared to show that they agreed that Yates’ later actions were required of her).
344. Exec. Order No. 13769, 3 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (2017); Exec. Order No. 13780, 3 Fed.
Reg. 13,209 (2017).
345. Michael D. Shear et al., Trump Fires Acting Attorney General Who Defied Him,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/us/politics/trump-immigration-ban-memo.html (“The president replaced Ms. Yates with Dana J. Boente, the
United States attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, saying that he would serve as
attorney general until Congress acts to confirm Senator Jeff Sessions of Alabama. In his
first act in his new role, Mr. Boente announced that he was rescinding Ms. Yates’s order.”).
346. Id.; Charlie Savage & Maggie Haberman, Trump Abruptly Orders 46 Obama-Era
Prosecutors to Resign, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/10/us/
politics/us-attorney-justice-department-trump.html (notably, Dana J. Boente was one of the
U.S. Attorneys that Trump refused to accept a resignation from).
347. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 338 (explaining that after a time of uncertainty, the
acting USA after the purge became Alana W. Robinson, then long after the 300 day window
anticipated by the law was over, AG Jeff Sessions arbitrarily nominated Adam Braverman
who was sworn into the office and served as USA, and since then Trump nominated private
citizen Robert Brewer to the post, attempting to buck Senatorial curtesy rules that normally
would allow Senator Kamala Harris to make the pick in order to strong arm the Senate to
accept a spoils system like the one that emerged during the Andrew Jackson administration). Cf. Eleanor Clift, The Unheralded Death of the Blue Slip, THE DAILY BEAST (Sept. 26,
2017, 6:56 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-unheralded-death-of-the-blue-slip;
Jordain Carney, Senate battle heats up over ‘blue slips,’ Trump court picks, THE HILL (Oct.
11, 2017, 1:54 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/354955-senators-battle-overtrumps-court-nominees (“Trump currently has 149 vacancies to fill in the federal court system, with nominees already named for 50 of those spots.”).
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of his own cabinet, firing them without cause, regardless of whether he
had an alternate ready to go.348
Trump’s strategy, apparently taken from his reality TV Show
The Apprentice, of ruling the government through an informal revolving door of “acting” executive officers, is grounds for judicial review of
his decision to appoint Matthew Whitaker as acting AG without advice
and consent from the Senate.349 During his presidency, Trump went on
the record with Margaret Brennan on Face the Nation and appeared to
clarify the intentionality and purpose behind his chaotic style of
administration:
Brennan: ‘Cause you have an acting AG until you get Barr confirmed—
Trump: Yes.
Brennan: An acting defense secretary. An acting chief of staff. An
acting interior secretary.
Trump: It’s OK. IT’S EASIER TO MAKE MOVES WHEN THEY’RE
ACTING.350

While some may contend the nomination of William Barr made pending litigation moot, litigation regarding former President Trump’s
appointment of acting officers like Whitaker is shown to be “capable of
repetition, yet evading review.”351 The installation of Matthew Whitaker as acting AG was especially concerning, not merely because he
appeared unqualified, but also because Whitaker’s installation arguably violated the proper “chain of command” that the legitimacy of
presidential power depends upon.352
Trump fired FBI Director James Comey, after Comey seemed to
help him clinch the presidency, because of Comey’s support of the investigation into Russia’s involvement in the 2016 election.353 Trump
348. Diehm et al., supra note 338.
349. The Apprentice: Meet the Billionaire (NBC television broadcast Jan. 8, 2004); Jen
Kirby, A brief guide to the legal challenges against acting Attorney General Matthew Whitaker, VOX (Dec. 6, 2018, 5:15 PM) https://www.vox.com/2018/11/21/18105428/matthewwhitaker-legal-challenges-mueller-trump.
350. Transcript: President, supra note 338 (emphasis added).
351. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973) (quoting Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC,
219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)).
352. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 497, 507
(2010); Yoo, Whitaker’s, supra note 342; Ruth Marcus, Matthew Whitaker is a Crackpot,
WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2018, 5:34 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/matthewwhitaker-is-a-crackpot/2018/11/08/69e8e190-e395-11e8-8f5f-a55347f48762_story.html.
353. Michael D. Shear & Matt Apuzzo, FBI Director James Comey is Fired by Trump,
N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/09/us/politics/james-comeyfired-fbi.html; Jordain Carney, Top Dems: IG report shows Comey’s actions helped Trump
win election, THE HILL (June 14, 2018, 5:45 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/national-security/
392369-top-dems-ig-report-shows-comeys-actions-helped-trump-win-election.
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repeatedly threatened to fire Special Counsel Robert Mueller directly,
or to classify the findings of his report.354 Following Attorney General
William Barr’s letter to the ranking members of the House and Senate
Judiciary Committees, Trump hailed the report as an exoneration of
all wrongdoing and expressed that it should be made public.355
However, a special counsel’s decision not to indict a sitting president is not an exoneration.356 A sitting president should never be
indicted for a crime given the harrowing variety of government havoc
that could result.357 An indicted president still in office would have his
hands on all the levers of government—a situation rife for corruption

354. Maggie Haberman & Michael S. Schmidt, Trump Sought to Fire Mueller in December, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/10/us/politics/trumpsought-to-fire-mueller-in-december.html; Darren Samuelsohn, GOP wants Mueller transparency—with caveats, POLITICO (Jan. 16, 2019, 6:59 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/
2019/01/16/congress-mueller-investigation-final-report-senate-republicans-1106912.
355. Letter from AG William P. Barr to Sen. Lindsey Graham et al. (Mar. 24, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/ag/page/file/1147981/download [hereinafter Barr’s “Principle Conclusions”]; Jill Colvin, Trump says public should see ‘ridiculous’ Mueller report, AP NEWS
(Mar. 21, 2019), https://apnews.com/article/093727be24b649f7adad971e0b48878d (“‘Let it
come out, let people see it,’ Trump told reporters Wednesday. ‘Let’s see whether or not it’s
legit.’”); Dylan Scott, Trump: Barr letter on Mueller report shows ‘total and complete exoneration’, VOX (Mar. 24, 2019, 4:40 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/3/24/
18279887/trump-mueller-report-barr-letter-exonerated-cleared (quoting Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 24, 2019, 4:42 PM) (“No Collusion, No Obstruction,
Complete and Total EXONERATION. KEEP AMERICA GREAT!”), searchable on https://
www.thetrumparchive.com; Sarah Sanders (@PressSec), TWITTER (Mar. 24, 2019, 4:13 PM),
https://twitter.com/PressSec/status/1109911057013919746 (“The findings of the Department of Justice are a total and complete exoneration of the President of the United States.”).
356. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (the President has every power to pardon and stave off
all criminal proceedings while still sitting for good reason—he is also at the head of the
Justice Department, the indicting department, so it would be somewhat unlikely to expect
the department to indict the President it serves—none of this is exonerating); MSNBC, New
Reporting Suggests Strain Between William Barr And Mueller Team, YOUTUBE (Apr. 4,
2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_VrwvmRQprs (“Ultimately, history teaches us,
that Presidents in the end, when they try this stuff, they lose.”) (statement of Rachel
Maddow).
357. See A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Crim. Prosecution, 24 Op.
O.L.C. 222, 222, 254 (2000) (“The indictment or criminal prosecution of a sitting President
would unconstitutionally undermine the capacity of the executive branch to perform its constitutionally assigned functions.” – “[C]riminal litigation uniquely requires the President’s
personal time and energy, and will inevitably entail a considerable if not overwhelming
degree of mental preoccupation. Indictment also exposes the President to an official pronouncement that there is probable cause to believe he committed a criminal act, impairing
his credibility in carrying out his constitutional responsibilities to ‘take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed,’ and to speak as the ‘sole organ’ of the United States in dealing with
foreign nations. . . . Thus a categorical rule against indictment or criminal prosecution is
most consistent with the constitutional structure, rather than a doctrinal test that would
require the court to assess whether a particular criminal proceeding is likely to impose serious burdens upon the President.”).
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and abuse—and thus he must leave office or be removed by impeachment before he is indicted for crimes committed while in office.358
Accordingly, the Mueller Team did not pursue an indictment
against the president but rather expected that their report would be
made available to Congress for use in any resulting impeachment proceeding.359 When the Mueller Team publicly disputed Barr’s
exonerating summary of the report as misleading, Trump reverted
back to his earlier position and advocated for the report to be sealed.360
The House Judiciary Committee in charge of impeachments seized on
the rift between Mueller and Barr and subpoenaed the whole, unredacted report—Barr defied this subpoena and the full (unredacted)
Mueller report has yet to be released to the House.361
On April 18, 2019, AG Barr publicly released a redacted version
of the Mueller Report confirming that Barr lied to Congress and the
American people.362 The Mueller Report, though it did not exonerate
358. See Proclamation No. 4311, 39 Fed. Reg. 32,601 (Sept. 10, 1974); A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Crim. Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. at 223–24 (2000)
(citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, at cl. 7; THE FEDERALIST NOS. 65, 69, 77 (Alexander Hamilton)) (establishing that the impeachment clause itself is not a general bar on indictments of
sitting presidents, but that the former attorneys general have concluded that the Justice
Department constitutionally should refrain from indicting sitting presidents as a rule). Cf.
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 191 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694).
359. See Mimi Rocah, Barr Looks Like He’s Trying to Protect Trump, Not Get Out the
Mueller Report, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 4, 2019, 10:52 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/barrlooks-like-hes-trying-to-protect-trump-not-get-out-the-mueller-report.
360. Andrew Desiderio & Kyle Cheney, Trump changes tune on public release of Mueller
report, POLITICO (Apr. 2, 2019, 4:35 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/04/02/trumpmueller-report-1249947 (quoting Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Apr. 2,
2019, 8:54 AM), searchable on https://www.thetrumparchive.com (“There is no amount of
testimony or document production that can satisfy Jerry Nadler or Shifty Adam Schiff. It is
now time to focus exclusively on properly running our great Country!”)).
361. Nicholas Fandos, Justice Dept. Agrees to Turn Over Key Mueller Evidence to House,
N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/10/us/politics/mueller-judiciary-committee.html (“The Judiciary Committee initially requested—and then
subpoenaed—the full text of Mr. Mueller’s report without redactions weeks ago, as well as
all of the evidence underlying it. Mr. Barr refused and after negotiations broke down, Mr.
Trump asserted executive privilege over the material, prompting the committee’s contempt
recommendation.”).
362. Compare Barr’s “Principle Conclusions”, supra note 355 (“The Special Counsel’s
decision to describe the facts of his obstruction investigation without reaching any legal
conclusions leaves it to the Attorney General to determine whether the conduct described in
the report constitutes a crime. . . . I have concluded that the evidence developed during the
Special Counsel’s investigation is not sufficient to establish that the President committed
an obstruction-of-justice offense. Our determination was made without regard to, and is not
based on, the constitutional considerations that surround the indictment and criminal prosecution of a sitting president.”), with 2 ROBERT S. MUELLER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT
ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 8
(2019), https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf (“while this report does not conclude that
the President committed a crime, it also does not exonerate him”); id. at 178 n.1091 (“A
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the president, gave assurances that “the evidence does not establish
that the president was involved in an underlying crime related to Russian election interference.”363 The facts presented in the first volume of
the Mueller Report, however, could support the prosecution of several
counts of treason arguably making Mueller culpable of an even more
serious fraud upon the public than Barr.364
At the very least, the facts in the Mueller Report contained multiple instances of criminal solicitation that it did not name as
criminally chargeable solicitation.365 Failing to identify specific instances of solicitation clearly for the House of Representatives
arguably resulted in weakened impeachment charges on December 18,
2019, for “abuse of power” and “obstruction of Congress.”366 Then only
possible remedy through impeachment for abuses of power would not substitute for potential criminal liability after a President leaves office.”). Cf. Katelyn Polantz, Judge blasts
Barr’s Justice Dept. for ‘getting a jump on public relations’ in Mueller report rollout, CNN
POLITICS (May 25, 2021, 1:23 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/05/25/politics/mueller-reportjustice-department-william-barr/index.html.
363. See, e.g., 2 MUELLER, supra note 362, at 157 (“In this investigation, the evidence
does not establish that the President was involved in an underlying crime related to Russian election interference.”).
364. 1 MUELLER, supra note 362, at 110, 124–26, 130, 132–40, 149, 185; 2 MUELLER,
supra note 362, at 12, 100–03 (“The President told Hicks to say only that Trump Jr. took a
brief meeting and it was about Russian adoption.”); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 (defining treason). Cf. Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2423 (2020) (citing to Aaron Burr’s treason trial
to justify state criminal subpoenas issued on a sitting president); Kevin Breuninger &
Amanda Macias, Tom Barrack’s Arrest Puts the Spotlight on United Arab Emirates’ Crucial
Role in Trump’s Foreign Policy, CNBC (July 20, 2021, 7:55 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/
2021/07/20/trump-friend-tom-barrack-arrest-puts-the-spotlight-on-united-arab-emirates.html; 1 MUELLER, supra note 362, at 134 (noting that Barrack suggested that Trump
hire Manafort).
365. 2 MUELLER, supra note 362, at 27 n.112, 56–60, 145 (for example, the Mueller Report “did not investigate Cohen’s campaign-period payments to women” even though they
were “potentially relevant,” though the Report itself resulted in successful criminal prosecution of Michael Cohen that produced public congressional testimony that Trump solicited
illegal payments to Stormy Daniels).
366. H.R. Res. 755, 116th Cong. (2019) (enacted) (impeaching Trump for “abuse of
power” and “obstruction of Congress,” including that Trump specifically “solicited the Government of Ukraine” for corrupt purposes linked to Russian interests and generally
“betrayed the Nation by abusing his high office to enlist a foreign power [i.e., Russia] in
corrupting democratic elections”—the solicitation charge attached to the “abuse of power”
article came about because of a whistleblower complaint filed directly with Congress that
confirmed Trump’s pressure campaign on Ukraine in apparent service to Russia) (citing
Unclassified Letter from Whistleblower to Hon. Richard Burr & Hon. Adam Schiff (Aug. 12,
2019) (revealing Trump’s July 25, 2019, phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelenskyy “to take actions to help the President’s 2020 reelection bid” by smearing then
presidential hopeful Joseph Biden and his son Hunter Biden)). The Mueller Report arguably
left a whistleblower on his or her own to name Trump’s crimes clearly so that the House of
Representatives could impeach Trump for something other than mere obstruction. See 1
MUELLER, supra note 362, at 67–78 (the Mueller team knew that Trump had motive to pressure foreign nations in favor of Russia to further his ambitions of building a Trump Tower,
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a little over a year later on January 6, 2021, when President Trump’s
attempts to corrupt Ukraine in favor of his election bid failed, the president incited an insurrection for the purpose of invalidating a
legitimate election result.367
Trump was impeached for a second time on the charge of inciting an insurrection.368 Inciting an insurrection is not a common law
crime like solicitation, but it appears to be a similar statutory charge
inclusive of the common law definition of solicitation.369 It also appears
that inciting an insurrection is a lesser, inclusive charge in the first
definition of treason in § 2381 that precedes the definition of inciting
insurrections in § 2383, and that Trump could potentially be charged
with each alongside and in support of each other now that Trump is no
longer in office.370
Despite the former president’s apparent attempts to corrupt foreign governments to help him win his 2020 presidential bid, the
president is meant to take an independent role in foreign affairs, for
“[i]n this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate
and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or

Moscow); id. at 129–44 (the Mueller team knew that Paul Manafort who was Trump’s campaign chair, previously led a campaign to plant a Russian operative at the top of the
Ukrainian Government named Victor Yanukovych against U.S. interests in the region); 2
MUELLER, supra note 362, at 156 (obstruction of the Mueller investigation itself became the
focus of the Mueller probe and other possible crimes that implicated Trump, that were the
original purpose of the Mueller investigation to discover and document, were not identified
clearly enough).
367. Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Jan. 13, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitolsiege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27; House Impeachment Managers’ Video
Compilation of January 6 Attack on the U.S. Capitol, C-SPAN (Feb. 9, 2021), https://www.cspan.org/video/?c4944572/house-impeachment-managers-video-compilation-january-6-attack-us-capitol.
368. H.R. Res. 24, 117th Cong. (2021) (enacted) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3
(stating that any person that has “engaged in insurrection or rebellion against” the United
States is precluded from “hold[ing] any office . . . under the United States”—if Trump was
convicted on this count in the Senate, it was hoped that it might preclude him from running
for any office again)).
369. 18 U.S.C. § 2383 (defining inciting an insurrection as a crime); 18 U.S.C. § 373
(defining solicitation as a crime).
370. 18 U.S.C. § 2383; 18 U.S.C. § 373; H.R. Res. 24, 117th Cong. (2021) (enacted). See
Watch: McConnell’s Full Remarks Following Senate Vote to Acquit Trump, NBC NEWS (Feb.
13, 2021), https://www.nbcnews.com/video/watch-mcconnell-s-full-remarks-following-senate-vote-to-acquit-trump-100994117808 (“President Trump is still liable for everything he
did while he was in office as an ordinary citizen, unless the statute of limitations has run,
still liable for everything he did while he’s in office; didn’t get away with anything, yet. We
have a criminal justice system in this country; we have civil litigation. And former presidents are not immune from being accountable by either one.”)
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listen as a representative of the nation.”371 As to treaties, “[i]nto the
field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is
powerless to invade it.”372 As Justice Sutherland wrote,
The marked difference between foreign affairs and domestic affairs
is . . . [in cases dealing with domestic affairs] the resolution directs
the official to furnish the information. In a case of the State Department, dealing with foreign affairs, the President is requested to
furnish the information “if not incompatible with the public interest.” A statement [from the President or his Secretary] that to
furnish the information is not compatible with the public interest
rarely, if ever, is questioned.373

This means that a joint resolution of Congress regarding domestic affairs is mandatory where it can reasonably be carried out for the
defense or welfare of the people.374 However, in cases of foreign affairs
the president can only be requested to comply.375 For example, the
president may properly block a private sale of machine guns to a war
zone without congressional authorization.376
When a president enters into an agreement with a foreign
power, or with multiple foreign powers, and their agreement is ratified
as a treaty with the advice and consent of the Senate, it becomes a
supreme law of the land.377 Indeed, the first application of federal
supremacy in the United States gave preemptive force to a treaty in
Rutgers v. Waddington.378 This case derived federal supremacy from
the United States social compact sounding in the jus gentium at common law prior to the U.S. Constitution’s ratification.379
371. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
372. Id.
373. Id. at 321 (emphasis added).
374. Id.; Nixon v. Adm’r Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 483–84 (1977) (affirming a statute
that ordered an agency to take custody of presidential papers after Nixon resigned).
375. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 321. Cf. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 191
(C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694) (in a matter of foreign affairs the federal courts’ subpoena
could only be a request in this matter); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713, 715 (1974)
(“The generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for
evidence in a pending criminal trial.” The Court continued citing to the Burr case, “It is
therefore necessary in the public interest to afford Presidential confidentiality to the greatest protection consistent with the fair administration of justice.”).
376. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319–20, 329.
377. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See also Chirac v. Lessee of Chirac, 15 U.S. 259, 271, 277
(1817) (stating that when a treaty becomes the supreme law of the land, the treaty can
modify state laws and even if the treaty expires, the rights conveyed by the treaty do not
expire or otherwise give way to previously enacted state laws).
378. THE CASE OF ELIZABETH RUTGERS, supra note 131, at 28, 36–37, 46.
379. Id. at 28. (“We must acknowledge there appears to us very great force in the observation arising from the federal compact. By this compact these states are bound together as
one great independent nation; and with respect to their common and national affairs, exer-
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In lieu of actual treaties, which require the advice and consent
of the senate, executive agreements are a popular alternative among
our presidents.380 While these agreements may be submitted to the
Senate for approval as an official treaty, there is nothing about executive agreements that is inherently unconstitutional.381 There are many
situations where an executive agreement is sufficient and
appropriate.382
However, the Senate’s use of advice and consent as a party tool
to obstruct presidential foreign negotiations is a violation of the separation of powers.383 The act of individual senators purposely disrupting
executive negotiations made by the president with foreign sovereigns
by making executive agreements a matter of internal politics by grandstanding is also a violation of the separation of powers.384 Passing a
cise a joined sovereignty, whose will can only be manifested by the acts of their delegates in
Congress assembled.”).
380. Treaty vs. Executive Agreement, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/
l/treaty/faqs/70133.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2018).
381. Id. See, e.g., Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320–21 (quoting Message from President
George Washington to the U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 30, 1796)) (“‘The nature of
foreign negotiations requires caution, and their success must often depend on secrecy; and
even when brought to a conclusion a full disclosure of all the measures, demands, or eventual concessions which may have been proposed or contemplated would be extremely
impolitic; for this might have a pernicious influence on future negotiations, or produce immediate inconveniences, perhaps danger and mischief, in relation to other powers. . . . To
admit, then, a right in the House of Representatives to demand and to have as a matter of
course all the papers respecting a negotiation with a foreign power would be to establish a
dangerous precedent.’”); see also Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 574 (1840) (Opinion of
Taney, C.J.) (“[I]n every instance where there was no engagement by treaty to deliver, and a
demand has been made, they have uniformly refused, and have denied the right of the executive to surrender, because there was no treaty, and no law of Congress to authorize it”—
Chief Justice Taney’s opinion, which was adopted as law by the Supreme Court of Vermont,
suggests the unconstitutionality of executive agreements like the UKUSA “Five Eyes”
Agreement for violating the property and privacy of individuals in the United States without a treaty confirmed by the Senate, and without making a law of Congress to authorize
it.).
382. See, e.g., Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) (“That Congress
cannot delegate legislative power to the President is a principle universally recognized as
vital to the integrity and maintenance of government ordained by the Constitution. The Act
of October 1, 1890 [allowing the president to make executive trade agreements] . . . is not
inconsistent with that principle.”).
383. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319.
384. Id. (“Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is
powerless to invade it.”). See also Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (“If the Congress chooses not to confront the President, it is not our task to do
so.”). Cf. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 148–49 (1926) (explaining why the Senate
could not constitutionally clog the president’s removal power beyond its impeachment
power), cited with approval in Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 730 (1986); Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685–86 (1988). See, e.g., Jonathan Capehart, Tom Cotton picked apart
by Army general over ‘mutinous’ Iran letter, WASH. POST (Mar. 13, 2015, 10:29 AM), https://
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law that requires the president to disclose his secrets involving foreign
affairs is patently unconstitutional.385
Senators recently violated the separation of powers on all these
counts.386 Under the leadership of Senator Cotton, a Rump Senate of
forty-seven senators, signed a letter addressed directly to Iran to embarrass the foreign affairs powers of the president.387 Then Congress
passed an unconstitutional law that would (1) require the president to
disclose his Iran negotiations to the House of Representatives, and (2)
require the president to submit future negotiations with Iran to congressional oversight.388
The resulting argument over Twitter between Senator Cotton
and Iranian dignitaries also illustrates the actual constitutional design.389 Congress is not equipped with translators or diplomats to
successfully carry out such a letter.390 A majority of the Senate could
call forward translators and attempt to subpoena foreign dignitaries,
but Senator Cotton did not have a majority of the Senate with him and

www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2015/03/13/tom-cotton-picked-apart-byarmy-general-over-mutinous-iran-letter/.
385. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 321 (quoting Message from President George
Washington to the U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 30, 1796)) (“‘To admit, then, a right
in the House of Representatives to demand and to have as a matter of course all the papers
respecting a negotiation with a foreign power would be to establish a dangerous precedent.’”); See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 64 (John Jay), NOS. 69, 75 (Alexander Hamilton) (“It
seldom happens in the negotiation of treaties, of whatever nature, but that perfect SECRECY
and immediate DESPATCH are sometimes requisite.”). Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3 (giving
Congress discretion to keep their own deliberations secret).
386. Letter from Senator Tom Cotton et al. to Leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran
(Mar. 10, 2015) (signed by 47 U.S. Senators, and unconstitutionally addressed to foreign
dignitaries on behalf of the United States).
387. Id.
388. Congressional Review and Oversight of Agreements with Iran, 42 U.S.C. § 2160e
(2015). See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319–21 (quoting Message from President George
Washington to the U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 30, 1796)) (in support of these limits
on congressional power, Justice Sutherland cited to a message of President Washington
that explained why the executive branch could not allow the House a right to review the
president’s secret negotiations—and thus he refused the House’s demands regarding the
Jay Treaty).
389. Megan Specia, Republican senators’ open letter to Iran sparks fierce Twitter spat,
MASHABLE, Mar. 10, 2015, https://mashable.com/2015/03/10/republicans-open-letter-to-iran/
#92hdx6NfaSqU (“The Foreign Minister also informed the authors that majority of US international agreements in recent decades are in fact what the signatories describe as ‘mere
executive agreements’ and not treaties ratified by the Senate.”).
390. FP Staff, Sen. Tom Cotton’s Farsi Version of His Explosive Letter to Iranian Leaders Reads Like a Middle Schooler Wrote It, FOREIGN POLICY (Mar. 30, 2015, 12:33 PM),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/30/sen-tom-cottons-farsi-version-of-his-explosive-letter-toiranian-leaders-reads-like-a-middle-schooler-wrote-it/.
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even if he did the court would likely overrule this behavior for lacking a
“legitimate legislative purpose.”391
Cotton’s Rump Senate appeared afflicted by the concern that
the president’s power over foreign affairs would run rampant absent
their check.392 The fears of the Rump Senate were unfounded because,
absent a congressional declaration of war, the president has the duty
and power to preserve the peace.393 This includes, for example, a unilateral power to proscribe U.S. citizens from conscripting themselves
as mercenaries in foreign wars.394
Presidential peace orders in matters of foreign affairs require
no law or resolution from Congress, while presidential war orders are
limited to the high seas absent a congressional declaration of war.395
This difference was illustrated in Curtiss-Wright and Little v. Barreme.396 In Curtiss-Wright, the Supreme Court endorsed a presidential
peace order regardless of congressional resolutions, and in Little, the
Supreme Court found liability for a “plain trespass” regardless of a
presidential war order.397

391. Letter from Senator Tom Cotton et al. to Leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran
(Mar. 10, 2015) (signed by a minority U.S. Senators on behalf of the entire U.S. Senate);
Trump v. Mazars, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2028, 2031–32 (2020).
392. Id. See Michael Ramsey, Did the Senators’ Letter to Iran Concede Too Much?, THE
ORIGINALISM BLOG (Mar. 10, 2015), https://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalismblog/2015/03/did-the-senators-letter-to-iran-concede-too-muchmichael-ramsey.html (last
visited Feb. 24, 2019) (reflecting the radical sentiments behind Senator Cotton’s letter and
arguing that the letter was not radical enough).
See Alexander Hamilton, Defense of the President’s Neutrality Proclamation [May
393.
1793]; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 614 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (quoting Letter from the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court to George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793)) (“‘We exceedingly regret every event that may cause embarrassment
to your administration, but we derive consolation from the reflection that your judgment
will discern what is right, and that your usual prudence, decision, and firmness will surmount every obstacle to the preservation of the rights, peace, and dignity of the United
States.’”)).
394. See President George Washington, Proclamation 4—Neutrality of the United
States in the War Involving Austria, Prussia, Sardinia, Great Britain, and the United
Netherlands Against France (Apr. 22, 1793); Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. 6, 16 (1794)
(upon a proper case or controversy the Court did not wait for Congress to speak before it
said, “And the said Supreme Court being further of opinion, that no foreign power can of
right institute, or erect, any court of judicature of any kind, within the jurisdiction of the
United States, but such only as may be warranted by, and be in pursuance of treaties, it is
therefore Decreed and adjudged that the admiralty jurisdiction, which has been exercised in
the United States by the Consuls of France, not being so warranted, is not of right.”).
395. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936); Little v.
Barreme, 6 U.S. 170, 178–79 (1804).
Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 311; Little, 6 U.S. at 178.
396.
397.
Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S., at 319; Little, 6 U.S., at 179.

\\jciprod01\productn\F\FAM\15-1\FAM101.txt

2021

unknown

Seq: 67

LEVIATHAN GOES TO WASHINGTON

10-JAN-22

10:23

67

At the fringe of the president’s neutral peace powers, is his
power to expel non-enemy, foreign combatants by refusing them accommodation in U.S. ports.398 Accordingly, President Jefferson
expelled British vessels by proclamation in response to the Chesapeake
Affair, in which four U.S. naval officers were seized and pressed into
British slavery.399 Three were African Americans and the fourth was
an English immigrant, and Jefferson boldly addressed all of them as
natural born, legitimate officers and freemen to dispute English
impressment.400
When the president makes orders of quasi-war on the high seas,
as President Adams did in Little, he or she requires the authorization
of a duly enacted piracy law.401 When the president wishes to make
war on land, his or her orders commanding such acts must necessarily
follow a congressional declaration of war.402 The president cannot legitimately exercise war powers without a declaration of war, even
where Congress attempts to waive the declaration of war
requirement.403
398.
Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10, with President Thomas Jefferson, Proclamation 14—Requiring Removal of British Armed Vessels From United States Ports and
Waters (July 2, 1807) (“Hospitality under such circumstances ceases to be a duty, and a
continuance of it with such uncontrolled abuses would tend only, by multiplying injuries
and irritations, to bring on a rupture between the two nations.”).
399. See President Thomas Jefferson, Proclamation 14—Requiring Removal of British
Armed Vessels From United States Ports and Waters (July 2, 1807).
See Id. (the men taken “were native citizens of the United States”); JOSEPH T.
400.
WILSON, THE BLACK PHALANX 73–74 (1890) [hereinafter JOSEPH T. WILSON] (Jefferson’s
Proclamation vindicated the honor of “three negroes, Ware, Martin and Strachan [who]
were natives of America” and “John Wilson, a white man . . . [who] was a British subject.”).
Cf. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319 (similarly affirming the President’s decision to block a
sale of goods to Bolivia to preserve peace).
See Little, 6 U.S. at 170.
401.
402.
Id. at 178–79; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; James Madison, Helvidius No. IV
[Sept. 14, 1793] (“In no part of the constitution is more wisdom to be found than in the
clause which confides the question of war or peace to the legislature, and not to the executive department.”); Holmes v. United States, 391 U.S. 936, 949 (1968) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (“I think we owe to those who are being marched off to jail for maintaining that
a declaration of war is essential for conscription an answer to this important undecided
constitutional question.”).
403. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; id. art. III, § 3, cl. 1. See Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S.
540, 577 (1840) (Opinion of Taney, C.J.) (“The question to be decided is a question of foreign
policy; committed, unquestionably, to the general government. The federal government has
also the power to declare war; and whenever it becomes a question whether we are to be at
peace or at war, undoubtedly the general government must determine that question. And if
Congress decides that the honour and interest of the country does not require war, and, on
that account, refuses to declare it, is not this an exercise of its power over the subject?”). See
Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) (nondelegation doctrine should apply to congressional attempts to waive its duty to declare war before delegating war
powers).
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Since the Vietnam War, Congress has nevertheless waived a
wide range of war powers to the president.404 These war powers were
steadily expanded to carry on the wars on drugs and crime.405 Finally,
in the wake of 9/11 Congress waived war powers to wage the war on
terror, now known as the “Long War,”406 which justified expanding the
practice of suspicionless searches on U.S. citizens that violate the holding in Kyllo v. United States.407
Congressional waivers of war powers to the president can implicate Congress in treason and other crimes that Congress did not
intend, including the suspicionless surveillance on members of Congress themselves.408 Unlike Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, where the
Supreme Court held that Congress may delegate power to make executive trade agreements, resolutions allowing the use of military force

404. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, 78 Stat. 384. See Alien Enemies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 21–24
(1940); War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–49 (1973). Cf. Sarnoff v. Shultz, 409 U.S.
929, 930 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“No declaration of war has been made respecting
Vietnam.”).
405. See Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1236;
Seizure and Forfeiture of Carriers Transporting, etc., Contraband Articles, 49 U.S.C.
§§ 781–89; Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–473, 98 Stat. 1837;
Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904; The Contras, Cocaine, and Covert Operations, NAT’L SEC. ARCHIVE: GEO. WASH. U., https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/
NSAEBB2/index.html [hereinafter The Contras] (President Reagan knowingly funded wars
in Nicaragua with drug money, to support the ultimate trafficking of cocaine into the United
States).
406. Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–40, 115
Stat. 224; National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No.
112–81, 125 Stat. 1298.
407. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1813; USA Patriot
Act, Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34–40
(2001) (“Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to
explore the details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a
warrant.”) (emphasis added).
408. Letter from Rep. Anna G. Eshoo to Hon. John Ratcliffe & Hon. Paul M. Nakasone
(Aug. 28, 2020) (“The surveillance of Congressional and judicial communications by the executive branch seriously threatens the separation of powers principles of our constitution.”)
(quoting BARTON GELLMAN, DARK MIRROR 326 (2020)); FISA, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–13. Cf. In re
All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intel. Surveillance Ct., 218 F. Supp.2d 611, 624–25
(FISA Ct. 2002) (the secret FISA Court broke its silence in 2002 when the barriers between
domestic and international investigation at the FBI were inappropriately broken down by
Congress—thus allowing the FBI to treat all U.S. citizens like hostile enemies); U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 3, cl. 1 (“Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying war
against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort.”).

\\jciprod01\productn\F\FAM\15-1\FAM101.txt

2021

unknown

Seq: 69

LEVIATHAN GOES TO WASHINGTON

10-JAN-22

10:23

69

beyond the high seas require a declaration of war.409 This is implied
from the rule in Little v. Barreme.410
The president cannot rule according to martial law, unless
there is actual, physical violence shuttering the doors of Article III
courts.411 To do this would be to administer a government of men
rather than law by suspending the common law of habeas corpus.412
The curtilage of the home continues to be protected by this common
law, for as James Otis declared in 1761, “A man, who is quiet, is as
secure in his house, as a prince in his castle.”413
Presidential privilege may be limited by the laws of Congress
according to Nixon v. Adm’r Gen. Servs.414 On their face, laws made to
subpoena confidential presidential documents on behalf of the public
do not violate the separation of powers, presidential privilege, the Bill
of Attainder Clause, or the individual rights of the president.415 Fed-

409. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) (“That Congress cannot
delegate legislative power to the President is a principle universally recognized as vital to
the integrity and maintenance of government ordained by the Constitution.”); Holmes v.
United States, 391 U.S. 936, 949 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
11.
410. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170, 178 (1804) (implying that the court will not uphold
inherent presidential war powers, but that it will invalidate presidential war orders wherever they surpass Congress’s duly enacted piracy laws and declarations of war as “a plain
trespass” so that foreigners can sue for redress in American Courts).
411. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 131 (1866) (during the Civil War trial by martial law
was overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court wherever actual violence did not shutter the
doors of Article III Courts.). See THE CONSPIRATOR (Lionsgate 2010) (this movie starring
Robin Wright and James McAvoy tells the story of how and why Ex parte Milligan came to
be).
412. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 129–31 (distinguishing this case from Luther v. Borden, where
the U.S. Supreme Court turned a blind eye on the basic constitutional rights of Martin and
Rachel Luther as a nonjusticiable political question—Luther’s failure to protect basic
human rights is one of the main turning points that drove the nation into Civil War).
413. SIMMONS, supra note 31, at 4, 17. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34–38
(2001) (“The Agema Thermovision 210 might disclose, for example, at what hour each night
the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath—a detail that many would consider
‘intimate’; and a much more sophisticated system might detect nothing more intimate than
the fact that someone left a closet light on.” Thus refusing to develop jurisprudence based
upon what “home activities are ‘intimate’ and which are not.”).
414. Nixon v. Adm’r Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 441–84 (1977).
415. See id. (considering whether the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act violated the separation of powers, presidential privilege, privacy rights, First
Amendment rights, or the Bills of Attainder Clause—the Court found that there was no
violation on the face of the Act). Cf. Trump v. Mazars, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2028, 2031–32 (2020)
(requiring congressional subpoenas, without a law, to be supported by a legitimate legislative purpose).
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eral courts can also subpoena confidential executive documents as was
done in United States v. Burr.416
If a president makes war on his own people with civil forfeiture,
dragnet surveillance programs, or by the supplanting of ordinary criminal law procedures of Article III courts with the arbitrary practice of
martial law administered by executive councils, it is the duty of the
legislative and judicial branches to check these abuses of power.417
Recognizing this duty, Rep. Barbara Lee cast the only vote against
passing the AUMF of 2001 in the wake of 9/11.418 As Justice Sutherland also concluded, “this court may not, and should not, hesitate to
declare acts of Congress, however many times repeated, to be unconstitutional if beyond all rational doubt it finds them to be so[.]”419
Leading the way again, around twenty years after her original
resistance to AUMF, Rep. Barbara Lee managed to pass a bill to repeal
the AUMF 2002 in the House of Representatives.420 Congress should
take Lee’s note, learn from her integrity, and join her in repealing all
former waivers of its war making powers as violations of the nondelegation doctrine, and otherwise require the president to maintain
neutrality with other nations whenever Congress has not declared
war.421 The judiciary should, wherever Congress fails to repeal them,
416. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 199–201 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694) (forcing the Executive to choose “either to produce the relevant information or to suffer
dismissal”; this holding should call the constitutionality of the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) into doubt); CIPA, Pub. L. No. 96–456, 94 Stat. 2025 (1980) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–16). As Professor Donohue’s research suggests, the courts
have begun presuming states secrets privilege under CIPA without an express invocation of
states secrets by the Executive Branch. Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets,
159 U. PA. L. REV. 77, 211–12 (2010) [hereinafter Donohue, The Shadow] (“Extraordinarily,
the court did not require that the head of the department with control over the information
formally invoke the privilege . . . . Once again, the executive branch had not actually invoked the state secrets privilege—nor did it need to do so.”).
417. See generally U.S. CONST. pmbl.; id. arts. I, III; Milligan, 71 U.S. at 129–31 (quoting Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 564 (1840) (Opinion of Taney, C.J.)); United States v.
The Amistad, 40 U.S. 518, 552–53 (1841) (quoting Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 569
(1840) (Opinion of Taney, C.J.); id. at 598 (see the note regarding the results of the case)). In
the case of Holmes, the Court denied that states have the power to deliver up a U.S. citizen
to be tried in the criminal courts of foreign nations. Holmes, 39 U.S. at 598.
418. Rep. Barbara Lee, Speech on 9/14/01, https://lee.house.gov/news/videos/watch/
speech-on-9/14/01.
419. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 327 (1936).
420. H.R. 256, 117th Cong. (2021) (sponsored by Rep. Barbara Lee).
421. A non-exhaustive list of these laws includes: Alien Enemies Act, 50 U.S.C.
§§ 21–24; War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–49; AUMF of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-40,
115 Stat. 224; NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, 125 Stat. 1298; Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–473, 98 Stat. 1837; Controlled Substances
Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904; Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–13;
USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). See Marshall Field & Co. Field v.
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overrule all federal laws that violate the separation of powers through
waiver and order the executive to desist all war making activities that
are not expressly supported by duly enacted piracy laws and declarations of war.422
Finally, the president has two primary ways to check the powers of Congress and the judiciary.423 First is the veto power, which was
discussed in the previous section.424 Second is the pardon power, which
was meant to remedy unjust convictions or to commute punishments
that significantly outweigh the crime.425 The president’s pardon power
is limited only to federal cases, whereas crimes tried in state courts can
only be pardoned by a governor, unless the state is in open
insurrection.426
A pardon “carries an imputation of guilt; acceptance a confession of it.”427 This distinguishes a pardon from immunity, because
immunity does not impute or confer any sort of guilt onto its beneficiClark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892); Holmes v. United States, 391 U.S. 936, 949 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 577 (1840) (Opinion of Taney, C.J.).
422. See, e.g., Milligan, 71 U.S. at 129–31 (overruling all military tribunals where an
Article III Court is available to hear a writ of habeas corpus). The Court has jurisdiction to
resolve the declaration of war question, but it was not yet briefed on the question as beheld
by Justice Douglas’s dissents in Holmes and Hart, and no case afterward decided the matter. Holmes v. United States, 391 U.S. 936, 938 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“It is clear
from our decisions that conscription is constitutionally permissible when there has been a
declaration of war. But we have never decided whether there may be conscription in absence
of a declaration of war. Our cases suggest (but do not decide) that there may not be.”); Hart
v. United States, 391 U.S. 956, 960 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
423. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
424. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
425. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150, 160 (1833) (“A
pardon is an act of grace . . . .”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander Hamilton). See, e.g.,
Abraham Lincoln, Exec. Order No. 1—Relating to Political Prisoners (Feb. 14, 1862); Jordan
Fabian, Obama grants clemency to 231 inmates in one-day record, THE HILL, (Dec. 19, 2016,
3:09 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/311059-obama-commutessentences-as-time-in-office-dwindles. Cf. Gregory Korte, Can Trump really do that? The
presidential pardon power, explained, USA TODAY (June 4, 2018, 3:46 PM), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/06/04/presidential-pardons-explanation-executive-clemency-powers/660381002/ (“Trump’s pardons are raising new questions about [the
pardon power’s] purpose and limits.”).
426. Abraham Lincoln, Exec. Order No. 1—Relating to Political Prisoners (Feb. 14,
1862); Carlesi v. People of the State of New York, 233 U.S. 51, 59 (1914). Cf. United States
v. Schaffer, 240 F.3d 35, 38 (2001) (declaring the effect of a pardon before a final determination on the merits was to moot the retrial case and any pending appeals, when accepted
before the retrial); David Grann, Trial by Fire, NEW YORKER (Sept. 7, 2009), https://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/09/07/trial-by-fire (Governor Rick Perry refused to
grant Cameron Todd Willingham clemency even though he was likely not guilty due to forensic evidence that came to light after his case was already decided.).
427. Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 90–91, 94 (1915).
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ary.428 A pardon must also be accepted in order to be legally valid,
meaning that the admission of guilt through acceptance of a pardon is
legally mandatory.429 Furthermore, according to D.C. Circuit precedent, pardons moot all pending appeals and orders granting new
trials.430
However, President Trump not only pardoned Sheriff Arpaio for
his existing conviction, but also for “any other [contempt] offenses . . .
that might arise, or be charged, in connection with Melendres v.
Arpaio.”431 This appears to be an attempt to grant immunity for future
flouting of the Article III equitable powers invested in the court’s decision in Melendres.432 In so much as Trump’s pardon was an attempt to
immunize the office of Sheriff of Maricopa County from contempt, it
was unconstitutional.433
It appears that former President Trump intended to immunize
the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office from constitutional violations
arising from its “concentration camp” for immigrants.434 On August 22,
2017, Trump stated that Sheriff Arpaio was convicted of contempt for

428.
Id. at 94–95 (dismissing contempt proceedings for refusing to testify, because a
pardon is not legislative immunity by which the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent
can be overcome).
429. Id. at 91 (observing “the necessity of the acceptance of a pardon to its legal efficacy”). Cf. Tim Marcin, Joe Arpaio Found Out He Admitted Guilt with Trump Pardon on
Live TV, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 15, 2018, 2:25 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/joe-arpaio-foundout-admitted-guilt-trump-pardon-live-tv-781824.
430. United States v. Schaffer, 240 F.3d 35, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
431. Executive Grant of Clemency to Joseph M. Arpaio (Aug. 25, 2017).
432. Melendres v. Arpaio, 989 F. Supp. 2d 822, 910 (D. Ariz. 2013), Maricopa County v.
Melendres, 784 F.3d 1254 (2016) (explaining Judge Snow’s orders attached to the office of
Sheriff of Maricopa County and not Arpaio personally), cert. denied 577 U.S. 1062 (2016).
433. See United States v. Arpaio, 887 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 2018). The former president’s apparent attempt to immunize the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office from the
consequences of violating “the constitutional rights of Hispanic people” is obviously unconstitutional, because the president has no power to immunize the government from the
consequences of violating the terms of the U.S. Constitution. Jaques Billeaud, Former Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio’s Immigration Patrols to Cost Public $200M, AZCENTRAL.
(May 17, 2021, 10:10 PM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/phoenix/2021/05/17/
arizona-former-sheriff-joe-arpaios-immigration-patrols-cost-public-200-m/5141225001/.
434. Executive Grant of Clemency to Joseph M. Arpaio (Aug. 25, 2017) (expressly intending to release Arpaio from future “offenses . . . that might arise, or be charged, in
connection with Melendres v. Arpaio”—the Melendres case named Arpaio in his official capacity not as an individual—it was not a case about the individual person, but wholly
regarded his office); Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 994 (9th Cir. 2012) (referring to
“Sheriff Joseph M. Arpaio and the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (collectively, the Defendants)”). Cf. Billeaud, supra note 433 (Trump’s pardon can reasonably be interpreted as
an attempt to help the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office avoid paying the high costs of institutionalizing concentration camps for racist reasons).
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“doing his job.”435 The former president also nearly quashed the case
“months before the case went to trial . . . but the President was advised
that that would be inappropriate.”436
A presidential quash of Arpaio’s case would have been grounds
for an obstruction charge against Trump, a potentially impeachable offense.437 As it stands, the former president allowed the case to go
forward and pardoned Arpaio only after the Sheriff was removed from
office.438 The court order remains binding on the office of Sheriff of
Maricopa County, a monitor was duly appointed to ensure the Sheriffs
compliance with the order, and one might hope “the world spins madly
on.”439
The world, however, is beginning to spin in reverse.440 After all
this, the Ninth Circuit split with D.C. Circuit precedent by allowing
Sheriff Arpaio to appeal his moot conviction.441 Instead of dismissing
Arpaio’s appeal, the Ninth Circuit appointed a special prosecutor to
defend Arpaio’s conviction in the U.S. Supreme Court; such an appointment might have been made to monitor compliance with the district
court’s order upon the Sheriff’s Office rather than this distraction.442
The Ninth Circuit may appoint a special prosecutor under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(a)(2) to defend the court’s binding
orders against the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office on its own motion
435. President Trump Hints at Pardoning Sheriff Joe Arpaio, C-SPAN (Aug. 22, 2017),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4680470/president-trump-hints-pardoning-sheriff-joearpaio.
436. Rachel Maddow, Trump exposed to new obstruction charge over Arpaio queries,
MSNBC (Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow/watch/trump-exposed-tonew-obstruction-charge-over-arpaio-queries-1034767427813?v=raila&.
437. Id.; 1 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 221, at 784 (“Obstruction of justice undermines the
judicial system in the same fashion that perjury does, and it also warrants conviction and
removal.”); 2 MUELLER, supra note 362, at 8 (“Because we determined not to make a traditional prosecutorial judgment, we did not draw ultimate conclusions about the President’s
conduct. . . . Accordingly, while this report does not conclude that the President committed a
crime, it also does not exonerate him.”).
438. Maddow, supra note 436.
439. Melendres v. Arpaio, 989 F. Supp. 2d 822, 910 (D. Ariz. 2013); Melendres v. Arpaio,
784 F.3d 1254, 1266 (9th Cir. 2015); The Weepies, World Spins Madly On [2006].
440. John Adams, Thoughts on Government 22 [1776].
441. United States v. Arpaio, No. CR-16-01012-001-PHX-SRB, 2017 WL 4839072, at *2
(D. Ariz. 2017) (citing United States v. Schaffer, 240 F.3d 35, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2001)); United
States v. Arpaio, 887 F.3d 979, 981–82 (9th Cir. 2018) (impliedly disagreeing with Schaffer).
442. United States v. Arpaio, 887 F.3d 979, 984 (9th Cir. 2018) (Tallman, J., dissenting)
(citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a)(2)) (correctly noting that the Court’s power under Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 42(a)(2) “allows the Court to appoint a private attorney to investigate
and prosecute potential instance of criminal contempt,” and since Arpaio is no longer sheriff
of anything, there is no risk that he personally could be in contempt of Judge Snow’s order).
See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
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under the Court’s inherent contempt power under Article III.443 The
Court does not need to be moved in order to take this action.444 However, it appears that the Ninth Circuit committed itself to defend moot
convictions rather than prosecuting live, presently occurring contempts of court.445
During concerns that the president participated in Russian
meddling in the 2016 election, former President Trump was convinced
that he had the “absolute right” to pardon himself of his own crimes.446
However, as Trump eventually discovered, the president is constitutionally barred from pardoning any person including himself from
impeachment.447 If a president pardoned himself from being criminally
charged for treason, obstruction of justice, or other impeachable offenses, he may still be impeached for these offenses and the pardon
itself may be cited as prima facie evidence of the president’s guilt in his
impeachment trial.448
The real existential threat to the Republic is not the president’s
pardon power, it is the court’s feudal doctrines of non-justiciability, and

443. U.S. CONST. art. III; Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 83, § 17 (vesting the federal
courts the power “to punish by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of said courts, all
contempts of authority in any cause or hearing”); Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 510 (1873)
(“The power to punish contempts is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of the judgments, orders, and writs of the courts, and consequently to the due administration of justice. The
moment the courts of the United States were called into existence and invested with jurisdiction over any subject, they became possessed of this power.”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 42. Cf.
United States v. Arpaio, 887 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 2018) (it is unclear that the special
prosecutor will continue investigating the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office itself for compliance with Judge Snow’s order, but it appears that the special prosecutor can and should—
this lack of clarity in the special counsel order itself and the Ninth Circuit’s preoccupation
with defending a moot conviction may be the basis of the dissent by Tallman and the dissenting justices en banc—the lack of clarity itself opens the Court up to an imputation of
improper political reasons for the order instead of a genuine intent to enforce duly ordered
findings of the lower courts).
444. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 799–800 (1987).
445. United States v. Arpaio, 887 F.3d 979, 980 (9th Cir. 2018) (making no mention of
the current Sheriff of Maricopa County Paul Penzone or Judge Snow’s order).
446. John Wagner, Trump says he has ‘absolute right’ to pardon himself of federal
crimes but denies any wrongdoing, WASH. POST (June 4, 2018), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-says-he-has-absolute-right-to-pardon-himself-offederal-crimes-but-denies-any-wrongdoing/2018/06/04/3d78348c-67dd-11e8-bea7c8eb28bc52b1_story.html.
447. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (the president has the power to
grant “reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of
impeachment”).
448. Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 94–95 (1915).
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sovereign and qualified immunity.449 If former President Trump did
meddle in the 2016 election with the help of the Russians, these doctrines say that all must blindly bow to his powers regardless of their
legitimacy.450 Therefore, our greatest concern exists in the slavish
reemergence of feudal law in the third branch of government—the
judiciary.451
Article III: The Judicial Power
The Judicial Power is the last and lowest of the three powers of
government, and yet it is also the most final and far reaching of the
three.452 Where the first two powers are vested directly through the
U.S. Constitution, the third judicial power is vested by the U.S. Constitution through the Judiciary Act.453 The Judiciary Act is therefore
considered the third of the three founding documents, and its existence
as a mere law that can be amended by Congress confirms the judiciary’s lower comparative station.454
The humility of the judiciary is also signified by the fact that
the judges on the U.S. Supreme Court are appointed to power by the
president with advice and consent of the Senate.455 These proceedings
can be highly controversial, especially to those with a controversial
449. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 46 (1849) (non-justiciability doctrine); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982) [hereinafter Fitzgerald I] (so called absolute immunity));
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) [hereinafter Fitzgerald II] (qualified immunity). Cf. Ali Vitali, Trump Says He Could ‘Shoot Somebody’ and Still Maintain Support,
NBC NEWS (Jan. 23, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/trump-says-hecould-shoot-somebody-still-maintain-support-n502911.
450. Jane Mayer, How Russia Helped Swing the Election for Trump, NEW YORKER (Oct.
1, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/10/01/how-russia-helped-to-swing-theelection-for-trump. See Luther, 48 U.S. at 46 (approving by default of “the declaration of
martial law by the legislative authority of the State, made for the purpose of self-defense”).
451. Luther, 48 U.S. at 46; Fitzgerald I, 457 U.S. at 749; Fitzgerald II, 457 U.S. at 818.
See The Bankers Case [1696] 14 How. St. Tr. 1, 32 (Eng.), distinguished and delegitimized
by Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 465 (1793) (Opinion of Wilson, J.); id. at 451 (Opinion of
Blair, J.); id. at 468 (Opinion of Cushing, J.); id. at 475–78 (Opinion of Jay, C.J.); id. at
437–45 (Iredell, J., dissenting) (Iredell’s dissent vigorously defended The Bankers Case, but
it was distinguished and delegitimized by the other justices). Cf. Schroeder, The Body,
supra note 121, at 24.
452. U.S. CONST. art. III.
453. Id. (“The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court,
and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”);
Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 83, §§ 1–35.
454. O’Connor, supra note 71, at 3–5 (citing Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 83).
455. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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past like Bork, Thomas, or Kavanaugh.456 It is a highly political and an
imperfect way of choosing jurists to sit on the land’s highest courts, but
it is necessary as only death or impeachment can remove them
involuntarily.457
The federal judge’s lifetime appointment without possibility of
removal except by impeachment composes the basis of judicial independence in the United States.458 This Article III system, which
successfully separated the judicial power from the executive and legislative is considered the United States’ most original addition to the
study of political science.459 This system was adopted in the U.S. Constitution directly from John Adams’ 1776 tract Thoughts on
Government where he said,
The judges, therefore, should be always men of learning and experience in the laws, of exemplary morals, great patience, calmness,
coolness, and attention. Their minds should not be distracted with
jarring interests; they should not be dependent upon any man, or
body of men. To these ends, they should hold estates for life in their
offices; or, in other words, their commissions should be during good
behavior and their salaries ascertained and established by law.460

According to Adams’ suggestions, the U.S. Constitution secures for federal judges a lifetime office “during good behavior.”461 During
impeachment proceedings, such as the impeachment of Associate Justice Samuel Chase of the U.S. Supreme Court, the Senate must find
that a federal judge objectively participated in bad behavior on the
456. Taking a Stand on Confirmation: Senatorial Voices for and Against Bork, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 6, 1987, at B6; see also Megan McCluskey, ‘Like a Frat Out of Hell.’ Jimmy
Kimmel Delivers a Blistering Play-By-Play of the Kavanaugh Hearing, TIME (Sept. 28, 2018,
11:47 AM), https://time.com/5409751/jimmy-kimmel-kavanaugh-hearing/; Dan Mangan,
There are key differences between the possible Brett Kavanaugh showdown with accuser
Christine Blasey Ford and the Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas saga, CNBC (Sept. 18, 2018),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/18/hearing-for-brett-kavanaugh-and-accuser-looks-likeanita-hill-case.html.
457.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.; Adam Edelman, Sen. Lindsey Graham got really,
really mad at the Kavanaugh hearing, NBC (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/
politics/supreme-court/sen-lindsey-graham-got-really-really-mad-kavanaugh-hearingn914456. Richard Wolff, Brett Kavanaugh’s credibility has not survived this devastating
hearing, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/
sep/27/brett-kavanaugh-credibility-devastating-hearing; Alan Fram & Lisa Mascaro, Kavanaugh sworn in after Senate approves him by 50-48 vote, THE BOSTON GLOBE (Oct. 6, 2018),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2018/10/06/gop-poised-elevate-kavanaugh-supreme-court/p7VM2vHiUelBEn17UGRTiP/story.html.
458. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; John Adams, Thoughts on Government 21–22 [1776].
459. See O’Connor, supra note 71, at 2, 6.
460. John Adams, Thoughts on Government 21–22 [1776] (emphasis added).
461. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; John Adams, Thoughts on Government 21–22 [1776].
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bench.462 If a federal judge has not committed any instance of bad behavior, he or she should not be impeached.463
The role that presidents and Congress hold in appointing and
impeaching was intended to preclude judges from holding duties that
might inure political bias.464 The alternative of periodic judicial elections proposed by some under democratic principles is usually a guise
for a fatalistic belief that judges are fundamentally unable to be impartial decision makers.465 The result of this alternative, as implemented
in many of the states, is highly problematic.466
Subjecting judges to periodic elections does not necessarily lead
to good behavior; it often leads to the worst judicial behavior of all.467
462. 2 SMITH & LLOYD, supra note 220, at 132–33, 145 (“the tenure by which a judge
holds his office, is good behaviour, therefore that he [i.e., Associate Justice Chase] is removable for misbehavior”).
463. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
464. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; John Adams, Thoughts on Government 21–22 [1776].
465. See Carrie Johnson, Is it Time to Reconsider Lifetime Appointments to the Supreme
Court?, NPR (Feb. 17, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2016/02/17/466976937/is-ittime-to-reconsider-lifetime-appointments-to-the-supreme-court.
466. See Judicial Selection: Significant Figures, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (May 8, 2015),
https://www.brennancenter.org/rethinking-judicial-selection/significant-figures. One of the
only states to retain a real independent judiciary branch is Massachusetts, which originally
abolished slavery through its courts, while there is a history in the South of abandoning the
appointment process for choosing judges by popular vote in periodic elections, during reconstruction Southern States had to readopt the appointment model in order to rejoin the
Union, and now it is being abandoned again. Mumbet’s Case [also known as Brom & Bett v.
Ashley], Court Decision, Aug. 1781, reprinted in BRUNS, supra note 111, at 468–70 ; Commonwealth v. Jennison, Charge of the Chief Justice and Jury Verdict (Mass. 1783), reprinted
in 13 PROCEEDINGS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY, 294–95 (1875); see Roy S.
Moore, Administrative Order of the Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court 4 (2016)
(the elected Chief Justice Roy Moore of Alabama attempted to block the U.S. Supreme
Court’s opinion Obergefell v. Hodges from taking effect in Alabama). See, e.g., FLA. CONST.
OF 1868, art. VI, § 3 (“The Supreme Court shall consist of a chief justice and two associate
justices, who shall hold their offices for life or during good behavior. They shall be appointed
by the Governor and confirmed by the Senate.”); ALA. CONST. OF 1819, art. V, §§ 11–13 (giving judges fixed salaries, requiring them to serve during good behavior, and upholding a
nomination process through a vote in the legislature); ALA. CONST. OF 1861, art. V, § 11 (“the
General Assembly shall provide by law for the election of judges”); ALA. CONST. OF 1901, art.
VI, § 152 (the government of Alabama never bounced back from the secessionist creation of
elections for the judiciary—in this light, Roy Moore and his attempts to erode federal jurisdiction over Alabama from the bench make logical sense because Alabama never came back
into the fold); T.A. Frank, The Last Days of Roy Moore: Inside the Strange, Surreal, Bewildering End of the Alabama Special Election, VANITY FAIR (Dec. 13, 2017), https://
www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/12/the-last-days-of-roy-moore-inside-the-end-of-the-alabama-special-election.
467. See Kate Berry, How Judicial Elections Impact Criminal Cases, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUST. (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/201908/Report_How_Judicial_Elections_Impact_Criminal_Cases.pdf (judicial elections distract judges
by giving them incentives other than administering justice and establishing the truth). See
also Matt Ford, When Your Judge Isn’t a Lawyer, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 5, 2017), https://
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For example, the elected judge, Roy Moore, of Alabama created numerous fiascos on the bench involving the repeated resistance to federal
court orders in an apparent appeal to his political base.468 His ongoing
bad behavior on the Alabama bench and his attempt to run for office in
the United States Senate after twice being removed from the Alabama
Supreme Court is a stain on Alabama law and politics.469
The Roy Moore fiascos are a living symbol of the entrenchment
of racism and bigotry in the South,470 but politicizing the bench also
created horrifying instances of bad behavior in the North.471 The most
despicable of these include the Kids for Cash scandal, where judges
purchased a financial interest in correctional institutions and used
their positions to ensure maximum profits biasing their judgements in
criminal cases, and the Porn-Gate scandal, where former Pennsylvania
Attorney General Kathleen Kane exposed numerous vulgar and offensive emails including porn exchanged by Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Justices.472 Now the Kids for Cash judges are serving time in federal
prison, at least two elected Pennsylvania Supreme Court justices resigned due to Porn-Gate, three others are reportedly still being
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/when-your-judge-isnt-a-lawyer/515568/ (reporting that Montana, Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, New York, Texas, South Carolina, and
Wyoming allow non-lawyer judges—in the case that these judges violated codes of judicial
conduct they cannot (as in Williams-Yulee) be censored by the appropriate state bar); Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 439–43 (2015) (it is a very high likelihood that if
Williams-Yulee had won her election while violating Florida’s Canons of Judicial Conduct
she would not have been censored by the Florida Bar; and even if she was, the determination in federal court would likely have been much different, i.e., nonjusticiable political
questions are usually blocked from federal review when the court doesn’t want to answer
questions like this—as things stand now, censoring her after she lost was a pyrrhic victory).
468. See, e.g., Matt Ford, The Incendiary Roy Moore, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 27, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/09/roy-moore-firebrand/541341/; Noah
Feldman, Alabama’s Renegade Judge Defies Gay Marriage Order, BLOOMBERG OPINION
(Jan. 28, 2015, 7:56 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2015-01-28/renegadealabama-judge-roy-moore-defies-gay-marriage-order.
469. See Jess Bidgood et al., For Roy Moore, a Long History of Combat and Controversy,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/18/us/roy-moorealabama.html.
470. See Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1302–03 (11th Cir. 2003) (comparing Justice Moore to segregationist judges that resisted federal orders to desegregate the South);
USA Today, Sharia Law, Slavery and Abolishing Amendments: 6 of Roy Moore’s Most Memorable Quotes, USA TODAY (Dec. 12, 2017, 1:25 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
politics/onpolitics/2017/12/12/sharia-law-slavery-6-roy-moores-most-memorable-quotes/
943955001/ (including racial slurs against Asians, Native Americans, Muslims, and, of
course, Roy Moore stated that the meaning of Trump making America great again was that
Trump would bring the country back to the time of African slavery).
471. See Berry, supra note 467, at 2.
472. See KIDS FOR CASH (SenArt Films 2013); David Gambacorta, The Great Pennsylvania Government Porn Caper, ESQUIRE (Feb. 24, 2016), https://www.esquire.com/newspolitics/a42234/porngate-pennsylvania-kathleen-kane/?Src=longreads.
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investigated, and AG Kane was charged with perjury and other crimes,
and resigned.473
The general problem with electing judges is that election
processes invite bad judicial behavior.474 We usually allow and even
applaud such behavior in our presidents and our congressional representatives.475 The same behavior our politicians ordinarily engage in,
such as promising to be tough on crime in political ads, is not acceptable from those in charge of jury instructions, bail hearings, custody
battles, and criminal sentencing.476
The judiciary is meant to be impartial, unbiased, and independent from the “jarring interests” of politics.477 The founders knew that
subjecting prospective and sitting judges to elections is obviously inappropriate, because it would force judges to promise politically biased
outcomes in cases before the facts could be reviewed.478 Indeed, judicial
independence from politics was once a mark of statehood in America,
and the reemergence of political terms for judges in many states resembles a backsliding into mere territorial or colonial status.479
473. See KIDS FOR CASH (SenArt Films 2013); Wallace McKelvey, ‘Porngate’ scandal in
Pennsylvania: The basics and the background, PENNLIVE (June 22, 2016), https://
www.pennlive.com/news/2016/01/porngate_scandal_in_pennsylvan.html (it is extremely difficult to keep up with the specifics of who is affected, has resigned, is resigning or will resign
or will be removed or will be tried and/or convicted in Pennsylvania over these emails);
Barbara Goldberg, Second Pennsylvania judge resigns amid ‘Porngate’ scandal, REUTERS
(Mar. 15, 2016, 4:15 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pennsylvania-kane/secondpennsylvania-judge-resigns-amid-porngate-scandal-idUSKCN0WH2MR.
474. KIDS FOR CASH (SenArt Films 2013); Gambacorta, supra note 464; Roy S. Moore,
Administrative Order of the Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court 4 (2016).
475. See, e.g., Teddy Roosevelt’s ‘Bully Pulpit’ Isn’t the Platform it Once Was, NPR (Nov.
4, 2013, 3:18 AM), https://www.npr.org/2013/11/04/242405056/teddy-roosevelts-bully-pulpitisnt-the-platform-it-once-was.
476. See 1 SMITH & LLOYD, supra note 220, at 306 (“political charges ought not to be
delivered from the bench”); Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 439–43 (2015);
Berry, supra note 467, at 2–3.
477. John Adams, Thoughts on Government 21–22 [1776]; THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 10–11, 17, 20–21 (U.S. 1776) (accusing the king of establishing political,
arbitrary, and biased judges and judicial processes in America); SIMMONS, supra note 31, at
9–13 (explaining how the American idea of separation of powers came about by the experience of Massachusetts Bay after “Chief Justice Sewall died, and Lieutenant Governor
Hutchinson was made his successor, thereby united in his person, the office of Lieutenant
Governor with the emoluments of the commander of the castle, a member of the Council,
Judge of Probate and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court!”).
478. John Adams, Thoughts on Government 21–22 [1776]; THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 10–11, 17, 20–21 (U.S. 1776).
479. Williams-Yulee, 575 U.S. at 438. See Benner v. Porter, 50 U.S. 235, 237, 240–43
(1850) (Limited judicial terms in the State of Florida were carried over from the organic act
that organized Florida when it was merely a territory.); Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton,
26 U.S. 511, 546 (1828) (the Court previously took great care in distinguishing itself from
such legislative courts that held their offices for limited terms). Cf. Downes v. Bidwell, 182
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Another violation of the ideal of the separation of powers is legislative mandates of mandatory minimum sentencing, especially in
cases of three strikes laws.480 Congress cannot dictate the foreign affairs decisions of a president, it can only make suggestions—so too it
cannot dictate all future sentencing for judges.481 Judicial adherence to
non-mandatory sentencing guidelines is a matter of judicial prudence,
as confirmed by both Chisholm v. Georgia and the Eleventh
Amendment.482
Despite persuasive reasons to avoid judicial elections, there are
also reasons to doubt the current federal system.483 For example,
U.S. 244, 267–70 (1901) (here the U.S. Supreme Court analyzed many of the organic laws
that organized the courts in various U.S. territories—the result of this case was a violation
of the U.S. social compact and should be considered bad law, but the research is useful); P.R.
CONST. art. V, § 8 (beside the fact that justice of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico must
retire at age 70, they are free from term limits and elections—this means a territory has a
characteristic of statehood (i.e., an independent judiciary) that many of our states refuse to
establish).
480. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70 (2003) (the U.S. Supreme Court failed to overrule a cruel and unusual use of the California three strikes law to give two consecutive 25
year sentences “for stealing approximately $150 in videotapes”—the Court should have
struck down the three strikes laws on its own motion for violating federal and California
Separation of Powers by attempting to dictate the judgments of the Court; this ought to
have been the determination of the Lockyer Court according to Constitutional Avoidance,
under its duty to interpret the laws and constitutions of the states in such a way that it does
not violate the U.S. Constitution—here, the implied interpretation of the California Constitution in Lockyer allows the legislature to dictate the judgments of the criminal courts,
which in turn violates the U.S. Constitution’s requirement that states keep a republican
form of government); CAL. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–3 (requiring the separation of powers between “legislative, executive, and judicial,” and expressly stating that the U.S. Constitution
“is the supreme law of the land”); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (requiring states to maintain a
republican form of government); John Adams, Thoughts on Government 8 [1776] (defining a
republican form of government as one that is a government of laws and not of men that
requires a working system of the separation of powers that does not arbitrarily dictate the
judgments of the courts with legislation that forces them to disregard mitigating factors).
481. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936); United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (holding that federal sentencing guidelines are
not mandatory, overruling “mandatory” federal guidelines for violating the Sixth
Amendment).
482. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 471 (1793) (Opinion of Jay, C.J.) (Chief Justice
Jay firmly held that feudal principles in The Bankers Case were abolished by The Declaration of Independence and the American Revolution, and therefore an individual may sue a
state in federal court.); U.S. CONST. amend. XI (stripping the Court of its power used in
Chisholm through the Constitution rather than by amending the Judiciary Act confirming
that amendments to the Judiciary Act to limit federal jurisdiction is an attempted modification of the Court’s prudential standing, which may also be confirmed by a study of the
Marshall Court).
483. ATTICUS V. THE ARCHITECT (Steve Wimberly 2017); Tuaua v. United States, 788
F.3d 300, 304 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404–05 (1857))
(drawing its essential constitutional rationale from Dred Scott to exclude the people of
American Samoa from their legal rights of citizenship) extended in Fitisemanu v. United
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Aaron Swartz revealed a connection between grant money paid by special interests for the production of law review articles and the influence
law review articles have over judicial outcomes.484 It is not difficult to
spot where judges cite to special interest funded law review articles
and fail to exercise their independent power.485
Moreover, perks paid out to federal judges from companies and
individuals with business before the court is commonplace.486 In fact,
Justice Antonin Scalia died on a hunting trip paid for by a large holding company known as J.B. Poindexter & Co., while it had business
before the court.487 The continuous, passive influence over federal judicial outcomes by certain individuals representing political and monied
interests is undeniable.488

States, Nos. 20-4017 & 20-4019, slip op. at 21–22, 25 (10th Cir. 2021) (quoting The
Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 72–73 (1872)) (citing Dred Scott, 60 U.S., at 404–05)
(explaining that “the Supreme Court concluded in Dred Scott v. Sandford that African
Americans couldn’t become citizens even if they had been born in the United States” to
justify denying the birthright citizenship of those born in American Samoa).
484. THE INTERNET’S OWN BOY (Participant Media 2014) (Swartz worked with a law student to download all the legal articles in a popular legal research database, and then
showed a troubling connection between the funders of research and favorable judicial
outcomes).
485. See, e.g., Schroeder, America’s, supra note 212, at 851 n.112 (noting Akhil Amar’s
influence over the Court’s decision to depart from the prohibition on advisory statements);
Joshua J. Schroeder, Choosing an Internet Shaped by Freedom: A Rationale to Rein in Copyright Gate Keeping, 2 BERKELEY J. OF ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS L. 48, 70 (2013)
[hereinafter Schroeder, Choosing] (there is a circuit split between the Ninth and Second
Circuits over the fate of internet governance through common law secondary copyright liability and the interpretations of the Courts cite to Nimmer’s idea of “red flag knowledge”
rather than the common law, which is a radical departure from ordinary judicial practice in
itself—the radical inference is that the U.S. Congress meant to include copyrights according
to Nimmer in the Copyright Statute (which there is no evidence of) rather than preserving
common law copyright absent any negative in the statute according to the rule from Dr.
Foster’s Case); Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing to
Nimmer’s private opinions about “red flag knowledge,” which the courts now vigorously define and interpret as if it were written in the law somewhere); N.L.R.B. v. Noel Canning,
573 U.S. 513, 549 (2014) (impliedly and accidentally reversing Youngstown and the Jay
Court’s prohibition on advisory statements by citing to Akhil Amar’s Unwritten Constitution) (citing AKHIL AMAR, THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 576–77 n.16 (2012)).
486. Center for Public Integrity et al., Supreme Court Justices Earn Free Trips and
More on the Side, TIME (July 2, 2015), https://time.com/3945044/supreme-court-justices-freetrips/; KIDS FOR CASH (SenArt Films 2013).
487. Mark Berman & Jerry Markon, Why Justice Scalia was staying for free at a Texas
resort, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/
2016/02/17/justice-scalias-death-and-questions-about-who-pays-for-supreme-court-justicesto-visit-remote-resorts/.
488. Reity O’Brien & Chris Young, Majority of Supreme Court members are millionaires,
CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (June 14, 2013), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2013/06/14/12827/
majority-supreme-court-members-millionaires.
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It is, however, a fallacy that simply because there is bad behavior in the judiciary that an elective system would ameliorate it.489 The
check that should be exercised to solve bad behavior among the judiciary is the impeachment process.490 The separation of powers exists to
preserve “the great political virtues of humility, patience, and moderation, without which every man in power becomes a ravenous beast of
prey.”491 The third, last, and most humble branch of government is
tasked with interpreting the highest sources of legal power including
the U.S. Constitution, the law of nations, natural law, and equity.492
This fact was embodied by the holding of Marbury v. Madison that, “It
is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Department to
say what the law is.”493 Accordingly, the judiciary was able to expound
the separation of powers and overrule a part of the Judiciary Act
itself.494

489. See, e.g., Andrew Cohen, An Elected Judge Speaks Out Against Judicial Elections,
THE ATLANTIC, (Sept. 3, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/09/anelected-judge-speaks-out-against-judicial-elections/279263/.
490. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; Nicholas Wu, Ayanna Pressley introduces impeachment
resolution against Brett Kavanaugh, USA TODAY (Sept. 17, 2019), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/09/17/ayanna-pressley-bring-impeachment-articles-against-kavanaugh/2349623001/. See, e.g., 2 SMITH & LLOYD, supra note 220, at
132–33, 145 (“the tenure by which a judge holds his office, is good behaviour, therefore that
he is removable for misbehavior”); ATTICUS V. THE ARCHITECT (Steve Wimberly 2017) (if
there ever was a case to be made for Congress to increase its investigations into the Courts
and Department of Justice for impeachable offenses, it was the miscarriage of justice carried out by those who orchestrated the downfall of Don Siegelman, including former federal
Judge Mark Fuller and former Attorney General Eric Holder).
491. John Adams, Thoughts on Government 17–18 [1776]; Letter from Abigail Adams to
John Adams (Mar. 31, 1776) (“Remember all men would be tyrants if they could.”).
492. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); U.S. CONST. art. III; Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 83, §§ 9, 11, 13; Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004)
(“For two centuries we have affirmed that the domestic law of the United States recognizes
the law of nations.”). See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 7
(“[E]quity must have a place in every rational system of jurisprudence, if not in name, at
least in substance. It is impossible that any code, however minute and particular, should
embrace or provide for the infinite variety of human affairs, or should furnish rules applicable to all of them.”); id. at §§ 77–79 (discussing the concurrent jurisdiction of equity with the
common law).
493. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
494. Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 83, § 13, overruled by Marbury, 5 U.S. at 173, 177
(“Certainly all those who have framed written Constitutions contemplate them as forming
the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every
such government must be that an act of the Legislature repugnant to the Constitution is
void.”).
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The Judiciary Act was formerly used to deny jurisdiction in
cases the Supreme Court found imprudent to hear.495 However, the Judiciary Act was amended in the 1930s to merge the courts of law and
equity, to abolish the forms, and to create an Advisory Committee on
Rules of Civil Procedure to replace the operation of the forms with the
purpose of extending jurisdiction to every injured party.496 The central
purpose of the Civil Rules was to minimize the prudential bases for
denying jurisdiction.497
Immediately before the first Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
merged law and equity, the beginning of administrative law, as it is
known today, was established by Crowell v. Benson.498 The Crowell
case decided, for the first time in U.S. history, that it was not a per se
violation of the separation of powers for Congress to delegate adjudica-

495. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 246, 404, 429–30 (1821). Cf. Paul Taylor, Congress’s
Power to Regulate the Federal Judiciary: What the First Congress and the First Federal
Courts Can Teach Today’s Congress and Courts, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 847, 869–70, n.101 (2010).
496. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (enacted in 1934); Colo. River Water Conserv.
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) (The Court later appeared to replace the
prudential system maintained by Cohens of balancing of the law with the constitution by
asserting a “virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction
given them.” It should be noted that this rule about federal jurisdiction is applied arbitrarily
and has not resulted in virtually unflagging use of federal jurisdiction. It has succeeded in
convincing the Court to arbitrarily apply federal jurisdiction, however, for the Court no
longer follows Cohens—it no longer balances the reversible laws and rules against the U.S.
Constitution to determine federal jurisdiction. This judicial arbitrariness is symbolized by
Iqbal and Twombly, because they allow federal courts to determine federal jurisdiction
based upon a standard of plausibility of facts not provided in any prior rule or law. Under
Twombly, the courts may follow Dioguardi v. Durning and other similar cases or trespass
them at will as if stare decisis means nothing.). Cf. Schroeder, America’s, supra note 212, at
883–85 (this article reviews recent cases that unsettled stare decisis).
497. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring only a short and plain statement of the claim);
Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)) (“Under
the new rules of civil procedure, there is no pleading requirement of stating ‘facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action,’ but only that there be ‘a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Thus, this Court wisely turned to the
lower courts and said, “here is another instance of judicial haste which in the long run
makes waste.”). But see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (requiring the
pleading of facts—something explicitly and purposely not required by the Supreme Court’s
own Civil Rules).
498. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–77; Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 58–65
(1932). See Rules Enabling Act, 48 Stat. 1064, § 2 (“The court may at any time unite the
general rules prescribed by it for cases in equity with those in action at law so as to secure
one form of action and procedure for both[.]”); FED. R. CIV. P. 2 (there is now only one form of
action, the civil action). See James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the
Judicial Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 659–62, n.62 (2004) (noting “the
significance of Crowell to the modern administrative state,” consisted in “the widespread
reliance on Crowell in crafting rules to govern the judicial review of agency action”).
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tive authority to an administrative agency.499 This case allowed the
beginning of the development of what is now called the administrative
state.500
Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court later developed administrative law, including Chevron deference, the arbitrary and capricious
standard, and ultra vires.501 Some scholars argued that the apparent
mirroring of Article II rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudicative
agencies with the original three branches of U.S. Government creates
the legitimacy of administrative law.502 However, there is no evidence
to suggest that this is the case.503
The actual legitimacy of the administrative state arises from
the continued availability of Article III review wherever administrative agencies touch on fundamental rights and the separation of
powers.504 An Article III court has collateral jurisdiction, according to
Crowell, to review administrative law akin to the way federal civil
courts review criminal cases through habeas corpus.505 The point
where Article III review of fundamental rights and the separation of
powers ends is also where the legitimacy of administrative law must
also end.506
499. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 58–65 (requiring as a condition that non-Article III decisions
must be reviewable in an Article III Court in the same way criminal court cases are reviewable on habeas corpus). See Northern Pipeline v. Marathon Pipe Line, 458 U.S. 50, 78 (1982)
(“[t]he use of administrative agencies as adjuncts was first upheld in Crowell v. Benson”).
500. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 504 (2011) (citing generally Crowell v. Benson, 285
U.S. 22 (1932)); id. at 506 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority underestimated
the strength of the constitutional basis of non-Article III Courts to adjudicate disputes
under Crowell). See Pfander, supra note 498, at 659–62, n.62.
501. Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–96; Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 476 U.S. 837, 844 (1984); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S.
452, 461 (1997). See Jared P. Cole, An Introduction to Judicial Review of Federal Agency
Action, CONG. RSCH. SERV., Dec. 7, 2016, at 3 n.33, 5 (citing cases involving ultra vires).
502. Ralph F. Fuchs, An Approach to Administrative Law, 18 N.C. L. REV. 183, 185
(1940).
503. See, e.g., Louis J. Virelli III, Administrative Abstention, 67 ALA. L. REV. 1019, 1067
(2016) (“agencies occupy a tenuous position in our tripartite democracy, yet perform many,
if not all, of the functions of the three constitutionally mandated branches”).
504. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 58–65; Cole, supra note 493, at 3–5.
505. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 58–59 (citing In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 154–55 (1890)). See
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended”).
506. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 57 (“The recognition of the utility and convenience of administrative agencies for the investigation and finding of facts within their proper province, and
the support of their authorized action, does not require the conclusion that there is no limitation on their use, and that the Congress could completely oust the courts of all
determinations of fact by vesting the authority to make them with finality in its own instrumentalities or in the executive department. That would be to sap the judicial power as it
exists under the federal Constitution, and to establish a government of a bureaucratic char-
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Over a series of recent cases, the U.S. Supreme Court unsettled
the precedents once considered the backbone of administrative law.507
While none drew Crowell jurisdiction into question, cases like Stern v.
Marshall appeared to generalize Crowell to the point of superfluity.508
Essential administrative law precedents were also unsettled by the
plausibility standard of Iqbal and Twombly—a standard that does not
conform to the Rules.509
The express purpose of the Civil Rules was to liberally open jurisdiction to anyone that makes “a short and plain statement of the
claim” for which relief may be granted.510 Plausibility of facts is an arbitrary standard with no possible uniform way of application by
district judges.511 It arises neither from prudential jurisprudence, the

acter alien to our system, wherever fundamental rights depend, as not infrequently they do
depend, upon the facts, and finality as to facts becomes in effect finality in law.”).
507. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law
and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties
made, or which shall be made . . . .” This means that cases at equity are meant to arise
under the laws and that the laws were meant to be shaped and interpreted at equity—law
and equity are not mutually exclusive and they never have been.). See, e.g., Armstrong v.
Exceptional Child Care Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 327–29 (2015) (There is a growing pool of
cases that limit and/or remove equity in a way that increases the unequal application of the
laws throughout the states and the sheer confusion regarding the state of federal law in
relation to federal agencies: “The sheer complexity associated with enforcing § 30(A), coupled with the express provision of an administrative remedy, § 1396c, shows that the
Medicaid Act precludes private enforcement of § 30(A) in the courts.” The complexity of a
law coupled with an administrative remedy is enough to oust the Court’s equitable enforcement of the law according to the U.S. Supreme Court.).
508. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 504 (2011) (citing generally Crowell v. Benson, 285
U.S. 22 (1932)). See also Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 842 (2018); Oil States Energy Servs. v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1374 (2018).
509. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 696 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (requiring the pleading of facts—something explicitly and purposely
not required by the Supreme Court’s own Civil Rules)). See Karen Petroski, Iqbal and Interpretation, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 417, 456, 464 (2012) (thinking about the plausibility
standard as a version of agency deference, though this is intrinsically awkward, because the
Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules is the U.S. Supreme Court’s agency that the plausibility standard does not defer to). But see FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring only a short and
plain statement of the claim); Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)) (This holding is still good law: “Under the new rules of civil
procedure, there is no pleading requirement of stating ‘facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action,’ but only that there be ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.’” Thus, the Dioguardi Court wisely turned to the District Court
and said, “here is another instance of judicial haste which in the long run makes waste.”).
510. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). See Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944).
511. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 696; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. See Arthur R. Miller, Simplified
Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 334–35 (2013) [hereinafter Miller,
Simplified] (noting that “plausibility” is defined in an “amorphous” way that invites judges
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positive law, nor from older sources of equity or common law.512
Indeed, the Supreme Court in Iqbal and Twombly made no attempt to reconcile or overrule existing case law mandated under the
Rules’ claim pleading.513 Iqbal and Twombly are a fundamental embarrassment of the Rules’ requirement of maximum access to justice on
the pleadings, and a violation of stare decisis.514 The plausibility standard the Court committed itself to, or any other standard besides the
one expressly given in Rule 8, is an illegitimate form that was supposed to be abolished by Rule 2.515
The judiciary may only speak on cases and controversies that
properly arise under the laws.516 Advisory statements upon hypothetical laws and hypothetical facts are prohibited.517 The judiciary must
wait until a proper case or controversy arises under the laws before it
can legitimately act, and even then the determinations made outside of
the facts of the case are ordinarily considered obiter dictum, i.e., unbinding on future precedent.518

to individually “evaluate the merits of the plaintiff’s case . . . without having the benefit of
discovery, let alone anything remotely approximating a trial or the input of a jury”).
512. 28 U.S.C. § 2072; FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE §§ 7, 13; BAKER, supra note 7, at 61–64; Maty v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 303
U.S. 197, 200 (1938) (This case was decided right before the Civil Rules were established,
and it noted that the purpose of the pleadings was to serve as a means of “arriving at fair
and just settlements of controversies”—they were not to become arbitrary grounds for
dismissal.).
513. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). See Maty, 303 U.S. at 200 (“Pleadings are intended to serve
as a means of arriving at fair and just settlements of controversies between litigants. They
should not raise barriers which prevent the achievement of that end.”); Dioguardi, 139 F.2d
at 775 (this and other cases like it, that actually apply Rule 8, are still good law, because
Twombly and Iqbal did not apply Rule 8, they made up an arbitrary form that arguably also
violates Rule 2).
514. Maty, 303 U.S. at 200; FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
515. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 696; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556; FED. R. CIV. P. 2 & 8. Cf. BAKER,
supra note 7, at 61–64 (it appears that under the Rules as applied by Iqbal & Twombly
litigants have less access to justice than they used to have when they sued under the writ of
trespass on the case).
516. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
517. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 614 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (quoting Letter from the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court to George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793) (refusing to make advisory statements at the President’s request)). Cf.
Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. 6, 16 (1794) (the Court spoke when a proper case or controversy arose before it).
518. Glass, 3 U.S. at 16. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 141 (1926) (arguing that Chief Justice Marshall’s commentary regarding the limits of the Executive
appointment and/or removal powers were “obiter dictum,” because the result of Marbury
was to limit the Court’s powers to issue a writ of mandamus).
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However, when injured individuals dispute their rights in open
court—the court cannot legitimately deny them.519 Not even the political question doctrine can legitimately dismiss cases brought by
ordinary persons injured by government violations of the separation of
powers.520 As Chief Justice Marshall opined,
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of
every individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford
that protection.521

Nothing can stand in the way of the judiciary in its task of securing
these rights.522 There is no law, constitutional interpretation, or executive application that can stand against the court’s power to redress
injuries, because the judiciary speaks only once all these things are
past.523 The window known as federal jurisdiction exists after the injury is done, when the claim is ripe, and before any further occurrence
renders the claim moot.524 In this window it is “the very essence of
judicial duty” for the federal courts to say what the law is.525
The judicial power to overrule laws as unconstitutional comes
from natural equity as Sir Henry Hobart confirmed in Day v.
Savadge.526 The U.S. social compact was inspired by this case to preserve natural equity in judicial courts and to expound on the laws
under the U.S. Constitution in order to come to a final determination of
what the law is.527 The judiciary’s province and duty under the consti519. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); U.S. CONST. amend. IX;
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 465 (1793) (Opinion of Wilson, J.); id. at 451 (Opinion of
Blair, J.); id. at 468 (Opinion of Cushing, J.); id. at 475–78 (Opinion of Jay, C.J.).
520. U.S. CONST. amends. III, IV, V (Taney’s opinion in Luther v. Borden turned a blind
eye to clear violations by the state police of these three Amendments); Luther v. Borden, 48
U.S. 1, 66–67 (1849) (Woodbury, J., dissenting).
521. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (emphasis added).
522. Id.
523. See, e.g., Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148–49 (1967).
524. See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 328 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring).
525. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 178.
526. Day v. Savadge [1614] Hob. 85, 87 (Eng.) (extending Dr. Bonham’s Case [1610] 8
Co. Rep. 107a, 118a (Eng.) (“when an Act of Parliament is against Common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the Common Law will control it, and
adjudge such Act to be void”)).
527. OTIS, supra note 18, at 175 (arguing “that acts of parliament against natural equity
are void. That acts against the fundamental principles of the British constitution are void.”);
SIMMONS, supra note 31, at 2, 5, 18 (the remedy for disposing of unjust laws adopted by the
Americans was “to confer on the judiciary the power to declare unconstitutional statutes
void”); William Wetmore, Wetmore’s Minutes of the Trial, Essex Inferior Court, Newburyport, Oct. 1773, Caesar v. Greenleaf [1773], in 2 ADAMS, LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 22, at
64–67 (quoting Day v. Savadge [1614] Hob. 85, 87 (Eng.)).
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tution flows directly from the “very great force in the observation
arising from the federal compact.”528
It is also one of the basic principles of statutory interpretation
that federal courts must interpret federal laws in a way that complies
with the constitution wherever possible.529 The federal courts therefore
should only overrule laws when there is no reasonable way to interpret
the law that does not conflict with the constitution.530 This doctrine
traces back to the first federal cases and later became known as “constitutional avoidance.”531
The prohibition on advisory statements, on the other hand,
arose from the first U.S. Supreme Court during the neutrality crisis
also known as the Citizen Genêt Affair.532 During this time, the newly
formed United States government was caught in a quandary of
whether or not to risk independence by supporting French allies in a
renewed war against England.533 Congress did not declare war and
President Washington proclaimed U.S. neutrality.534
The French Consul, known as Citizen Genêt, did not get his way
and consequently appealed to the people.535 He flamboyantly stoked
American hatred for England, throwing parties along the coast, and
capturing British merchant ships along the way, refitting them as
French cruisers.536 Genêt set up a French Admiralty Court in Philadelphia and recruited American privateers to hunt down British
sailors on the high seas.537
528. THE CASE OF ELIZABETH RUTGERS, supra note 131, at 28; Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.
529. This is known as Constitutional Avoidance Doctrine. Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297
U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)) (“‘When the validity
of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.’”).
530. I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299–300 (2001) (upholding Constitutional Avoidance Doctrine).
531. Id.
532. Casto, supra note 274, at 173. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 614 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting Letter from the Justices of the
U.S. Supreme Court to George Washington, U.S. President (Aug. 8, 1793)) (refusing to make
advisory statements at the President’s request)). Cf. Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. 6, 16
(1794) (the Court spoke when a proper case or controversy arose before it).
533. Casto, supra note 274, at 177.
534. President George Washington, Proclamation 4—Neutrality of the United States in
the War Involving Austria, Prussia, Sardinia, Great Britain, and the United Netherlands
Against France (Apr. 22, 1793).
535. Casto, supra note 274, at 178. See Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Rufus King
[Aug. 13, 1793] (setting forth “[t]he facts with regard to Mr. Genet’s threat to appeal from
the President to the People”).
536. Casto, supra note 274, at 175.
537. Id.
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The situation reached a head when Genêt’s cruiser,
L’Embuscade, seized the British merchant vessel, Little Sarah, off “the
capes of Delaware.”538 At the sight of British vessels being towed into
port with “the British colours . . . reversed, and the French flying above
them” crowds of Philadelphians “burst into peals of exaltation.”539 As
soon as the Washington administration learned of the taking of the
Little Sarah, the administration approached Genêt to inquire about detaining the ship.540
At this, Genêt “flew into a great passion, talked extravagantly
and concluded by refusing to order the vessel to stay.”541 When Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson inquired about the matter, Genêt
launched into a complaint regarding the U.S. policy of neutrality and
“charged us with . . . violat[ing] the treaties between the two nations.”542 Alexander Hamilton and James Madison began a vigorous
debate in the press over the matter of neutrality that ended in more
agreement than disagreement between them.543
John Adams later remembered “ten thousand people in the
streets of Philadelphia, day after day, threatened to drag Washington
out of his House.”544 President Washington and his cabinet determined
to make their principled response to Genêt’s appeal to the people
center around the case of Little Sarah.545 It is interesting to note that
when the cabinet considered shooting the small ship down as it left the
harbor, it was Jefferson (i.e., the most outspoken American enthusiast
of French terrorism at the time) who dissented because “it is morally
certain that bloody consequences would follow.”546
During this quandary, President Washington asked, “Is the
Minister of the French Republic to set the Acts of this Government at
defiance—with impunity? And then threaten the Executive with an appeal to the People.”547 Washington continued, “What must the World
538. Id.
539. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe (May 5, 1793).
540. Casto, supra note 274, at 177–78.
541. Thomas Jefferson, Memorandum of a Conversation with Edmond Charles Genet
(July 10, 1793).
542. Id.
543. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 11, 1793); Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 3, 1793) (“We have decided unanimously to require the recall of Genet.”).
544. Letter from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson (June 30, 1813).
545. Casto, supra note 274, at 180.
546. Thomas Jefferson, Dissenting Opinion on the Little Sarah (July 8, 1793). Cf. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Smith (Nov. 13, 1787) (writing from Paris and
appearing to support government administered terror).
547. Letter from George Washington to Thomas Jefferson (July 11, 1793).
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think of such conduct, and of the Government of the U. States in submitting to it?”548 Perplexed by this debacle, Washington’s cabinet
resolved to convene the Supreme Court justices to answer their urgent
questions.549
The Washington Cabinet amassed twenty-nine legal questions
to be answered by the Supreme Court.550 Of the many questions made
to the justices of the first U.S. Supreme Court, Thomas Jefferson preliminarily inquired, “Whether the public may, with propriety, be
availed of [the Court’s] advice on these questions.”551 After travelling
to Philadelphia, and convening over the request of Washington’s Cabinet, the Jay Court unanimously refused to grant the president’s
request for advice.552
The justices referred the cabinet to “[t]he Lines of Separation
drawn by the Constitution between the three Departments of Government—their being in certain Respects checks on each other—and our
being Judges of a court in the last Resort.”553 The Court concluded
that, “the power given by the Constitution to the president of calling on
the heads of department for opinions, seems to have been purposely as
well as expressly limited to executive departments.”554 Therefore, the
Court denied Washington’s request saying, “we exceedingly regret
every event that may cause embarrassment to your administration;
but we derive consolation from the reflection, that your judgment will
discern what is right.”555
Justice Frankfurter quoted directly to this Jay Court letter to
President Washington in his Youngstown Sheet & Tube, Co. v. Sawyer
concurrence.556 Thus, Justice Frankfurter signaled that even at times
when the Supreme Court properly asserts its jurisdiction to vindicate
the separation of powers, the Court’s opinions are by nature of their

548. Id.
549. Casto, supra note 274, at 178.
550. Id. at 180; [Thomas Jefferson et al.,] IV. Questions for the Supreme Court [July 18,
1793].
551. [Thomas Jefferson et al.,] IV. Questions for the Supreme Court [July 18, 1793].
552. Letter from the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court to George Washington (Aug. 8,
1793).
553. Id.
554. Id.
555. Id.
556. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 614 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (quoting Letter from the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court to George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793)).
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power limited.557 Thus, whatever the Court says in a certain case, the
other branches must refuse to “disregard the gloss which life has written upon” the constitution.558
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court recently began dictating this
gloss of life as if the Court is life itself, commanding rather than being
commanded by the provisions of the Constitution.559 By doing so the
Court violated the prohibition on advisory opinions that Justice Frankfurter attempted to uphold.560 The Supreme Court is dutybound not to
illuminate all the dark corners of how the separation of powers is supposed to operate.561 As Chief Justice Marshall opined,
A Constitution, to contain accurate detail of all the subdivisions of
which great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they
may be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a
legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It
would probably never be understood by the public.562

Chief Justice Marshall prescribed that the constitution’s “nature,
therefore, requires that only its great outlines should be marked, its
important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects
themselves.”563 Accordingly, many of the earliest judicial opinions regarding the constitution determined its objects from the provisions of
the U.S. social compact as a general guide.564
557. Id. (neither of the parties to the case will “find ready accommodation for differences
on matters which, however close to their concern and however intrinsically important, are
overshadowed by the awesome issues which confront the world”).
558. Id. at 610.
559. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 528–30 (2014) (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S.
at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
560. Id.
561. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 614 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting Letter from the
Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court to George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793)).
562. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819).
563. Id.
564. Id.; Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304, 310 (1795) (“The preservation of
property then is a primary object of the social compact, and by the late Constitution of Pennsylvania, was made a fundamental law.”); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 459–60 (citing Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419,
474–75 (1793) (Opinion of Jay, C.J.)) (“The importance of examining the preamble, for the
purpose of expounding the language of a statute, has been long felt, and universally conceded in all juridical discussions. It is an admitted maxim in the ordinary course of the
administration of justice, that the preamble of a statute is a key to open the mind of the
makers, as to the mischiefs, which are to be remedied, and the objects, which are to be
accomplished by the provisions of the statute. We find it laid down in some of our earliest
authorities in the common law; and civilians are accustomed to a similar expression, cessante legis prœmio, cessat et ipsa lex. . . . There does not seem any reason why, in a
fundamental law or constitution of government, an equal attention should not be given to
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The radical nature of Justice Scalia’s legal positivism necessarily denies the existence of that social compact in at least two ways:565
first, it attempts to destroy the “gloss which life writes upon the” constitution by proclaiming our constitutions “dead, dead, dead”;566
second, it improperly dictates constitutional guidelines to the legislature and executive for all future exigencies of state by forcing the
constitution to “partake of the prolixity of a legal code.”567
The judiciary and the American legal community should respectfully turn away from Justice Scalia’s delusions and affirm once

the intention of the framers, as stated in the preamble. And accordingly we find, that it has
been constantly referred to by statesmen and jurists to aid them in the exposition of its
provisions.”).
565. Originalism: A Primer on Scalia’s Constitutional Philosophy, NPR (Feb. 14, 2016),
https://www.npr.org/2016/02/14/466744465/originalism-a-primer-on-scalias-constitutionalphilosophy. Bork and Scalia’s political realism was not necessarily conservative, and notable conservative thinkers like Harry Jaffa vehemently attacked it. See, e.g., Erik Linstrum,
Political scholar Jaffa defends moral foundation of government, DAILY PRINCETONIAN (Sept.
30, 2003), https://www.dailyprincetonian.com/article/2003/09/political-scholar-jaffa-defendsmoral-foundation-of-government (citing Harry Jaffa, Natural Law and American Political
Thought (Sept. 29, 2003), https://jmp.princeton.edu/events/natural-law-and-american-political-thought) (“Justice Scalia, like all Legal Positivists, denies to the Declaration of
Independence any constitutional status whatever.”); J. Paul Kelleher, Neil Gorsuch’s “natural law” philosophy is a long way from Justice Scalia’s originalism, VOX (Mar. 20, 2017, 8:20
AM), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/3/20/14976926/gorsuch-natural-law-supremecourt-hearings.
566. Bruce Allen Murphy, Justice Antonin Scalia and the ‘Dead’ Constitution, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/15/opinion/justice-antonin-scaliaand-the-dead-constitution.html (“‘The only good Constitution is a dead Constitution.’”)
(statement of Justice Scalia). Judge Bork disputed and disagreed with Scalia on the matter
of his dead constitution. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 995–96 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.,
concurring) (“Judge Scalia’s dissent implies that the idea of evolving constitutional doctrine
should be anathema to judges who adhere to a philosophy of judicial restraint. But most
doctrine is merely the judge-made superstructure that implements basic constitutional
principles. . . . A judge who refuses to see new threats to an established constitutional value,
and hence provides a crabbed interpretation that robs a provision of its full, fair and reasonable meaning, fails in his judicial duty.”).
567. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819); Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System,
Mar. 8–9, 1995, in 18 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 79, 111 (1997) (explaining
Scalia’s support for legal positivism, which is essentially a preference for legal codes, by
mischaracterizing McCulloch, a case that rejected the prolixity of legal codes); NFIB v.
Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 654 (2012) (Opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S.
316, 411, 421 (1819)) (Quoting McCulloch, Roberts said, “Such laws, which are not ‘consist[ent] with the letter and spirit of the constitution,’ are not ‘proper for carrying into
Execution’ Congress’s enumerated powers.” In McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall held that
the Court cannot and should not dictate Congress’s choice of means, and Justice Scalia argued in Sebelius that the Court can and should, but he failed to carry Roberts’ vote, and
therefore he failed to reverse McCulloch.); NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 555–57
(2014) (Scalia concurred with this advisory statement).
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more that the constitution is a living document.568 The constitution is
living because its provisions were not meant to provide for exigencies
“which can be best provided for as they occur.”569 It is living because
the gloss which life writes upon the constitution is ever changing and
moving with the people who engage themselves in each branch of the
U.S. government.570
The gloss that life writes upon the constitution is a real, vital,
and breathing aspect of constitutional law; it is a mystery that cannot
be codified, measured, or predicted beforehand.571 Justice Frankfurter’s gloss that life writes upon the constitution can only be
observed in the present moment, and discussed after the fact.572 Constitutional construction must, therefore, also evolve and change
through the Ciceronian practice of justification through public discourse, on a case by case basis, and in the courts according to the facts
and circumstances of the times.573

568. The life of our constitutions exist in the ministers our constitutions empower to
serve the people, to protect the rights of each person. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John
Cartwright (June 5, 1824) (“But can they [our Constitutions] be made unchangeable? Can
one generation bind another, and all others, in succession for ever? I think not. The Creator
has made the earth for the living, not the dead. Rights and powers can only belong to persons, not to things, not to mere matter, unendowed with will. The dead are not even
things.”).
569. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 415.
570. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
571. Id.
572. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776); John Adams, Thoughts
on Government 10–11 [1776] (setting forth the basic idea of the separation of powers).
573. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (citing
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 492–95 (1954)) (“A judge who refuses to see new
threats to an established constitutional value, and hence provides a crabbed interpretation
that robs a provision of its full, fair and reasonable meaning, fails in his judicial duty. That
duty, I repeat, is to ensure that the powers and freedoms the framers specified are made
effective in today’s circumstances. The evolution of doctrine to accomplish that end contravenes no postulate of judicial restraint. The evolution I suggest does not constitute a major
change in doctrine but is, as will be shown, entirely consistent with the implications of Supreme Court precedents.”); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 57 (1932) (the federal courts
retained their power to reevaluate old agency determinations on a case by case basis to see
whether they fit the needs of the times, because “fundamental rights depend . . . upon the
facts, and finality as to facts becomes in effect finality in law”); Kastely, supra note 186, at 1,
7–9 (“this equating of law with justice and reason means that law depends upon a practice
of justification,” which is talking with others in our communities about the law to decide
whether it is right or wrong, just or unjust—“we are not asked to reach a final judgment on
them,” meaning that circumstances are alive and may change, causing a law that may be
just at one time to become unjust in another or vice versa). Cf. ON THE BASIS OF SEX (Focus
Features 2018) (“‘A court ought not be affected by the weather of the day. But will be by the
climate of the era.’”) (the future Justice Ginsburg quoting Paul Freund).
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CONVERGENCE

As Kafka once stated, “It is difficult to speak the truth, for although there is only one truth, it is alive and therefore has a live and
changing face.”574 Thus, Justice Scalia’s style of post-modern Benthamism will always fail to reduce constitutional law into predictable,
rational formulae.575 Laws, and the factual circumstances that laws
address, do not usually reduce into Platonic absolutes, but rather ordinarily flux and converge over time.576
Since the forms were closed in 1938, the writ of trespass on the
case—under which the bench addressed matters of flux and convergence—fell into disuse and now lies forgotten.577 The bench proceeded
574. HANNAH ARENDT, MEN IN DARK TIMES 28 (1974) [hereinafter ARENDT, MEN] (quoting Franz Kafka, though the translation is likely hers). See Max Kennerly, Lessons from
Kafka: Aaron Swartz and Prosecutorial Overreaching, LITIGATION & TRIAL LAW BLOG (Jan.
14, 3013), https://www.litigationandtrial.com/2013/01/articles/series/special-comment/
kafka-aaron-swartz/ [hereinafter Kennerly, Lessons] (quoting from portions of Kafka’s The
Trial). See also Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 57 (1932) (holding that the Legislative and
Executive branches of government were powerless to “sap the judicial power as it exists
under the federal Constitution . . . to establish a government of a bureaucratic character
alien to our system wherever fundamental rights depend, as not infrequently they do depend, upon the facts, and finality as to the facts becomes in effect finality in law”).
575. Barbara Esbin, Internet over Cable: Defining the Future in Terms of the Past, 7
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 37, 113 (1999). Compare Jaffa, supra note 565 (noting that Scalia
categorically rejected the significance of the Declaration of Independence as a part of his
commitment to legal positivism), with [Jeremy Bentham,] Short Review of the Declaration
[1776], in BENTHAM & LIND, supra note 38, at 120. But see Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435,
582 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Scalia nevertheless balked at the prospect of actually
instituting Bentham’s ideas in America: “Perhaps the construction of such a genetic panopticon is wise. But I doubt that the proud men who wrote the charter of our liberties would
have been so eager to open their mouths for royal inspection.”).
576. See Wire Fraud Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (this statute first appeared in the 1952
as 6 Stat. 722, long before the internet, and when the government prosecuted Aaron Swartz
for wire fraud it meant defining “property” in the statute as including copyright over documents created for knowledge and learning for which most authors made no money, and did
not intend to make money); Max Kennerly, Explaining the Outrageous Aaron Swartz Indictment for Computer Fraud, LITIGATION & TRIAL LAW BLOG (July 19, 2011) https://
www.litigationandtrial.com/2011/07/articles/series/special-comment/aaron-swartz-computer-fraud-indictment/ [hereinafter Kennerly, Explaining] (a preliminary analysis done in
real time before Swartz’s death). See also Schroeder, Choosing, supra note 485, at 50 (noting
the impending conflict between net neutrality rules and copyright law because communications and copyrighted content are the same thing when digitized and communicated over
the internet). Cf. Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565, 1574 (2020) (recently, in a surprise
decision the unanimous U.S. Supreme Court let Chris Christie’s cronies off for their part in
the Bridge-gate scandal, because their part in it was purely for political gain rather than “to
obtain money or property”).
577. BAKER, supra note 7, at 68 (“‘The forms of action we have buried,’ said Maitland at
the turn of the twentieth century, ‘but they still rule us from their graves.’ Yet the posthumous rule of the forms of action has tended towards a tyranny which in life they were never
permitted . . . .” The only reason this may also be so in the United States is because our bar
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to apply old forms to new problems in an exceedingly erratic way.578
For example, courts applied constructive possession principles originally developed in property cases involving hunters, whalers, and
migratory animals to cases about Egyptian artifacts, internet domains,
and cocaine.579
Internet flux and convergence practically demolished any rational construction of the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996
(“FTA”).580 When Congress enacted the FTA, it perceived that the internet was good for little more than distributing pornography.581
and bench forgot how to assert trespass on the case or its practical equivalent under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to help the common law evolve with the times.). See, e.g.,
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 762–64 (2013) (attempting to fashion a way to address “an injustice that they had not earlier known or understood” directly under the U.S.
Constitution).
578. United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 405 (2d Cir. 2003) (applying ferae naturae
common law principles about capturing and hunting animals to a case about Egyptian archeology and patrimony law).
579. Id.; State v. Schmidt, 110 N.J. 258, 266–67 (1988) (citing Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai.
175, 180–81 (N.Y. 1805)); Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Intern., Inc., 259 Va. 759, 771
(2000). Cf. Proceedings in the Lords on the Question of Literary Property [in Donaldson v.
Becket], Feb. 4–22, 1774, in 17 THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND, FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1803, at 977 (1813) [hereinafter THE PARLIAMENTARY] (Opinion of
Ashurst, J.) (When a judge is inspired by former case law to create a new protection at
common law, he or she should issue a writ of trespass on the case as the judges in Millar did
to recognize a new right at common law, “It had been said, that when the bird was once out
of the hand, it was become common, and the property of whoever caught it; this was not
wholly true, for there was a case upon the law books, where a hawk with bells about its neck
had flown away; a person detained it, and an action was brought at common law against the
person who did detain it a book with an author’s name to it was the hawk, with the bells
about its neck, and an action might be brought against whoever pirated it.”).
580. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 857–58 (1997) (“As stated on the first of its 103
pages, [the Telecommunication Act’s] primary purpose was to reduce regulation and encourage ‘the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technology.’ The major
components of the statute have nothing to do with the Internet; they were designed to promote competition in the local telephone service market, the multichannel video market, and
the market for over-the-air broadcasting.”) (emphasis added). Cf. Ernesto Falcon, While the
Net Neutrality Fight Continues, AT&T and Verizon are Opening a New Attack on ISP Competition, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (June 8, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/06/
while-net-neutrality-fight-continues-congress-and-states-att-and-verizon-are (these socalled competitors joined together to petition the FCC to exempt themselves from the Telecommunications Act of 1996 primary purpose of preserving competition).
581. Esbin, supra note 575, at 55 (noting that Congress paid more attention to the Internet’s “indecent,” meaning pornographic, potential than anything else);
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at scattered
sections of 47 U.S.C.). See also Rob Frieden, Adjusting the Horizontal and Vertical in Telecommunications Regulation: A Comparison of the Traditional and a New Layered Approach,
55 FED. COMM. L.J. 207, 212 (2003) (explaining how the FTA failed to capture the basic
reality that: “Converging technologies and markets make it quite possible for a single venture to own or lease facilities capable of operating across previously discrete and mutually
exclusive markets.”); Robert C. Atkinson, Telecom Regulation for the 21st Century: Avoiding
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Congress thus drafted FTA according to “status-based embedded assumptions about market share, essentialness, pervasiveness, and use
of public resources,” artificially preserving soon to be obsolete market
structures.582
The most problematic market structure that still enjoys a legal
monopoly, in spite of the internet, is cable.583 Traditional cable services
do not exist anymore; the services sold under the name of cable services
today are, as far as the hardware is concerned, internet streaming services.584 Cable streaming and internet streaming services are the same
services artificially sold separately, contradicting antitrust law, net
neutrality rules, and § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.585

Gridlock, Adapting to Change, 4 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 379, 380, 403 (2006) (arguing that Congress needs to “start from scratch”). Cf. J. Gregory Sidak, The Failure of Good
Intentions: The Worldcom Fraud and the Collapse of American Telecommunications after
Deregulation, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 207, 215 (2003) (raising major questions regarding how far
Chevron deference can go to justify FCC’s policies, if they are patently flawed to the tune of
“a trillion dollars or more of wasted investment”).
582. Frieden, supra note 581, at 209–10; Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104–104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
583. Scholars quickly noticed that the internet was missing from the FTA, and that the
FTA alone keeps cable and other services separate from internet services for purposes of
access and billing. See Esbin, supra note 575, at 80.
584. Tim Berners-Lee, Answers for Young People, W3ORG, https://www.w3.org/People/
Berners-Lee/Kids.html (last visited on Aug. 10, 2021) (explaining internet basics, that computers send and receive packets of digitized information over a wire—this is the internet);
Curt Franklin, How Cable Television Works, HOW STUFF WORKS, https://electronics.howstuffworks.com/cable-tv.htm, at 3 (last visited on Oct. 29, 2018).
585. Franklin, supra note 584, at 3 (noting the transition from traditional cable, to the
digital internet distribution model); Schroeder, Choosing, supra note 485, at 51 (Comcast/
NBC/Universal owned the exclusive rights to the 2012 Summer Olympics, exclusively licensed Google/YouTube to distribute it online, and required online viewers to purchase a
cable subscription to watch the Olympics online through YouTube); Brian Fung, Most Americans streamed the Olympics from PCs, not mobile devices. Here’s why., WASH. POST (Aug.
24, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/08/24/how-internetusers-watched-the-rio-olympics-according-to-data/ (Comcast/NBC/Universal again purchased the exclusive rights to broadcast the Olympics in 2016, and again, viewing it online
required purchasing a cable subscription). See also Jon Brodkin, Verizon throttled fire department’s “unlimited” data during Calif. Wildfire, ARSTECHNICA (Aug. 21, 2018), https://
arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/08/verizon-throttled-fire-departments-unlimited-dataduring-calif-wildfire/; Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, 120 Stat. 21; In the Matter of Digital
Television Distributed Transmission System Technologies, 23 FCC Rcd. 16731 (2008); DTV
Delay Act, 123 Stat. 112–114; In The Matter Of: Authorizing Permissive Use Of The “Next
Generation” Broadcast Television Standard, 32 FCC Rcd. 9930 (2017) (establishing ATSC
3.0 on a “Internet Protocol (IP)-based broadcast transmission platform”). This spectrum was
taken from television channels and auctioned to cell phone companies. Colin Lecher, How
the FCC’s massive airwaves auction will change America—and your phone service, THE
VERGE (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.theverge.com/2016/4/21/11481454/fcc-broadcast-incentive-auction-explained.
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Unfortunately, the Supreme Court propped up these obsolete
streams of profit in their ruling American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo—
a decision based upon the Court’s adoption of the false propaganda
spun by public relations experts, rather than the facts confirmed by
telephonic science.586 As the Crowell Court observed, this was the final
nail in the coffin, because “finality as to the facts becomes in effect finality in law.”587 It no longer matters if cable as it existed in 1976
exists today, because the Aereo Court held that it does as a matter of
law.588
The Court’s decision in Aereo is erroneous because television
and cable are no longer analog as they were in 1976, when the current
copyright law was passed.589 When Aereo was decided, cable networks
were already phasing out analog transmissions in favor of new digital
cable/television distribution.590 The Aereo Court was misinformed that
the only way to defend “ ‘the very existence of broadcast television as
we know it’ ” was to grant old cable and broadcast companies dead
hand control over the internet.591

586. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431, 450–51, 455–59 (2014) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“So which is Aereo: the copy shop or the video-on-demand service? In truth, it is
neither. Rather, it is akin to a copy shop that provides its patrons with a library card. Aereo
offers access to an automated system consisting of routers, servers, transcoders, and dimesized antennae. Like a photocopier or VCR, that system lies dormant until a subscriber
activates it. . . . The Court’s conclusion that Aereo performs boils down to the following
syllogism: (1) Congress amended the Act to overrule our decisions holding that cable systems do not perform when they retransmit over-the-air broadcasts; (2) Aereo looks a lot like
a cable system; therefore (3) Aereo performs. That reasoning suffers from a trio of defects.”).
587. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 57 (1932).
588. Id.; Aereo, 573 U.S. at 450–51 (arbitrarily propping up old FTA distinctions in IP
law that no longer exist in reality).
589. By “no longer analog,” I mean that cable networks adopted Tim Berners-Lee’s technology to stream cable content digitally. Aereo, 573 U.S. at 450–51; Franklin, supra note
584, at 3; In the Matter of Digital Television Distributed Transmission System Technologies, 23 FCC Rcd. 16731 (2008) (establishing the rules for the digital transmission of
television over the air, so that large portions of spectrum could be taken from traditional
television broadcasters and auctioned to cell phone companies); In The Matter Of: Authorizing Permissive Use Of The “Next Generation” Broadcast Television Standard, 32 FCC Rcd.
9930 (2017) (establishing ATSC 3.0 on a “Internet Protocol (IP)-based broadcast transmission platform”).
590. Brief for Petitioners at 39, Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431 (2014) (No.
13–461) (arguing that watching live TV online through Aereo’s service would threaten the
very existence of live TV—when the digitization of live TV literally means that all live TV in
the United States is now distributed at a functional level over the internet); Aereo, 573 U.S.
at 455–59 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (correctly expressing suspicion about the very existence of
traditional broadcast services in the internet age).
591. Aereo, 573 U.S. at 455–59 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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One low price for access to all digitized content is still something the internet is capable of providing.592 Most experts believed that
this was the internet’s natural end, but they underestimated the old
and dying propensity of the Baby Boomer generation for greed and gullibility.593 The Boomers are presently in the process of asserting dead
hand control over the internet based on their preference for a dead past
that will ultimately cost Americans billions of dollars to subsidize.594
The Boomer-controlled Congress and court has failed to face (or
even to understand) the reality that “the internet seamlessly blends
592. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–104, pmbl., 110 Stat. 56 (1996)
(the purpose of the FTA and the FCC was to reduce price for access and expand service to
every person); 47 U.S.C. § 257 (2018) (directing the FCC to review “market entry barriers
for entrepreneurs and other small businesses” for “promotion of the public interest, convenience, and necessity”). Paying for internet service itself (i.e., the use of the actual cable/
telephone networks to send and receive information) and paying for over the top online
services like audio-visual content including movies, music, and books will become even more
confusing as a few companies like AT&T, Verizon, and Comcast are trying to corner the
markets. See, e.g., Chloe Aiello, AT&T bumps the price of DirecTV Now, CNBC, (July 2,
2018, 1:18 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/02/att-is-bumping-directv-now-packages-by5.html (“Although AT&T attributed its changes to market forces, the company may be
under pressure to find new sources of revenue after its $85.4 billion purchase of Time
Warner.”); Schroeder, Choosing, supra note 485, at 51 (noting that NBC is owned by Comcast—a competitor of AT&T/TWC—and that in 2012 NBC purchased exclusive rights to air
the Olympics in the United States, and NBC/Comcast exclusively distributed Olympic content through YouTube/Google, which would not allow Americans to watch the Olympics
online without purchasing a “traditional” cable subscription).
593. See, e.g., Esbin, supra note 575, at 113 (“The coming era of digital personal communications . . . is an era of converging technologies, converging products, converging media
and converging industries. More and more, the computer, broadcast, cable, telephone, satellite, and media entertainment industries will find themselves part of a much larger
marketplace. These industries must learn to compete in broad markets, driven by consumer
needs rather than be protected from competition in their traditional market segments.”);
Aereo, 573 U.S. at 455–60 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Julius Genachowski, Fed. Commc’ns
Comm’n Chair, Remarks at Brookings: Preserving a Free and Open Internet: A Platform for
Innovation, Opportunity, and Prosperity (Sept. 21, 2009) (transcript available at http://techpresident.com/blog-entry/preserve-brilliance-julius-genechowskis-remarks-brookings)
(presuming that the internet would be used for democratizing effects).
594. FCC Restoring Internet Freedom, 47 C.F.R. pts 1, 8, 20 (repealing FCC net neutrality rules); Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–171 ,§ 3003, 120 Stat. 21 (2006)
(the federal government made billions of dollars auctioning off spectrum to the highest bidder after pushing television stations off traditional channels and onto the internet); Aaron
Pressman, Why Almost 1,000 TV Stations Are About to Shift Channels, FORTUNE (Apr. 19,
2017), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/why-almost-1-000-tv-142229062.html; See Carol
Rose, supra note 244, at 768 (In matters of inherent public property like the internet, the
“real danger is that individuals may ‘underinvest’ in such activities, particularly at the outset” because “increasing participation enhances the value of the activity rather than
diminishing it.”). Cf. Zaid Jilani, Killing Net Neutrality has brought on a New Call for Public Broadband, THE INTERCEPT(Dec. 15, 2017), https://theintercept.com/2017/12/15/fcc-netneutrality-public-broadband-seattle/ (this is a nice idea, but it will not succeed without a
strong assertion of antitrust principles because the government already sold the air to private interests).
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content and conduit.”595 From the birth of the internet onward, the
natural and ongoing flux and convergence of networks, technologies,
and content leveled the vertically situated market structures of the
past.596 However, legally enforced dead hand control allows companies
to continue billing for now obsolete, formerly vertically separated
markets.597
So much wonder and credulity are expressed by older generations over the topic of the internet as it continues to demolish the world
they once knew.598 Internet genius, inventor, and activist, Aaron
Swartz, told Americans of an unfortunate run-in he had with such an
elder congressman; who expressed his unfounded worries and fears as
reason enough to break the internet.599 The congressman was a progressive, a liberal, an advocate for civil liberties,

595. See Frieden, supra note 581, at 212–14.
596. Id.; PETER W. HUBER ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 47–50 (2d ed.
1999) (noting fragmentation and convergence driving the telecom markets since the FTA
was passed).
597. Frieden, supra note 581, at 212; Jeremy G. Philips, Don’t Look Now, but the Great
Unbundling Has Spun Into Reverse, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/02/14/business/dealbook/bundling-online-services.html (the myth of the bundle (and
ergo unbundling) was created by telecom giants to preserve their parallel revenue streams
as the internet destroyed any literal or practical or objective difference between them, and
the result is this: “Consumers merely have swapped one bundle for another (or often, several).” We are paying far more than we had in the past for services that the internet has
minimized the cost of providing to us. Antitrust issues abound.). Major antitrust issues,
reviewable by FCC’s public interest standard, are ignored and rubber stamped. United
States v. Radio Corp. of Am., 358 U.S. 334, 351–52 (1959) (“antitrust considerations alone”
can “keep the statutory [public interest standard] from being met”); Jim Chen, The Echoes
of Forgotten Footfalls: Telecommunications Mergers at the Dawn of the Digital Millennium,
43 HOUS. L. REV. 1311, 1316 (2007) (“The prospect that the Commission or the Justice Department would actually bar a merger, however, has diminished to a historic nadir.”); Karle
Bode, FCC Commissioner Says Her Agency is Now Just a Giant Rubber Stamp for Sinclair
Broadcasting, TECHDIRT (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20180404/
08140239558/fcc-commissioner-says-her-agency-is-now-just-giant-rubber-stamp-sinclairbroadcasting.shtml.
598. WASH. STATE: OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN., INTERNET SAFETY FOR SENIORS, https://
www.atg.wa.gov/internet-safety-seniors (last visited Oct. 29, 2018) (“Seniors generally buy
into a few myths about information exposure online. The first myth is that if you don’t use a
computer you aren’t exposed online.”); Katie Gibbons, Over-55s at risk from online fake
news, THE TIMES (Feb. 17, 2018, 12:01 AM), https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/fake-newsrisk-to-over-55s-wsd8zh6pv; Alexis C. Madrigal, Older People Are Worse than Young People
at Telling Fact from Opinion, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/
technology/archive/2018/10/older-people-are-worse-than-young-people-at-telling-fact-fromopinion/573739/.
599. Aaron Swartz, F2C2012 Keynote Address at Freedom to Connect 2012: How We
Stopped SOPA, YOUTUBE (May 21, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fgh2dFngFsg
[hereinafter Swartz, Keynote].
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The Congress was going to break the internet and they just didn’t
care. I remember when this moment first hit me. I was at an event
and I was talking, and I got introduced to a Senator—one of the
strongest proponents of the original COICA [“Combating Online Infringements and Counterfeits Act”] bill in fact. And I asked him
why despite being such a progressive, despite giving a speech in
favor of civil liberties, why he was supporting a bill that would censor the internet?
And you know that typical politician smile he had suddenly faded
from his face, and his eyes started burning this fiery red, and he
started shouting at me. He said, “Those people on the internet!
They think they can get away with anything! They think they can
just put anything up there, and there’s nothing we can do to stop
them! They put up everything! They, they put up our nuclear missiles and they just laugh at us! Well, we’re going to show them.
There’s got to be laws on the internet. It’s got to be under control.”
N-now as far as I know no one has ever put up the U.S.’s nuclear
missiles on the internet. I mean, it’s just not something I’ve heard
about. But, that’s sort of the point, he wasn’t having a rational concern, right, it was this irrational fear that things were out of
control. Here was this man, a United States Senator, and those people on the internet, they were just mocking him. They had to be
under control. Things had to be under control. And I think that was
the attitude of Congress.600

As the Millennial prodigy Aaron Swartz first demonstrated, the “fiery
red” shouting elders may pose a significant barrier to progress, but this
barrier can be overcome with patience and good humor.601 All that was
required to halt COICA in its progress was one Senator, and the activism led by Aaron Swartz was able to convince Senator Ron Wyden to
halt the bill.602 Aaron Swartz demonstrated that grass roots activism
organized through the internet could bring about sweeping legal
change.603
Internet flux and convergence is not the end of the separation of
powers as Swartz demonstrated.604 While the internet may have accel600.
601.
602.

Id.
Id.
See Aaron Swartz, Wyden Again Halts the Internet Censorship Bill, HUFFINGTON
POST (June 1, 2011, 11:17 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/wyden-again-halts-theint_b_869281.
603. About, DEMAND PROGRESS, https://demandprogress.org/about/ (last visited July 26,
2021) (naming Aaron Swartz as a cofounder—one of Swartz’s many successful experiments
with the internet—and naming the successful campaigns Demand Progress led against internet censorship).
604. See, e.g., Josh Blackman, Donald Trump’s Constitution of One, NAT’L REV. (May 12,
2016, 8:00 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2016/05/donald-trump-constitution-end-
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erated it, flux and convergence always did create a pretext for
violations of the separation of powers.605 Part II will detail prevalent
separation of powers violations predicated on the elderly cohort’s failure to keep up with the accelerated changes brought by internet fueled
flux and convergence that affect the law.606
A Message from Senator Dianne Feinstein
In 1997, the self-described Boomer prophets William Strauss
and Neil Howe, known as “Strauss-Howe,” copped a phrase from A
Game of Thrones writing ominously that “winter is coming.”607
Strauss-Howe explained that the Boomer generation was the key to
America’s survival in the coming winter.608 They glowingly wrote of
separation-powers/ (“Beyond libel laws, the serial-tweeter even said he would censor the
Internet in the name of national security. In a speech in December, Trump urged shutting
down parts of the Internet to stop ISIS—as if the Internet can be sectioned off like rooms in
a casino.”).
605. See, e.g., Andrew Griffin, London Terror Attack: Trump Says Internet must be ‘Cut
Off’ to Stop Further Attacks, INDEPENDENT (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.independent.co.uk/
life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/donald-trump-twitter-internet-cut-terror-attacks-parsonsgreen-tube-attack-explosion-latest-a7948141.html (it is extremely unclear what cutting off
the internet even means). Tech and telecom companies groom the public to accept false
information about technology that feeds into major country-wide decisions about how to
govern technology. See, e.g., Karl Bode, ‘5G’ Wireless Doesn’t Even Technically Exist Yet, But
Everyone’s Pretty Sure It’s Going to Fix Everything, TECHDIRT (Mar. 17, 2014, 8:52 AM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140306/08062826462/5g-wireless-doesnt-even-technically-exist-yet-everyones-pretty-sure-its-going-to-fix-everything.shtml; Brian Barrett,
Inside the Olympics Opening Ceremony World-Record Drone Show, WIRED (Feb. 9, 2018),
https://www.wired.com/story/olympics-opening-ceremony-drone-show/ (this drone show
never happened, and yet mainstream articles regarding the drone show at the Olympics
remain so pervasive that most people actually believe they saw the drone show).
606. Avi Selk, ‘There’s so many different things!’: How Technology Baffled an Elderly
Congress in 2018, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/
style/theres-so-many-different-things-how-technology-baffled-an-elderly-congress-in-2018/
2019/01/02/f583f368-ffe0-11e8-83c0-b06139e540e5_story.html. See Bianca Majumder, Congress Should Revive the Office of Technology Assessment, CTR. AM. PROGRESS (May 13, 2019,
9:00 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2019/05/13/469793/congress-revive-office-technology-assessment/ (Congress became willfully ignorant on
technology ever since Newt Gingrich disbanded the Office of Technology Assessment that
was originally established in 1972 to explain the impacts complex technology might have on
constituents to Congress.).
607. WILLIAM STRAUSS & NEIL HOWE, THE FOURTH TURNING: AN AMERICAN PROPHECY 7
(1997) (appearing to take this phrase from A Game of Thrones); GEORGE R. R. MARTIN, A
GAME OF THRONES 240 (1996) (inventing this phrase to mean something along the lines of
that an apocalypse is coming).
608. STRAUSS & HOWE, supra note 607, at 325 (taken from Nathaniel Hawthorne’s glowing opinion of the Puritans).
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their future selves, “Thus will the Gray Champion [i.e., the Boomers]
ride once more.”609
Strauss-Howe’s prophesies, written in a time of relative peace
and prosperity,610 appealed to Boomer vanity by putting the whole
Boomer generation at the center of an imaginary political movement.611 Strauss-Howe foretold that the next turning would occur
around the year 2020, during which the “Aging Boomers will be drawn
to . . . preservation of values that will increasingly seem antiquated to
others.”612 It appears, however ironically, that the long awaited anticipation created by Strauss-Howe actually helped to cause the
insurrection.613
609. Id. at 51, 285. See also id. at 141, 325 (“As the next Gray Champion, the Boom
Generation will lead at a time of maximum danger—and opportunity. . . . The continued
maturation of Boomers is vital for the Crisis to end in triumph.”); id. at 329–30 (feeding the
Boomer ego by naming the Boomers who will be edging toward their 80’s “old priest-warriors” and “elder expressions of the Prophet archetype” and writing boldly of the unending
relevance of the Boomer: “Whether we welcome him or not, the Gray Champion will command our duty and sacrifice at a moment of Crisis.”).
610. See Peace, Prosperity, and Scandal, CBS (Jan. 15, 2001, 1:48 PM), https://
www.cbsnews.com/news/peace-prosperity-and-scandal/ (“On the peace-and-prosperity front,
the numbers are beyond spin and are in Mr. Clinton’s favor: America’s economy enjoyed its
longest peacetime expansion during his two terms in office.”).
611. See David Greenberg, The Crackpot Theories of Stephen Bannon’s Favorite Authors, POLITICO (Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/04/20/
stephen-bannon-fourth-turning-generation-theory-215053/; see also Neil Howe, Where did
Steve Bannon get his worldview? From my book., WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/entertainment/books/where-did-steve-bannon-get-his-worldviewfrom-my-book/2017/02/24/16937f38-f84a-11e6-9845-576c69081518_story.html (“When ‘The
Fourth Turning’ came out, our biggest partisan fans were Democrats . . . . Yet we’ve also had
conservative fans . . . .”). These self-described prophesies appealed to Boomers, whether
liberal or conservative, because the book itself described Millennials (they coined the “Millennial generation” and defined the Millennials when they were still children, before they
had a chance to speak for themselves) in very unflattering light, as if Millennials were
puddy in the Boomers’ hands. Id.; STRAUSS & HOWE, supra note 607, at 285, 325 (predicting
that “the young Millennials will follow the Gray Champion off a cliff,” if the Boomers decide;
in several places the book revels in the Boomers’ role of defining the destiny of the Millennial generation and it exhorts Boomers to assert heavy handed control over Millennial
futures, likely because Strauss-Howe feared that Millennials would be the most dangerous
generation).
612. STRAUSS & HOWE, supra note 607, at 282; Jeremy W. Peters, They Predicted ‘The
Crisis of 2020’ . . . in 1991. So How Does This End?, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2020), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/05/28/us/politics/coronavirus-republicans-trump.html (“Their conclusions about the way each generation develops its own characteristics and leadership
qualities influenced a wide range of political leaders, from liberals like Bill Clinton and Al
Gore to pro-Trump conservatives like Newt Gingrich and Stephen K. Bannon.”).
613. STRAUSS & HOWE, supra note 607, at 6, 31 (“Sometime before the year 2025,”
Strauss-Howe prophesied “[t]he nation could erupt into insurrection or civil violence, crack
up geographically, or succumb to authoritarian rule.”). See Adele M. Stan, Insurrectionist in
Chief: How Steve Bannon led the Vanguard of the Capitol Riots, NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 10,
2021), https://newrepublic.com/article/161574/steve-bannon-capitol-riots-insurrectionist-
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An abiding belief that Boomers will be the saviors of humanity,
supported by Strauss-Howe, emboldened many to take key roles in the
January 6 coup attempt.614 The Boomer tendency toward pride predated Strauss-Howe and perhaps they would have taken these actions
without prophesy.615 However, the Boomer tendency of denying that
their generation is even capable of leaving America in a lurch, is a form
of the “toxic positivity” that infused Donald J. Trump with an unnatural boldness that helped him win the presidency.616
Millennials do not similarly feel entitled to pretend superiority.617 Millennials were not the architects of the January 6, 2021
insurrection, nor did they vote for Donald Trump who incited it.618 Unlike the Boomers, who were known for rejecting the elderly in their

chief (discussing the Boomer prophesies of Strauss-Howe, that originally became popular
because they satisfied Boomer vanity, as a direct cause of the insurrection of January 6,
2021).
614. JILL FILIPOVIC, OK BOOMER, LET’S TALK 13–14 (2020) (“Boomers on the left and the
right cast their early adult years as a period of idealism and progress. They think themselves as having improved the world. A few Boomers certainly did, but overall, the Boomer
generation brought us a rapid national shift away from the ideals of gender equality, racial
justice, and pacifism. Perhaps this generation-wide self-delusion helps explain why
Boomers have such a casual relationship with the truth. . . . Here’s a smattering of what Fox
News viewers and readers of FoxNews.com have heard from anchors, contributors, and
guests:” Here Filipovic listed headlines that characterized Millennials as everything from
the laughable “easily offended cocoon-dwellers” to asking, “Are Millennials to blame for all
the world’s problems?” to stating flatly “In 2017, the average terrorist is a Millennial.”).
615. Id. at 14 (noting how Boomers from “aging lefties” to “the conservatives at Fox” all
seem to “take credit for twentieth-century social progress while binge-watching Fox News
and disseminating conspiracies theories on Facebook”). Compare STRAUSS & HOWE, supra
note 607, at 141, 325 (“As the next Gray Champion, the Boom Generation will lead at a time
of maximum danger—and opportunity. . . . The continued maturation of Boomers is vital for
the Crisis to end in triumph.”), with HOBBES, supra note 6, at 283 (appearing to describe
believers in Strauss-Howe: “in such a number of men, that out of pride, and ignorance,
thake their own Dreams, and extravagant Fancies, and Madnesse, for testimonies of Gods
Spirit”); id. at 231 (naming human “pride” as the basis of his theory that all humanity must
fall under absolute rule of “Leviathan”). Cf. Stan, supra note 613.
616. See MARY TRUMP, TOO MUCH AND NEVER ENOUGH 211 (2020).
617. FILIPOVIC, supra note 614, at 147 (“most [Millennials] were almost apologetic for
suggesting that their pain might matter”); Andrew Van Dam, The Unluckiest Generation in
U.S. History: Millennials have faced the worst economic odds, and many will never recover,
WASH. POST (June 5, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/05/27/millennial-recession-covid/.
618. Aaron Blake, More Young People Voted For Bernie Sanders Than Trump And Clinton Combined – By A Lot, WASH. POST (June 20, 2016, 2:03 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/06/20/more-young-people-voted-for-berniesanders-than-trump-and-clinton-combined-by-a-lot/ [hereinafter Blake, More]; Carrie Dann,
Younger voters choose Biden over Trump—but they’re not wild about either, NBC NEWS
(Sept. 17, 2020, 1:30 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/meet-the-press/younger-voterschoose-biden-over-trump-they-re-not-wild-n1240269.
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youth,619 Millennials welcomed lessons by members of the Silent generation, such as Joan Didion, who doubted the dogmas of inherent
Boomer goodness throughout their lives.620
Thus, on March of 2014, Millennial ears were open and listening when Senate Intelligence Committee Chairwoman Dianne
Feinstein, member of the Silent generation, announced from the Senate floor information that should have changed the trajectory of
American history.621 Feinstein announced that the CIA improperly accessed the Senate committee staff’s computers during the Senate
investigation of the CIA’s torture program.622 Feinstein revealed a
breach of the separation of powers on the national stage, no corrective

619. Malcolm Kaines, Baby Boomers, Critics of Millennials, Once Advised: ‘Ignore Anyone Over 30’, MEDIUM (July 29, 2018), https://medium.com/@MKaines/baby-boomers-criticsof-millennials-once-said-ignore-anyone-over-30-9b2f694b8dec.
620. Vicky Spratt, The Real Reason Millennial Women Should All Be Obsessed With
Joan Didion, GRAZIA (Oct. 30, 2017), https://graziadaily.co.uk/life/tv-and-film/can-learnjoan-didion-documentary/ (reviewing the highly watched Netflix documentary about Didion
The Centre Will Not Hold). As Millennials learned from Didion’s cutting critiques of the
Boomers, during the summer of love in 1967, the Boomers fed their five year olds acid,
attempted to levitate the Pentagon, accepted the white supremacist Charles Manson among
their ranks, and largely avoided joining the parallel occurring freedom summer events led
by Dr. King. JOAN DIDION, THE WHITE ALBUM 42–47 (1990) [hereinafter DIDION, THE WHITE]
(“Many people I know in Los Angeles believe that the Sixties ended abruptly on August 9,
1969, ended at the exact moment when word of the murders on Cielo Drive traveled like
brushfire through the community, and in a sense this is true. The tension broke that day.
The paranoia was fulfilled.” Didion wrote of the day the news of the Tate murders broke: “I
remembered all of the day’s misinformation very clearly, and I also remember this, and wish
I did not: I remember that no one was surprised.”); id. at 206–08 (After the Sixties passed
away, many struggled against a deep seated fatalism, as one person Didion recalled, “attempted suicide in Mexico and then, in a recovery which seemed in many ways a more
advanced derangement, came home and joined the Bank of America’s three-year executivetraining program.”); JOAN DIDION, SLOUCHING TOWARDS BETHLEHEM 130–32 (1981) [hereinafter DIDION, SLOUCHING] (noticing, after seeing Hippies in black face harassing a black
person, Boomers feeding acid to their babies); Peter Manseau, Fifty Years Ago, a Rag-Tag
Group of Acid-Dropping Activists Tried to “Levitate” the Pentagon, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Oct.
20, 2017), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/how-rag-tag-groupacid-dropping-activists-tried-levitate-pentagon-180965338/; Daniel Kreps, How a Stolen
Beach Boys Song Helped Lead to Charles Manson’s Murderous Path, ROLLING STONE (Mar.
17, 2017), https://www.rollingstone.com/tv/tv-news/how-a-stolen-beach-boys-song-helpedlead-to-charles-mansons-murderous-path-117577/ (talking about how the Beach Boys recorded one of Manson’s super creepy songs about enslaving and possibly murdering women
originally titled Cease to Exist); American Experience: Freedom Summer (PBS television
broadcast January 17, 2014) (noting the uncomfortable coexistence of Hippies and those
actually fighting social justice causes).
621. Dianne Feinstein, Chairman, S. Intel. Comm., Floor Speech on the CIA and the
Separation of Powers, C-SPAN (Mar. 11, 2014), https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4486741/dianne-feinstein-cia-separation-powers [hereinafter Feinstein, Floor Speech].
622. Id.
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action was taken by the Boomer controlled White House and Congress,
and eventually Feinstein herself walked back her calls for reform.623
The CIA confirmed that it hacked Congress by removing or altering evidence collected by the Senate Intelligence Committee during
the Senate’s review of the CIA torture program.624 This strongly supports the idea that authorization of war powers through resolution
cannot be meaningfully overseen when war powers are used to coerce
Congress into reauthorizing them.625 It appears that meaningful Senate oversight of executive war powers delegated by resolution is,
therefore, not possible.626
623. Eyder Peralta, CIA Chief Apologizes to Sens. Feinstein, Chambliss Over Computer
Intrusion, NPR (July 31, 2014, 12:28 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/
07/31/336855226/cia-chief-apologizes-sens-feinstein-chambliss-over-computer-intrusion
(CIA admitted what it did, but split hairs over whether it was a separation of powers violation, and then nothing happened—Obama was president, and the press did not dig into the
intrusion); Evan Halper, After calling for surveillance reform, Feinstein casts crucial vote to
kill it, L.A. TIMES, (Jan. 17, 2018, 11:40 AM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-polfisa-democrats-20180117-story.html.
624. Peralta, supra note 623.
625. Feinstein, Floor Speech, supra note 621.
626. This is an apparent, recent confirmation of what the founders thought when they
ratified the declaration of war requirement. THE FEDERALIST No. 41 (James Madison) (“Is
the power of declaring war necessary? No man will answer this question in the negative.”);
James Madison, Helvidius No. IV [Sept. 14, 1793] (“In no part of the constitution is more
wisdom to be found than in the clause which confides the question of war or peace to the
legislature, and not to the executive department.”). Nevertheless, presidents still claim the
power to wage war through U.N. resolution, without congressional approval through either
declaration or resolution arguably making congressional oversight superfluous. Louis
Fisher, The Korean War: On What Legal Basis Did Truman Act, 89 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 21,
33–39 (1995) (noting that Truman never got congressional approval for the Korean War—
and cited to the U.N. Participation Act of 1945 to justify going to war for the first time);
David Gray Adler, The Law: The Clinton Theory of the War Power, 30 PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES
Q. 155, 156 (2000) (tracing the lineage of “[u]nilateral acts of presidential war making” from
“Truman in Korea” to “Reagan in Grenada, to Bush in Panama, to Clinton in Iraq and Bosnia” and this article predated 9/11 and our war against terror in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
elsewhere). Setting aside the fact that presidents since Truman claim unilateral war powers, the congressional tradition of waiving war powers on the belief that they could be
supervised in a meaningful way was first based upon a lie, the existence of which reveals
they never were supervised in a meaningful way. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, H.R.J. Res.
Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964) (this resolution is the first congressional authorization of military force and set the standard for the way wars are waged by the United States
ever since, based upon a lie that U.S. forces were attacked in the Gulf of Tonkin). The untrue claim that there was an attack in the Gulf of Tonkin as a the basis for going to war with
Vietnam without a declaration was first revealed by the Pentagon Papers as analyzed in
Hannah Arendt’s essay Lying in Politics. ARENDT, CRISES, supra note 187, at 5; U.S. DEP’T
OF DEF., REPORT OF THE OFF. OF THE SEC’Y OF DEF. VIETNAM TASK FORCE (1969), https://
www.archives.gov/research/pentagon-papers [hereinafter PENTAGON PAPERS]. The Gulf of
Tonkin lie was finally revealed to have originated by the president himself when President
Johnson’s papers were declassified, and now “[w]e can . . . finally tell the full story of what
happened—and didn’t—in the Gulf of Tonkin.” D.D. Guttenplan, When presidents lie to
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Feinstein’s announcement should have inspired members of
Congress to take strong action to protect the legislative power from the
executive use of illegitimate war powers.627 The first motion it should
have made was to reinvoke the presumption of executive neutrality established by George Washington with the support of the first Supreme
Court unless or until a war is actually declared by Congress.628 That
did not happen.629
Instead, the over-simplified, unitary executive theory continued
to press forward.630 This theory arises from the idea that the three
branches of government are each unitary owing responsibility only to
themselves, implying that each branch has no duty to work with the
other branches to govern.631 The idea of unitary powers undermines
make war, GUARDIAN (Aug. 2, 2014, 5:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2014/aug/02/vietnam-presidents-lie-to-wage-war-iraq (linking to D.D. Guttenplan’s presentation War, Lies and Audiotape about the unlikelihood that the Gulf of Tonkin incident
happened and yet: “Even today, the Gulf of Tonkin resolution remains the template for
presidential war-making.”); Scott Shane, Vietnam War Intelligence ‘Deliberately Skewed,’
Secret Study Says, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/02/politics/
vietnam-war-intelligence-deliberately-skewed-secret-study-says.html (“‘The overwhelming
body of reports, if used, would have told the story that no attack happened,’ he wrote. ‘So a
conscious effort ensued to demonstrate that an attack occurred.’”).
627. Connie Bruck, The Inside War: To Expose Torture, Dianne Feinstein fought the
C.I.A.—and the White House, NEW YORKER (June 22, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2015/06/22/the-inside-war (“Most important, he [President Obama] refused to
characterize the procedures as torture, or to say that they should not be used again. ‘I defer
to the policymakers in future times,’ he said.”). See also Spencer Ackerman, There’s a Secret
Patriot Act, Senator Says, WIRED (May 25, 2011, 4:56 PM), https://www.wired.com/2011/05/
secret-patriot-act/; Swartz, Keynote, supra note 599 (noting a single U.S. Senator, Ron
Wyden, was responsible for putting the COICA bill on hold, taking a pivotal act in saving
the internet from SOPA, PIPA, and ACTA).
628. President George Washington, Proclamation 4—Neutrality of the United States in
the War Involving Austria, Prussia, Sardinia, Great Britain, and the United Netherlands
Against France (Apr. 22, 1793); Letter from the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court to
George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793) (supporting Washington’s neutrality decision based upon
the separation of powers); Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. 6, 16 (1794) (stripping France of
all legitimacy regarding its by-any-means-necessary attempts to convince George Washington and the United States to join French wars).
629. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Rejects Bipartisan Effort to End 9/11 Military Force
Declaration, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/us/politics/
senate-rejects-rand-paul-effort-to-end-military-force-declaration.html.
630. See, e.g., Dana D. Nelson, The ‘unitary executive’ question, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 11,
2008, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/la-oe-nelson11-2008oct11-story.html (“In
answering Gwen Ifill’s question about vice presidential powers at last week’s debate, Joe
Biden redirected attention to the still not very well known concept of the ‘unitary
executive.’”).
631. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (specifically allowing members of Congress to be arrested for treason); id. art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice President and all civil officers of the
United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason,
bribery, and other high crimes and misdemeanors.”); id. art. III, § 3, cl. 1 (defining treason).
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express constitutional limits upon each of the three powers so they can
attack each other as vigorously as possible, which is clearly antithetical to the “good government” the founders hoped to establish.632
The Senate Intelligence Committee published its report on the
CIA torture program, which was commented on by the ACLU and
other groups, but was largely forgotten by the general public.633 AmeriSee, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 614 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) (quoting Letter from the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court to George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793)) (demonstrating that when the Court asserts the separation of powers
to refuse making impermissible advisory statements at the President’s request, the Court
nonetheless should say that it regrets every instance it might embarrass the president’s
power). Cf. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 677–78 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting
a “novel unitary scheme of Article III review of military commissions that was absent in
1942”—but the difference is not a novel unitary scheme, but the absence of a declaration of
war which should have distinguished Ex parte Quirin, a WWII case, from Hamdan and any
case since the end of WWII—the last war we formally declared); John C. Yoo, War and the
Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2 (2002) [hereinafter Yoo, War] (noting that the
issue of “control” over war is the center of the ongoing debate between Professor Yoo, author
of the infamous Bush-era torture memos, and Professor Ramsey, former clerk of Justice
Scalia, each of whom maintain a unitary view of power-as-mere-control rather than powers
as something more complex like a means for legitimate governance).
632. The prevalence of the unitary powers ideology weighs strongly in favor of answering Alexander Hamilton’s opening question of the Federalist Papers about whether human
beings “are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice”
in the negative. THE FEDERALIST No. 1 (Alexander Hamilton); Yoo, War, supra note 626, at
28 (resisting the ways that the founders “sought to control executive power by disrupting
the structural unity of the executive branch,” because as an advocate of unitary executive
power, Yoo saw power as a mere Lord of the Flies styled struggle for control in which he
contended the executive prevails). Yoo’s regular pro-Congress debate partner Professor
Ramsey contended that the legislature prevails; but both Yoo and Ramsey were preoccupied
with mere unitary control of government and they each make little space for the nuance
required for how government officials should properly govern. id. See also Jonathan Stein &
Tim Dickinson, Lie by lie: A Timeline of How We Got Into Iraq, MOTHER JONES (Sept./Oct.
2006), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2011/12/leadup-iraq-war-timeline/ (naming
Yoo’s statements as a DOJ lawyer that laws and treaties don’t apply to the president’s inherent war powers). Cf. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 14 (U.S. 1776) (naming
the English government illegitimate for “render[ing] the Military independent of and superior to the Civil power”); JEFFERSON, NOTES, supra note 268, at 323 (Echoing the Declaration
in his draft of the Virginia constitution, and indicating that the Suspension Clause of the
U.S. Constitution was later ratified in order to maintain that “[t]he military shall be
subordinate to the civil power.”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. But see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
542 U.S. 507, 580–83 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the “unitary Executive”
was reason enough for the Court to suspend habeas jurisdiction).
633. See generally Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Committee
Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program Together
with Foreword by Chairman Feinstein and Additional and Minority Views, S. Rep. No.
113–288 (2014) (whatever is in this report is at least in part a product of the CIA’s hacking
efforts—and it is unclear how much of its findings were compromised); Ashley Gorski & Noa
Yachot, Who’s Afraid of the Torture Report?, ACLU BLOG (Nov. 10, 2015, 6:00 PM), https://
www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/torture/whos-afraid-torture-report (noting that Obama
officials were blocking officials from reading the Senate report on torture even after it was
publicly released).
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cans will never know the extent to which the report’s findings were
adulterated by the executive, nor what may have been uncovered had
the Senate Intelligence Committee been allowed to investigate without
interference.634 The fact of executive interference with the legislative
branch is, however, undeniable.635
Executive meddling in legislative affairs by the use of war powers casts doubt on the legitimacy of all U.S. laws.636 If even Congress is
not secure from war powers, then those war powers, whatever they are,
cannot be legitimate—because war powers must derive from Congress
alone.637 In the words of John Adams, “an executive that unduly takes
control of Congress is a government of men that is subverting or altogether destroying the Rule of Law.”638
Only a small contingent of lawmakers, led by Senator Ron
Wyden of Oregon, disputed the legitimacy of secret law.639 The rest
appeared to presume the legitimacy of the industrial war and prison
complexes in the United States according to secret law, even after Edward Snowden’s disclosures,640 and none appeared to recognize their
634. Spencer Ackerman, ‘A constitutional crisis’: the CIA turns on the Senate, GUARDIAN
(Sept. 10, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/sep/10/cia-senate-investigation-constitutional-crisis-daniel-jones.
635. Id.
636. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1 (an executive that hacks Congress to get his way
is arguably committing treason as defined in the constitution—an impeachable offense).
637. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10–16; James Madison, Helvidius No. IV [Sept. 14, 1793]
(“In no part of the constitution is more wisdom to be found than in the clause which confides
the question of war or peace to the legislature, and not to the executive department.”).
638. John Adams, Thoughts on Government 8, 13–14, 26 [1776].
639. Ron Wyden, On NSA Spying & Secret Law, C-SPAN (Dec. 31, 2012), https://www.cspan.org/video/?c4279272/ron-wyden-nsa-spying-secret-law; Press Release, Sen. Ron
Wyden, Wyden: Gorsuch’s History on Torture and Secret Law is Disqualifying for Supreme
Court (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/wyden-gorsuchshistory-on-torture-and-secret-law-is-disqualifying-for-supreme-court. See Kastely, supra
note 186, at 8 (noting that the legitimacy of the laws requires that they be made public).
640. See, e.g., Norman Solomon, Big Brother’s Loyal Sister: How Dianne Feinstein is
Betraying Civil Liberties, COMMON DREAMS (Nov. 6, 2013), https://www.commondreams.org/
views/2013/11/06/big-brothers-loyal-sister-how-dianne-feinstein-betraying-civil-liberties;
Swartz, Keynote, supra note 599 (noting that some of the most corrupt or misinformed individuals are progressive and Democrat); James Risen, If Donald Trump Targets Journalists,
Thank Obama, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/30/opinion/
sunday/if-donald-trump-targets-journalists-thank-obama.html (“Dana Priest, a Pulitzer
Prize-winning reporter for The Washington Post, added: ‘Obama’s attorney general repeatedly allowed the F.B.I. to use intrusive measures against reporters more often than any
time in recent memory. The moral obstacles have been cleared for Trump’s attorney general
to go even further, to forget that it’s a free press that has distinguished us from other countries, and to try to silence dissent by silencing an institution whose job is to give voice to
dissent.’”); Glenn Greenwald, Democrats Continue to Delude Themselves About Obama’s
Failed Guantánamo Vow, THE INTERCEPT (Aug. 12, 2015), https://theintercept.com/2015/08/
12/democrats-continue-lie-obamas-failed-guantanamo-vow/.
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own vulnerability until Barton Gellman published his book Dark Mirror that revealed that members of Congress may regularly be
monitored and perhaps manipulated by executive branch surveillance.641 When President Obama put Congress to the test in 2014 and
asked it to abide by an executive that hacks Congress whenever the
Senate tries to oversee executive torture programs, Congress failed to
push back.642
Under the leadership of Senator Feinstein, Congress managed
to say what happened at least, which is something the Boomers in
leadership resisted.643 The Boomers’ preference for appearing to be inherently good was overridden by Senator Feinstein, even when it
caused members of her own party to take some heat.644 By airing this
grievance publicly on the floor of Congress, Feinstein gave future generations an opportunity to discuss the events giving rise to a
government spy program with the capability of hacking Congress.645
However, it is unfortunate that Congress was unable to gather
the political will to pass laws that preclude future presidents from corrupting congressional investigations by targeting them with spy
operations and specifically to stop the executive branch from continuing to torture people.646 Failing to end secret torture chambers
administered by the U.S. Government without oversight leant gravity
to QAnon conspiracies, which supported Trump’s candidacy with mis-

641. See Letter from Rep. Anna G. Eshoo to Hon. John Ratcliffe & Hon. Paul M.
Nakasone (Aug. 28, 2020) (“The surveillance of Congressional and judicial communications
by the executive branch seriously threatens the separation of powers principles of our constitution.”) (quoting GELLMAN, supra note 407, at 326).
642. Even when Congress itself was the victim of acts of espionage by their own government, Congress still did not change existing laws that allow the President sweeping control
over domestic communications. Jason Koebler, The CIA Hacked Senate Computers, Lied
About It, and No One is Getting Fired, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (July 31, 2014), https://
motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/gvy537/the-cia-hacked-senate-computers-lied-about-itand-no-one-is-getting-fired; Josh Gerstein, Feinstein still pressing Obama to declassify ‘torture report’, POLITICO (Nov. 29, 2016), https://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2016/
11/feinstein-cia-torture-report-231978 (Congress has the power to fix this, but Feinstein
only managed to beg Obama to do the bare minimum of what Congress should do for itself);
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3 (“Each House shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from
time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in their judgment require secrecy . . . .”)
643. Feinstein, Floor Speech, supra note 621.
644. Id.; Bruck, supra note 627.
645. Feinstein, Floor Speech, supra note 621.
646. See Sara Morrison, The Senate voted to let the government keep surveilling your
online life without a warrant, VOX (May 14, 2020, 4:46 PM), https://www.vox.com/recode/
2020/5/13/21257481/wyden-freedom-patriot-act-amendment-mcconnell.
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information.647 Congress’s lack of action in 2014 also added a measure
of reality to Trump’s consistent attack on the Washington “swamp”
that he purportedly tried to drain on January 6, 2021.648
Young Americans can still pull the Boomers’ hands off the selfdestruct button if young Americans endeavor to understand how the
Baby Boomers are subverting the separation of powers.649 Members of
the Silent Generation, like Senator Feinstein, were willing to air
messages on the Senate floor to reveal both a corruption of the separation of powers by a Boomer run White House.650 Ever since Feinstein’s
message the government began to unravel until finally on January 6,
2021, the President Trump attempted to stage a coup d’etat.651
The self-interested rationalism of the Baby Boomers in charge
that encouraged and excused the attacks of January 6, 2021, resemble
Marat’s declarations of rational self-interest that directly predated the
647. See Mikael Thalen, QAnon’s Guantanamo Frenzy, Daily Dot (Aug. 2, 2021), https://
www.dailydot.com/debug/conspiracy-theory-newsletter-guantanamo-bay-facebook-08-022021/. Cf. Greenwald, supra note 640 (Obama promised to end Guantanamo and failed to
shut it down).
648. See Ken Bensinger & Jessica Garrison, Watching the Watchmen, BUZZFEED NEWS
(July 20, 2021, 8:36 AM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/kenbensinger/michigankidnapping-gretchen-whitmer-fbi-informant (reporting that “the FBI, played a far larger
role than has previously been reported” in pro-Trump plots to retain the presidency); Zoe
Tillman, Trump Gave Capitol Rioters the Language to Defend the Insurrection and Deny
Reality, BUZZFEED NEWS (July 17, 2021, 11:01 AM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/
zoetillman/january-six-suspects-trump-statements. Cf. McKenzie Sadeghi, Fact check:
Claims of FBI role in Jan. 6 Capitol attack are false, USA Today (June 25, 2021, 5:35 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/factcheck/2021/06/25/fact-check-no-evidence-fbi-organized-jan-6-capitol-riot/7753276002/.
649. See Stan, supra note 613 (discussing the Boomer prophesies of Strauss-Howe as a
cause, and may be the cause, of the January 6, 2021, coup attempt). Cf. FILIPOVIC, supra
note 614, at 13–14; BRUCE CANNON, A GENERATION OF SOCIOPATHS: HOW THE BABY BOOMERS
BETRAYED AMERICA xxv (2017) (calling the Boomer systems created to steal wealth from the
young “generational plunder”).
650. Feinstein, Floor Speech, supra note 621 (“Based on what Director Brennan has informed us, I have grave concerns that the CIA’s search may well have violated the
separation of powers principles embodied in the United States Constitution, including the
Speech and Debate clause. It may have undermined the constitutional framework essential
to effective congressional oversight of intelligence activities or any other government function.”) (emphasis added); Daniel Cooney, Sen. Dianne Feinstein on NSA Ruling: Telecom
Companies Should Hold Data, NBC (May 10, 2015), https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-thepress/sen-dianne-feinstein-telecom-companies-should-hold-data-n356721 (originally a proponent of the USA Patriot Act, after the Senate was hacked by the CIA, Feinstein continued
to hold out hope that executive spying of Americans could be limited by overseeing who
holds our data—which is a non-solution).
651. HOBBES, supra note 6, at 46–48, 231; Dan Zak, Baby boomers are the zombie invasion we’ve feared, WASH. POST, (June 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/artsand-entertainment/wp/2016/06/29/baby-boomers-are-the-zombie-invasion-weve-feared/
(“Our elders have broken the tradition of being good ancestors.”).
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French Reign of Terror.652 Americans can learn from history that ordinary gamblers make the most capable terrorists.653 Americans can
also, like Phillis Wheatley, oppose the selfishness that caused the
Boomers’ worst mistakes in order to help free people once again from
oppression and bondage; the choice is eternally theirs.654
The Merger of War and Peace Powers
The separation of war and peace powers in the constitution resides in the power and duty of Congress to declare war.655 Peace
powers are presumed—Congress does not need to declare peace before
it can regulate commerce with foreign nations, between the states, or
with Native American tribes.656 The president does not need congressional approval to enter into peace talks or trade negotiations, to
652. Zak, supra note 651; 1 JEAN-PAUL MARAT, A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY ON MAN 138–39
(1773) (causing rivers of blood to flow in France based upon rational self-interest); ERNEST
BELFORT BAX, JEAN PAUL MARAT 325–30 (1879) (Speaking of Marat, French mothers said of
their children: “‘We will give them for a gospel,’ said one, ‘the complete words of this great
man.’”). See, e.g., Tom Toles, Opinion, He who dies with the most toys now loses!, WASH.
POST (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/opinions/wp/2016/10/24/hewho-dies-with-the-most-toys-now-loses/ (denouncing Boomer selfishness ideologies). The
American Revolutionaries frequently denounced selfishness. Ann Bleecker, A Pastoral Dialogue [1780], in ANN ELIZA BLEECKER, THE POSTHUMOUS WORKS OF ANN ELIZA BLEECKER
253–59 (1793) (“Americans! Ye thought your labours o’er, / Ah no! the hydra Envy brings
you more.”).
653. Compare Jose A. Del Real & Jonah Engel Bromwich, Stephen Paddock, Las Vegas
Suspect, Was a Gambler Who Drew Little Attention, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/10/02/us/stephen-paddock-vegas-shooter.html (explaining that Paddock was a millionaire real estate businessman who liked casinos, he did not hold any
strong religious views, and he seemed like a “nice” guy), with Elaina Plott, Why Trump
Can’t Quit Steve Wynn, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 28, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2018/01/trump-wynn/551693/ (Trump is a billionaire real estate businessman who
likes casinos, he does not hold any strong religious views, and to many he seems like a “nice”
guy.).
654. Phillis Wheatley, To the University of Cambridge [1767] (Wheatley advised the students of Harvard to “Suppress the sable monster in its growth”); Phillis Wheatley, To the
Right Honorable William, Earl of Dartmouth [1773] (Wheatley explained the basis for her
cause for American freedom saying, “And can I then but pray / Others may never feel tyrannic sway?”—this poem was written in front of the wealthy English merchant Thomas
Wooldridge who was so inspired by it that he sent it to the Earl of Dartmouth on her behalf—this Earl was in charge of managing all the American Colonies during the
revolutionary era and is the namesake of Dartmouth College). See 2 WILLIAM LEGGE, THE
MANUSCRIPTS OF THE EARL OF DARTMOUTH 107–08 (George Athan Billias intro., 1972) (confirming that Wooldridge sent Phillis Wheatley’s poem to William Legge the Earl of
Dartmouth in 1772).
655. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; MONSIEUR DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 314–15
(Edward D. Ingraham ed. & trans., 1867) [1758].
656. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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embargo arms deals, or to block U.S. citizens from mercenary
service.657
By contrast, war powers are not presumed.658 On the high seas,
a piracy law passed by Congress is required; on land, a formal declaration of war is required.659 Within the physical borders of the United
States, legitimate war powers do not exist unless America is attacked.660 The president has inherent war powers to put down

657. See President George Washington, Proclamation 4—Neutrality of the United
States in the War Involving Austria, Prussia, Sardinia, Great Britain, and the United
Netherlands Against France (Apr. 22, 1793) (ordering U.S. citizens not to sell themselves as
mercenaries to the French Government in their war against England); President Thomas
Jefferson, Proclamation 14—Requiring Removal of British Armed Vessels From United
States Ports and Waters (July 2, 1807) (revoking hospitality toward British vessels impressing U.S. citizens into British service); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299
U.S. 304, 311, 331–32 (1936) (affirming the president’s power to block a sale of machine
guns to the Chaco region of Bolivia).
658. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10–11.
659. Id.; Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170, 178 (1804) (holding that the president’s attempt
to order the civil forfeiture of a vessel beyond the authorization of Congress was a plain
trespass); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 642 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (“Nothing in our Constitution is plainer than that declaration of a war is entrusted only to Congress. Of course, a state of war may, in fact, exist without a formal
declaration. But no doctrine that the Court could promulgate would seem to me more sinister and alarming than that a President whose conduct of foreign affairs is so largely
uncontrolled, and often even is unknown, can vastly enlarge his mastery over the internal
affairs of the country by his own commitment of the Nation’s armed forces to some foreign
venture.”).
660. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 120–21 (1866) (“The Constitution of the United States
is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its
protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its
provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or despotism, but the theory of necessity on which it is based
is false; for the government, within the Constitution, has all the powers granted to it, which
are necessary to preserve its existence; as has been happily proved by the result of the great
effort to throw off its just authority [i.e., the Civil War].”—the rule is that as long as the
doors of the court are not shuttered by actual violence, that civil law rules, and martial law
(which is not a law) is illegitimate and not permitted); Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585–86 (
“The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the President’s military power as
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. . . . Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the several constitutional provisions that grant executive power to the President.
In the framework of our Constitution, the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. . . . The President’s order does
not direct that a congressional policy be executed in a manner prescribed by Congress—it
directs that a presidential policy be executed in a manner prescribed by the President. . . .
The Constitution does not subject this lawmaking power of Congress to presidential or military supervision or control.”).
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insurrections, as in the Civil War, and to repel an attack by a foreign
nation on American soil, as in the attack on Pearl Harbor.661
Declarations of war are well defined in the law of nations, and it
appears that the United states has only recently lost touch with this
basic requirement.662 In conflicts preceding the Korean and Vietnam
661. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 127 (“Martial law cannot arise from a threatened invasion. The
necessity must be actual and present; the invasion real, such as effectually closes the courts
and deposes the civil administration.”); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 334–35
(1946) (affirming Milligan’s “‘open court’ rule” in response to the Japanese invasion at Pearl
Harbor); U.S. CONST. pmbl.; id. art. IV, § 4 (The preamble states that a purpose of the U.S.
Government is to ensure “domestic Tranquility,” and thus in this interest “on application of
the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened)” the states
shall be protected “against domestic violence.” Domestic violence includes the Southern
slavery system; the Confederate States in rebellion had more than a long enough chance to
end the institution of slavery and given the time to do so they attempted to reform the entire
U.S. as a slavery country, and then they tried to secede. As a practical matter, when every
level of government is besieged with treason, and the U.S. Supreme Court appears to throw
its entire weight behind the rebels in the South as the Taney Court did—the President must
take action in the style of President Lincoln to safeguard the font from which every power of
the federal government is derived—the U.S. social compact.). But see Ex parte Merryman,
17 F. Cas. 144, 152 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487) (The Southern sympathizer Chief Justice
Taney held that President Lincoln suspended habeas corpus by arresting a suspect of armed
insurrection who we might consider a terrorist suspect today. Then Chief Justice Taney
considered a habeas writ to release Merryman before Lincoln had any chance of investigating whether Merryman had any connection to the suspected crimes or trying him for such
crimes could take place—Ex parte Merryman directly precipitated the Civil War, and gave
pretextual legal cover for those who carried out the Lincoln assassination.); Abraham Lincoln, Exec. Order No. 1—Relating to Political Prisoners (Feb. 14, 1862) (noting that the
federal courts and all levels of the federal government were besieged with treason—possibly
referring to Merryman).
662. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison) (“Is the power of declaring war necessary? No man will answer this question in the negative. It would be superfluous, therefore,
to enter into a proof of the affirmative.”); VATTEL, supra note 655, at 314–15 (“The right of
making war belongs to nations only as a remedy against injustice: it is the offspring of
unhappy necessity. This remedy is so dreadful in its effects, so destructive to mankind, so
grievous even to the party who has recourse to it, that unquestionably the law of nature
allows it only in the last extremity,—that is to say, when every other expedient proves ineffectual for the maintenance of justice. . . . [then Vattel goes over the baseline requirements
for going to war and concludes] But all this is not sufficient. As it is possible that the present
fear of our arms may make an impression on the mind of our adversary, and induce him to
do us justice,—we owe this further regard to humanity, and especially to the lives and peace
of the subjects, to declare to that unjust nation, or its chief, that we are at length going to
have recourse to the last remedy, and make use of open force, for the purpose of bringing
him to reason. This is called declaring war.”). See Fisher, supra note 626, at 33–39 (noting
the role of UN Security Council decisions in the creation of the Korean War); Youngstown,
343 U.S. at 642 (Jackson, J., concurring) (President Truman started his war in Korea without congressional approval, and then ordered the nation’s privately owned steel mills to be
seized for public use in furtherance of war, and when one of these steel mills disputed this
order in court he told the court that he “invested himself with ‘war powers,’” to which the
Court replied that it would be nothing “more sinister and alarming” if such a thing were
legitimately possible, noting that a declaration of war may be required.); Exec. Order No.
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Wars, the declaration of war requirement was observed.663 Only in the
post-WWII era the distinction between war and peace, which was regularly expounded on the floor of Congress, was forgotten.664 For
example, John Quincy Adams defined the war and peace powers from
the floor of Congress saying,
There are, then, Mr. Chairman, in the authority of Congress and of
the Executive, two classes of powers, altogether different in their
nature, and often incompatible with each other—the war power and
the peace power. The peace power is limited by regulations, and restricted by provisions, prescribed within the Constitution itself. The
war power is limited only by the laws and usages of nations. The
power is tremendous: it is strictly constitutional, but it breaks down
every barrier so anxiously erected for the protection of liberty, of
property, and of life.665

Thus, when President Truman tried to seize all U.S. steel mills to support his private war in Korea without congressional approval, the U.S.
Supreme Court responded, “In the framework of our Constitution, the
President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes
the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. . . . And the Constitution is
neither silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws which the President is to execute.”666 Justice Jackson further clarified that, “Nothing
in our Constitution is plainer than that declaration of a war is entrusted only to Congress.”667
10340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3,139 (1952) (ordering the seizure of several steel businesses across the
United States listed in the order).
663. The Korean War was waged without any form of congressional approval and the
Vietnam War was indulged solely by congressional resolution. Fisher, supra note 626, at
33–39; Sarnoff v. Shultz, 409 U.S. 929, 930 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“No declaration
of war has been made respecting Vietnam. Hence the question can be phrased in terms of
the constitutionality of the use of funds to pursue a ‘Presidential war.’”).
664. See, e.g., Ronald K. L. Collins & David M. Skover, What is War?: Reflections on Free
Speech in “Wartime” 36 RUTGERS L.J. 833, 839 (2005) (“a formal declaration has not proven
historically to be a condition precedent for the existence of ‘war’; and in more modern times,
such a declaration has become entirely irrelevant”).
665. JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, SPEECH OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, ON THE JOINT RESOLUTION
FOR DISTRIBUTING RATIONS TO THE DISTRESSED FUGITIVES FROM INDIAN HOSTILITIES IN THE
STATES OF ALABAMA AND GEORGIA 3–4 (1836) [hereinafter QUINCY ADAMS, SPEECH] (emphasis added).
666. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587, 590 (quoting the executive order, basing its seizure of
steel mills on the “‘American fighting men and fighting men of other nations . . . now engaged in deadly combat with the forces of aggression in Korea’”); id. at 642 (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (“That seems to be the logic of an argument tendered at our bar—that the President having, of his own responsibility, sent American troops abroad derives from that act
‘affirmative power’ to seize the means of producing a supply of steel for them.”).
667. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 642 (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson’s concurrence was not clear enough to stop the President from redefining the declaration of war in
Japan to require unconditional surrender. Dorothy Day, We Go on Record: the CW Response
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The expansion of presidential powers during the Truman Administration was years in the making.668 Advocacy for the obsolescence
of declarations of war trace back at least as far as the Spanish–American War; and the beginning of Theodore Roosevelt’s political
career.669 It appeared that in the year 2020, Theodore Roosevelt finally
prevailed in his struggle to merge the war and peace powers and vest
them in the president as imagined by his Corollary on the Monroe
Doctrine.670
Though Congress and the president seem to regard declarations
of war as a vestige of a bygone era, the question has never been briefed
in the U.S. Supreme Court.671 Apart from the president’s duty to defend the people of the United States from invasion or rebellion, no U.S.
to Hiroshima, CATHOLIC WORKER (Sept. 1, 1945) http://www.catholicworker.org/dorothyday/
articles/554.html (“Mr. Truman was jubilant. President Truman. True man; what a strange
name, come to think of it. We refer to Jesus Christ as true God and true Man. Truman is a
true man of his time in that he was jubilant. He was not a son of God, brother of Christ,
brother of the Japanese, jubilating as he did. He went from table to table on the cruiser
which was bringing him home from the Big Three conference, telling the great news; ‘jubilant’ the newspapers said. Jubilate Deo. We have killed 318,000 Japanese.”). See Gar
Alperovitz, Did America Have to Drop the Bomb? Not to End the War, But Truman Wanted
to Intimidate Russia, WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 1985) https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/
opinions/1985/08/04/did-america-have-to-drop-the-bombnot-to-end-the-war-but-trumanwanted-to-intimidate-russia/46105dff-8594-4f6c-b6d7-ef1b6cb6530d/.
668. Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Sir George Otto Trevelyan (June 19, 1908) (“I
believe in power” — “I don’t think that any harm comes from the concentration of power in
one man’s hands.”).
669. Prior to his involvement position as Assistant Secretary to the Navy and as leader
of the Rough Riders in Cuba, he was only a local political figure. THEODORE ROOSEVELT,
ROUGH RIDERS 26, 58, 187 (1899); Treaty of Paris of 1898, Spain-U.S., art. 1–3, Dec. 11,
1898, 11 Bevans 615 (ceding Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines to the United States,
and creating the opportunity for the United States to invade Cuba in order to eventually
force Cuba to allow the United States to open Guantanamo Bay prison on Cuban soil). See
Platt Amendment, 31 Stat. 895, 897 (1901) (requiring Cuba to lease the U.S. lands); 1903
Treaty of Relations, Cuba-U.S., art. 1, Feb. 16–23, 1903, 6 Bevans 1116 (creating Guantanamo Bay); Theodore Roosevelt, Exec. Order No. 518 (Oct. 23, 1906) (order for U.S.
reoccupation of Cuba).
670. Proclamation No. 9844, 84 Fed. Reg. 4949 (Feb. 15, 2019) (appropriating funds to
build a wall between the United States and Mexico without congressional approval). Compare President Theodore Roosevelt, Fourth Annual Message (Dec. 6, 1904) (primarily
justifying “interference from the United States . . . in the last resort” in other countries in
the Western Hemisphere, and noting that interference with Cuba was required citing to the
Platt Amendment), with President James Monroe, Seventh Annual Message (Dec. 2, 1823)
(primarily declaring noninterference in foreign countries, and noting “[w]ith the existing
colonies or dependencies of an European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere”); Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Sir George Otto Trevelyan (June 19, 1908) (“I
believe in power” — “I don’t think that any harm comes from the concentration of power in
one man’s hands.”). But see Sierra Club v. Trump, 977 F.3d 853, 888–90 (9th Cir. 2020).
671. Holmes v. United States, 391 U.S. 936, 938 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“It is
clear from our decisions that conscription is constitutionally permissible when there has
been a declaration of war. But we have never decided whether there may be conscription in
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Supreme Court opinion upheld a presumption that war powers are inherent presidential powers.672 If the Court ever did, it might render
itself superfluous.673
Though the Court is in nearly unanimous agreement that Article III should not be rendered ineffective in matters of war and peace,
it has yet to formulate an effective way to adjudicate constitutional violations occurring under war resolutions.674 It is hard to say why, when,
or even whether the Court left the question of congressional declarations of war behind.675 It appears that the question is still ripe for
review under Flast as noted by Justice Douglas in his Sarnhoff v. Schultz dissent.676
Since WWII, the question of what war powers are vested in
which branches of government—absent a formal declaration—was left
absence of a declaration of war. Our cases suggest (but do not decide) that there may not
be.”). Cf. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585–86.
672. Holmes, 391 U.S. at 949 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (it seems that the existence of the
military industrial complex largely exists in an empty space in the law created by the
Court’s refusal to answer this question); Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585–86 (deciding only that
if a President does not have congressional approval, he cannot seize the nation’s steel
mills—however, the Court did not make clear what kind of approval would be required).
Jurisdiction to hear the question still appears to exist under Flast. Sarnoff v. Shultz, 409
U.S. 929, 930 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968)).
673. Justice Thomas argued that the Court should not help a U.S. citizen illegally and
arbitrarily imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 592–93
(2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should allow the president to lock a
U.S. citizen in a foreign prison without a trial and throw away the key, practically advocating the overruling of Ex parte Milligan by arguing that U.S. citizens today should be treated
like enemies of the state, and suspending the writ of habeas corpus in Hamdi’s case and
almost entirely removing federal jurisdiction to review any such cases arising from presidential detention of U.S. citizens as long as the executive branch alleges that the crimes
these disappeared persons committed against the United States were truly heinous).
674. Id. at 536 (plurality opinion) (“Whatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations in
times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual
liberties are at stake.”). Id. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens
dissented, because they believed that Hamdi deserved to be tried for treason in an Article
III Court, “Where the Government accuses a citizen of waging war against it, our constitutional tradition has been to prosecute him in federal court for treason or some other crime.”).
675. Holmes, 391 U.S. at 936 (mem.) (noting that, perhaps, if the question presented
included whether “in the absence of a declaration of war” whether the U.S. Government
could “compel military service in [an] armed international conflict oversees” he would have
voted for certiorari like Justice Douglas).
676. Sarnoff v. Shultz, 409 U.S. 929, 930 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968)) (“The action here, as in Flast, is a challenge by federal taxpayers
of a violation of a specific constitutional provision. Actions of the Congress and of the Executive are involved here as in Flast. The question is therefore no more ‘political’ in this case
than in Flast.”); Holmes, 391 U.S. at 936 (mem.); Hart v. United States, 391 U.S. 956, 960
(1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (a dissent along the same lines as Holmes, arguing the Court
should have granted certiorari).
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unanswered.677 Leaving this vital question undecided, the post-9/11
Court lurched forward.678 In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld the Court set forth a
confusing simultaneous application of Ex parte Quirin and Ex parte
Milligan though the former was decided under a declaration of war
and the latter was not.679
The unfortunate post-9/11 result was a tripartite compromise
represented by Hamdi, Padilla, and Rasul.680 While these cases acknowledged the right to counsel, to habeas corpus, and to due process,
677. Holmes, 391 U.S. at 949 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585–86
(this case hinted at the fact that a declaration of war would be necessary to justify a government taking of the nation’s steel mills, but did not get it did not need to get into the
details—thus it can be characterized as a nondelegation case for its focus on Congress’s
Takings Clause power). World War II involved six declarations of war against Japan, Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania.
678. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518–19, 535 (2004) (plurality opinion) (citing Ex
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28, 30, 61 (1942) (involving a military execution of a U.S. citizen in
the United States during WWII); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 233–34 (1944)
(Murphy, J., dissenting) (involving the internment of loyal U.S. citizens during WWII)); id.
at 543 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S.
283, 285–88 (1944) (another case regarding Japanese internment during WWII)); id. at
586–87 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 12 (1946) (a case involving the military execution of General Yamashita during General McArthur’s military rule of
the Philippines); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 313–14 (1946) (a case involving the
martial rule of Hawaii after Pearl Harbor); Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 767 n. 9
(1948) (a suit regarding the U.S. recovering an excess of profits made by private companies
on war contracts)); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 444 (2004) (citing Ahrens v. Clark,
335 U.S. 188, 190–92 (1948) (a case denying habeas review to Germans being deported from
Ellis Island, because Ellis Island was according to Ahrens beyond the jurisdiction of the
Court—this was wholly overruled in Boumediene regardless of whether a declaration of war
was made, because habeas jurisdiction is based upon federal jurisdiction over the custodian,
regardless of the geographic location)); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 472–73 (2004) (citing
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777–78 (1950) (a case involving habeas jurisdiction
over cases regarding war crimes committed by foreign enemies held in military bases
abroad, during war)).
679. See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 523 (plurality opinion) (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317
U.S. 1, 21 (1942) (noting that the petitioners who were denied habeas relief, including one
naturalized U.S. citizen, were trained “at a sabotage school near Berlin, Germany” – “[a]fter
the declaration of war between the United States and the German Reich”) (emphasis added); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 124–25 (1866) (During the Civil War, an insurrection or
rebellion which was perpetrated by the Southern States without a declaration of war, Milligan was held and tried by a military commission in the North. It would be absurd to say
that Congress could have declared war on its own states, or that Lincoln should have waited
for Congress to do so before putting down the Confederate Rebellion.)).
680. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509, 535–36 (plurality opinion) (deciding that U.S. citizens
have a right to due process before their life, liberty, or property are taken from them—but
decided that a military tribunal could satisfy this requirement); Padilla, 542 U.S. at 434–35
(deciding that habeas jurisdiction turns on the federal jurisdiction over the custodian, not
the prisoner—but deciding that the exact custodian must be named in the habeas petition
based on the interpretation of a law directly overruled by Boumediene); Rasul, 542 U.S. at
474–75 (deciding that enemy aliens held in Guantanamo Bay have a constitutional right to
a habeas petition).
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Justice O’Connor’s plurality in Hamdi left open the possibility that
process given in military courts could suffice as due legal process.681 In
all earlier case law and under the light of all human history, this is an
unsustainable contradiction.682
The Hamdi plurality gave rise to a strange, new Article III review process for military tribunals.683 The travesty of the Hamdi
plurality’s trusting civil jurisdiction to the military consists in the fact
that martial law is necessarily arbitrary and uncontrollable;684 the
Hamdi plurality’s use of a Mathews balancing test to cede power to the
executive as if the military law is an ordinary administrative enabling
law smacks of a naivete that preceded the rise of dictatorships preceding WWII.685 Like the more recent congressional oversight failure in
executive torture programs, the Hamdi plurality invited a cyberattack
on the Court.686
681. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 537–38 (plurality opinion) (The Court found that Hamdi was
given “no process,” however it held, “There remains the possibility that the standards we
have articulated could be met by an appropriately authorized and properly constituted military tribunal.”).
682. See Milligan, 71 U.S. at 124–25 (“Civil liberty and this kind of martial law cannot
endure together; the antagonism is irreconcilable; and, in the conflict, one or the other must
perish.”); 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *413 (“For martial law, which is built
upon no settled principles, but is entirely arbitrary in its decisions, is, as Sir Matthew Hale
observes, in truth and reality no law, but something indulged rather than allowed as a law
. . . .”).
683. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 537–38 (plurality opinion) (there is literally no guidance for
how civil courts should review the legal process of military tribunals because no court has
tried to do this before).
684. Id., not following Milligan, 71 U.S., at 124–25 (“Civil liberty and this kind of martial law cannot endure together; the antagonism is irreconcilable; and, in the conflict, one or
the other must perish.”); 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *413 (“For martial law,
which is built upon no settled principles, but is entirely arbitrary in its decisions, is, as Sir
Matthew Hale observes, in truth and reality no law, but something indulged rather than
allowed as a law.”).
685. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 537–38 (plurality opinion); Harry Schnitker, Pope Pius XII
and the Holocaust, CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY (Aug. 8, 2011), https://
www.catholicnewsagency.com/resource/56005/pope-pius-xii-and-the-holocaust (explaining
Ludwig Kaas’ fatal mistake); Gesetz zur Behebung der Not von Volk und Reich [Ermächtigungsgesetz] [Enabling Act], Mar. 23, 1933, RGB? I at 141 (Ger.) (the delegation of plenary
rulemaking authority to the Executive without the possibility of independent judicial review
created the Third Reich). See also Rasul, 542 U.S. at 473–74 (quoting Williams v. Kaiser,
323 U.S. 471, 484 n.2 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)) (“Habeas corpus is, however, ‘a
writ antecedent to statute, . . . throwing its root deep into the genius of our common law.’
The writ appeared in English law several centuries ago, became ‘an integral part of our
common-law heritage’ by the time the Colonies achieved independence, and received explicit
recognition in the Constitution, which forbids suspension of ‘[t]he Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus . . . unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it.’”); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2).
686. Hamdi, 542 U.S., at 509, 538 (plurality opinion) (deciding that there is a “possibility that the standards we have articulated could be met by an appropriately authorized and
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The Hamdi Court’s naive trust in military tribunals to administer due process, not only invited the military to entirely ignore the
Court’s decision in Hamdi (which the military did), but also entrusted
the Court itself to the hands of a dangerous branch of government by
departing from the unanimous Court opinion in Ex parte Milligan that
mandated the opposite.687 The military maintains capabilities of hacking the highest officials in numerous governments including our own
as revealed by Edward Snowden, Senator Feinstein, and recent reporting on Pegasus, one of many private run spy programs that the United
States military may pay a private contractor to use.688 U.S. officials are
on the recently leaked list of “tens of thousands of . . . individuals . . .
selected for possible surveillance” by Pegasus, and judges including
those on the U.S. Supreme Court could be targeted by foreign governments or by our own through Pegasus or a similar program, and the
Court has no reason to suspect that the military will abstain from using these capabilities, especially after the military flouted Hamdi.689
The new post-9/11 system gave Americans far less than the constitution mandated under Ex parte Milligan, but it was not a total
properly constituted military tribunal”—after this decision the military completely defied
the standards Justice O’Connor articulated and destroyed any future chance for the court to
assert habeas corpus for Hamdi, revealing that by holding out for a “possibility” that the
military might be able to administer due process for U.S. citizens without an actual court,
Justice O’Connor squandered both Hamdi’s rights as a citizen to resist martial law as well
as the Court’s power to immediately resist military force wherever a citizen is being treated
as a foreign enemy without a trial).
687. See Letter from Rep. Anna G. Eshoo to Hon. John Ratcliffe & Hon. Paul M.
Nakasone (Aug. 28, 2020) (“The surveillance of Congressional and judicial communications
by the executive branch seriously threatens the separation of powers principles of our constitution.”) (quoting GELLMAN, supra note 407, at 326); Feinstein, Floor Speech, supra note
621; Stephanie Kirchgaessner, Officials Who are US Allies Among Targets of NSO Malware,
says WhatsApp Chief, THE GUARDIAN (July 24, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://
www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/jul/24/officials-who-are-us-allies-among-targets-ofnso-malware-says-whatsapp-chief (“The leak contained tens of thousands of phone numbers
of individuals who are believed to have been selected as candidates for possible surveillance
by clients of NSO, including heads of states such as the French president, Emmanuel Macron, government ministers, diplomats, activists, journalists, human rights defenders, and
lawyers.”).
688. Feinstein, Floor Speech, supra note 621; Letter from Rep. Anna G. Eshoo to Hon.
John Ratcliffe & Hon. Paul M. Nakasone (Aug. 28, 2020); Kirchgaessner, supra note 687;
Dana Priest et al., Private Israeli Spyware Used to Hack Cellphones of Journalists, Activists
Worldwide, WASH. POST (July 18, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2021/nso-spyware-pegasus-cellphones/ (only a fraction of the total number of
people that may be under surveillance by Pegasus was analyzed).
689. Feinstein, Floor Speech, supra note 621; Letter from Rep. Anna G. Eshoo to Hon.
John Ratcliffe & Hon. Paul M. Nakasone (Aug. 28, 2020) (noting that the judiciary and the
legislative branches may fall pray to the executive spy programs, and may already be compromised on a regular basis); Kirchgaessner, supra note 687.

\\jciprod01\productn\F\FAM\15-1\FAM101.txt

120

unknown

Seq: 120

FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW

10-JAN-22

10:23

Vol. 15:1:1

bust.690 The Supreme Court successfully reaffirmed its jurisdiction to
review the habeas petitions of U.S. citizens and foreigners regardless
of the geographic location where a prisoner is held.691 In Boumediene v.
Bush, the Supreme Court finally overruled the Military Commissions
Act of 2006 as an unconstitutional suspension of the Great Writ of
habeas corpus.692
The story of the Court’s vindication of habeas jurisdiction from
Rasul, to Hamdan, and finally to Boumediene represents the vital operation of the separation of powers by the Supreme Court.693 Of the
three original post-9/11 Supreme Court opinions released on June 28,
2004, only Rasul ultimately led to further review and a proper separation of powers finding in Boumediene.694 The other two cases, Hamdi
and Padilla, failed Americans in their most basic judicial duty of properly asserting the Article III Power.695
690. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509, 535–36 (plurality opinion); Padilla, 542 U.S. at 434–35;
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 474–75. The constitutional baseline guarded by habeas corpus law, that
Hamdi, Padilla, and Rasul failed to entirely uphold was that the military must be made
subordinate to the civil law. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 124–25; 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *413.
691. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535 (plurality opinion) (“we necessarily reject the Government’s assertion that separation of powers principles mandate a heavily circumscribed role
for the courts”); Rasul, 542 U.S. at 468 (“Aliens held at the base, like American citizens, are
entitled to invoke the federal courts’ § 2241 authority.” However, § 2241 was later ruled an
unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S.
723, 792 (2008).).
692. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 792.
693. See Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023, 1028–29 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“The story starts
with Rasul v. Bush. In that case, several Guantanamo detainees had filed a petition for
habeas corpus seeking ‘release from custody, access to counsel, freedom from interrogations,
and other relief.’ . . . The Supreme Court held that the district court had jurisdiction to hear
all of these claims. . . . Shortly thereafter, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act of
2005, which contained a provision designed to abrogate Rasul and strip federal courts of
jurisdiction over Guantanamo detainees’ claims. After the Supreme Court held that this
provision could not apply retroactively to cases pending at the time the DTA was enacted [in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld], Congress responded by passing the MCA, the statute at issue in this
case, whose jurisdiction-stripping provisions unequivocally applied to all claims brought by
Guantanamo detainees.” In response, the Supreme Court held in Boumediene, 553 U.S. at
792, that, “MCA section 7 ‘operates as an unconstitutional suspension of the writ.’”); Bostan
v. Obama, 662 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2009) (trying to balance Boumediene with Hamdi).
694. Aamer, 742 F.3d at 1028–29.
695. See Bostan, 662 F. Supp. 2d at 4 (interpreting Hamdi balancing as reason to allow
the military tribunal to admit hearsay as evidence); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 455
(2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It is quite wrong [for the majority] to characterize the proceeding as a ‘simple challenge to physical custody,’ that should be resolved by slavish
application of a ‘bright-line rule,’ designed to prevent ‘rampant forum shopping’ by litigious
prison inmates. As the Court’s opinion itself demonstrates, that rule is riddled with exceptions fashioned to protect the high office of the Great Writ. This is an exceptional case that
we clearly have jurisdiction to decide.”).
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While Boumediene directly called Hamdi and Padilla into question, it did not finally or unequivocally overrule them.696 Both Hamdi
and Padilla were decided based upon the Court’s now debunked assumption that the government did not intend to suspend the writ.697 In
light of the fact that Hamdi and Padilla misjudged the government’s
intentions, and the laws they arose under are now abrogated by
Boumediene, whatever parts of their holdings that may still be cited as
persuasive precedent should be set aside as erroneous dicta.698
The three sister rulings Padilla, Hamdi, and Rasul were decided on the same day in 2004. Each ruling represented three
perspectives on the Supreme Court, and shortly thereafter, each fared
much differently than the other.699 First, Padilla represented an attempt to resurrect formalism that was swiftly undermined if not
rendered wholly impracticable by Boumediene.700 Taken simply, Pa696. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771 (citing Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 564 (Scalia, J., dissenting))
(“If the privilege of habeas corpus is to be denied to the detainees now before us, Congress
must act in accordance with the requirements of the Suspension Clause.”); id. at 795–96
(citing Padilla, 542 U.S. at 435–36)) (hinting that the government could channel future
cases “to one district court” in order to “reduce administrative burdens on the Government”
whenever a habeas petition is filed in another district—the question of whether a court can
and should also correct minor errors such as the persons named as custodian in a petition
instead of denying jurisdiction altogether, remains open). Cf. Hensley v. Municipal Court,
San Jose, 411 U.S. 345, 350, n. 8 (1973) (stating that Wales v. Whitney was no longer controlling, which apparently allowed Padilla to use it as controlling in that case).
697. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 525 (plurality opinion) (“All agree suspension of the writ
has not occurred here. Thus, it is undisputed that Hamdi was properly before an Article III
court to challenge his detention under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.”); id. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“No one contends that the congressional Authorization for Use of Military Force, on which
the Government relies to justify its actions here, is an implementation of the Suspension
Clause.”); Padilla, 542 U.S. at 432, 442 (refusing to reach the suspension clause issue based
upon 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) “within their respective jurisdictions” limiting language—but
Boumediene ultimately held § 2241(e) of that same statute was an unconstitutional suspension of the writ, revealing that this law does not define the “respective jurisdictions” of the
Court, but that the Court’s jurisdiction as defined by the Court rides over this law);
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 795–96 (“Channeling future cases to one district court would no
doubt reduce administrative burdens on the Government. . . . If, in a future case, a detainee
files a habeas petition in another judicial district in which a proper respondent can be
served, the Government can move for change of venue to the court that will hear these
petitioners’ cases, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.”).
698. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771, 795 (“The only law we identify as unconstitutional is MCA § 7, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e).”). See also Schroeder, The Body, supra note 121, at
78. Cf. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 548 (2013) (“we are not necessarily bound by dicta should more complete argument demonstrate that dicta is not correct”).
699. Only Rasul was challenged by Congress, and ultimately defended by the Court in
Boumediene. See Aamer, 742 F.3d at 1028–29 (recounting this fact).
700. Padilla, 542 U.S. at 434–35, 446–47 (citing Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 574
(1885) (Padilla drew its immediate custodian rule from this pre-Civil Rules case)) (basing
its formalistic finding,in part, upon the “important corollary to the immediate custodian
rule in challenges to present physical custody under § 2241”—a law overruled as an uncon-
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dilla created an absurd, formalistic basis for dismissal as if Civil Rule
2 never closed the forms.701
In contrast with Padilla, the Hamdi decision set forth an administrative state solution.702 In this case, Justice O’Connor attempted
to transcend the obvious factual distinctions between Ex parte Milligan and Ex parte Quirin with Mathews v. Eldridge judicial
balancing.703 In Hamdi Justice O’Connor only appeared to appeal to
the center, while in actuality threatening to unsettle all past habeas
usages and holdings, by denying the right of a non-military trial.704
stitutional suspension of the writ in Boumediene); Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 751, 752, 793
(“prudential barriers that may have prevented the English courts from issuing the writ . . .
are not relevant here,” and also “federalism concerns . . . are not relevant here”). Cf. FED. R.
CIV. P. 2 (“There is one form of action—the civil action.” The purpose of this rule is to preclude formalities like the Wales immediate custodian rule.); FED. R. CIV. P. 60(a) (expressly
empowering federal judges to correct minor errors like failing to name an immediate custodian “on motion or on its own, with or without notice” as Boumediene arguably did);
Hensley, 411 U.S. at 350–51, n.8 (setting Wales v. Whitney aside as no longer controlling in
habeas cases).
701. Padilla, 542 U.S. at 434–35 (defying Civil Rule 2, and applying the formalism of
yesteryear—even acknowledging that actual custody is no longer required to file habeas
corpus, but still clinging to arbitrary formalism anyway, when there is actual custody); FED.
R. CIV. P. 2. See Hensley, 411 U.S. at 350, n.8 (“Thus, we have consistently rejected interpretations of the habeas corpus statute that would suffocate the writ in stifling formalisms or
hobble its effectiveness with the manacles of arcane and scholastic procedural requirements.” This Court specifically held that Wales v. Whitney “may no longer be deemed
controlling,” and yet that did not stop Padilla from defying stare decisis and resurrecting
the arcane and scholastic manacle of Wales from its grave.). Cf. Adam Serwer, The Supreme
Court is Headed Back to the 19th Century, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.the
atlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/09/redemption-court/566963/ (noting the Roberts Court’s
general strategy of resurrecting precedents of yesteryear including pre-Civil Rules formalism that “led the Supreme Court to overturn the Civil Rights Act of 1875”).
702. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529 (plurality opinion) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
703. Id.
704. Id. at 537–38 (“There remains the possibility that the standards we have articulated could be met by an appropriately authorized and properly constituted military
tribunal.”). The idea that due process of the law can be administered by a military tribunal
is patently absurd. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 124–25 (1866); 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *413 (Joseph Chitty Esq. 1826) (1753). In Hamdi, Justice O’Connor ironically relied upon a cost/benefit balancing test originally developed by eugenics
propagandists in support of eugenics laws. LAUGHLIN, supra note 164, at 454 (the introduction to Laughlin’s model sterilization law contains a cost/benefit balancing test that weighs
strongly in favor of adopting eugenics). These tests were eventually asserted in Buck v. Bell
to justify the forced sterilization of women. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207–08 (1927) (“The
principle that sustains compulsory vaccination [i.e., that the benefits outweigh the costs] is
broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopin tubes.”) (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197
U.S. 11, 24 (1905) (deciding “the risk of such an injury” should “be seriously weighed against
the benefits”)). O’Connor nevertheless maintained, perhaps in defense of her preference for
balancing tests, that “[t]he Court has never cited Buck v. Bell, for instance, as support for
any important proposition.” SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW 105 (2004)
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Justice O’Connor’s oxymoronic plurality in Hamdi made
strange bedfellows of Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens, who dissented
together, because the Court failed to secure Hamdi a real trial; applying administrative law presumptions in the place of constitutionally
mandated common law habeas corpus review.705 In a rare occurrence,
Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens joined in a righteous gambit against
Justice O’Connor’s frivolous redefinition of the common law,
Having found a congressional authorization for detention of citizens
where none clearly exists; and having discarded the categorical procedural protection of the Suspension Clause; the plurality then
proceeds, under the guise of the Due Process Clause, to prescribe
what procedural protections it thinks appropriate. It “weigh[s] the
private interest . . . against the Government’s asserted interest,”
and—just as though writing a new Constitution—comes up with an
unheard-of system in which the citizen rather than the Government
bears the burden of proof, testimony is by hearsay rather than live
witnesses, and the presiding officer may well be a ‘neutral’ military
officer rather than judge and jury. It claims to engage in this sort of
“judicious balancing” from Mathews v. Eldridge, a case involving
. . . the withdrawal of disability benefits! Whatever the merits of
this technique when newly recognized property rights are at issue
(and even there they are questionable), it has no place where the
Constitution and the common law already supply an answer.706

[hereinafter O’CONNOR, THE MAJESTY]. However, Buck was cited by Justice Brandeis for an
important proposition in his dissent in Olmstead v. United States, which was routinely cited
by the Court thereafter. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (ironically citing Buck v. Bell to justify his oft cited “right to be left alone” idea,
which he appeared to limit as a right for “civilized men” only), followed by Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 659 (1961); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 494 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 152–54 (1973) (citing to both Buck v. Bell and Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead side by side, to define the outer limits to the right to abortions); Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). The
sheer complexity of Buck’s long progeny allowed Justice Powell to lift the cost/benefit balancing test from the American eugenic past sybolized by Buck without naming this past.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347–49 (1976) (balancing costs and benefits for the express purpose of denying an evidentiary hearing, a denial of due process rights like Buck).
Finally, when Justice O’Connor tried to use this test to limit the role of habeas corpus in the
war on terror, her opinion was entirely ignored by the military emphasizing the fact noted
by Milligan and its progeny that the military cannot be relied upon to administer due process of the law. Dahlia Lithwick, Nevermind: Hamdi Wasn’t So Bad After All, SLATE (Sept.
23, 2004, 5:37 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2004/09/hamdi-wasn-t-so-bad-afterall.html (“With a yawn and a shrug, the administration sidestepped the courts and the
judiciap process once again, abandoning this criminal prosecution altogether and erasing
the episode from our national memory.”).
705. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Where the Government accuses a citizen of waging war against it, our constitutional tradition has been to prosecute
him in federal court for treason or some other crime.”).
706. Id. at 575–76 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The absurdities and oxymorons in Justice O’Connor’s Hamdi
plurality opinion were set aglow by Justice Thomas’s dissent as well.707
Justice Thomas could not endorse Mathews v. Eldridge and appeared
not to understand that Mathews was Justice O’Connor’s pretext for the
real decision in Hamdi.708 For Mathews, the Hamdi plurality, and Justice Thomas all appeared to agree with the denial to U.S. citizens of the
usual habeas remedy of release pending charges and a public trial in a
civil court.709
Perhaps more alarming than Justice Thomas’s lock ‘em up and
throw away the key approach, was Justice Ginsburg and Justice Souter’s concurrence with Justice O’Connor’s decision.710 These “liberal”
judges signed onto a radical restructuring of due process and habeas
common law that, if it were enacted by Congress, would be an unconstitutional suspension of the writ.711 Part of their error was the
attempt to objectify the suspension of the writ as a legal act, when it

707. See id. at 580–81 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
708. Id. at 533–34 (plurality opinion) (Attempting to use Mathews to justify something
less than an actual treason trial to hold U.S. citizens in Guantanamo Bay as suspected
traitors: “Hearsay, for example, may need to be accepted as the most reliable available evidence from the Government in such a proceeding.”); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349
(1976) (“We conclude that an evidentiary hearing is not required . . . and that the present
administrative procedures fully comport with due process.”). Mathews used a cost/benefit
balancing test to justify less process that would be required in an Article III Court, and
when it is used it is usually to justify giving less process than would ordinarily be required.
See, e.g., Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1100–01 (2014) (revealing that the idea
that Mathews favored civil rights to be a grave misunderstanding of that case by both the
prosecutors and the defense attorneys in Kaley; the Court’s Mathews analysis favored the
prosecutors and not the defendants); Thuraissigiam v. DHS, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1982 (2020)
(this case extended dicta from Justice O’Connor’s application of Mathews in Landon v.
Plasencia as if it were the holding of that case to deny immigrant rights).
709. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (Referring to Mathews, “I do
not think that the Federal Government’s war powers can be balanced away by this Court.”).
Cf. Lithwick, supra note 686 (noting that the result of the Hamdi plurality was a complete
denial of rights to Hamdi despite its attempts to require quasi-judicial process in a military
tribunal; the actual result of Hamdi was apparently what Justice Thomas wanted).
710. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 558–59 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
711. Id. (allowing that simply because there is “probably” a history of presidents holding
alien enemy combatants incommunicado without access to the writ as justification for executive overreach through fraud and force—Souter did not point to any judicial opinion that
legitimizes a violation of the separation of powers because none exist, and he did not substantiate his claim that presidents probably always held alien enemy combatants in prison,
incommunicado, without access to the writ with historical evidence that this actually happened in America—indeed, he cited to King Edward III circa 1350 as perhaps the origin of
such attempts to legitimize violations of the separation of powers as an inheritance of the
founders).
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can never be a legal act—suspension is always an act of unlawful
force.712
Justice O’Connor stated the Court’s duty to vindicate its relevance as an independent, third branch of power to protect individual
rights even during war, but she did not follow through on this intention.713 The Hamdi case was strangely remanded for more “process”
under Mathews, when its judgement of no due process should have resulted in release pending a civil trial.714 By issuing an order opposite of
her judgment, Justice O’Connor abdicated her duty to defend our
rights, and thus Yaser Esam Hamdi, a U.S. citizen, was deported with
no further process.715
The Hamdi, Padilla, and Rasul decisions were not the first to
sidestep the question of whether a declaration of war is the exclusive
712. See id. (presuming AUMF and other laws did not suspend the writ, when all that
matters is whether the writ was actually suspended in the facts and circumstances as
presented in the case before the court—something which the Court always has jurisdiction
to review); Id. at 552 (Justice Souter managed to compare Hamdi’s situation to Ex parte
Milligan’s “‘actual and present’ necessity” requirement—however, he failed to actually apply this standard to his decision to join O’Connor’s novel Mathews balancing plurality that
appeared to be the result of divination rather than objective legal and jurisprudential analysis, which mystifies the question of why they joined O’Connor rather than Scalia’s dissent).
Cf. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 733 (2008) (finding that § 7 of the MCA, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(e) “operates as an unconstitutional suspension of the writ”—there are no magic
words required, as long as a law or ultimately an executive action operates as a suspension
of the writ, then the Court’s jurisdiction must ride over the executive’s unconstitutional acts
of force and fraud, wherever they exist) (emphasis added).
713. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535–36 (plurality opinion) (requiring a meaningful role for
the courts).
714. Id. at 537–39 (Remanding the case to the Fourth Circuit to conduct a review of the
military tribunal’s “process,” which is absurd because the Court already decided that Hamdi
was given “no process” saying, “Plainly, the ‘process’ Hamdi has received is not that to
which he is entitled under the Due Process Clause.” The answer is release pending charges
and a trial—not Mathews balancing.).
715. See id. at 537–38 (“Hamdi has received no process. . . . Plainly, the ‘process’ Hamdi
has received is not that to which he is entitled under the Due Process Clause.” And yet in
the very next sentence, O’Connor paradoxically found, “There remains the possibility that
the standards we have articulated could be met by an appropriately authorized and properly constituted military tribunal.”—this is the very essence of an impermissible advisory
statement that leaves the objective facts and circumstances of the case in an attempt to tell
the executive what it ought to do in an imaginary situation where there is a “properly constituted military tribunal”—a novel phrase the Court attempted to define with Mathews.).
See also Jerry Markon, Hamdi Returned to Saudi Arabia, WASH. POST (Oct. 12, 2004),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23958-2004Oct11.html (Hamdi was deported after he was coerced into renouncing his U.S. citizenship in exchange for release, and
as the Post explained, “Hamdi’s release also means that the government never had to explain why he was detained in the first place.”). Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 614 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting Letter from the Justices of
the U.S. Supreme Court to George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793) (refusing to make advisory
statements at the president’s request)).
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mode by which Congress may delegate war powers to the president.716
The Supreme Court also sidestepped this question in United States v.
Holmes and United States v. Hart regarding conscription.717 The Court
refused to review the declaration of war question again in United
States v. O’Brien regarding burning draft cards and again in Sarnoff v.
Schultz, a taxpayer suit.718
If the Supreme Court ever asserted jurisdiction to decide the
declaration of war question it may render cases like O’Brien or Hamdi
as “coram non judice, and void.”719 For if a declaration of war is essential to the proper delegation of congressional war powers, then the
nondelegation doctrine applies.720 The overriding presumption in
Hamdi, that the Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”) can
delegate war powers without a formal declaration of war, renders it
vulnerable to being overruled as an unconstitutional merger of war
and peace.721
President George Washington and the first U.S. Supreme Court
affirmed the requirement of a declaration of war to the delegation of

716. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 389 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The
underlying and basic problem in this case, however, is whether conscription is permissible
in the absence of a declaration of war.”) (citing Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366, 390
(1918) (affirming the power of conscription only “as the result of a war declared”)).
717. Holmes v. United States, 391 U.S. 936, 938 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Hart v.
United States, 391 U.S. 956, 960 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
718. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 385–86; Sarnoff v. Shultz, 409 U.S. 929, 930 (1972) (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
719. See, e.g., Ex parte Randolph, 2 Brock 447, 451 (C.C.D. Va. 1833) (affirming the
court’s power to find a legal or judicial process void “as if there were none at all”—the court
may thus find “the whole proceeding is coram non judice, and void”). Hamdi, 542 U.S. at
537–39 (plurality opinion) (explaining Hamdi’s clear and horrible attempt to respect “no
process” as possibly legitimate “due process” fits the textbook definition of coram non
judice).
720. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587–88 (“In the framework of our Constitution, the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a
lawmaker. And the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws
which the President is to execute. The first section of the first article says that ‘All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States . . . .’”)
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1); id. at 642 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“Nothing in our Constitution is plainer than that declaration of a war is entrusted only to Congress.”). See Field v.
Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) (“That Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the
President is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of
government ordained by the Constitution.”).
721. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518 (plurality opinion) (presuming without question that we
are at war and that the AUMF is a legitimate delegation of war powers). See Randolph, 2
Brock at 451; O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 389 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Field, 143 U.S. at 692;
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587–88, 642 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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war powers during the neutrality crisis of 1793.722 According to the law
of nations and the practice of the first several U.S. presidents, unless
or until a war is declared, the president is limited to the use of his or
her peace powers.723 For in the words of Justice Jackson, “nothing in
our Constitution is plainer than that declaration of a war is entrusted
only to Congress.”724
The purpose of a formal declaration of war is to put its recipient
on notice, to define who the enemy is, and to explain the terms by
which peace may be reestablished.725 President Truman was arguably
the first president to transcend the terms of an official declaration of
war, when he declared his own terms of “unconditional surrender” to
justify dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.726 Presi722. Casto, supra note 274, at 199–200. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 614 (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) (quoting Letter from the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court to George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793)).
723. President George Washington, Proclamation 4—Neutrality of the United States in
the War Involving Austria, Prussia, Sardinia, Great Britain, and the United Netherlands
Against France (Apr. 22, 1793); President John Adams, Proclamation—Granting Pardon to
Certain Persons Engaged in Insurrection Against the United States in the Counties of
Northampton, Montgomery, and Bucks, in the States of Pennsylvania (May 21, 1800); President Thomas Jefferson, Proclamation 14—Requiring Removal of British Armed Vessels
From United States Ports and Waters (July 2, 1807); President James Madison, Proclamation—Announcement of a State of War Between the United States and the United Kingdom
(June 19, 1812) (“Whereas the Congress of the United States by virtue of the constitutional
authority vested in them, have declared by their act bearing date the 18th day of the present month, that war exists between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and
the dependencies thereof, and the United States of America and their Territories. Now
therefore, I James Madison, President of the United States of America, do hereby Proclaim
the same to all whom it may concern . . . .”). See Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 577 (1840)
(Opinion of Taney, C.J.) (“The federal government has also the power to declare war; and
whenever it becomes a question whether we are to be at peace or at war, undoubtedly the
general government must determine that question. And if Congress decides that the honour
and interest of the country does not require war, and, on that account, refuses to declare it,
is not this an exercise of its power over the subject? And could it be said that the power was
a dormant power, because war had not been declared?”).
724. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 642 (Jackson, J., concurring) (Jackson continued: “[o]f
course, a state of war may in fact exist without a formal declaration. But no doctrine that
the Court could promulgate would seem to me more sinister and alarming than that a President whose conduct of foreign affairs is so largely uncontrolled, and often even is unknown,
can vastly enlarge his mastery over the internal affairs of the country by his own commitment of the Nation’s armed forces to some foreign venture.”).
725. VATTEL, supra note 655, at 314–15.
726. U.S. Declaration of War upon Japan, Pub. L. No. 77–328, 55 Stat. 795 (1941) (requiring the President to bring the conflict to a “successful termination”—though not
defining the reasons for the war, or how the war could be brought to a conclusion, these
functions if unexercised in a declaration of war should be considered nondelegable legislative power); President Harry S. Truman, Statement by the President Announcing the Use of
the A-Bomb at Hiroshima (Aug. 6, 1945) (“It was to spare the Japanese people from utter
destruction that the ultimatum of July 26 was issued at Potsdam. Their leaders promptly
rejected that ultimatum. If they do not now accept our terms they may expect a rain of ruin
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dent Truman also went to war in Korea without congressional
approval and tried to unilaterally seize all U.S. steel mills among other
things.727
Now, the AUMF, National Defense Authorization Act
(“NDAA”), and other war powers resolutions, accomplish none of the
purposes of declaring war.728 At their worst, these unconstitutional
resolutions invite treasons by the presidential administration like the
CIA’s cyberattacks on Congress in 2014.729 Presidents at war with
their own governments undercut Congress’s ability to regulate “intelligence activities or any other government function,” and the Hamdi
Court’s Mathews balancing test cannot meaningfully contend against
it.730
The merger of war and peace powers, by applying the laws of
peace to regulate the powers of war as Justice O’Connor’s plurality attempted to do in Hamdi, openned the door to totalitarian abuse.731 The
opinion, then considered most centrist, was actually the most extreme.732 For once a military tribunal is allowed to administer final
from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth. Behind this air attack will
follow sea and land forces in such numbers and power as they have not yet seen and with
the fighting skill of which they are already well aware.”) (citing The Potsdam Declaration,
July 26, 1945 (requiring “unconditional surrender” from Japan)). See also President Harry
S. Truman, Statement by the President Calling for Unconditional Surrender of Japan (May
8, 1945) (defining the terms of surrender as unconditional—where these terms should be
defined by Congress if at all).
727. Fisher, supra note 626, at 33–39. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 10155, 15 Fed. Reg.
5,785 (Aug. 29, 1950) (order to seize the railroads).
728. War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1549; AUMF of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107–40, 115 Stat. 224; NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–81, 125 Stat. 1298
(2011). See President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the
American People (Sept. 20, 2001) (declaring a war against terror—this did not put any person, organization, or sovereign nation on notice that they are an enemy to the United
States, nor did it inform anybody of how they might end the war). Cf. Jacob Silverman, The
Ferever Wars Aren’t Ending. They’re Just Being Rebranded., NEW REPUBLIC (July 28, 2021),
https://newrepublic.com/article/163088/forever-wars-arent-ending-theyre-just-rebranded.
729. Feinstein, Floor Speech, supra note 621.
730. Id.; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 575–76 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
731. Hamdi 542 U.S. at 537–38 (plurality opinion).
732. Id. (causing the distruction of a U.S. citizen’s rights); Coleman v. Thompson, 501
U.S. 722, 759–60 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (explaining the fundamental confusions
furthered by Justice O’Connor’s demolishing of Fay v. Noia); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 579 (2003) (“The Court today overrules Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). I
joined Bowers, and do not join the Court in overruling it. Nevertheless, I agree with the
Court that Texas’ statute banning same-sex sodomy is unconstitutional.”). Compare Noah
Feldman, Thank You, Justice O’Connor, for the Art of Compromise, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 24,
2018, 2:55 P.M.) https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-10-24/sandra-day-o-connor-s-influence-is-missed-at-supreme-court (presenting, without support, that the legacy of
Justice O’Connor as one of compromise rather than confusion), with Schroeder, The Body,
supra note 121, at 35 (observing how “the Court began to expose the layers of contradiction
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due process of the law, before stripping a person of their life, liberty,
and property, with no jury, no public opinion, and no independent
judge; all is already lost.733
The AUMF, NDAA, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(“FISA”), USA Patriot Act, and other laws enable the president to wage
war against whoever he or she deems a terrorist, including U.S. citizens.734 In 2004, the executive branch concluded that “the justification
for action and spending seem limitless” and defined global counterinsurgency as a war against “an omnipotent, unslayable, hydra of
destruction.”735 This statement epitomizes the reasons why the framers did not entrust the executive with emergency war powers,
They knew what emergencies were, knew the pressures they engender for authoritative action, knew, too, how they afford a ready
pretext for usurpation. We may also suspect that they suspected
that emergency powers would tend to kindle emergencies.736

When executive officials get creative and declare unending wars
against omnipotent hydras of destruction, Americans have reason to
believe that executive officials are trying to kindle sham emergencies.737 For when U.S. citizens and the U.S. Congress itself are treated
as enemies of the state, there seems to be little difference between
American presidents waging a war on terror and the French Terroriste,
Saint-Just, declaring France “revolutionary until the peace.”738
Congressional waivers of war powers are incentivized by
money.739 Trillions of U.S. taxpayer dollars have been paid to private
contractors to accomplish any number of jobs that facilitate U.S.
wars.740 A money pit of perks, payouts, and congressional shareholder
started by Part II of Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Williams v. Taylor, as reveled through
O’Connor’s contradictory opinion in Wiggins v. Smith”).
733. Feinstein, Floor Speech, supra note 621; Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 575–76 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
734. Feinstein, Floor Speech, supra note 621; Solomon, supra note 640.
735. THOMAS H. KEAN ET AL., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 364 (2004).
736. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 649 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added), extended in Sierra Club v. Trump, 977 F.3d 853, 888–90 (9th
Cir. 2020).
737. KEAN ET AL., supra note 735, at 367.
738. Compare Louis Antoine de Saint-Just, Rapport sur la Nécessité de Declarer le
Gouvernement Révolutionnaire Jusqu’à la Paix, Oct. 10, 1793, in 2 œVRES COMPLÈTES DE
SAINT-JUST 88 (1908), with President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People (Sept. 20, 2001), and KEAN ET AL., supra note 735, at 364.
739. See, e.g., NDAA for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. 115–91, 131 Stat. 1287 (2017).
740. Id. (the defense budget was just under $700 billion for one year). Cf. The 10th Annual BGOV200: The top government contractors in 2020, BLOOMBERG GOVERNMENT (last
visited Aug. 11, 2021), https://about.bgov.com/bgov200/ (stating that in 2020, 682 billion
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status in these companies (making hundreds of billions of dollars on
wars), the sale of arms, and the facilitation of intelligence gathering,
keep the military industrial complex grinding on.741
Only a few whistleblowers managed to curb the toll on human
life caused by the military industrial complex.742 Unfortunately, when
reporters fail to protect their sources, these whistleblowers are exposed
and abused mercilessly by the executive department.743 In spite of the
dangers, natural human love stages her resistance to the tyranny of
greed in America usually at a great personal cost to the whistle blowers brave enough to carry the banner of love for country and for fellow
citizens over us.744
American judges may allow the final word on the hydra of terror and greed to go to the revolutionary poets and preachers of
contracting dollars were presumably spent—this website updates every year and makes
information on government contractors semi-public).
741. David R. Baker, Army contract for Feinstein’s husband / Blum is a director of firm
that will get up to $600 million, SFGATE (Jan. 18, 2012, 11:00 PM), https://www.sfgate.com/
news/article/Army-contract-for-Feinstein-s-husband-Blum-is-a-2621196.php; Oliver
Burkeman & Julian Borger, The Ex-presidents’ Club, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 31, 2001, 11:31
PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/oct/31/september11.usa4 (both the Bush
family and the bin Laden family were investors in the Carlyle Group when 9/11 happened—
both likely made money based upon the increased U.S. military spending as a result of the
9/11 attack).
742. See, e.g., Anna Ruby, How Deepwater whistleblower Michael DeKort used YouTube
to save lives, YOUTUBE (May 23, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VOF5GArVHCo;
Tom Vanden Brook, Marine whistle-blower vindicated after seven-year fight, USA TODAY
(Sept. 25, 2014, 6:11 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/09/25/franzgayl-mraps-marine/16225499/; Michael Hastings, The Runaway General: The Profile that
Brought down McChrystal, ROLLING STONE (June 22, 2010, 2:00 PM), https://
www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/the-runaway-general-the-profile-that-broughtdown-mcchrystal-192609/; Sarah Stillman, The Invisible Army, NEW YORKER (May 30,
2011), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/06/06/the-invisible-army; A GOOD AMERICAN (El Ride Productions 2015) (documentary following William Binney’s whistleblowing on
Thin Thread—noting the U.S. intelligence community had the information to stop the 9/11
attacks); CITIZENFOUR (Praxis Films 2014) (Laura Poitras’s award winning documentary
film about Edward Snowden’s reveal of the U.S. Government’s dragnet surveillance
programs).
743. See Michael M. Grynbaum & John Koblin, After Reality Winner’s Arrest, Media
Asks: Did ‘Intercept’ Expose a Source?, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
ON
2017/06/06/business/media/intercept-reality-winner-russia-trump-leak.html; WAR
WHISTLEBLOWERS (Brave New Foundation 2013).
744. WAR ON WHISTLEBLOWERS (Brave New Foundation 2013). See, e.g., Carole Cadwalladr, ‘I spent seven years fighting to survive’: Chelsea Manning on whistleblowing and
WikiLeaks, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 7, 2018, 4:30 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/
2018/oct/07/chelsea-manning-wikileaks-whistleblowing-interview-carole-cadwalladr; Gina
Cherelus, Reality Winner sentenced for leaking top secret U.S. report, REUTERS (Aug. 23,
2018, 8:49 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-russia-leaks/reality-winnersentenced-for-leaking-top-secret-u-s-report-idUSKCN1L81FD. Cf. Song of Solomon 2:4 (“his
banner over me is love”).
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America.745 For the poets and preachers of the American Revolution
were moved by the siren call of love to face their own mortality in order
to denounce the hydra of human greed.746 The first to lead the charge
was the humble Phillis Wheatley, who exhorted the sons of Harvard to
“suppress the sable monster in its growth.”747
The Americans unanimously regarded Wheatley’s call as a mystery of heaven on earth; her voice, it seemed to them, broke out of the
darkness like the creation of light.748 Therefore, a marvelous throng of
artists and preachers sprang forth in response to her call.749 For example, the African American pastor in the North, Lemuel Haynes, lifted
his voice to proclaim upon the very knife’s edge of the Revolution the
fundamental principle in Dr. Bonham’s Case,
It cannot be thought impertinent for us to turn one eye into our own
breast, for a little moment, to see, whether through some inadvertency, or a self-contracted spirit, we do not find the same monster
[of tyranny] lurking in our own bosom. . . . Every privilege that
mankind enjoy have their origin from god; and whatever acts are
passed in any Earthly Court, which are derogatory to those edicts
that are passed in the Courts of Heaven, the act is void.750
745. MERCY OTIS WARREN, To a Young Gentleman, residing in France [1782]; Phillis
Wheatley, To the University of Cambridge in New-England [1773]; Ann Bleecker, A Pastoral
Dialogue [1780], in BLEECKER, supra note 652, at 253–59; Lemuel Haynes, Liberty Further
Extended [1776], in Bogin, supra note 64, at 94.
746. Ann Bleecker, A Pastoral Dialogue [1780], in BLEECKER, supra note 652, at 253–59;
Mercy Otis Warren, To a Young Gentleman residing in France [1782]; Phillis Wheatley, To
the University of Cambridge [1767].
747. Phillis Wheatley, To the University of Cambridge [1767]; Phillis Wheatley, To the
University of Cambridge in New-England [1773] (advising her fellow American patriots to
“suppress the deadly serpent in its egg,” updating the sable monster language) (quoting
William Shakespeare, Julius Caesar II.I.32 (1599)).
748. Joseph Ladd, The Prospects of America [1785], in THE LITERARY REMAINS OF JOSEPH BROWN LADD, M.D. 23, 35 (H.C. Sleight, Clinton Hall 1832) [hereinafter LITERARY
REMAINS] (speaking of “the far-spread name / Of wondrous WHEATLY [sic], Afric’s heir to
fame,” whose “glowing genius shines / . . . With magic power the grand descriptions roll /
Thick on the mind, and agitate the soul.”). See also Matilda, On Reading the Poems of Phillis Wheatley, the African Poetess [1796]; Phillis Wheatley, A Rebus, by I.B. [1773] (a witty
poem/riddle believed to be written by James Bowdoin to be solved by Phillis Wheatley on
the next page).
749. Jennifer Billingsley, Works of Wonder, Wondering Eyes, and the Wondrous Poet:
The Use of Wonder in Phillis Wheatley’s Marvelous Poetics, in NEW ESSAYS ON PHILLIS
WHEATLEY 174 (John C. Shields & Eric D. Lamore eds., 2011) (“Wheatley realized before
Kant that the power of the imagination allows the poet not only to recognize other realms of
knowledge but to represent those realms in his or her own work.” Wheatley not only
prefigured the works of Washington Irving and the Fireside Poets, but she also prefigured
the German Idealism symbolized by Goethe, which are the foundations to which all Kantians must pay homage.) (emphasis added).
750. Lemuel Haynes, Liberty Further Extended [1776], in Bogin, supra note 64, at
94–95, 99 (emphasis added) (Lemuel Haynes advocated for the principle in Dr. Bonham’s
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In the immediate proceeding years, the music of Wheatley’s friend and
choral collaborator, William Billings, pealed out of church buildings of
every persuasion, “Down with this earthly king!”751 The Americans began to sing out about the new reality that they made for themselves,
“No king but God. / To the King they shall sing, Hallelujah. / And the
continent shall sing, / God is our rightful King.”752
In bright succession, Mercy Otis Warren followed the example
of her courageous brother James into the public fray to face down the
French Reign of Terror.753 She boldly refuted John Adams’ appeals to
French reason, and instead incited French emotion through the imagination, by courageously bearing witness to the monster AVARICE rising
out of the sea.754 She valiantly rallied the men of France to resist their
greed in marvelous verse,

Case to be used to end the greedy practice of slaveholding, calling it a product of mankind’s
“own carnal avarice.”).
751. William Billings, Independence [1778].
752. Id.
753. 3 WARREN, supra note 35, at 392–97 (addressing John Adams’ monarchical tendencies) and at 407–08 (“The guillotine was glutted with the blood of innocent victims,” because
“ambitious, unprincipled, corrupt, and ignorant men,” came “forward, under pretense of
supporting the rights and liberties of mankind, without any voices but those of disorder and
disorganization. . . . Decency, humanity, and every thing else respected in civil society, disappeared, until the outrages of cruelty and licentiousness resembled the regions of
pandemonium.”); Mercy Otis Warren, To Mr. Adams [1773], enclosed in Letter from Mercy
Otis Warren to John Adams (Oct. 11, 1773) (addressing John Adams’ fatalism); id. in
POEMS, DRAMATIC AND MISCELLANEOUS 195–97 (1790) as To Mr. ____ (this version of the
poem, though easier to find, is slightly altered and does not indicate who it was addressed
to); Letter from Mercy Otis Warren to John Adams (Aug. 27, 1807) (Mercy strongly reasserted “that in a certain portion of his time Mr. Adams was in favor of a monarchic
government.” Here, she also reminded him of the poem she had written him in 1773.). Examples of John Adams’ appeals to French reason include his Discourses on Davila and his
Defence of the Constitutions: ADAMS, DISCOURSES, supra note 142, at 84 (declaring that
“France, by the same infallible progress of reasoning, will discover the same necessity” of
bicameralism—but France decided against bicameralism, the Reign of Terror swept the nation, and Adams’ blind faith in rationalism was embarrassed); 3 ADAMS, A DEFENCE, supra
note 91, at 316–17 (Adams appealed to French reason in this multi-volume tract: “If nations
and peoples cannot be brought to a more rational way of thinking, and to judge of things,
instead of being intoxicated with prejudice and superstition against words, it cannot be expected that truth, virtue, or liberty, will have much chance in the establishment of
governments.”). Cf. [Thomas Jefferson,] Notes on John Adams and the French Revolution
[Jan. 15, 1793], in 25 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 63–64 (John Catanzariti ed., 1992)
(“Mr. Adams declared that ‘men could never be governed but by force’.”).
754. Mercy Otis Warren, To a Young Gentleman residing in France [1782], in WARREN,
POEMS, supra note 724, at 221.
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His forky fang, and livid lip, reveal’d
The crooked form, a gaudy vest conceal’d;
Large tablets mark’d the monster’s gally breast,
And AV’RICE stood conspicuous on his crest755

Then Warren publicly testified that southern greed was the illegitimate basis of the preservation of African slavery in the aristocratic
(i.e., anti-democratic) South.756 Addressing her fellow New Yorkers on
the same topic, the poetess Anne Eliza Bleecker roared, “Americans!
Ye thought your labours o’er, / Ah no! the hydra Envy brings you
more.”757 Reverend Samuel Cooper, who at an earlier time presided
over Phillis Wheatley’s baptism, joined the mighty chorus that Wheatley herself created (according to her call for the cause of the Union),
when he stated from the floor of the Massachusetts Legislature that
the tyranny of arbitrary power is “the means of gratifying an unbounded avarice and ambition.”758
The poets and preachers of the revolution moved the founding
American statesmen to agree that greed is, as James Madison once
wrote, one of the “most dangerous weaknesses of the human breast,”
and a key conspirator “against the desire and duty of peace.”759 Thus,
the American Revolutionaries launched their prayers into heaven for
posterity that “our liberty never be justly reproached as licentiousness.”760 Mounting a resistance to greed animates the U.S. social
755. Id. See also Mercy Otis Warren, Simplicity [1779] (stating that in the pursuit of
happiness “nearest those, who nearest nature live, / Despising all that wealth and power
can give”).
756. 3 WARREN, supra note 35, at 21–22 (“In the southern colonies, it is true, . . . the
great number of slaves thought necessary to secure their produce, and the easy acquisition
of fortune, nourished more aristocratic principles. . . . Democratic principles are the result of
equality of condition. A superfluity of wealth, and a train of domestic slaves, naturally banish a sense of general liberty, and nourish the seeds of that kind of independence that
usually terminates in aristocracy.”).
757. Ann Bleecker, A Pastoral Dialogue [1780], in BLEECKER, supra note 652, at 253–59.
758. Samuel Cooper, Sermon on the Commencement of the Constitution, T. & J. FLEET,
& J. GILL, Oct. 25, 1780, at 7 [1780].
759. James Madison, Helvidius No. IV [Sept. 14, 1793]. See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 6
(Alexander Hamilton); ADAMS, DISCOURSES, supra note 142, at 61–69 (quoting ADAM SMITH,
THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 80–90 (1892) (1759)).
760. Samuel Cooper, Sermon on the Commencement of the Constitution, T. & J. FLEET,
& J. GILL, Oct. 25, 1780, at 37 [1780]; Nathaniel Niles, Two Discourses on Liberty, I. THOMAS
& H.W. TINGES, June 5, 1774, at 7–8, 26, 29–30, 58 [1774] (“For who is so blind as not to see
that the li[c]e[n]tious cannot be friend to li[be]rty?”); Isaac Backus, An Appeal to the Public
for Religious Liberty 3–4 [1773] (“those who now speak great swelling words about liberty,
while they despise government, are themselves servants of corruption”). Cf. 3 ADAMS, A DEFENCE, supra note 91, at 477–78 (Resolving as a rule of policy “‘[t]o use liberty with
moderation, lest it turn to licentiousness;’ . . . How then is licentiousness to be avoided? By
the energy of laws.”) (responding to Letter from M. Turgot to Dr. Price (Mar. 22, 1778), in
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compact’s pursuit of peace for “War is . . . the true nurse of executive
aggrandizement,” and thus Congress was given sole power to declare
war.761
Twentieth Century warfare in the cause of greed bled into figurative wars against terror, drugs, and crime on American soil that
continue to oppress innocent people in the United States.762 These
quasi-wars waged against U.S. citizens expanded until they touched
the people’s representatives in Congress.763 To alleviate these horrifying, systemic, and unconstitutional intrusions upon American lives,
BARNARD, supra note 192, at 48 (“We see her [America] irrevocably independent. Will she be
happy in her freedom?”)).
761. James Madison, Helvidius No. IV [Sept. 14, 1793] (“In war the public treasures are
to be unlocked, and it is the executive hand which is to dispense them.”) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 75 (Alexander Hamilton)); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. But see Darlene
Superville, Barbara Bush saw Trump as a ‘symbol of greed’, AP NEWS (Apr. 2, 2019), https://
apnews.com/article/0541030ae2264381a41b4fa9edf07f0c; 1 MUELLER, supra note 362, at
67–68 (presenting facts that make it appear that Trump’s treasons, if they existed, are tied
to his voracious greed as symbolized by his long pursuit of a Trump Tower Moscow deal).
762. Sarah Stillman, Taken, NEW YORKER (Aug. 5, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2013/08/12/taken [hereinafter Stillman, Taken]; David Nakamura, Trump uses
expansive definition of ‘emergency’, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2018, 9:15 AM), https://
www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-national-emergency-20181101-story.html (“President Trump declared a national emergency last week — in a tweet.”); Hiba Kahn, Isis and
al-Qaeda are little more than glorified drug cartels, and their motivation is money not religion, INDEPENDENT (Apr. 16, 2017), https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/isis-al-qaedadrugs-trafficking-cartels-heroin-terrorism-a7684961.html.
763. Alien Enemies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 21–24; War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1541–1549; AUMF of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–40, 115 Stat. 224 (Sept 18, 2001); NDAA for
the Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–81, 125 Stat. 1298 (Dec. 31, 2011); Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–473, 98 Stat. 1837 (Oct. 12, 1984); Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801–904; Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1801–1813; USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001); The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–132, 110 Stat. 1214;
Mayfield v. Gonzales, No. 04-1427-AA, 2005 WL 1801679, at *4 (D. Or. 2005); Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Petitioner Yaser Hamdi, a presumed American citizen, has been imprisoned without charge or hearing in the Norfolk and
Charleston Naval Brigs for more than two years, on the allegation that he is an enemy
combatant who bore arms against his country for the Taliban.”); In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 624–25 (FISA Ct.
2002); Gonnerman, supra note 160; Nsikan Akpan, Police militarization fails to protect officers and targets black communities, study finds, PBS (Aug. 21, 2018, 12:40 PM), https://
www.pbs.org/newshour/science/police-militarization-fails-to-protect-officers-and-targetsblack-communities-study-finds; James Cullen, The History of Mass Incarceration, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUST. (July 20, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/
history-mass-incarceration; Sarah Stillman, Get Out of Jail, Inc., NEW YORKER (June 23,
2014), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/06/23/get-out-of-jail-inc [hereinafter
Stillman, Get Out]; Sarah Stillman, Why are Prosecutors Putting Innocent Witnesses in
Jail?, NEW YORKER (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-areprosecutors-putting-innocent-witnesses-in-jail [hereinafter Stillman, Why are Prosecutors];
Stillman, Taken, supra note 762; A GOOD AMERICAN (El Ride Productions 2017); CITIZENFOUR (Praxis Films 2014).
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liberty, and property, it is in the interest of every American to demand
and reassert the declaration of war requirement once more.764
The Empire Strikes Back: On the Laws of Land and Sea
The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power, “To define
and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations.”765 Following this language, Article
VI states that federal laws, treaties, and the U.S. Constitution itself
“shall be the supreme law of the land.”766 Therefore, the U.S. Constitution expressly authorizes, as a matter of supremacy, that laws of the
land shall be preemptive upon the arbitrary laws of the sea.767
Under this express authority, Congress outlawed the slave
trade by making the trade a violation to the law of nations and a piracy
punishable by death.768 In order to continue trading in flesh, the South
cried federalism and state’s rights, extorted the Eleventh Amendment
from the Union, and terrorized local federal judges.769 It took the
764. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 389 (1968)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
765. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
766. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Other laws of the land though not supreme include those
made by the fifty states including their constitutions, statutes, and common law. Erie R. Co.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71 (1938) (“‘The laws of the several States, except where the
Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States otherwise require or provide, shall be
regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law, in the courts of the United States, in
cases where they apply.’”) (quoting Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, § 34).
767. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10; id. art. VI, cl. 2.
768. Act to Protect the Commerce of the United States and Punish the Crime of Piracy
of 1819, Pub. L. No. 15–17, 3 Stat. 510; Act to Protect the Commerce of the United States
and Punish the Crime of Piracy of 1820, Pub. L. No. 16–13, 3 Stat. 600; Act to Protect the
Commerce of the United States and Punish the Crime of Piracy of 1823, Pub. L. No. 17–8, 3
Stat. 721 (making the prohibition of the slave trade perpetual). See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.
10; id. art. VI, cl. 2.
769. QUINCY ADAMS, ARGUMENT supra note 114, at 96 (“Upon this plain and simple
statement of facts, can we choose but exclaim, if ever [a] soul of an American citizen was
polluted with the blackest and largest participation in the African slave-trade, when the
laws of his country had pronounced it piracy, punishable with death, it was that of the same
John Smith. He had renounced and violated those rights, by taking a commission from Artigas to plunder the merchants of mariners of nations in friendship with his own; and yet he
claimed the protection of that same country which he had abandoned and betrayed. Why
was he not indicted upon the act of May 15, 1820, so recently enacted before the commission
of his last and most atrocious crime?”) (citing Pub. L. 16–13, 3 Stat. 600); The Antelope, 23
U.S. 66, 81, 126 (1825) (the circuit court in Georgia casted lots to determine which African
people would go free and set the pirate free rather than following the supreme law of the
land that required the Africans to all go free and the pirate to be hanged—the whole thing
was such a debacle that the U.S. Supreme Court faltered and decided “no principle is settled”); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 335–37 (1915) (“We, of course, agree that if a trial is
in fact dominated by a mob, so that the jury is intimidated and the trial judge yields, and so
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Union winning a Civil War before federal anti-slavery laws would be
applied with anything approaching uniformity in the South.770
Though Americans did not overcome the Jeffersonian Terror,771
the founders took many anti-slavery stands on behalf of all Americans,
black and white, man and woman.772 In 1807, when England dishonorably kidnapped four naval officers from the U.S.S. Chesapeake (three
of which were black), President Jefferson himself went on the international stage to claim them as natural citizens of the United States,
born free and equal.773 In the words of war historian Joseph T. Wilson,
The forcible capture and imprisonment of Ware, Martin and
Strachan, the three negroes taken from the Chesapeake, and who
were recognized by the United States authorities as citizens of the
republic, was sounded as the keynote and rallying cry of the war;
the outrage served greatly to arouse the people.774

In 1812, President James Madison spoke of these men as representatives among the thousands of U.S. citizens “torn from their country and
everything dear to them” by British impressment “to risk their lives in
that there is an actual interference with the course of justice, there is, in that court, a departure from due process of law in the proper sense of that term.”).
770. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); U.S. CONST. amend. IX
(reserving unenumerated and preexisting natural human rights to every person and acknowledging independent jurisdictional grounds for enforcing them in the natural law); id.
amend. IV. See, e.g., Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304, 309 (1795) (“Could the
Legislature have annulled these articles, respecting religion, the rights of conscience, and
elections by ballot? Surely no. As to these points there was no devolution of power; the
authority was purposely withheld, and reserved by the people themselves.”).
771. Thomas Jefferson was the only founder to support the French Reign of Terror, and
his support inspired many instances of terrorism in America. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Smith (Nov. 13, 1787) (“the tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to
time with the blood of patriots & tyrants”); Tolson, supra note 151 (the insurrectionists
“evidently felt that no saction would be forthcoming” for ransacking the Capitol Building on
January 6, 2021 “because, as Thomas Jefferson famously wrote, ‘the tree of liberty must be
refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants’”). See also Andrew Cohen, Tyranny, from Tim McVeigh to Ginny Thomas, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 18, 2010), https://
www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2010/03/tyranny-from-tim-mcveigh-to-ginny-thomas/
37637/ (noting that Timothy McVeigh was inspired by Jefferson’s support of terrorism to
murder “168 innocents at the Alfred P. Murrah federal building on April 19, 1995”).
772. See, e.g., OTIS, supra note 18, at 120, 140–41, 147. But see Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to Albert Gallatin (Aug. 2, 1823) (Jefferson encouraged his Democratic Republican
comrades to flout the orders of federal judges, which he saw as an attempt to “monarchize
this nation,” saying “The judges, as before, are at their head, and are their entering
wedge.”).
773. President Thomas Jefferson, Proclamation 14—Requiring Removal of British
Armed Vessels From United States Ports and Waters (July 2, 1807); Cf. JOSEPH T. WILSON,
supra note 400, at 76 (“That the outrage did not end in immediate war, was due partly to
the fact that the Americans had no Navy to fight with.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
774. JOSEPH T. WILSON, supra note 400, at 68.
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the battles of their oppressors.”775 The American victory in the War of
1812 was not glorious, for Washington, D.C. was burned to the ground;
all Americans were able to do was to shout back at their oppressors we
exist!, but that was their right.776
Despite American wars fought to vindicate the laws of the land
over the laws of the sea, the rule of arbitrary British sea dominion
keeps rising up against Americans like tsunamis.777 The English Empire orchestrated many victories in the United States by appealing to
the vanity of the South.778 Feudal systems, which the U.S. Constitution officially expelled from the land, keep defying the U.S. social
compact to assert control over America, including an unchecked civil
forfeiture regime and a dragnet surveillance program.779
These royal influences in America culminated in Ex parte Quirin, where the Court eroded Ex parte Milligan based upon the laws of
the sea, i.e., civil forfeiture.780 It is no surprise, therefore, that Quirin
775. President James Madison, Special Message [to Congress asking it to declare war on
Great Britain], (June 1, 1812). See Act declaring War between the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland and the dependencies thereof, and the United States of America and
their territories, ch. 102, 2 Stat. 755 (1812); Robert E. Cray Jr., Remembering the USS Chesapeake: The Politics of Maritime Death and Impressment, 25 J. OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC 445,
472–73 (2005) (“Both sides had been fighting for a month before the men were returned.”).
776. See Whitney Houston, The Star-Spangled Banner (1991) (performed at Super Bowl
XXV); Cray Jr., supra note 775, at 472 (Francis Scott Key wasn’t the only songwriter in the
land during the War of 1812: “You all remember well, I guess / The Chesapeake disaster, /
When Britons dared to kill and press / To please their royal master. / That day did murder’d
freemen fall, / Their graves are cold and sandy; / Their funeral dirge was sung by all, / Nor
yankee doodle dandy.”).
777. Samuel Cooper et al., Pietas et Gratulatio 43–44 [1761] (“As, on her white-clift, seagirt shore, / With head reclined, Britannia sat, / Her ocean dashing on her rocks”). See, e.g.,
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 844–45 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
U.S. Supreme Court should have applied an arbitrary geographic barrier on habeas corpus
based on feudal law—as if the Suspension Clause, and indeed the U.S. social compact itself,
did not overrule, reverse, or otherwise totally undo feudal law in America) (citing Rex v.
Cowle [1759] 2 Burr. 834, 855–56 (Eng.)). Cf. Letter from Novanglus to the Inhabitants of
the Colony of Massachusetts Bay (Apr. 10, 1775), reprinted in JOHN ADAMS & JONATHAN
SEWALL, NOVANGLUS AND MASSACHUSETTENSIS 129–30 (1819) (Adams perceived that the basis of British injustice to its colonies laid in part upon the earlier habeas corpus case also
written by Lord Mansfield Rex v. Cowle—a case the Americans rejected during the revolution as an example of “feudal law.”).
778. Robert Hayne, Speech of Mr. Hayne in the Senate, on Mr. Foote’s Resolution (1830),
reprinted in ROBERT HAYNE & DANIEL WEBSTER, THE GREAT DEBATE 51–52 (Lindsay Swift
ed., 1898) (Robert Hayne rose up on behalf of the South and was inspired by Edmund
Burke’s romanticizing and ennobling of the Southern enslavement of Africans as the same
as English style feudalism.) (quoting Edmund Burke, The Speech . . . [for] Conciliation with
the Colonies, J. DODSLEY, Mar. 22, 1775, at 18–19 [1775]).
779. See Stillman, Taken, supra note 762; Donohue, National Security, supra note 31.
780. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 29–30 (1942) (departing from Milligan based on the
arbitrary laws of the sea by allowing a U.S. citizen to be tried and executed by military
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became Justice O’Connor’s inspiration in Hamdi to disregard the
rights of U.S. citizens.781 The O’Connor plurality in Hamdi turned a
blind eye to the government’s violations of the Eighth Amendment to
strip Yaser Esam Hamdi of his U.S. citizenship, and to banish him to
Saudi Arabia without due process of law.782
How much the United States did, or did not do, to tip the scales
toward the freedom of the seas is debatable.783 However, it is clear that
the United States vindicated the freedom of the seas and Great Britain
opposed America in all her naval power and lost, twice.784 America did
not contradict Wheatley’s prophesy of a “heaven defended line,” nor did
America intend to disappoint her declarations, “To every Realm shall

tribunal based upon his classification as an enemy combatant (i.e., pirate) for violation of a
law of war—the Court did this by applying prize law, which until then was only applicable
on the high seas) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10; United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153
(1820); United States v. The Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. 210 (1844); The Marianna Flora, 24
U.S. 1 (1826)).
781. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 523 (2004) (plurality opinion) (citing Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 21 (1942)).
782. Markon, supra note 715; Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958) (this Court was
inspired by Hannah Arendt to decide that “denationalization” is forbidden by the Eighth
Amendment); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 539 (plurality opinion) (Hamdi’s case was emphatically
not remanded for further proceedings as O’Connor ordered—Hamdi was stripped of his U.S.
citizenship, placed on a no fly list, and deported to Saudi Arabia without consulting a federal court).
783. QUINCY ADAMS, ARGUMENT, supra note 114, at 62–63 (arguments in a case where
the President attempted to comply with the Queen of Spain’s request to deliver up the Africans of the Amistad up to be tried and killed in Cuba); Ron Soodalter, The Limits of
Lincoln’s Mercy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2012, 12:30 PM), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/23/the-limits-of-lincolns-mercy/ (quoting Lincoln regarding
Nathaniel Gordon’s request for pardon after being sentenced to death for carrying on the
slave trade, “I believe I am kindly enough in nature, and can be moved to pity and to pardon
the perpetrator of almost the worst crime that the mind of man can conceive or the arm of
man can execute; but any man, who, for paltry gain and stimulated by avarice, can rob
Africa of her children to sell into interminable bondage, I will never pardon.”) (emphasis
added).
784. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); President Thomas Jefferson, Proclamation 14—Requiring Removal of British Armed Vessels From United States
Ports and Waters (July 2, 1807); President James Madison, Special Message [to Congress
asking it to declare war on Great Britain], (June 1, 1812); President Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation 95–Regarding the Status of Slaves in States Engaged in Rebellion Against the
United States [Emancipation Proclamation] (Jan. 1, 1863); Anon., Early Washington: An
Old Resident’s Recollections of the War of 1812, WASHINGTON EVENING STAR, Mar. 31, 1888,
at 2 (“‘Great God! Madam,’ cried Gen. Cockburn, ‘is this the kind of storm you are accustomed to in this infernal country?’ ‘No, sir,’ was the reply. ‘This is a special interposition of
Providence to drive our enemies from our city.’ ‘Not so, madam,’ he answered, ‘it is rather to
aid your enemies in the destruction of your city.’”).
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Peace her Charms display, / And Heavenly Freedom spread her golden
Ray.”785
Professor Laura K. Donohue’s writings and speeches on privacy
and security faithfully traced the root of the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment in the common law back to the
American reversal of England’s attempts to rule all the oceans through
accident, fraud, and force.786 Her newer works addressed Otis’s Paxton’s Case.787 As she recounted, Otis’s stand in Paxton’s Case was not
only the origin of the Fourth Amendment, but was the beginning of
American independence itself.788
Otis’s arguments in Paxton’s Case were against a peculiar type
of general warrant known as a writ of assistance.789 The defining characteristics of general warrants are that: (1) they lack particularity
about the person or place to be searched or seized, and (2) they are not
supported by evidence of probable cause.790 General warrants were rejected by the law of the land in England, however, they were allowed in
the American Colonies as a matter of admiralty law, i.e., the law of the
sea, by writ of assistance.791
The writ of assistance, likely invented by Oliver Cromwell to
oppress the English people, is particularly degrading because it requires the person who is being searched or seized to assist the police.792
785. Phillis Wheatley, Liberty & Peace [1784]; Phillis Wheatley, On the Capture of General Lee [1776]; Phillis Wheatley, To His Excellency General Washington [1775] (Putting
into words our existence as a part and parcel of all humanity, which is “freedom’s heavendefended race!”).
786. Donohue, National Security, supra note 31; Laura K. Donohue, The Original
Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1194 (2016) [hereinafter Donohue, The
Original].
787. Donohue, The Original, supra note 786, at 1194.
788. Id.; SIMMONS, supra note 31, at 13.
789. SIMMONS, supra note 31, at 13.
790. See Donohue, The Original, supra note 786, at 1194.
791. See id. at 1196; SIMMONS, supra note 31, at 13.
792. See Letter from John Adams to Hezekiah Niles (Jan. 14, 1818); The Death Warrant
of King Charles I (Jan. 29, 1648/49) (“requir[ing] [a]ll [o]fficers[, ][s]oldiers, and other[s,] the
good people of this Nation of England[,] to be assistinge unto you in this service”) (emphasis
added); An Ordinance For raising of Twenty thousand pounds a Moneth for the Relief of
Ireland (Feb. 16, 1647/8), in 1 ACTS AND ORDINANCES OF THE INTERREGNUM, 1642–1660, at
1072, 1099–1100 (C.H. Firth & R.S. Rait eds., 1911) [hereinafter ACTS . . . OF THE INTERREGNUM] (allowing tax collectors to require the assistance of “any persons Authorized to assist
. . . or any other person or persons whatsoever, dwelling in or near the place” “to break open
any House, Shop, or other thing,” to pay off Oliver Cromwell’s mercenary soldiers to invade
Ireland—i.e., it appears that the Puritans invented writs of assistance to plunder England
in order to pay Cromwell to pillage Ireland); Oliver Cromwell, Underneath—Writ of Assistance (May 9, 1648), in 3 THOMAS CARLYLE, THE LETTERS AND SPEECHES OF OLIVER
CROMWELL 385 (S. C. Lomas ed., 1904); Letter from Oliver Cromwell to General Desbrowe
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The suspicionless seizures by writ of assistance were not exclusive to
investigations for crime.793 Writs of assistance were often issued for
the impressment of innocent English and American boys into involuntary naval servitude and the civil forfeiture of colonial resources over
land, i.e., what the U.S. Constitution calls a taking.794
The chief advocate of Cromwell’s Navigation Acts and writs of
assistance was George Downing—an American Puritan.795 Downing
graduated from Harvard, became a spy for Cromwell during the English Civil War, and when the Crown was restored he betrayed his
revolutionary friends by torture and death, and sponsored the passage
of the Navigation Acts in Parliament.796 Otis and Adams had choice
(Mar. 11, 1654–55), in 3 CARLYLE, supra note 792 at 462–63 (authorizing “[w]ith writ of
assistance” the violent suppression of speech, the impressment (i.e., theft and enslavement)
of property and people into Cromwell’s service, and the violent quelling and capture of those
politically unaligned with the ascension of Cromwell) (emphasis added). Cf. TUDOR, supra
note 34, at 60 n.*, 65 n.*, 78–79 (“The form of this writ [of assistance], was nowhere to be
found; in no statute, no law book, no volume of entries . . . .” At the time of the American
Revolution, the Puritan sources involving writs of assistance were suppressed by the
crown.); Letter from John Adams to William Tudor (June 17, 1818).
793. See, e.g., Oliver Cromwell, Underneath—Writ of Assistance (May 9, 1648), in 3 CARLYLE, supra note 792, at 385; Letter from Oliver Cromwell to General Desbrowe (Mar. 11,
1654–55), in 3 CARLYLE, supra note 792, at 462–63.
794. U.S. CONST. amend. V (takings must be for a public use and purchased with “just
compensation”); THE CASE OF THE KING AGAINST ALEXANDER BROADFOOT 11 (1758) [1743]
(Opinion of Sir Michael Foster) [hereinafter THE CASE . . . AGAINST ALEXANDER BROADFOOT]
(writs of assistance were issued “to the Customers and other Officers of almost all the PortTowns in the Kingdom,” which stated that “all Sheriffs, Mayors and other Officers are requir’d to be assisting” the Crown, “requiring them to arrest and take up for the King’s
Service All and Singular Ships, Barges and other Vessels”); Benjamin Franklin, Franklin’s
Remarks on Judge Foster’s Argument in Favor of the Right of Impressing Seamen [before
Sept. 17, 1781], in 35 THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 158 (Barbara B. Oberg ed.,
Princeton University Press 2008) (“Inconvenience to the whole trade of a nation will not
justify injustice to a single seaman.”); President James Madison, Special Message [to Congress asking it to declare war on Great Britain], (June 1, 1812) (“British cruisers have been
in the continued practice of violating the American flag on the great highway of nations, and
of seizing and carrying off persons sailing under it.”); John Adams, Minutes of the Argument,
Surveyor General v. Loggs, Court of Vice Admiralty, Boston, March 8, 1773, in 2 ADAMS,
LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 22, at 267, 269 (the English Crown was impressing or civil forfeiting timber from America to build warships). See also Letter from John Adams to William
Tudor (Sept. 23, 1818) (Adams noted that the English colonists considered the rights to the
natural resources, as well as “the immense regions of uncultivated wilderness” of America
to lie with the Native Americans: The colonists did not have “any confidence in their charter, as conveying any right, except the king, who signed it. They considered the right to be in
the native Indians. And in truth all the right there was in the case, lay there.”).
795. SIMMONS, supra note 31, at 22.
796. Letter from John Adams to William Tudor (July 14, 1818) (“To borrow the language
of the great Dr. Johnson, this ‘[d]og’ Downing must have had a head and [b]rains, or, in
other [w]ords, [g]enius and [a]ddress: but, if [w]e may believe [h]istory, he was a [s]coundrel.
To ingratiate himself with Charles the Second[,] he probably not only pleaded his [m]erit in
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words for this horrible betrayer of America, and thus, America began
its repentance from Puritanism during the American Revolution.797
Shortly thereafter, Jeremy Bentham raised the fundamentals of
Puritan legal practice to contest the legitimacy of the Declaration of
Independence on behalf of his conquering crown.798 Indeed, ever since
the Puritan Revolution sank England into “the great depth . . . hell’s
profound domain,”799 the English Crown came to embody the political
realism espoused by Cromwell.800 Puritanical legal practice is a conspicuous growth of Cromwellian realism founded upon American legal
positivism that resulted in the Puritan genocide of the Pequots.801
inventing the [n]avigation [a]ct, but he betrayed to the [b]lock some of his old [r]epublican
and [r]evolutionary [f]riends.”).
797. See id. (“George Downing! Far from boasting of thee as my countryman, or of thy
statute as an American invention, if it were lawful to wish for any thing past, that has not
happened, I should wish that thou hadst been hanged, drawn, and quartered, instead of
Hugh Peters and Sir Henry Vane.”); SIMMONS, supra note 31, at 22.
798. Jeremy Bentham, Short Review of the Declaration [1776], in BENTHAM & LIND,
supra note 38, at 120.
799. Phillis Wheatley, Phillis’s Reply to the Answer [1774] (Wheatley’s characterization
of the failures of the Puritan experiment).
800. BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT, supra note 39, at xxxiv–xxxv n. s; Letter from Jeremy Bentham to the Citizens of the United States, July 1817 [Letter VII], in 4 BENTHAM, THE WORKS,
supra note 42, at 501 (“Behold what was said in his day by Cromwell! In my eyes, it ranks
that wonderful man higher than anything else I ever read of him:—it will not lower him in
yours.”); DUMONT, supra note 38, at 120, 231–36 (“If it be better for the happiness of the
greatest number that a man should die . . . cut him [down] without mercy.”).
801. Letter from Oliver Cromwell to Captain John Leverett (Apr. 3, 1655), in 3 CARLYLE,
supra note 792, at 300–01; id. at 409–10; JOHN MASON, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PEQUOT
WAR 9 (Paul Royster, ed. 1736) [1637] (predating Cromwell’s military career, and a possible
inspiration of his heinous treatment of Irish Catholics); THOMAS HUTCHINSON, THE HISTORY
OF THE COLONY OF MASSACHUSET’S BAY 190–95 (1765) [hereinafter HUTCHINSON, 1765 THE
HISTORY]; THOMAS HUTCHINSON, THE HISTORY OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETS-BAY 3
(1767) [hereinafter HUTCHINSON, 1767 THE HISTORY]; L.D. Samuel Highland, An Exact Relation of the Proceedings and Transactions of the late Parliament 18 [1654] (expressing a
hope that England might repeat the legal positivism of the American Puritans so that “the
great volumes of Law would come to be reduced into the bigness of a pocket book, as it is
proportionable in New England and elsewhere”); SELDEN, TABLE-TALK, supra note 28, at 61
(as the Puritan Revolution unfolded, and as Cromwell administered an arbitrary and tyrannical government by legal positivism, Selden’s argument that the Courts of Equity were as
arbitrary as the “chancellor’s foot” fell flat, and lost all objective credibility); WORTHINGTON
CHAUNCY FORD, JOHN COTTON’S MOSES HIS JUDICIALLS AND ABSTRACT OF THE LAWS OF NEW
ENGLAND 10–11 (Cambridge University Press 1902) (Admitting that in his study of this first
Puritan code “that only a few grains of wheat are found in this bushel of chaff.”); Massachusetts Body of Liberties 94.2 [1641] (“If any man or woman be a witch, . . . they shall be put to
death.”); The Lawes and Liberties of Massachusetts [1648] (largely a reproduction of the
original Body of Liberties, updated and revised from time to time and published as Laws
and Liberties). See AUSTIN WOOLRYCH, COMMONWEALTH TO PROTECTORATE 271–73, 300
(1982). Cf. BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT, supra note 39, at xxxv n. s (successfully fending off Sir
William Blackstone’s attacks on the Puritan use of Legal Positivism); id. at 141 (urging
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The nature of Cromwellian oppressions by writ of assistance in
England and America drew their supposed legitimacy from the law of
the sea.802 The idea that the seas symbolized the uncontrollable power
of the all-conquering rulers of the earth was a feudal aberration that
existed in English law ever since the Viking conquest was instituted
under William the Bastard.803 The idea of British sea dominion, first
conceived by William the Bastard, was perfected by Oliver Cromwell’s
conquest of Jamaica, reified by Charles II’s conquest of New York, and
affirmed by English jurists in Campbell v. Hall and Ex parte Bancoult
respectively.804
The origin of Cromwellian legal realism is the Puritan propagandist Marchamont Nedham’s translation of John Selden’s Latin
treatise, The Sea is Closed, into English.805 Selden claimed an English
right to own all the seas, drawn from the mad Emperor Caligula’s
claim of conquering Neptune, by collecting sea shells from what is pre-

legislators to take up the Puritan project of “transforming, by a digest, the body of the common law thus completed, into statute-law”).
802. See Letter from John Adams to James Lovell (Oct. 4, 1779) (“What is at stake for
Britannia? What will be the Consequence to her of American Independence? Is not the Empire of the Sea at stake?”). See Campbell v. Hall [1774] 1 Cowp. 206, 208, 211–12 (Eng.); 20
T.B. HOWELL, A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 283, 289 (1816) (“‘Jamaica was
conquered by Oliver Cromwell’”) (statement of Lord Mansfield during the trial of Campbell);
Thomas Hutchinson, Diary, Nov. 28, 1774, in 1 Thomas Hutchinson, The Diary and Letters
of His Excellency Thomas Hutchinson 307–09 (Peter Orlando Hutchinson ed., 1884) [hereinafter HUTCHINSON, THE DIARY]; THE CASE . . . AGAINST ALEXANDER BROADFOOT, supra note
794, at 11.
803. HOBBES, supra note 6, at 119,132, 231, 246, 522–23 (“This is the generation of that
great LEVIATHAN, or rather, to speak more reverently, of that mortal god, to which we owe
under the immortal God, our peace and defence.” This state of affairs in England stretched
back at least to William the Conqueror, who Hobbes associated with “the great power of
Leviathan, . . . King of the Proud. There is nothing . . . on earth to be compared with him. He
is made so as not to be afraid, He seeth every high thing below him; and is king of all the
children of pride.”).
804. Id. at 178, 192 (claiming an absolute right of the English sovereign to distribute
“Lands at home; so also to assigne in what places, and for what commodities, the subject
shall traffique abroad”); OTIS, supra note 18, at 244 (noting that the English spoke of the
colonists in terms of “yokeing and curbing the cattle”); [John Mein,] Sagittarius’s Letters and
Political Speculations 98, 100, 109–10 [1775]; Campbell v. Hall [1774] 1 Cowp. 206, 211–12
(Eng.) (tracing the right of conquest symbolized by New York back to Cromwell’s conquest of
Jamaica); R (On the Application of Bancoult) v. Sec’y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth
Affairs, [2008] UKHL 61, ¶¶ 32, 36, 81–84, 87, 125, 146–49 (Eng.) (affirming Campbell v.
Hall [1774] 1 Cowp. 206 (Eng.)) See 20 HOWELL, supra note 802, at 283, 289 (“‘Jamaica was
conquered by Oliver Cromwell’”) (statement of Lord Mansfield during the trial of Campbell);
HUTCHINSON, THE DIARY, supra note 802, at 307–09.
805. See generally 2 JOHN SELDEN, OF THE DOMINION OR, OWNERSHIP OF THE SEA, WRITTEN AT FIRST IN LATIN, AND ENTITLED, MARE CLAUSUM (Marchamont Nedham trans., 1652)
[hereinafter SELDEN, OF THE DOMINION].
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sent day Holland.806 Thus, Cromwell began the project of English
empire building with an attempt to get Holland on board with his
quest of conquering the sea.807
Holland, however, decided to defend Hugo Grotius’ tract, The
Sea is Free, entered into the law of nations on behalf of Holland’s policies of free trade. Thus, Holland resisted Cromwell and disputed his
claims.808 Cromwell subsequently waged the First Anglo-Dutch War
over the fate of all the seas, which ended as a stalemate.809 Then Cromwell’s sights turned to the Spanish Empire, from whom he conquered
the island colony of Jamaica.810
The English claim of a right to impress, tax, and enslave the
whole world eventually drove America to declare independence.811 England’s voracious hunger for conquest grew from the “Madnesse” of
men recorded by Thomas Hobbes, as a strange confluence of pride and
dejection in humanity; such that they bow to Leviathan.812 King
Charles II claimed his right of Leviathan over the people in the style of
Oliver Cromwell, the regicide, which only intensified the oxymoronic
spectacle of English realism.813
After Cromwell’s untimely death, Holland issued a complaint
into the law of nations.814 In response, the great betrayer, George
Downing, at the behest of his King Charles II fomented a second war
with Holland.815 This war England won, resulting in a treaty at Breda;
where New Amsterdam was ceded to England and renamed for the
806. Id. at 202–03 (claiming Caligula’s collection of seashells taken from the shores of
Holland as “Tokens of Sea-Dominion, and as a most sure pledge of the British Empire”).
807. CHARLES FIRTH, OLIVER CROMWELL AND THE RULE OF THE PURITANS IN ENGLAND
312–13 (1908).
808. Id.; see generally HUGO GROTIUS, MARE LIBERUM (David Armitage ed., Richard
Hakluyt & William Welwod trans., 2004) (1609).
809. The Treaty of Westminster, Eng.-Neth., Apr. 5–15, 1654.
810. FIRTH, supra note 807, at 401–02.
811. Campbell v. Hall [1774] 1 Cowp. 206, 208, 211–12 (Eng.). See King George III, The
King’s Speech of Nov. 30, 1774 [1775]; HUTCHINSON, THE DIARY, supra note 802, at 307–09
(confirming the timing of King’s Speech was contemporaneous with the ruling of Campbell
v. Hall, and that the Campbell case and the King’s Speech harkened back to Cromwell’s
conquest of Jamaica).
812. HOBBES, supra note 6, at 46–48.
813. The Navigation Act 1660, 12 Car. 2 c. 18 (Eng.).
814. SIR GEORGE DOWNING, A REPLY OF SIR GEORGE DOWNING, KNIGHT AND BARONET,
ENVOY EXTRAORDINARY FROM HIS MAJESTY OF GREAT BRITAIN, & TO THE REMARKS OF THE
DEPUTIES OF THE ESTATES GENERAL, UPON HIS MEMORIAL OF THE 20TH OF DECEMBER, 1664,
at 80, 94 (1665) (“And whereas the Deputies would have it thought no indignity or affront to
his Majesty, for that Fleet to have passed, for that, say they, The Sea is open to all the
World.”).
815. Id. at 93, 104 (“[T]hey might as well have spared the labour of making their Complaint, and the King his Master will hold himself obliged to oppose Force to Force.”).
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Duke of York (who would later become King James II of England).816
This land of New York became known throughout the world as “the
seat of the Empire.”817
Prior to the conquest of New York, the crown’s most fundamental power to tax was limited to England.818 Up to this point, the
original Virginia and Plymouth Colonies, which were the first English
Colonies in the world, maintained their liberties through social compacts that they reified through royal charter.819 After the conquest of
New York, however, a succession of English monarchs consolidated
power over all New England without the consent of the Americans.820
In response, the American colonies declared as one obsta
principiis! (resist beginnings) and maintained the rights of the En-

816. Treaty of Breda, Eng.-Neth., July 31, 1667 (ceding the New Netherlands territories
to England, which became what is today New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and
Delaware).
817. Letter from George Washington to James Duane (Apr. 10, 1785).
818. Campbell v. Hall [1774] 1 Cowp. 206, 208, 211–12 (Eng.) (finding for the first time
that due to the Cromwellian conquests of Jamaica and New York, that the King could tax
the whole world without representation); Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement
Co., 59 U.S. 272, 282 (1856) (the barons are the King’s tax collectors based upon William the
Bastard’s conquest of the people of England—in the moment in history Murray’s Lessee
cited to, only the people of England were conquered, and thus the original Massachusetts
Bay Colonists made their escape based upon their physically leaving conquered England to
a land still naturally free from English conquest—the use of this insular English taxation
law in Murray’s Lessee based on the Bastard’s illegitimate conquest, defies the very roots of
American society as an opposition to the rights of conquest, and a vindication of the freedom
of the seas) (citing 4 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *115), affirmation noted in Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2597 (2011). See also 4 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *269 (The U.S.
Supreme Court continues to dogmatically draw from what is a quintessentially feudal structure of tax collection involving William the Bastard’s Domesday Book, as if the Taney
Court’s decision in Murray’s Lessee to affirm this feudalism was reasonable and did not
contribute to the nation falling into Civil War shortly thereafter.).
819. JOHN BUTMAN & SIMON TARGETT, NEW WORLD INC. 303–04 (2018) (revealing that in
1691, Plymouth Colony, which was established around the same time as Virginia, was
merged with Massachusetts Bay); The Mayflower Compact [1620]; The Portsmouth Compact
[1638]; Rhode Island Parliamentary Patent [1643]; Rhode Island Royal Charter [1663]. See
Roger Williams, A Just and Generous Assertion of Indian Rights [1633?], mentioned in 1
JOHN WINTHROP, WINTHROP’S JOURNAL “HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND” 116–17 (James Kendall
Hosmer ed., 1908) [hereinafter WINTHROP’S JOURNAL] (The Puritans destroyed all copies of
this tract, and no known copy survives.). See also Letter from John Adams to William Tudor
(Sept. 23, 1818); JEFFERSON, NOTES, supra note 263, at 163–64; Jeremiah Drummer, A Defence of the New-England Charters 8 [1715].
820.
The Charter of the Dominion of New England [1686] (This was an attempted
merger of Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New York, and New
Jersey, abandoned and officially dissolved in 1689, because of the resistance. The Connecticut Charter Oak and the Great Boston Revolt of 1689 signaled its downfall.). See OTIS,
supra note 18, at 161–62 (quoting Jeremiah Dummer, A Defence of the New-England Charters 29 [1715]).

\\jciprod01\productn\F\FAM\15-1\FAM101.txt

2021

unknown

Seq: 145

LEVIATHAN GOES TO WASHINGTON

10-JAN-22

10:23

145

glishman by compact; as established in their charters.821 The colonies
upheld the common law as the law of the land, symbolized by Connecticut’s Charter Oak; rejecting the English government of the sea.822 The
American idea that the law of the land should apply outside of England

821. Jeremiah Dummer, A Defence of the New-England Charters 23, 49, 88 [1715] (“And
to comple[te] the oppression, when they upon their trial claimed the rights of Englishmen,
they were scoffingly told, those things would not follow them to the ends of the earth. Unnatural insult; must the brave adventurer, who with the hazard of his life and fortune,
seeks out new climates to enrich his mother country, be denied those common rights, which
his countrymen enjoy at home in ease and indolence? Is he to be made miserable, and a
slave by his own acquisitions? Is the laborer alone unworthy of his hire, and shall they only
reap, who have neither sowed nor planted? Monstrous absurdity! Horrid inverted order!”—
“Burnt houses may rise again out of their ashes, and even more beautiful than before, but
‘tis to be feared that liberty once lost, is lost forever.”); The Riverbends Channel, James
Baldwin Debates William F. Buckley (1965), YOUTUBE (Oct. 27, 2012), https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=ofeoS41xe7w (Baldwin’s claims were strikingly similar to Dummer’s in regard
to the creation of property rights later adopted by James Otis to justify our revolution in the
maxim qui sentit commodum sentire debet et onus, meaning those who get the benefit should
also carry the burden: “I am stating very seriously, and this is not an overstatement: That I
picked the cotton, and I carried to market, and I built the railroads under someone else’s
whip, for nothing. For nothing. The Southern oligarchy, which has until today so much
power in Washington, and therefore some power in the world, was created by my labor and
my sweat, and the violation of my women, and the murder of my children.”); CNN, Community organizer [DeRay McKesson] speaks to CNN about Baltimore protests, YOUTUBE (July
23, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J8]NxbjJUP8 (McKesson’s statements on air
are strikingly similar to Dummer’s statements in 1715 in the spirit of obsta principiis, “I
know that Freddie Gray will never be back, but those windows will be. . . . Broken windows
are not broken spines.”). The resistance of Jeremiah Dummer inspired the founders beginning with James Otis and Phillis Wheatley. OTIS, supra note 18, at 331 (“It is my
countrymen of the utmost consequence that we boldly oppose the least infraction of our
charter, and rights as men. Obsta Principiis is a maxim never to be forgot: If we do not
resist at the first attack, it may soon be too late; and where such a prize as the liberties and
privileges of British subjects is at stake, who dares say it is not better to be too jealous, than
too secure, and begin too early rather than suffer all to be lost by inattention and neglect.”);
Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772], in PHILLIS WHEATLEY, POEMS ON
VARIOUS SUBJECTS, RELIGIOUS AND MORAL 7 (1773) (claiming a property right to reap what
she had sown, as Dummer said all British colonial subjects should). Cf. Letter from John
Adams to James Lovell (Oct. 4, 1779) (“What is at stake for Britannia? What will be the
Consequence to her of American Independence? Is not the Empire of the Sea at stake?”);
[John Mein,] Sagittarius’s Letters and Political Speculations 98, 100, 109–10 [1775]; Campbell v. Hall [1774] 1 Cowp. 206, 208, 211–12 (Eng.).
822. William Tudor, An Oration Delivered March 5th, 1779, EDES & GILL, Mar. 5, 1779,
at 11 [1779] (according to this ancient wisdom, the American Revolutionaries generally recited the maxim obsta principiis meaning “resist beginnings”); Letter from Novanglus to the
Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay (Feb. 6, 1775), reprinted in ADAMS & SEWALL, supra note 777, at 34 (“Obsta principiis—Nip the shoots of arbitrary power in the bud,
is the only maxim which can ever preserve the liberties of any people.”); Letter from W.H.
Sumner to John Adams (May 3, 1823) (“Obsta principiis, was the motto of our fathers.”). See
Jeremiah Dummer, A Defence of the New-England Charters 88 [1715] (“Burnt houses may
rise again out of their ashes, and even more beautiful than before, but ‘tis to be feared that
liberty once lost, is lost forever.”).
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was diametrically opposed to Oliver Cromwell’s claims arising from
Caligula’s sea dominion.823
In 2008 the House of Lords expressly affirmed the imperial
powers of the crown upon absurd Cromwellian sources in the 1774 case
Campbell v. Hall.824 Lord Mansfield officially unbounded the crown
from the law of the land to unilaterally tax the colonies and to write,
and rewrite, the constitutions of British colonies at will.825 The Campbell case promised that English impressment, civil forfeiture, and writs
of assistance would flourish across the empire despite the American
resistance led by James Otis.826
After reading King George III’s speech issued contemporaneously with Campbell and published in Massachusetts, Abigail Adams
indelibly remarked, “The die is cast.”827 To King George III’s disappointment, the American Colonies did not betray Massachusetts Bay,

823. Rhode Island Royal Charter [1663]. See Roger Williams, A Just and Generous Assertion of Indian Rights [1633?], mentioned in 1 WINTHROP’S JOURNAL, supra note 819, at
116–17 (though in his day, he was attacked by his own people, Roger Williams’ view that the
common law and the rights of the Englishman should be extended to all people, including
women and Native Americans, was eventually adopted universally by the Colonies as a fact
fully and finally moved beyond question by the Declaration of Independence); United States
ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 27 n.9 (1955) (“A declaration of rights adopted by nine
colonies in 1765 contained this statement: ‘That trial by jury, is the inherent and invaluable
right of every British subject in these colonies.’ The Declaration of Independence stated as
one of the grievances of the colonies that the King of Great Britain had deprived the colonists of the benefits of trial by jury in many cases and that he had ‘affected to render the
Military independent of and superior to the Civil power.’ Another charge was that he had
transported colonials ‘beyond the Seas to be tried for pretended offences.’”) (quoting THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 2, 14, 20, 21 (U.S. 1776)).
824. R. v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Ex parte Bancoult
[2008] UKHL 61, ¶¶ 32, 36, 81–84, 87, 125, 146–49 (Eng.) (affirming Campbell v. Hall
[1774] 1 Cowp. 206, 208, 211–12 (Eng.)).
825. Campbell v. Hall [1774] 1 Cowp. 206, 208, 211–12 (Eng.).
826. Id. (“An Englishman in Ireland, Minorca, the Isle of Man, or the plantations, has
no privilege distinct from the natives.”); Samuel Johnson, Taxation No Tyranny 30 [1775]
(England thereby claimed “a right to bind them [the Colonists] by statutes, and to bind them
in all cases whatsoever”) (emphasis added); THOMAS HUTCHINSON & ANDREW OLIVER, COPY
OF LETTERS SENT TO GREAT-BRITAIN 16 (1773) (“There must be an abridgement of what are
called English liberties.” Lord Mansfield in Campbell officially created Governor Hutchinson’s secret petitions to the Lords of England into undoubted law.) (statement of Thomas
Hutchinson).
827. Letter from Abigail Adams (draft) to Mercy Otis Warren (Feb. [3?], 1775); Hannah
Griffitts, The Patriotic Minority in Both Houses of the British Parliament.—1775, in Milcah,
supra note 77, at 130–32; King George III, The King’s Speech of Nov. 30, 1774 [1775];
Thomas Hutchinson, Diary, Nov. 28, 1774, in 1 Hutchinson, The Diary, supra note 802, at
307–09 (confirming the timing of the King’s Speech in England was contemporaneous with
the ruling of Campbell v. Hall, and that the Campbell case and the King’s Speech ironically
harkened back to Cromwell’s conquest of Jamaica as the bases for their decisions).
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they united against the crown.828 At this, England lost its imperial seat
of New York and the Americans were a phoenix reborn e pluribus
unum; the American Union glowed like Moses’ vision of “a bush burning and yet not consumed.”829
The purpose of establishing American independence was to perpetually quarantine, oust, and overrule arbitrary feudal law and
martial law, which are the laws of Caligula’s sea conquest.830 Thomas
Hobbes rendered the authoritative text on the laws and principles of
arbitrary, feudal government in his Leviathan.831 Hobbes believed that
men’s “Madnesse,” that he characterized as a strange confluence of
pride and dejection in all human beings, required them to bow to their
conquering rulers, but the Americans did not agree.832
The Americans disputed Hobbes and his idea that humankind
was irrevocably mad; such that they must inevitably bow to their rulers and make themselves slaves.833 Thus, they courageously resolved
“to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really
capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and
choice.”834 For over two centuries the United States managed to disprove Hobbes by their “conduct and example” under the separation of
powers.835
James Otis was the first among us to issue the fiery American
rebuttal to the Hobbesian theory of human madness in Paxton’s
Case.836 Otis rose up on behalf of all English Colonists, black and
white, man and woman, living in America, India, or Africa, to publish
828. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1–32 (U.S. 1776) (this was the first
time they called themselves “United States”).
829. Samuel Cooper, Sermon on the Commencement of the Constitution, T. & J. FLEET,
& J. GILL, Oct. 25, 1780, at 2 [1780] (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Exodus
3:2).
830. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 27 n.9 (1955) (quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 2, 14, 20, 21 (U.S. 1776)); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1335 (“the common law was deemed by our
ancestors as part of the law of the land, brought with them upon their emigration”).
831. HOBBES, supra note 6, at 119, 231, 522–23.
832. Id. at 46–48; OTIS, supra note 18, at 241 (fraud and force were rejected as “Hobbesian maxims,” i.e., illegitimate bases of government).
833. Letter from John Adams to John Quincy Adams (Aug. 11, 1777) (giving his son “the
Works of Mr. Hobbes” to study, calling it for the most part “a great deal of mischievous
Philosophy”); QUINCY ADAMS, ARGUMENT, supra note 114, at 89 (Comparing the Southern
cause of slavery to Hobbes’ wicked attempt “to prove that government and despotism are
synonymous words.”).
834. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton).
835. Id.; John Adams, Thoughts on Government 10–11 [1776]; U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, III.
836. OTIS, supra note 18, at 175 (stating “that acts of parliament against natural equity
are void. That acts against the fundamental principles of the British constitution are void”).
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the cause of all British colonists in pamphlets in England; directly refuting Hobbesian pride and fatalism.837 In Otis’s words,
Some favourite modern systems must be given up or maintained by
a clear open avowal of these Hobbesian maxims, viz. That dominion
is rightfully founded on force and fraud.—That power universally
confers right.—That war, bloody war, is the real and natural state
of man—and that he who can find means to buy, sell, enslave, or
destroy, the greatest number of his own species, is right worthy to
be dubbed a modern politician and an hero.838

It did not matter if at some point or another, through fraud or force,
some king or emperor tricked colonists in America, India, or Africa like
a serpent of Eden into servitude; because fraud and force are illegitimate bases of power.839 In order to make our case against the tyrants
of the world, Otis wrote that every person has “a natural right to be
free, and they have it ordinarily in their power to make themselves so if
they please.”840 America followed Otis’s lead on July 4, 1776, by declaring its independence.841
So too, Phillis Wheatley rose up among the Americans like an
angel of light and “shook the dazzling glories of [her] head” to vindicate
the cause of British colonists all over the world against Hobbesian fa837. Id. at 3 (“mankind seem at this day to be in a great measure cured of their madness
in this”); id. at 4 (“Are not women born as free as men? Would it not be infamous to assert
that the ladies are all slaves by nature?”); id. at 29 (“The Colonists are by the law of nature
free born, as indeed all men are, white or black. No better reasons can be given, for enslaving those of any color than such as baron Montesquieu has humorously given, as the
foundation of that cruel slavery exercised over the poor Ethiopians; which threatens one day
to reduce both Europe and America to the ignorance and barbarity of the dark ages.”); id. at
250 (“That I may not appear too paradoxical, I affirm, and that on the best information, the
Sun rises and sets every day in the sight of five millions of his majesty’s American subjects,
white, brown and black.”); id. at 199 (Otis argued that “the dominions should be in fact
represented. Else it will follow, that the provincials in Europe, Asia, Africa and America,
ought to all generations to content themselves with having no more share, weight, or influence even in the provincial government of their respective countries, than the Hotentots
have in that of China, or the Ethiopians in that of Great-Britain.”).
838. Id. at 241.
839. Id.; SIMMONS, supra note 31 (“To suppose them [i.e., the people] SURPRISED BY
FRAUD, OR COMPELLED BY FORCE into any other compact, such fraud and such force could
confer no obligation. Every man had a right to trample it under foot whenever he pleased.”)
(emphasis added); Cicero, De Officiis 1.13.41 (“But let us remember we must have regard for
justice even towards the humblest. Now the humblest station and the poorest fortune are
those of slaves . . . . While wrong may be done, then, in either of two ways, that is, BY FORCE
OR BY FRAUD, both are bestial . . . .”) (emphasis added). See United States v. The Amistad, 40
U.S. 518, 520 (1841) (public documents that signify the enslavement of people “are always
open to be impugned for fraud”).
840. OTIS, supra note 18, at 126–27.
841. Id.; THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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talism.842 Wheatley’s mighty poems dared to help the American
imagination soar boldly through the night of terrors; as if riding a chariot of stars.843 Like Otis, Wheatley candidly refuted the Hobbesian
idea, that human beings are inevitably slaves to pride and dejection,
and therefore their physical enslavement is inevitable; instead, she
fully faced the horrors of death with faith in God and hope in the world
to come.844
Accordingly, Wheatley proclaimed the reversal of English sea
dominion in her poems, drawing upon the ancient poetics of Ovid.845
She declared America’s side on that of Mount Parnassus and the God
of Creation against the sire of ocean, chaos, and arbitrary government.846 Wheatley wondrously vindicated the newborn United States
with her poems that rivaled John Milton; with insights into the human
imagination that conspicuously prefigured and outwitted those of German idealism.847
Wheatley’s poetic pronouncements needed no man to affirm
them, for she spoke directly back to what the German idealists later
called chaoskampf.848 John Adams and John Hancock agreed with
842. Phillis Wheatley, Isaiah lxiii [1773] (this poem stands out among the others to
demonstrate the mightiness of Phillis Wheatley’s poems); Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et al.,
To the Public, [Oct. 1772,] in WHEATLEY, supra note 821, at 7.
843. Phillis Wheatley, To a Gentleman and Lady on the Death of the lady’s Brother and
Sister, and a Child of the Name Avis, Aged One Year [1773] (“On death’s domain intent I fix
my eyes, / where human nature in vast ruin lies.”).
844. Phillis Wheatley, An Elegy, to Miss Mary Moorhead, on the Death of her Father, the
Rev. Mr. John Moorhead [1773]. See Letter from Phillis Wheatley to Sir John Thornton
(Mar. 29, 1774) (“Had not Christ taken away the envenom’d sting [of death], where had been
our hopes? What might we not have fear’d, what might we not have expected from the
dreadful King of Terrors?”).
845. Phillis Wheatley, Liberty & Peace [1784]; Phillis Wheatley, Ocean, [1773?].
846. In Ovid’s account of the flood story, like the Bible’s story of Noah, the ark lands on
Mount Parnassus, and the symbolism embraced by Wheatley drawn from Ovid refuted the
Puritanical endorsement of Caligula’s conquests of the seas by defeating Poseidon. Ovid,
Metamorphoses 1.312 (describing Parnassus as the place where humanity received a second
chance after the flood); Phillis Wheatley, To Maecenas [1773] (“So long, great Sir, the muse
thy praise shall sing, / So long thy praise shall make Parnassus ring”); Phillis Wheatley,
Ocean [1773] (at Wheatley’s celebration that creation defeated “old Chaos of tyrannic soul,”
and when God separated the land from the sea, “the mighty Sire of Ocean frownd / ‘His
awful trident shook the solid ground’”).
847. Phillis Wheatley, America [1768]; Phillis Wheatley, To His Excellency General
Washington [1775]; Phillis Wheatley, On Imagination [1773]; Phillis Wheatley, Thoughts on
the Works of Providence [1773]. Cf. Goethe, Prometheus [1785, 1789] (the widespread fame
of Wheatley’s ideas and writings prefigured Goethe’s rise to prominence; Wheatley and Goethe later became co-inspirers of the famed fireside poet Henry Wadsworth Longfellow).
848. WHEATLEY, supra note 821, at 3 (the dedication page of her book is to Selina Hastings the Countess of Huntingdon who was the primary patron of her works—she was no
man). See Phillis Wheatley, Ocean [1773?]. Phillis Wheatley, On Messrs. Hussey and Coffin
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Wheatley when they endeavored to dispute the arbitrary force of the
feudal imagination that animated English despotism in America.849
The founding lawyers, thus, joined Wheatley’s transformation of
Milton’s reveries of doom into a new song of hope.850
Some of the lost works of the founding poetess, Phillis Wheatley, are being rediscovered.851 In one recently recovered work entitled
Ocean, Wheatley recorded a grand distinction about how the human
imagination worked to create the materials by which human beings
could change the course of human events.852 By comparing our creative
capacities with God’s creation of the world, Phillis Wheatley claimed
her place as Ciceronian poet and primary defender of the American
Dream,
When first old Chaos of tyrannic soul
Wav’d his dread Sceptre o’er the boundless whole,
Confusion reign’d till the divine Command
On floating azure fix’d the Solid Land,
Till first he call’d the latent seeds of light,
And gave dominion o’er eternal Night.
From deepest glooms he rais’d this ample Ball,
And round its wall he bade the surges roll;
With instant haste the new made seas complyd,
And the globe rolls impervious to the Tide;
[1767]; 2 JOSEPH LAVALÉE & PHILLIS WHEATLEY, THE NEGRO EQUALLED BY FEW EUROPEANS
167–248 (J. Trapp trans., 1790) (Wheatley’s book of poems was reprinted in America with
Lavalée’s book); Letter from Voltaire to A M. Le Baron Constant de Rebecque (Apr. 11,
1774), in 16 VOLTAIRE, supra note 268, at 594–95 (praising Wheatley’s work); HENRI GRÉGOIRE, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL FACULTIES, AND
LITERATURE, OF NEGROES 44–45, 234–41 (D.B. Warden trans., 1810). Compare Phillis
Wheatley, Ocean [1773?] with Rosanna Rackley, Kingship, Struggle, and Creation: The
Story of Chaoskampf 5 (2015) (Master’s thesis) (available at the University of Birmingham
eThesis Repository).
849. John Adams, Adams’ Copy of the Information and Draft of His Argument, Court of
Vice Admiralty, Boston, Oct. 1768–Mar. 1769, Jonathan Sewall v. John Hancock [1768–69],
in 2 ADAMS, LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 22, at 194–210.
850. Phillis Wheatley, To a Gentleman of the Navy [1774]; Phillis Wheatley, Phillis’s
Reply to the Answer [1774]; THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
851. Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Thomas Jefferson and The Trials of Phillis Wheatley, CSPAN (Mar. 22, 2002), https://www.c-span.org/video/?169288-1/thomas-jefferson-trials-phillis-wheatley (Phillis Wheatley’s husband “John Peters, a fast-talking small businessman
who affected the airs and dress of a gentleman and who would later sell off Phillis’s proposed second volume of poetry—the one to have been dedicated to Franklin—which has
never been recovered. Am I the only scholar who dreams of finding this lost manuscript?”);
see, e.g., Phillis Wheatley, Ocean [1773?].
852. Phillis Wheatley, Ocean [1773?].
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Yet when the mighty Sire of Ocean frownd
“His awful trident shook the solid Ground.”853

John Adams similarly wrote in his diary of God’s creation of this world,
“He had no preexisting matter to work upon or to change from a chaos
into a world. But he produced a world into being by his almighty fiat,
perhaps in a manner analogous to the production of resolutions in our
minds.”854 According to the sublime poetics of Phillis Wheatley, the
Americans rose up, faced the arbitrary British government of the seas,
and sought to create a new government, a good government, out of the
chaos.855
Remembering these birth pangs of the United States, Frederick
Douglass looked into the present horrors of the nation and sang out
among us, “The fiat of the Almighty Let there be Light! has not yet
spent its force.”856 Almost a quarter of a millennium after the United
States was born, however, a curtain of forgetfulness is drawn over the
“magic power” of Phillis Wheatley’s verses.857 A renewed movement to
fold the United States back into the British Empire is showing its ugly
face.858
853. Id.
854. John Adams, Diary no. 1, May 22 [i.e., 23], 1756, at 17.
855. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson
(Aug, 13, 1813) (“Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject to property”).
856. Frederick Douglass, What to the Slave is the 4th of July? (July 5, 1852), in 1 AMERICAN SPEECHES 551 (Ted Widmer ed., 2006).
857. Joseph Ladd, The Prospects of America [1785], in LITERARY REMAINS, supra note
748, at 23, 35 (speaking of “the far-spread name / Of wondrous Wheatly [sic], Afric’s heir to
fame,” whose “glowing genius shines / . . . With magic power the grand descriptions roll /
Thick on the mind, and agitate the soul”).
858. Donald Trump, Speech in Fort Worth, Texas, Feb. 26, 2016, https://
www.politico.com/blogs/on-media/2016/02/donald-trump-libel-laws-219866 (last visited Nov.
6, 2020) (“I’m going to open up our libel laws so when they write purposely negative and
horrible and false articles, we can sue them and win lots of money”); Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 5, 2018, 7:33 AM), searchable on https://
www.thetrumparchive.com (“Someone can write an article or book, totally make up stories
and form a picture of a person that is literally the exact opposite of the fact, and get away
with it without retribution or cost. Don’t know why Washington politicians don’t change
libel laws?”); Clifford v. Trump, 339 F. Supp. 3d 915, 921, 925, 928, 929 (C.D. Cal. 2018)
(protecting Trump’s “rhetorical hyperbole” that is almost certainly false from suit under an
anti-SLAPP statute); see Donohue, The Original, supra note 786, at 1189 (“Some of the most
well-known search cases at the time, for instance, centered on seditious libel, not stolen
goods—even as other statutes provided for such disparate objects as counterfeit coins and
indigents wanted for service on the high seas.”); Brendan O’Neill, The return of seditious
libel, SP!KED (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.spiked-online.com/2018/02/26/the-return-of-seditious-libel/ (“When you use this legal tool of aristocratic vengeance, this chilling feudalistic
hangover, this law beloved of Holocaust deniers, Saudi plutocrats and other enemies of the
open society, you forfeit every right to call yourself radical.”). Cf. John Adams, V. “A Dissertation on the Canon and the Feudal Law,” No. 3 (Sept. 30, 1765) (“The stale, impudent

\\jciprod01\productn\F\FAM\15-1\FAM101.txt

152

unknown

Seq: 152

FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW

10-JAN-22

10:23

Vol. 15:1:1

In 2008, the English House of Lords reaffirmed Campbell v.
Hall and the Cromwellian version of British Empire, based upon the
mad Emperor Caligula; as if the American Revolution never happened.859 In the same year, the U.S. Supreme Court firmly
distinguished the same feudal doctrines from legitimate U.S. common
law in Boumediene v. Bush.860 The Boumediene Court adopted the
views of John Adams; who vigorously lambasted Cowle in the papers
during the American Revolution.861
The U.S. Supreme Court’s references to the feudal law in Cowle,
that almost infiltrated Boumediene, began as dicta in Rasul v. Bush;
but Cowle’s foundation upon territorial wars between Scotland and Eninsinuations of slander and sedition, with which the gormandizers of power have endeavor’d
to discredit your paper, are so much the more to your honour; for the jaws of power are
always opened to devour, and her arm is always stretched out if possible to destroy, the
freedom of thinking, speaking and writing. And if the public interest, liberty and happiness
have been in danger, from the ambition or avarice of any great man or number of great men,
whatever may be their politeness, address, learning, ingenuity and in other respects integrity and humanity, you have done yourselves honour and your country service, by
publishing and pointing out that avarice and ambition.”); Millar v. Taylor [1769] 4 Burr.
2303, 2311–12 (Eng.). (Copyright, i.e., the right to copy books in the printing press, existed
before 1640 in “the power of the Crown.” These copyrights were granted by the Queen in
Council and enforced by the Star Chamber—which was like putting the CIA and the FISA
Courts in charge of creating and enforcing copyrights, to censor speech and punish any
speech against the government).
859. R. v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Ex parte Bancoult
[2008] UKHL 61, ¶¶ 32, 36, 81–84, 87, 125, 146–49 (Eng.) (affirming Campbell v. Hall
[1774] 1 Cowp. 206, 208, 211–12 (Eng.)). See 20 HOWELL, supra note 802, at 213 (“In the
king and Cowle, 2 Burr. 858, your lordship, speaking of Calvin’s case, said, ‘the question
was, whether the plaintiff Calvin, born in Scotland after the descent of the crown of England to king James the first, was an alien born, and consequently disabled to bring any
real or personal action for any land within the realm of England;’ and your lordship added,
‘but it never was a doubt whether a person born in the conquered dominions of a country is
subject to the king of the conquering country.’”) (statement of Mr. Alleyne speaking to Lord
Mansfield in the case of Campbell v. Hall) (quoting Rex v. Cowle [1759] 2 Burr. 834, 835
(Eng.)).
860. Brief for Respondents at 28, Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (Nos.
06–1195, 06–1196) (The government rested its case on the rule from Cowle, that the limitation on English habeas jurisdiction “was drawn at formal sovereignty, not at de facto
control.” Cowle is feudal law that can no longer legitimately apply in American courts after
1776.) (citing Rex v. Cowle [1759] 2 Burr. 834, 855–56 (Eng.)).
861. Id.; Brief for Boumediene Petitioners at 11, Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723
(2008) (No. 06–1195) (citing Rex v. Cowle [1759] 2 Burr. 834, 898–99 (Eng.)); Novanglus,
Letter from Novanglus to the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay (Apr. 10,
1775), reprinted in ADAMS & SEWALL, supra note 777, at 129–30 (directly stating that Cowle
was “feudal law” and illegitimate—Adams would be shocked if he were alive to see the
Boumediene respondents comparing the United States to a conquering crown in Cuba so
that the President can keep an illegitimate and unconstitutional foreign prison to punish
people for indefinite periods of time, incommunicado, without due process) (citing Rex v.
Cowle [1759] 2 Burr. 834, 898–99 (Eng.).
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gland was held illegitimate in America.862 The decisions to extend U.S.
habeas jurisdiction over prisoners in Guantanamo Bay in Rasul and
Boumediene were based upon “the District Court’s jurisdiction over petitioners’ custodians.”863 The basis for federal jurisdiction under the
Suspension Clause is therefore not territorial.864
The feudal basis of English sovereignty over foreign lands abolished English common law in Scotland and introduced territorial
barriers to English habeas jurisdiction.865 Unfortunately, Justice
Scalia defended Cowle as if it were legitimate U.S. common law.866
However, the supremacy of the crown’s laws in foreign lands in Cowle
directly contradict the supremacy of federal law in the United States
that must be inferred from the “very great force . . . arising from the
federal compact.”867
As the Honorable James Duane decided from the bench of New
York City, federal supremacy in the United States is meant even for
the protection of the natural human rights of our enemies.868 The
862. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 482–84 (2004) (noting that the English Courts have
since changed course, determining that habeas cases now “the writ depend[s] not on formal
notions of territorial sovereignty”) (citing Rex v. Cowle [1759] 2 Burr. 834, 854–55 (Eng.); Ex
parte Mwenya, [1960] 1 Q.B. 241, 303 (Eng.)).
863. Id. at 483–84; Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 748, 750.
864. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 745 (“The [Suspension] Clause protects the rights of the
detained by affirming the duty and authority of the Judiciary to call the jailer to account.”).
865. Rex v. Cowle [1759] 2 Burr. 834, 835 (Eng.) (“Berwick . . . was ours only by conquest
. . . . A conquered country retains its own laws, till others are given by the conquerors. No
certiorari therefore lies, to Berwick”); Novanglus, Letter from Novanglus to the Inhabitants
of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay (Apr. 10, 1775), reprinted in ADAMS & SEWALL, supra
note 777, at 129–30 (Cowle is an application of “feudal law”). See also HUTCHINSON & OLIVER, supra note 826, at 16 (“There must be an abridgement of what are called English
liberties”); Campbell v. Hall [1774] 1 Cowp. 206, 208, 211–12 (Eng.) (This case created
Hutchinson’s requested abridgement of English liberties by saying, “An Englishman in Ireland, Minorca, the Isle of Man, or the plantations, has no privilege distinct from the
natives”).
866. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 844 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (defending Cowle’s feudal basis
for the supremacy of English law, which is the backdrop of English choice of law principles
in foreign territories—including Wales and Scotland).
867. THE CASE OF ELIZABETH RUTGERS, supra note 131, at 28; Rex v. Cowle [1759] 2
Burr. 834, 850–51 (Eng.) (“The consequence of this doctrine was, that, by the FEUDAL LAW,
supreme jurisdiction resulted to him, in right of his Crown, as Sovereign Lord, in many
cases, which he might lay hold of; and when the said territories should come into his hands
and possession, they would come back as parcel of the realm of England, from which, (by
fiction of law at least,) they had been originally severed.”) (emphasis added).
868. THE CASE OF ELIZABETH RUTGERS, supra note 131, at 28 (the treaty of peace with
England, which was struck before the Supremacy Clause was ratified, derived federal
supremacy from the U.S. social compact of 1776 itself). Cf. John Adams, Diary no. 19, [Dec.
16, 1772—Dec. 18, 1773], at 16 (noting that if U.S. law did not defend the equal rights of our
enemies as well as our friends, that we would necessarily fall back into injustice of prosecuting witches). This basic, backdrop reality of U.S. law was affirmed in a whole host of later
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founding opinions on federal compact were woven into the very
lifeforce of American law, which refutes the dissents in Boumediene.869
As Joseph Story wrote, “The Declaration of Independence has accordingly always been treated as an act of paramount and sovereign
authority, complete and perfect per se.”870
The U.S. social compact is considered a paramount law “not
merely as a practical fact, but in a legal and constitutional view of the
matter by courts of justice.”871 Justice Scalia and his fellow dissenters
in Boumediene missed this indubitable reality that is synonymous with
American law, and absurdly applied English feudal devolution as expounded in Cowle.872 By doing so, Justice Scalia betrayed his own
dissent in Hamdi; where he defended the habeas common law required
under the U.S. social compact.873
For instance, the earliest federal habeas cases issued the writ
as a matter of course directly into the U.S. newly purchased, unincorporated, foreign Louisiana Territory.874 The federal courts also issued
the Great Writ on behalf of black prisoners of slaveholders, in the antebellum South, to free them before the Civil War.875 Finally, in the wake
cases involving what is known today as the constitutional avoidance doctrine. INS v. St.
Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300–02 (2001); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 341, 345–48 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932); Ex parte Randolph 20
F. Cas. 242, 254 (No. 11,558) (CC Va. 1833) (Marshall, C.J.); Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance
2 U.S. 304, 304–05 (1795).
869. THE CASE OF ELIZABETH RUTGERS, supra note 131, at 28
870. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 211.
871. Id. See THE CASE OF ELIZABETH RUTGERS, supra note 131, at 28.
872. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 844 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See Vanhorne’s Lessee, 2 U.S.
at 308–11 (consulting the “social compact” of Pennsylvania to decide property claims under
Pennsylvania law—the social compact set forth during the American Revolution was meant
to be consulted as the baseline of American law in federal courts rather than English feudal
law).
873. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 844 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (scandalously advocating an
abandonment of the common law in favor of Cowle feudalism); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507, 556 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The gist of the Due Process Clause, as understood
at the founding and since, was to force Government to follow those common-law procedures
traditionally deemed necessary before depriving a person of life, liberty or property.”).
874. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75, 100–01 (1807) (requiring release or a new trial for
Bollman and Swartwout’s alleged involvement in Aaron Burr’s alleged conspiracy to revolutionize Mexico). Cf. Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 189–93 (1948) (a very short and vague
opinion appearing to decide the federal courts have no jurisdiction on Ellis Island to issue a
writ of habeas corpus to “some 120 Germans who are being held at Ellis Island, New York,
for deportation to Germany” during World War II), overruled by Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct.
Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 495 (1973) (emphasizing that habeas jurisdiction runs to the custodian,
not the prisoner).
875. Habeas Corpus for Fugitive Slaves Cases, 1820–1843, microformed on Habeas
Corpus Case Records of the U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Columbia, Microcopy No.
434, 1820–1863, roll no. 1–2 (Nat’l Archives Microfilm Publ’ns), http://www.ccharity.com/
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of Mary Surratt’s execution, without due process of law, the Court decided Ex parte Milligan, to extend habeas jurisdiction to the most
hideous enemy combatants imaginable.876
There is a longstanding dispute over whether the laws of land
or laws of the sea will finally prevail in England and America; and “the
conflict is irreconcilable.”877 The unwritten English Constitution was
contents/petitions-writs-habeas-corpus-persons-alleged-be-fugitive-slaves/; Letter from
George Washington to Robert Morris (Apr. 12, 1786) (“I hope it will not be conceived from
these observations, that it is my wish to hold the unhappy people who are the subject of this
letter [i.e., black folk suing for their freedom under the privilege of habeas corpus], in slavery. I can only say that there is not a man living who wishes more sincerely than I do, to see
a plan adopted for the abolition of it . . . .”). But see Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506, 526
(1858) (finding that “the fugitive slave law is, in all of its provisions, fully authorized by the
Constitution of the United States,” including its suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus
to African Americans arrested as fugitive slaves—Wisconsin refused to acknowledge that
Ableman comported with the U.S. Constitution and continued releasing slaves—the fact
that the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 was needed in order to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus on a racial basis is also evidence that the writ was being issued on behalf of black
folks—two years later this case and the Fugitive Slave law was overruled by the Civil War
and repealed by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments).
876. THE CONSPIRATOR (The American Film Company 2010) (giving the story of Mary
Surratt’s military execution, and revealing how the likely guilty party went free because the
court’s writs of habeas corpus were ignored); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 6–7, 124–25
(1866) (Milligan was a part of what would later become the KKK, “a secret society known as
the Order of American Knights or Sons of Liberty,” who gathered “for the purpose of overthrowing the Government and duly constituted authorities of the United States; holding
communication with the enemy; conspiring to seize munitions of war stored in the arsenals;
to liberate prisoners of war, etc.”). But see Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 29–30 (1942) (departing from Milligan based on the arbitrary laws of the sea by allowing a U.S. citizen to be
tried and executed by military tribunal based upon his classification as an enemy combatant (i.e., pirate) for violation of a law of war—the Court did this by applying prize law,
which until then was only applicable on the high seas) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10;
United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153 (1820); United States v. The Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S.
210 (1844); The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. 1 (1826)).
877. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 124–25 (“the antagonism is irreconcilable, and, in the conflict,
one or the other must perish”); Quirin, 317 U.S. at 29–30 (this case scandalously used the
law of the seas to work around Milligan’s requirement that the law of the land apply even to
enemy combatants, and it had a heavy influence on Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion in
Hamdi). Compare Rex v. Cowle [1759] 2 Burr. 834, 850–51 (Eng.) (Under feudal law, however, habeas does not extend to any territory other than England (even excluding Scotland
and Wales) unless there is a positive law—this feudal law is exactly what cut off Somerset’s
common law requirement in America), with Somerset v. Stewart [1772] 98 ER 499, 510
(Eng.) (At common law, geographically within English borders, slavery is said to be “so odious, that nothing can be suffered to support it, but positive law. Whatever inconveniences,
therefore, may follow from a decision, I cannot say this case is allowed or approved by the
law of England; and therefore the black must be discharged.” As Quirin is an exception to
Milligan in the United States, Somerset is an exception to Cowle in England. What is the
basis of law, and what is the exception is almost the perfect constitutional opposite in the
United States from what it was in England.). Cf. The Amistad, 40 U.S. 518, 594 (1841)
(overruling The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66, 188 (1825) (relying on the presumption of slavery in
the English case Le Louis) (citing Le Louis [1817] 2 Dodson 238, 255 (Eng.) (Opinion of Sir
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compromised by the Conquest of William the Bastard, where the Viking laws of the sea spilled over onto English soil.878 The American
written U.S. Constitution and state constitutions, however, are free
from this feudal corruption—a reversal that took place over nearly a
century as recounted by James Otis,
‘It has ever been boasted,’ says Mr. Dummer in his defence of the
charters, ‘as the peculiar privilege of an Englishman, and the security of his property, to be tried by his country, and the laws of the
land: Whereas the admiralty method deprives him of both, as it
puts his estate in the disposal of a single person, and makes the
civil law the rule of judgment; which tho’ it may not properly be
called foreign being the law of nations, yet ‘tis what he has not consented to himself, nor his representative for him.’879

Soon after this “peculiar privilege of an Englishman” was universally
denied to the American Colonists, the U.S. Constitution was written in
order to secure the people under the promises of our social compact, to
expel the law of the seas from our land.880 One of the very purposes of
waging the American Revolution was to ensure that military law
would never overtake civil law; as it so often did under the English
Crown, out of the feudal, Viking conquest of William the Bastard that
arose from the sea.881
William Scott) (presuming slavery according to the English oxymoron of the free trade in
human flesh)).
878. HOBBES, supra note 6, at 317 (“the right of the kings of England did depend on the
goodness of the cause of William the Conqueror, upon their lineal and directest descent from
him”); Sir Henry Vane the Younger, A Healing Question 4–5 [1656]. See THE CASE . . .
AGAINST ALEXANDER BROADFOOT, supra note 794, at 11.
879.
OTIS, supra note 18, at 162 (quoting Jeremiah Dummer, A Defence of the NewEngland Charters 29 [1715]).
880. Id.; HUTCHINSON & OLIVER, supra note 826, at 16 (“There must be an abridg[e]ment
of what are called English liberties.”); Campbell v. Hall [1774] 1 Cowp. 206, 208, 211–12
(Eng.) (“An Englishman in Ireland, Minorca, the Isle of Man, or the plantations, has no
privilege distinct from the natives.”); THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S.
1776); U.S. CONST. amends. I–X. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 746–47 (citing Somerset v.
Stewart [1772] 20 How. St. Tr. 1, 80–82 (Eng.)).
881. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 n.9 (1955) (“The Declaration
of Independence stated as one of the grievances of the colonies that the King of Great Britain had deprived the colonists of the benefits of trial by jury in many cases and that he had
‘affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil power.’ Another
charge was that he had transported colonials ‘beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offences.’”) (quoting and citing THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 2, 14, 20, 21 (U.S.
1776)); Milligan, 71 U.S. at 124–25 (The English government’s rendering of “the ‘military
independent of and superior to the civil power’ . . . was deemed by our fathers such an
offence that they assigned it to the world as one of the causes which impelled them to declare their independence.”) (quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 14 (U.S.
1776)). Cf. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 843 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2).
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Thus, Boumediene ought to have unanimously invalidated the
feudal law in Cowle, which is the essence of military law as laid down
by the Bastard King, i.e., sovereignty by conquest.882 The U.S. Supreme Court should have clearly turned on its own motion, sua sponte,
to the U.S. social compact as embodied in the Declaration of Independence; as it excellently did in United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles.883
The majority of the Boumediene Court managed to distinguish Cowle,
but this was not enough to fully preclude the Court’s future use of geographic limitations set forth in Cowle.884
The U.S. social compact as embodied by the Declaration of Independence requires that the laws of legitimate governments must
safeguard natural human rights.885 This requirement is boldly written
throughout the annals of the heroic acts performed during the American Revolution.886 The American reversal, brought about by the laws of
land, the common law, and the rights of the Englishman against arbitrary, feudal, martial laws that rise out of British sea dominion, is the
beating heart of American Revolution.887
882. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 748 (distinguishing Rex v. Cowle [1759] 2 Burr. 834,
854–56 (Eng.)); Letter from Novanglus to the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts
Bay (Apr. 10, 1775), reprinted in ADAMS & SEWALL, supra note 777, at 129–30 (Cowle is an
application of “feudal law,” rejected as illegitimate in America); 1 WILSON, THE WORKS,
supra note 113, at 22 (wisely noting the English jurists like Blackstone “deserve[ ] to be
much admired; but . . . ought not to be implicitly followed”).
883. See Quarles, 350 U.S. at 17 n.9 (In just such a question, the U.S. Supreme Court is
meant to look to the U.S. social compact embodied in the Declaration of Independence under
Quarles, which requires that it refute every form of feudal law.) (quoting THE DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 2, 14, 20, 21 (U.S. 1776)).
884. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 748 (distinguishing Rex v. Cowle [1759] 2 Burr. 834,
854–56 (Eng.)); id. at 850 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Scalia characterized the Court’s distinguishing of Cowle as the breaking of “a chain of precedent as old as the common law that
prohibits judicial inquiry into detentions of aliens abroad absent statutory authorization.”
Then he wrote rather harshly and absurdly, “The Nation will live to regret what the Court
has done today. I dissent.”).
885. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
886. Id.; Phillis Wheatley, On the Death of General Wooster [1778] (Wheatley told the
hero’s story of how white American Revolutionaries laid down their lives defending the sentiment that, “‘But how, presumptuous shall we hope to find / Divine acceptance with the
Almighty mind— / While yet (O deed Ungenerous!) they disgrace / And hold in bondage
Africa’s blameless race / Let Virtue reign—And those accord our prayers / Be victory our’s,
and generous freedom theirs.’”); OTIS, supra note 18, at 119–20, 129, 140–41 (“The Colonists
are by the law of nature free born, as indeed all men are, white or black. . . . Nothing better
can be said in favor of a trade, that is the most shocking violation of the law of nature, has a
direct tendency to diminish the idea of the inestimable value of liberty, and makes every
dealer in it a tyrant from the director of an African company to the petty chapman in needles and pins on the unhappy coast. It is a clear truth, that those who everyday barter away
other men[’]s liberty will soon care little for their own.”).
887. See OTIS, supra note 18, at 162 (quoting Jeremiah Dummer, A Defence of the NewEngland Charters 29 [1715]). See supra note 61 (noting many resolves that the American
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For if there is anything the U.S. social compact stands for, it is
the natural rights of all humankind that extend equally to every person.888 The American Revolution on the side of English common law
and against English feudalism was paid for in the blood of multiple
generations of Americans in the field of battle.889 The U.S. Judiciary
should rise up to say, as President Lincoln said in a similarly politically polarized moment in American history, “that these dead shall not
have died in vain . . . that government of the people, by the people, for
the people shall not perish from this earth.”890
The Trial of Phillis Wheatley: On the Freedom of Mind
In 1634, John Milton published Comus, a play in which an unnamed lady mounts a successful resistance against Comus, a god of
anarchy and chaos, by praying to the sea nymph Sabrina for her release from Comus’s enchanted chair.891 In this early work, Milton
appropriated women as his champions of the freedom of mind.892 InRevolutionaries made asserting their claim to the Rights of Englishmen imported to
America by their immigration).
888. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
889. Id.; President George Washington, Proclamation 4—Neutrality of the United
States in the War Involving Austria, Prussia, Sardinia, Great Britain, and the United
Netherlands Against France (Apr. 22, 1793); President Thomas Jefferson, Proclamation
14—Requiring Removal of British Armed Vessels From United States Ports and Waters
(July 2, 1807); President James Madison, Special Message [to Congress asking it to declare
war on Great Britain], (June 1, 1812); President Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation 95–Regarding the Status of Slaves in States Engaged in Rebellion Against the United States
[Emancipation Proclamation] (Jan. 1, 1863).
890. President Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863); See, e.g., Ex
parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 124–25 (1866) (If an absolute government of the executive is to be
endured without checks and balances, “republican government is a failure, and there is an
end of liberty regulated by law.”).
891. John Milton, Comus 664–65, 859–66 [1634].
892. Id.; 1 WILSON, THE WORKS, supra note 113, at 35 (arriving at a problematic view of
women by paraphrasing Milton: “‘Those thousand decencies that daily flow / From all her
words and actions, mixed with love / And sweet compliance . . .’”) (paraphrasing John
Milton, Paradise Lost IV.298, VIII.488–89, VIII.601–03 [1667]); QUINCY ADAMS, SOCIAL,
supra note 113, at 7–9, 24–25 (“The woman therefore can have no direct agency in the formation of the social compact which constitutes the body politic. Nor had the women of
Massachusetts any direct agency in forming the Constitution of the Commonwealth.”) (quoting John Milton, Paradise Lost IV.304–11 [1667]). But see Catherine Sedgwick, Slavery in
New England [1853], in 34 BENTLEY’S MISCELLANY 421–22 (1853) (relaying the fact that the
first application of the Declaration of Independence in Massachusetts State Court was to
free Elizabeth Freeman from slavery); Mumbet’s Case [also known as Brom & Bett v.
Ashley], Court Decision, Aug. 1781, reprinted in BRUNS, supra note 111, at 468–70 (a black
woman vindicated the rights of all black folk in Massachusetts under the overriding law of
the Declaration of Independence).

\\jciprod01\productn\F\FAM\15-1\FAM101.txt

2021

unknown

Seq: 159

LEVIATHAN GOES TO WASHINGTON

10-JAN-22

10:23

159

deed, Milton’s legacy of free thought is inextricably tied to these words
spoken by his imaginary, virginal lady,
“Fool! do not boast;
Thou canst not touch the freedom of mind . . .
I hate when Vice can bolt her arguments,
And Virtue has no tongue to check her pride”893

John Milton’s writings became larger than life, outshining the contemporaneous struggles of his friends Roger Williams and Anne
Hutchinson in Massachusetts, and so his portrayals of women (especially his portrayal of Eve in Paradise Lost) became the primary basis
of anti-feminist thought throughout the world.894 In direct response,
Phillis Wheatley staged her revolution on Miltonic poetics, and she
placed a key in the sands of time to unlock Americans from the prison
that Milton’s ideas made for them.895
John Adams, for example, moved to exclude women from politics, and John Quincy Adams cited directly to John Milton to justify
continuing female disfranchisement in Massachusetts.896 James Wilson also approvingly quoted Milton’s problematic view of women in his
famed lectures on the law.897 Against the blindness of these men, Phillis Wheatley revolutionized Milton and became a better champion for
893. John Milton, Comus 662–63, 760–61 [1634]. See LOSCOCCO, supra note 113, at 54
(“Hearing Milton’s Lady in Wheatley’s POEMS transforms how readers understand her
first several verses.”); Phillis Wheatley, To the Rev. Mr. Pitkin, on the Death of His Lady
[1772] (Wheatley’s Lady speaking, “‘To Him, who died, dread Justice to appease, / Which
reconcil’d, holds Mercy in Embrace; / Creation too, her MAKER’S Death bemoan’d, / He in
his Death slew ours, and as he rose, / He crush’d the Empire of our hated Foes. / How vain
their Hopes to put the God to flight, / And render Vengeance to the Sons of Light!’”).
894. Joyce E. Chaplin, Roger Williams: The Great Separationist, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30,
2011 (Williams “attracted the powerful and the intelligent. The jurist Edward Coke had
been his patron during his youth; the poet John Milton was a later friend. Even his critics
found him an appealing personality.”); J.F. Maclear, Anne Hutchinson and the Mortalist
Heresy, 54 NEW ENG. Q. 74, 74–77 (1981) (“This neglect of the ‘American Jezebel’s’ mortalism is somewhat difficult to understand, especially since students of seventeenth-century
England have paid such close attention to the idea in Overton, Milton, and Hobbes.”).
895. Phillis Wheatley, Phillis’s Reply to the Answer [1774] (speaking directly of Milton
“But, lo! in him Britannia’s prophet dies.”). Compare John Milton, Paradise Lost I.663–69
[1667], with Phillis Wheatley, An Hymn to Humanity [1773]. Cf. LOSCOCCO, supra note 113,
at 54.
896. Letter from John Adams to James Sullivan (May 26, 1776) (John Adams even betrayed his own wife in the presence of others when he advocated the destruction of the
rights of women based upon the idea that women do not have any opinions of their own.);
QUINCY ADAMS, SOCIAL, supra note 113, at 7–89, 25 (quoting John Milton, Paradise Lost
IV.304–11 [1667]). Cf. Letter from John Quincy Adams to John Adams (July 7, 1814) (discussing Milton’s Paradise Lost).
897. 1 WILSON, THE WORKS, supra note 113, at 35 (paraphrasing John Milton, Paradise
Lost IV.298, VIII.488–89, VIII.601–03 [1667]).
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the freedom of mind than Milton’s lady ever was, abolishing any reason
why Miltonic thought should disfranchise her sex.898
Shortly before Phillis Wheatley took her mighty stand in the
autumn of 1772, her artistic collaborator and first American choral
composer, William Billings, rose up to claim his rights as author of a
popular book of music.899 In response and for the first time in American history, a colonial legislature passed a law to give an author a
copyright.900 Billings’ legal victory was empty, however, because then
Governor and Chief Justice, Thomas Hutchinson, refused to allow Billings’ copyright bill to become law.901
898. Wheatley focused directly upon the Puritan funeral elegy and redeemed it in the
present moment to support the revolution with a unique song of hope for the world to come.
Phillis Wheatley, An Elegiac Poem, on the Death of that Celebrated Divine, and Eminent
Servant of Jesus Christ, the Late Reverent, and Pious George Whitefield [1770] (this poem
gave Wheatley instant renown in both Europe and America). See Phillis Wheatley, Phillis’s
Reply to the Answer [1774] (speaking directly of Milton “But, lo! in him Britannia’s prophet
dies”). Compare John Milton, Paradise Lost I.663–69 [1667], with Phillis Wheatley, An
Hymn to Humanity [1773]. Cf. LOSCOCCO, supra note 113, at 54.
899. William Billings’ Second Petition, Massachusetts, May 27, 1772 (Praying for a remedy for the “unfair advantage is about to be taken against him & that others are
endeavoring to reap the Fruits of his great Labour & Cost,” according to a proof that Billings
was “the real Author of the Book.”); Phillis Wheatley & William Billings, An Elegy, Sacred
to the Memory of that Great Divine, the Reverend and Learned Dr. Samuel Cooper, E. RUSSELL, Jan. 2, 1784, at 3–8 [1784] (appended to this elegy by Wheatley, was the lyrics to
William Billings’ hymn written for Samuel Cooper’s funeral that is known by its first line
Samuel the Priest Gave Up the Ghost). Cf. FRÉDÉRIC LOUIS RITTER, MUSIC IN AMERICA 60
(1884) (Describing that “when the War of Independence broke out, he [Billings] gave vent to
his patriotism in strains of the wildest enthusiasm and fervor. He was altogether a very
original being, and, in some sense, the prototype of the Yankee psalm-tune music-teacher as
he existed at the end of the last century. Billings was a mixture of ludicrous, eccentric,
commonplace, smart, active, patriotic, and religious elements, with a slight touch of musical
and poetical talent. To this side of the tanner-composer’s moral nature his personal appearance and habit formed a harmonious sequel. He was somewhat deformed, blind of one eye,
one leg shorter than the other, one arm somewhat withered; and he was given to the habit of
continually taking snuff. He accrued this precious article in his coat-pocket made of leather,
and every few minutes would take a pinch, holding the snuff between the thumb and
clinched hand. To this picture we must add his stentorian voice, made, no doubt, rough as a
saw by the effects of the quantity of snuff that was continually rasping his throat.”).
900. William Billings’ Printing Privilege, Massachusetts, July 14, 1772 (“Be it enacted
by the Governour Council & House of Representatives—That the said William Billings be
and hereby is impower’d solely to print and vend his said Compositions consisting of Psalmtunes, Anthems and Canons & have and receive the whole and only benefit and
[endowment?] Arising therefrom for and during the full term of seven years . . . .”); JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF MASSACHUSETTS 1772–1773, at 124, 131, 135
(1980) (“The engross’d Bill for granting to William Billings, the Sole Privilege of printing
and vending a certain Book of Music, by him compos’d. Read and Resolved, That this Bill
pass to be enacted.”).
901. JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF MASSACHUSETTS 1772–1773, at
131, 134–35 (1980) (Governor Thomas Hutchinson refused to give his assent to Billings’
copyright saying, “By your Charter the Legislative Power consists of three Branches, and
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In order to debate the propriety of Hutchinson’s refusal to assent to Billings’ copyright bill, the Massachusetts Legislature entered
into a silent period from July 14, 1772, to January 6, 1773, when the
Legislature convened “a Great and General Court or Assembly of His
Majesty’s Province of the Massachusetts-Bay in New England. Begun
and held at Harvard-College in Cambridge.”902 Phillis Wheatley was
tried during this silent period where it was adjudged that she was the
author of her poems.903 Loyalist and revolutionary miraculously united
to secure Phillis Wheatley a right of attribution to the works of her
hands.904
A black woman slave of Boston thereby became the first “rose
that grew from concrete” in America.905 Seeming to “prov[e] nature’s
laws wrong,” she “learned to walk without having feet,” and thus, her
marvelous gambit shined so magnificently that some today question
whether she had a trial at all.906 The recent rediscovery of the revolutionary figure of Phillis Wheatley, though inspiring, is terribly

the Consent of the Governor is expressly declared to be essential to every valid Act of Government.” There was then a dispute between Hutchinson and the Legislature over whether
the ultimate legislative power arose from the consent of the people or whether it was
granted from the power of the crown.). Cf. SIMMONS, supra note 31, at 9.
902. JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF MASSACHUSETTS 1772–1773, at
137 (1980). Cf. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXX (“In the government of this commonwealth, the
legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of
them: the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of
them: the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of
them: to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.”).
903. HENRY LOUIS GATES, JR., THE TRIALS OF PHILLIS WHEATLEY 2 (2003); JOURNALS OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF MASSACHUSETTS 1772–1773, at 135, 137–43 (1980) (The
journals of the House in Massachusetts ended on July 14, 1772 with a prorogue until Sept.
30, 1772 at which time it said beginning on May 7, 1772 and ending on January 6, 1773,
there was “a Great and General Court or Assembly of His Majesty’s Province of the Massachusetts-Bay in New England”—the journals pick up again with a message from Governor
Hutchinson espousing the same opinion as before, according to which he killed Billings’
copyright, however also during this time he and many of the most illustrious characters in
Boston including John Hancock, Cotton Mather, and James Bowdoin tried Phillis Wheatley
and according to her success in proving her attribution by demonstrating her marvelous
talents they signed an attestation to her attribution to the works of her hands. This puts
Phillis Wheatley’s right of attribution confirmed by trial and attestation at the center of the
fundamental disputes in Massachusetts regarding the separation of powers before the
revolution that would later become the cornerstone of the United States.). See also QUINCY,
JR., supra note 32, at 340–42 (1865) (describing that the ordinary courts of judicature in
Massachusetts were finally ended in Oct. of 1774 “by reason of the difficulty of the times”).
904. Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772,] in WHEATLEY, supra
note 821, at 7.
905. Tupac Shakur, The Rose that Grew from Concrete [1999].
906. Id.
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incomplete; none of us yet captured the legal significance of Wheatley’s
marvelous feat.907
For Phillis Wheatley was the origin of U.S. copyright and patent common law—and it was and is the racial biases of the bench that
continue to cause America’s failure to respect the common law rights of
attribution for authors that she sought to secure.908 The historical facts
are clear, where white men failed to secure their own literary rights in
America, a black woman wondrously prevailed.909 Americans can no
longer afford to miss the legal gambit Wheatley made to secure her
own literary property.910
907. Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772,] in WHEATLEY, supra
note 821, at 7; HOBBES, supra note 6, at 46–48 (Hobbes described human pride and dejection
as a sort of psychological madness, a natural law, that keeps humanity enslaved to absolute
rulers, but like Tupac’s poem Wheatley proved these laws wrong). See Mark Rose, The Author as Proprietor: Donaldson v. Becket and the Genealogy of Modern Authorship, 23
REPRESENTATIONS 51, 58, 78 (1988) [hereinafter Mark Rose] (“[T]he problem of how the legal-economic and the aesthetic levels of discourse interact is one that literary historians—
and, I would add, legal historians as well—have barely explored . . . . Much work remains to
be done in the construction of what Foucault would have called a ‘genealogy’ of literary
property.”).
908. The first case in England to recognize copyright common law was Millar v. Taylor
in 1769 based, in part, on an author’s rights rather than the crown; then Phillis Wheatley
won her trial for attribution in 1772 and published an attestation of this trial’s judgment in
her book printed in London and distributed across the world in 1773, leaving the original
attestation document on file with her publisher in England, which facilitated her book’s
official registration at the Stationers Company under her name; then in Donaldson v. Becket
the House of Lords put Millar’s common law basis into doubt; and finally, James Madison
and James Wilson claimed the English common law as the basis of the Patent & Copyright
Clause referring to Millar in THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison), and in 2 WILSON,
THE WORKS, supra note 113, at 105. Phillis Wheatley’s trial and attestation is a precedent of
the American Revolution like James Otis’s Paxton’s Case that secures the common law for
the United States unadulterated by the corruptions of the crown and lords who threw it into
confusion and doubt in Donaldson.
909. Phillis Wheatley, To the Right Honorable William, Earl of Dartmouth [1773]
(“Should you, my lord, while you peruse my song, / Wonder from when my love of Freedom
sprung, / Whence flow these wishes for the common good, / By feeling hearts alone best
understood, . . . .”) (emphasis added). See 2 WILLIAM LEGGE, THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THE EARL
OF DARTMOUTH 107–08 (1895) (receiving this poem).
910. Letter from Phillis Wheatley to David Wooster (Oct. 18, 1773) (This is perhaps the
first cease and desist letter in American history, “I expect my Books which are publish’d in
London at Capt. Hall, who will be here I believe in 8 or 10 days. I beg the favour that you
would honour the enclos’d Proposals, & use your interest with Gentlemen & Ladies of your
acquaintance to subscribe also, for the more subscribers there are, the more it will be for my
advantage as I am to have half the Sale of the Books. This I am the more solicitous for, as I
am now upon my own footing and whatever I get by this is entirely mine, & it is the Chief I
have to depend upon. I must also request you would desire the Printers in New Haven, not to
reprint that Book, as it would be a great hurt to me, preventing any further Benefit that I
might receive from the Sale of my Copies from England.”) (emphasis added). See Thomas
Hutchinson, C.J., et al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772,] in WHEATLEY, supra note 817, at 7; Phillis Wheatley’s Registration, Sept. 10, 1773, TSC/1/E/06/09, Register of entries of copies
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Henry Louis Gates, Jr., the most accomplished of Wheatley’s
advocates, placed Wheatley at the beginning of the African American
literary tradition, however, it appears Wheatley was actually the beginning of much more.911 The cause of white male authors was also
wondrously vindicated by an enslaved black woman for the common
good, so the literary tradition of Washington Irving could finally take
root in America.912 The origin of American copyright and patent laws
1746–1773. Other letters involving the broad sale of Wheatley’s books in America as the
primary source of her living include: Letter from Phillis Wheatley to Obour Tanner (Oct. 30,
1773) (“I enclose proposals for my book”); Letter from Phillis Wheatley to Samuel Hopkins
(Feb. 9, 1774); Letter from Phillis Wheatley to Miss Obour Tanner (Mar. 21, 1774) (“Pray
excuse my not writing to you so long before, for I have been so busy lately, that I could not
find liezure [sic]. I shall send the 5 Books you wrote for . . . .”); Letter from Phillis Wheatley
to Miss Obour Tanner (May 6, 1774) (“I have recd. the money you sent . . . I have recd by
some of the last ships 300 more of my Poems.”); Letter from Phillis Wheatley to Samuel
Hopkins (May 6, 1774); Letter from Phillis Wheatley to Mary Wooster (July 15, 1778).
911. GATES, JR., supra note 903, at 18 (writing that Wheatley’s book marks “the beginning of an African American literary tradition”—this statement appears to be a gross
understatement). See Letter from George Washington to Phillis Wheatley (Feb. 28, 1776);
Letter from George Washington to Joseph Reed (Feb. 10, 1776) (expressing his “view of
doing justice to her great poetical genius”); 1 BENSON J. LOSSING, THE PICTORIAL FIELDBOOK OF THE REVOLUTION 556 (1860) (Lossing stated that Wheatley did meet with Washington in Cambridge; historians posit that it was Lossing’s friend the famous poet Henry
Wadsworth Longfellow who purchased Washington’s old house learned of first hand knowledge of the meeting and passed it to Lossing.). See generally HENRY WADSWORTH
LONGFELLOW, VOICES OF THE NIGHT (1839) (the poetic symbols in this book of poems seem to
have been affectionately lifted from Phillis Wheatley’s works).
912. Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772,] in WHEATLEY, supra
note 821, at 7. See DICKSON D. BRUCE, JR., THE ORIGINS OF AFRICAN AMERICAN LITERATURE,
1680–1865, at x (2001). Washington Irving was previously referred to by many as the first
man of letters, because we thought he was the first to make his entire income from writing—but that was before we had Wheatley’s letter to David Wooster where she states that
profits from her book made up her primary income. See Letter from Phillis Wheatley to
David Wooster (Oct. 18, 1773) (It appears that Washington Irving, as important as he was
in his time, was not the first American to make a living as an author: “Since my return to
America my Master, has at the desire of my friends in England given me my freedom. . . . I
am now upon my own footing and whatever I get by this [sale of books] is entirely mine, & it
is the Chief I have to depend upon.” Accordingly, the first man of letters in America appears
to have been a black woman.); AMERICAN FICTION 267 (William Allan Neilson ed., 1917)
(“Whether we agree or not with the judgment that Washington Irving was the first American man of letters, it is not to be questioned that he was the first American author whose
work was received abroad as a permanent contribution to English literature.”—this was not
so, for Wheatley had her book entered into the Stationer’s Company register long before
Irving arrived on the scene, and her poetry was published across the world and was taken
seriously and commented on by the likes of the men of the Enlightenment like Voltaire,
Jefferson, and others. As for permanently contributing to English literature, Wheatley’s
ideas were directly influential upon Henry Wadsworth Longfellow and perhaps upon Irving
himself.); JANE G. LANDERS, ATLANTIC CREOLES IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTIONS 217 (2010) (citing evidence of the widespread effect of Phillis Wheatley’s works in Latin America—noting
that her poems were found among the possessions of Jorge Davidson, a free person of color
and abolitionist in Cuba); Letter from Voltaire to A M. Le Baron Constant de Rebecque
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must be the trial and attestation of Phillis Wheatley.913
The trial of Phillis Wheatley occurred during a Great Court of
Massachusetts Bay held at Harvard, and it was a highly consequential
affair.914 Indeed, there is more contemporaneous evidence of Wheatley’s trial than James Otis’s speech in Paxton’s Case, which is
considered to have breathed life into the American Revolution.915
(Apr. 11, 1774), in 16 VOLTAIRE, supra note 266, at 594–95 (praising Wheatley’s work); JEFFERSON, NOTES, supra note 268, at 208 (criticizing Wheatley’s work).
913. William Billings’ Second Petition, Massachusetts, May 27, 1772 (Praying for a remedy for the “unfair advantage is about to be taken against him & that others are
endeavoring to reap the Fruits of his great Labour & Cost,” according to a proof that Billings
was “the real Author of the Book.”); Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et al., To the Public, [Oct.
1772,] in WHEATLEY, supra note 821, at 7 (where Billings was denied, Wheatley was not
denied—from the vivid descriptions of Billings’ startling appearance and mannerisms given
by the history books, it is hard not to imagine him roaring his support for Phillis Wheatley
in her own cause out of empathy for a fellow author and revolutionary); Phillis Wheatley &
William Billings, An Elegy, Sacred to the Memory of that Great Divine, the Reverend and
Learned Dr. Samuel Cooper, E. RUSSELL, Jan. 2, 1784, at 3–8 [1784] (appended to this elegy
by Wheatley, was the lyrics to William Billings’ hymn written for Samuel Cooper’s funeral
that is known by its first line Samuel the Priest Gave Up the Ghost).
914. Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772,] in WHEATLEY, supra
note 821, at 7 (this attestation that references the existence of and determination of a trial
in Wheatley’s favor is more evidence than we have of most other trials of the founding era,
including James Otis’s riveting arguments in Paxton’s Case, and Joseph Hawley’s call to
fight in 1774 that historians do not doubt occurred). See JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF MASSACHUSETTS 1772–1773, at 134–35, 137 (1980) (the date of Wheatley’s
trial fell during the silent court period of Massachusetts Bay after Governor Hutchinson
vetoed William Billings’ copyright bill to debate the separation of powers issues that arose
from Hutchinson’s refusal to assent—the record book was prorogued during this period,
thus Wheatley’s attestation was published in her book and the original was kept in the
bookshop of Archibald Bell in London, England for safe keeping and for public viewing upon
request); Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Jonathan Williams, Sr. (July 7, 1773) (After her
trial Benjamin Franklin was bid to visit Phillis Wheatley, who was likely turned away by
her loyalist masters, but he said, “Upon your Recommendation I went to see the black Poetess and offer’d her any Services I could do her.”).
915. Letter from John Andrews to William Barrell (Feb. 24, 1773) (describing Phillis
Wheatley’s book and the attestation she received in the previous months confirming that
she was the book’s genuine author); TUDOR, supra note 34, at xviii (“The reader will be
disappointed, if he expects to find in this volume, more than mere fragments of the life of
James Otis. After a diligent and widely extended search, but little comparatively has been
recovered of his private life, or of his public services; yet before the year 1770, no American,
Dr. Franklin only excepted, was so much known, and so often named in the other colonies,
and in England. His papers have all perished, none of his speeches were recorded, and he
himself having been cut off before the revolution actually commenced, his name is connected
with none of the public documents that are familiar to the nation.”). See Letter from John
Adams to Hezekiah Niles (Jan. 14, 1818) (“Mr. Otis’s oration, against Writts of Assistance,
breathed into the Nation the Breath of Life.”); Letter from John Adams to William Tudor
(June 1, 1818) (“And as I sincerely believe Mr. Otis to have been the earliest and the principle founder of one of the greatest political revolutions that ever occurred among men, it
seems to me of some importance that his name and character should not be forgotten.”);
Letter from John Adams to William Wirt (Jan. 5, 1818) (Very gently calling Wirt’s attention
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Thus, the precedent of Wheatley’s attribution rights must still sound
in the U.S. social compact to guide the construction of the Patent &
Copyright Clause.916
Phillis Wheatley preserved common law copyright in the wake
of Billings’ legal failure, by establishing a common law case in her own
name.917 She did not seek a perpetual copyright, but she sought to
share her works with the public for a reasonable living.918 Her right of
attribution, snatched from “the best Judges” of Boston, like a laurel
from Mæcenas honored head, unlocked the possibility of Wheatley’s career by securing her copyright through the Stationers Company in
England.919
to his overemphasis of Patrick Henry’s role saying: “I envy none of the well merited glories
of Virginia or nay of her sages or heroes; but I am jealous, very jealous of the honour of
Massachusetts. The resistance to the British system for subjugating the Colonies began in
1760 and in 1761 in the month of February when James Otis electrified the town of Boston
the province of Massachusetts Bay and the whole Continent more than Patrick Henry ever
did in the whole course of his life.”); Letter from John Adams to William Wirt (Mar. 7, 1818)
(John Adams kindly informed Patrick Henry’s biographer William Wirt that Otis’s principal
tract The Rights of the British Colonies “was published more than a year before Mr. Henry’s
Resolutions were moved.”). See generally SIMMONS, supra note 31 (a cobbled together remembrance of what was the most important oration in American history is all that
remains—and yet we honor it and reverence it and interpret the U.S. Constitution according to it).
916. Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772,] in WHEATLEY, supra
note 821, at 7; THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); MASS. CONST. pt. 1,
art. I (1780) (like many others of the original constitutions of the states, Massachusetts,
under the direction of John Adams. reiterated the principles of Union expounded in paragraph two of the Declaration of Independence); THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison)
(“The copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain, to be a right at
common law.”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
917. Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772,] in WHEATLEY, supra
note 821, at 7; William Billings’ Second Petition, Massachusetts, May 27, 1772. See JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF MASSACHUSETTS 1772–1773, at 134–35, 137
(1980) (Wheatley’s trial commenced on or around Octobor, 1772, directly after William Billings’ legal failure to secure a copyright because of Governor Hutchinson’s violation of the
colonial separation of powers, and during an unrecorded, turbulent debate presumably at
Harvard College, where the silent Great Court was convened.). Cf. Millar v. Taylor [1769] 4
Burr. 2303, 2314, 2337–38 (Eng.) (Just as the Americans were inspired by Phillis Wheatley,
the English inferred the proper authorial attribution as a fundamental requirement of copyright from the writings of John Milton, which was recognized in Millar as a right to stop
non-authors from passing off an author’s work “as his, when they are not his, in contradiction to truth,” by virtue of a sale by the author as opposed to an arbitrary grant from the
crown.) (citing MILTON, AREOPAGITICA, supra note 259, at 187; John Milton’s Publishing
Contract for Paradise Lost, Apr. 27, 1667 (the literary proprietor derived a right to print
from Milton, through common law contract, rather than from the crown)).
918. Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772,] in WHEATLEY, supra
note 821, at 7; Letter from Phillis Wheatley to David Wooster (Oct. 18, 1773).
919. Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772,] in WHEATLEY, supra
note 821, at 7; JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF MASSACHUSETTS 1772–1773,
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With courageous humility, Phillis Wheatley marked out the basis of every legitimate copyright and patent thereafter upon the right
of attribution to the works of her hands.920 The basis of a common law
cause of action to protect literary property upon authorial attribution,
which is common law copyright, was affirmed by the King’s Bench in
Millar v. Taylor.921 According to Judge Ashurst, the matters of Millar
and Donaldson were almost decided in favor of the rights of Phillis
Wheatley,
It had been said, that when the bird was once out of the hand, it
was become common, and the property of whoever caught it; this
was not wholly true, for there was a case upon the law books, where
a hawk with bells about its neck had flown away; a person detained
it, and an action was brought at common law against the person
who did detain it; a book with an author’s name to it was the hawk,
with the bells about its neck, and an action might be brought
against whoever pirated it.922

The lynch pin of William Billings’ second copyright petition, was also
that he was “the real Author of the Book” and it would be unjust for
at 137 (1980); Phillis Wheatley, To Mæcenas [1773] (“I’ll snatch a laurel from thine honour’d
head.”).
920. Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772,] in WHEATLEY, supra
note 821, at 7. Cf. Mark Rose, supra note 907, at 53–54, 58 (“Copyright had traditionally
been a publisher’s not an author’s right. Under the Stationers’ Company regulations only
members of the guild could hold copyright. Authors had no explicitly recognized place in the
scheme.” Furthermore, any determinations made in England before and after Phillis
Wheatley’s trial and attestation regarding authorial rights were all mere dicta because,
“Ironically, authors themselves were conspicuously absent from the formal proceedings in
which this process of elaboration occurred. Tonson, Collins, Millar, Taylor, Donaldson, and
Becket—all the principals in ‘the great cause concerning literary property’ were booksellers.” Therefore, though unacknowledged in this article, Phillis Wheatley is the origin of the
sentiment that, “Every man was entitled to the fruits of his labor . . . and therefore it was
self-evident that authors had an absolute property in their own works.” This property is not
so absolute in the sense meant by its advocates in England who were mostly booksellers
intending to weaponize it to preserve their perpetual right to monetize creative works, for it
is properly delineated and defined by Phillis Wheatley’s trial and attestation to help her
make a career in America as a poet and to make a living upon her original genius.).
921. Millar v. Taylor [1769] 4 Burr. 2303, 2314, 2337–38 (Eng.) (Just as the Americans
were inspired by Phillis Wheatley, the English inferred the proper authorial attribution as a
fundamental requirement of copyright from the writings of John Milton, which was recognized in Millar as a right to stop non-authors from passing off an author’s work “as his,
when they are not his, in contradiction to truth,” by virtue of a sale by the author as opposed
to an arbitrary grant from the crown.) (citing MILTON, AREOPAGITICA, supra note 259, at
187); John Milton’s Publishing Contract for Paradise Lost, Apr. 27, 1667 (deriving a right to
print from Milton rather than from the Crown)).
922. Proceedings in the Lords on the Question of Literary Property [in Donaldson v.
Becket], Feb. 4–22, 1774, in 17 THE PARLIAMENTARY, supra note 579, at 977 (Opinion of
Ashurst, J.) (emphasis added).
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others to reap profits where he had sown.923 However, the House of
Lords arbitrarily reversed Judge Ashurst and denied common law copyright saying, “when once the bird is out of the cage—volat
irrevocabile—Ireland, Scotland, America, will afford her shelter.”924 In
1774 as Lord Camden vied for the ruling in Donaldson, his peer Lord
Mansfield established the Cromwellian oppression of America in
Campbell v. Hall.925
The perfection of feudal, arbitrary powers disconnected from
constitutions, and void of natural equity through legal positivism, began for the very first time in western society in the Puritan colony of
Massachusetts Bay.926 Thus, on the eve of the American Revolution, it
may be said that the Lords of Donaldson oxymoronically copied an
American idea.927 It may also be said that the Donaldson Lords
923. William Billings’ Second Petition, Massachusetts, May 27, 1772.
924. Proceedings in the Lords on the Question of Literary Property [in Donaldson v.
Becket], Feb. 4–22, 1774, in 17 THE PARLIAMENTARY, supra note 579, at 1001 (Argument of
Lord Camden).
925. Campbell v. Hall [1774] 1 Cowp. 206, 208, 211–12 (Eng.); 20 HOWELL, supra note
802, at 283, 289 (“‘Jamaica was conquered by Oliver Cromwell’”) (statement of Lord Mansfield during the trial of Campbell); Thomas Hutchinson, Diary, Nov. 28, 1774, in 1
Hutchinson, The Diary, supra note 802, at 307–09 (confirming that Lord Mansfield justified
his decision in Campbell v. Hall upon Cromwell’s conquest of Jamaica—Campbell attempted to legitimize England’s power to tax the whole world without representation);
SIMMONS, supra note 31, at 20–22 (James Otis “gave a history of the navigation act of the
first of Charles II., a plagiarism from Oliver Cromwell.”); William Tudor, An Oration Delivered March 5th, 1779, EDES & GILL, Mar. 5, 1779, at 9 [1779] (reminding Americans that we
should resist tyranny, and not merely the arbitrary titles of “Dictator, King, Protector,” because “Cromwell under the name of Protector, was as absolute a despot as he could have
been with any other title”); Arthur Lee et al., The American Commissioners: Memorandum
for the Dutch, [before Mar. 31, 1778] (this memo traced the beginning of this collusion between crown and Cromwell against the common law in America all the way to the American
Revolution, recounting that the monopoly on American commerce began in 1652 just prior
to Cromwell’s ascension to absolute power in 1653); [John Mein,] Sagittarius’s Letters and
Political Speculations 98, 100, 109–10 [1775] (Mein, a rabid loyalist, confirmed the conflation of crown and Crowell in the minds of loyalists by celebrating Cromwell, and blaming
the early Massachusetts Bay Puritans for resisting the political suicide that he invited);
Letter from Thomas Hutchinson to Elisha Hutchinson (July 28, 1774), in 1 HUTCHINSON,
THE DIARY, supra note 802, at 199 (“We seem to be copying Cromwell’s times . . . .”).
926. FORD, supra note 801, at 7–11 (explaining a bit of how the first codes of Massachusetts were written, beginning with John Cotton’s tract Moses Judicialls); WOOLRYCH, supra
note 801, at 271–73, 300 (calling the Massachusetts Bay Lawes and Liberties “the first modern code of the western world,” which became an “exemplar” for the Parliament of Saints in
England who attempted and failed to produce a legal code to “cram . . . all the complexities
. . . distilled in its common law during nearly half a millennium”).
927. Proceedings in the Lords on the Question of Literary Property [in Donaldson v.
Becket], Feb. 4–22, 1774, in 17 THE PARLIAMENTARY, supra note 579, at 992–1001 (Argument
of Lord Camden) (arguing that common law copyright is taken away and not secured by the
positive laws—this was a direct departure of the ordinary common law maxim of statutory
construction in Dr. Foster’s Case and the basis of the Statute of Monopolies in the common
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thereby abdicated their House’s seat of supreme judicial authority to
Phillis Wheatley, a revolutionary, writer, and former slave.928
Phillis Wheatley left behind a key for the proper interpretation
of U.S. copyright and patent laws, the freedoms of speech, assembly,
and religion, and privacy law by expounding upon the laws of land and
sea.929 She exposed the way the human mind works in her pieces entitled Thoughts on the Works of Providence, On Imagination, and On
Recollection and their variants.930 Then she made a prophesy correlating the freedom of the seas, the freedom of mind, and the U.S. Patent &
Copyright Clause in her poem Liberty & Peace which reads in part,
For now kind Heaven, indulgent to our Prayer,
In smiling Peace resolves the Din of War.
Fix’d in Columbia her illustrious Line,
And bids in thee her future Councils shine.
To every Realm her Portals open’d wide,
Receives from each the full commercial Tide.
Each Art and Science now with rising Charms,
law, which was passed at a time when copy-rights and patents were conceptually the same
thing, the distinction between patent and copyright was not yet developed); 9 BENTHAM, THE
WORKS, supra note 43, at 196 (Bentham impliedly approved of Donaldson writing of literary
property “wherever by the name of Common Law, Judge-made law reigns,—security is an
empty name”); WOOLRYCH, supra note 801, at 271–73, 300 (Benthamite legal positivism was
inspired by the Puritanical legal positivism first experimented with in Massachusetts Bay).
928. Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772,] in WHEATLEY, supra
note 821, at 7. See Proceedings in the Lords on the Question of Literary Property [in Donaldson v. Becket], Feb. 4–22, 1774, in 17 THE PARLIAMENTARY, supra note 579, at 992–1001
(Lord Camden expressly departed from his Lord Coke’s common law rules of statutory interpretation expounded by Coke in Dr. Foster’s Case, to imply that the common law right of
authors acknowledged in Millar was taken away by statute in Donaldson—this was an abdication of his high seat to the Americans who agreed with him on this statement, “[i]f there
be such a right at common law, the crown is a usurper,” because the Americans held there to
be a common law copyright and that the crown is a usurper.); Campbell v. Hall [1774] 1
Cowp. 206, 208, 211–12 (Eng.) (basing English Empire on the conquest of New York, a land
they no longer held at the conclusion of the American Revolution—this too is an abdication
by the pride of the conquering English Lords of international law, which is a branch of the
common law, to the U.S. judiciary).
929. Phillis Wheatley, Liberty & Peace [1784]; Phillis Wheatley, An Hymn to Humanity
[1773]; Phillis Wheatley, On Messrs. Hussey and Coffin [1767]; Phillis Wheatley, Ocean
[1773?]; Phillis Wheatley, An Elegy to Miss Mary Moorhead, on the Death of her Father, the
Rev. Mr. John Moorhead [1773]; Phillis Wheatley, America [1768] (“Turn, O Brittania claim
thy child again”); Phillis Wheatley, To the King’s Most Excellent Majesty n.* [1768]. See also
Phillis Wheatley, To the University of Cambridge, Wrote in 1767 [1767]; Phillis Wheatley,
To the University of Cambridge, in New England [1773]; Phillis Wheatley, To S. M. a young
African Painter, on seeing his Works [1773].
930. Phillis Wheatley, Thoughts on the Works of Providence [1773]; Phillis Wheatley, On
Imagination [1773]; Phillis Wheatley, On Recollection [1773]. See also Phillis Wheatley, An
Hymn to Humanity [1773].
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Th’ expanding Heart with Emulation warms.
E’en great Britannia sees with dread Surprize,
And from the dazzl’ing splendor turns her Eyes!931

The freedom of mind championed throughout Wheatley’s poems, involves the capacity of human beings to imagine, to remember, and to
pray as part and parcel of the human capacity of action.932 Under
Wheatley’s cause and on behalf of all authors and free thinkers, the
American Revolutionaries resolved to create a free copyright and patent system for authors and inventors for limited times, which does not
violate the freedoms of speech, assembly, and religion of others.933
The trial and attestation of Phillis Wheatley composes the basis
of all other legitimate copyright and patent rights under the right of
attribution.934 At the time of her trial this right was wholly original,
931. Phillis Wheatley, Liberty & Peace [1784] (emphasis added). See also John Adams,
Fragmentary notes for “A Dissertation on the Canon and the Feudal Law”, May–August
1765; Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (May 12, 1780).
932. See, e.g., Phillis Wheatley, Thoughts on the Works of Providence [1773].
933. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; id. amend. I. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James
Madison) (referring to Millar v. Taylor and appearing not to accept the determination of the
Lords in Donaldson as applying to America, “The copyright of authors has been solemnly
adjudged in Great Britain, to be a right at common law.”—this makes perfect sense, because
the American Revolutionaries rejected the determinations in Cowle, Donaldson, and Campbell v. Hall that denied the common law rights of all Americans). See Campbell v. AcuffRose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994) (“Thus expressed, fair use remained exclusively
judge-made doctrine until the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act, in which Justice Story’s
summary is discernible.”) (citing Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D. Mass.
1841)).
934. Attribution is the only possible way to legitimize common law copyright in authors
rather than through arbitrary decrees of Crown in Council. Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et al.,
To the Public, [Oct. 1772,] in WHEATLEY, supra note 817, at 7 (Phillis Wheatley accomplished what John Milton could only dream of, and what William Billings attempted and
failed at—thereby, she became the originator of a precedent that allowed her to become the
master of her own works through a right of attribution). The fact that no authors were
previously given copyright such that they could become proprietor over their own works is
an area with not enough research done. Scholars like Mark Rose merely note that at some
point during the Eighteenth Century the shift from booksellers to authors finally occurred
broadly in the Western World. Scholars also note that John Milton was the first to make the
claim of literary property, and that the Statute of Anne was the first positive law to support
the legal fiction, that authors rather than the Crown are the legitimate origin of copyrights.
However, in the English copyright cases that first recognized a common law copyright arising from the authorship of a work directly before the American Revolution, all the litigants
were booksellers. William Billings attempted and failed to gain his proprietary rights over
his own works by a positive law, and it was Phillis Wheatley that successfully acquired
them through trial and attestation in Boston, Massachusetts in 1772. Mark Rose, supra
note 907, at 53–54, 58 (noting these realities in English and European law); Oren Bracha,
Early American Printing Privileges. The Ambivalent Origins of Authors’ Copyright in
America, in PRIVILEGE AND PROPERTY: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT 89–114 (Ronan
Deazley et al. eds., 2013), https://books.openedition.org/obp/1068?lang=en#ftn50 (noting
Billings’ pivotal bill for copyright, and that before him there was no legal contemplation of
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not vindicated for any person before Wheatley; thus, she was undoubtedly a mother to the rights of all those who would later develop the
American artform itself.935 In response to Wheatley’s powerful unchaining of American minds, other American poets began to write,
A PHILLIS rises, and the world no more
Denies the sacred right to mental pow’r;
While, Heav’n-inspir’d, she proves her Country’s claim
To Freedom, and her own to deathless Fame.936

Thereby, Phillis Wheatley completed a revolution begun by Edward
Coke and John Milton in England to create copyright and patent law
into a common law of the land in America.937 The perfection of the common law right to attribution as to the whole world in Wheatley’s trial
and attestation against the crown and Puritan alike was a final, legal
masterstroke, accomplished by heaven on behalf of all Americans to
establish patent and copyright law as a common law of the land in the
United States.938
author’s rights in America, but not acknowledging Phillis Wheatley’s trial and attestation.Indeed, Bracha’s thesis of an “ambivalent” beginning of author’s copyright in the U.S.
only exists because he ignored the cause of Phillis Wheatley; who was not ambivalent about
her rights); Proceedings in the Lords on the Question of Literary Property [in Donaldson v.
Becket], Feb. 4–22, 1774, in 17 THE PARLIAMENTARY, supra note 579, at 977 (Opinion of
Ashurst, J.) (noting that the author’s name, i.e., attribution, is what creates the literary
property in the books, like bells around an eagle’s neck).
935. Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772,] in WHEATLEY, supra
note 821, at 7.
936. Matilda, On Reading the Poems of Phillis Wheatley, the African Poetess [1796]. See
also Jupiter Hammon, An Address to Miss Phillis Wheatley [1779]; Joseph Ladd, The Prospects of America [1785], in LITERARY REMAINS, supra note 748, at 23, 35 (speaking of “the
far-spread name / Of wondrous WHEATLY (sic), Afric’s heir to fame,” whose “glowing genius
shines / . . . With magic power the grand descriptions roll / Thick on the mind, and agitate
the soul.”); Mary Deverell, On Reading the Poems of Phillis Wheatley [1781]; Anon., Palinode to Phillis Wheatley [1777] (somewhat tongue in cheek, and yet demonstrating the
extent of Wheatley’s fame in England).
937. Phillis Wheatley, Phillis’s Reply to the Answer [1774] (speaking of how John Milton
sank England into “hell’s profound domain”); MILTON, AREOPAGITICA, supra note 259, at 187;
3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *182–83 (citing Statute of Monopolies 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3
(Eng.)).
938. Statute of Monopolies 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (Eng.); Habeas Corpus Act 1640, 16 Car.
I c. 10 (Eng.); Statute of Anne 1710, 8 Ann., c. 21 (Eng.); Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et al., To
the Public, [Oct. 1772,] in WHEATLEY, supra note 821, at 7. But see Licensing of the Press Act
1662, 14 Car. II, c. 33 (Eng.) (This law reenacted the censorship previously enforced through
the Star Chamber. John Milton’s Paradise Lost was censored by then acting licensor the
Arch Bishop of Canterbury—eventually this act expired, and the crown enforced its copyright licenses through seditious libel law.); Stamp Act 1765, 5 Geo. III, c. 12 (Eng.)
(whatever gains were made in the law of land on behalf of authors and the free press, they
were all precluded in America forcing the freedom of authors to become a leading cause of
the American Revolution).
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The revolutionary precedent of Phillis Wheatley’s trial holds the
power to secure us from the former abuses of feudal patent and copyright oppressions of the English crown.939 Indeed, Wheatley’s trial and
attestation not only exist at the center of the most heated separation of
powers disputes of America, but also those of England.940 The freedom
of thought that Phillis Wheatley represented was intended to be available to every person throughout the world.941
As Wheatley and her revolutionary compatriots knew, every
positive, manmade law is woven into a preexisting fabric of law that
guides judicial construction.942 The common law is one such fabric; feudal and canon law is another.943 The common law provides Americans
with staples of judicial process, such as jury trials, stare decisis,
habeas corpus, international law, federal supremacy, and the idea of
an overriding constitution.944 Feudal law is established by accident,
939. Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772,] in WHEATLEY, supra
note 821, at 7.
940. Id.; JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF MASSACHUSETTS 1772–1773,
at 135, 137–43 (1980) (Governor Hutchinson vetoed William Billings’ copyright bill); Proceedings in the Lords on the Question of Literary Property [in Donaldson v. Becket], Feb.
4–22, 1774, in 17 THE PARLIAMENTARY, supra note 579, at 992–1001 (reversing the King’s
Bench in Millar v. Taylor).
941. Phillis Wheatley, To His Excellency General Washington [1775]; Phillis Wheatley,
On the Capture of General Lee [1776] (“Believ’st thou chief, that armies such as thine / Can
stretch in dust that heaven-defended line?”); Phillis Wheatley, On the Death of General
Wooster [1778]; Phillis Wheatley, Phillis’s Reply to the Answer [1774] (inviting an English
poet and sailor to join her cause against arbitrary government, on the side of freedom).
942. John Adams, III. “A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law,” No. 1, Aug. 12,
1765 (Feudal law “was originally, a code of laws, for a vast army, in a perpetual encampment” by which “the first rank” of the general’s “great officers held the lands” by which “the
common people were held together, in herds and clans, in a state of servile dependence upon
their lords.” The settlements in colonial America were populated by those who wanted to
escape and oppose this feudal slavery. It was by this “love of universal Liberty” and a hatred
for feudalism that first “accomplished the settlement of America.”); John Adams, II. Draft of
“A Dissertation on the Canon and the Feudal Law, Aug. 1765 (The opposition to canon and
feudal slavery was the “struggle that peopled America. It is commonly said that these colonies were peopled by Religion—But I should rather say that the Love of Liberty, projected
conducted and accomplished the settlement of America.”). See, e.g., JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 157 (“The whole structure of our
present jurisprudence stands upon the original foundations of the common law.”); Dr. Bonham’s Case [1610] 8 Co. Rep. 107a, 118a (Eng.) (“when an Act of Parliament is against
Common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the Common Law
will control it, and adjudge such Act to be void”).
943. John Adams, III. “A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law,” No. 1, Aug. 12,
1765.
944. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473–74 (2004) (“Habeas corpus is, however, ‘a writ
antecedent to statute, . . . throwing its root deep into the genius of our common law.’”)
(quoting Williams v. Kaiser 323 U.S. 471, 484, n.2 (1945)); MD. CONST. OF 1776 pt. 1, art. 3
(including a Declaration of Rights that secures in its third article to “the inhabitants of
Maryland” an entitlement “to the common law of England, and the trial by Jury, according
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fraud, and force; and is a font of arbitrary domination, brutality, and
violence.945
In America, the common law is applicable based upon a determination of the people of the United States “to resist in blood, rather
than become the slaves of arbitrary power.”946 Thus, Joseph Story observed the American reliance upon common law principles for the
construction of the U.S. Constitution.947 As James Madison believed,
common law was the basis of the Patent & Copyright Clause according
to England’s original affirmation of common law copyright in Millar v.
Taylor.948
The common law rules of statutory construction dictate that
laws should not be interpreted to destroy, preempt, or repeal preexisting laws, absent the clearly stated legislative intention to do so.949 This
rule of statutory construction, as originally set forth in Lord Coke’s Dr.

to that law”); OTIS, supra note 18, at 175 (Repeating Otis’s argument from Paxton’s Case,
the citizens of Massachusetts Bay expounded the basis of all American written constitutions
to come.) (extending Dr. Bonham’s Case [1610] 8 Co. Rep. 107a, 118a (Eng.)); Thomas
Burns, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis 3 (1893), in Historical Theses and Dissertations Collection at Cornell Law School. Paper 270. (“The doctrine of Stare Decisis is generally
characterized by law-writers as a product or principles of the Common Law.”); THE CASE OF
ELIZABETH RUTGERS, supra note 131, at 23 (drawing principles of federal supremacy from
the common law jus gentium).
945. Letter from Novanglus to the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay (Apr.
10, 1775), reprinted in ADAMS & SEWALL, supra note 777, at 129–31 (citing Rex v. Cowle
[1759] 2 Burr. 834, 835 (Eng.)).
946. 1 WARREN, supra note 35, at 177.
947. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 459
(lifting the common law maxim given in Dr. Foster’s Case for statutory construction saying
“it has a foundation in the expression of every code of written law, from the universal principle of interpretation, that the will and intention of the legislature are to be regarded and
followed,” and concluding that it also applies to constitutional construction, writing that a
construction “leading to an obvious absurdity, or to a direct overthrow of the intention expressed in the preamble” should not be permitted.).
948. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison) (“The copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain, to be a right at common law.”—the first case to recognize
a common law copyright in authors was Millar v. Taylor, the case Madison was probably
referring to); Phillis Wheatley’s Registration, Sept. 10, 1773, TSC/1/E/06/09, Register of entries of copies 1746–1773; 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *182–83 (the common law was the
source of limiting patents for numbers of years) (citing Statute of Monopolies 1623, 21 Jac.
1, c. 3 (Eng.)); Millar v. Taylor [1769] 4 Burr. 2303, 2351 (Eng.) (“For, if a statute gives a
remedy in the affirmative, (without a negative, expressed or implied,) for a matter which
was actionable before by common law; the party may sue at common law, and wave his
remedy by statute, if he pleases.”—the finding in this case that the common law can give a
perpetual copyright is mere dicta, and on doubtful footing because the perpetual copyright
comes from feudal law).
949. Dr. Foster’s Case [1614] 11 Co. Rep. 56b, 62a–64b (Eng.).
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Foster’s Case, was expressly adopted in the United States.950 The feudal oxymoron administered by the House of Lords in Donaldson v.
Becket, was unanimously rejected in the United States.951
Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court appeared to adopt Donaldson, in Wheaton v. Peters, to abolish common law copyright in
America.952 However, Wheaton’s holding was not clear or unambigu-

950. Jesse W. Markham, Jr., The Supreme Court’s New Implied Repeal Doctrine: Expanding Judicial Power to Rewrite Legislation Under the Ballooning Conception of “Plain
Repugnancy”, 45 GONZAGA L. REV. 437, 460–62 (2009) (quoting THEODORE SEDGWICK, A
TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 127 (1857)) (citing Dr. Foster’s Case [1614] 11 Co. Rep. 56b,
62b–63a (Eng.)) (“‘So in this country, on the same principle [as Dr. Foster’s Case], it has
been said that laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation, and with full knowledge of
all existing ones on the same subject; and it is, therefore, but reasonable to conclude that
the legislature, in passing a statute, did not intend to interfere with or abrogate any prior
law relating to the same matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is irreconcilable;
and hence, a repeal by implication is not favored; on the contrary, courts are bound to uphold the prior law, if the two acts may well subsist together.’”); Harford v. United States, 12
U.S. 109, 109–10 (1814); Cope v. Cope, 137 U.S. 682, 686 (1891). See also Case v. Humphrey,
6 Conn. 130, 141 (1826) (citing Dr. Foster’s Case [1614] 11 Co. Rep. 56b, 62b–63a (Eng.)).
951. During the drafting of the U.S. Constitution, James Madison and James Wilson
agreed to ratify the Patent & Copyright Clause upon an understanding of the preexisting
common law as set forth by Lord Coke and vindicated by John Milton. THE FEDERALIST NO.
43 (James Madison); 2 WILSON, THE WORKS, supra note 113, at 105. See 17 THE PARLIAMENTARY, supra note 579, at 992–1001 (Donaldson’s apparent rejection of common law copyright
was a result of an extremely blustrous political argument given by Lord Camden on the
floor of Parliament; in which Camden reasoned that the possible extension of common law
copyright to America was a reason to destroy the common law rights of English authors as
well: “What diversity of judgments! What confusion in opinion must they fall into! Without a
trace or line of law to direct their determination! . . . Knowledge and science are not things
to be bound in such cobweb chains; when once a bird is out of the cage—volat irrevocabile—
Ireland, Scotland, America, will afford her shelter, and what, then, becomes of your action?”); 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *182–83 (asserting that IP statutes are enacted to
affirm the common law, not to repeal it); Dr. Foster’s Case [1614] 11 Co. Rep. 56b, 62b–63a
(Eng.), adopted in Harford, 12 U.S. at 109–10 (implicitly construing U.S. statutes not to
repeal the preexisting common law).
952. Oil States Energy Servs. v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1375 (2018)
(denying Article III review based on the idea that patents are not a common law property
right, but are only a creature of statute based in part upon the holding in Wheaton) (citing
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 663–64 (1834)); L. Ray Patterson, Folsom v. Marsh and Its
Legacy, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 431, 442 (1998) (attempting to proclaim common law copyright
undone or overruled by Wheaton). Cf. H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, Copyright at Common
Law in 1774, 47 CONN. L. REV. 1, 25–33 (2014) (Professor Gómez-Arostegui, reflecting the
distraction among his colleagues with regard to the question of whether copyrights are perpetual, appears only to be concerned about whether a perpetual copyright is reversed, but
nothing is written here about whether a limited copyright as envisioned by the founders,
especially regarding Phillis Wheatley’s attribution right, is viable at common law.). But see
3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *182–83 (citing Statute of Monopolies 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3
(Eng.)) (limited patents granted to inventors rather than the favorites of the crown or head
of state are most certainly creatures of the common law).
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ously adoptive of Donaldson.953 For Wheaton held that, “an author at
common law has a property in his manuscript, and may obtain redress
against anyone who deprives him of it or by improperly obtaining a
copy endeavors to realize a profit by its publication.”954
Common law is the root of “the principle, supposed to be essential to all written Constitutions, that a law repugnant to the
Constitution is void.”955 The common law is also the root of federal
supremacy, “By our excellent constitution, THE COMMON LAW IS DECLARED TO BE A PART OF THE LAW OF THE LAND; and the jus gentium [i.e.,
international law] is a branch of the common law.”956 The Rutgers v.
Waddington Court, therefore, noted that to oppose common law would
be “dangerous to the union itself.”957
Contrary as it may seem to some, the formation of the United
States was not the culmination of European philosophy, but rather a
product of over two centuries of American experience.958 The United
953. Wheaton, 33 U.S., at 656, 661–62, 668 (citing Lord Camden’s argument in Donaldson, but the entire court was of the opinion that the law reporters in question were not
subject to copyright, whether by positive or common law). Cf. Rex v. Cowle [1759] 97 Eng.
Rep. 587, 587–88, 2 Burr. 834, 835 (Eng.), distinguished by Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S.
723, 748 (2008) (denying that English limits on the common law apply in America).
954. Wheaton, 33 U.S., at 657–58, 668 (not defining common law rights because the
Court unanimously agreed that the content of the Wheaton law reporter at issue in Wheaton was not subject to copyright under common or statutory law saying, “the Court is
unanimously of opinion that no reporter has or can have any copyright in the written opinions delivered by this Court, and that the judges thereof cannot confer on any reporter any
such right”). Indeed, secondary copyright liability comes directly from the common law and
it is applied regularly and forcefully by the federal courts. See Schroeder, Choosing, supra
note 485, at 57, 64 (“Copyright law loosely draws its theories of secondary liability from
common law sources.”) (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 435 (1984) (“The absence of such express language in the copyright statute does not
preclude the imposition of liability for copyright infringements on certain parties who have
not themselves engaged in the infringing activity. For vicarious liability is imposed in virtually all areas of the law, and the concept of contributory infringement is merely a species of
the broader problem of identifying the circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual accountable for the actions of another.”)).
955. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803). See OTIS, supra note 18, at 175 (citing
Dr. Bonham’s Case [1610] 8 Co. Rep. 107a, 118a (Eng.)); William Wetmore, Wetmore’s Minutes of the Trial, Essex Inferior Court, Newburyport, Oct. 1773, in 2 ADAMS, LEGAL PAPERS,
supra note 22, at 67 (extending Day v. Savadge [1614] Hob. 85, 87 (Eng.); Dr. Bonham’s
Case [1610] 8 Co. Rep. 107a, 118a (Eng.) (opinion of Lord Coke)).
956. THE CASE OF ELIZABETH RUTGERS, supra note 131, at 23 (emphasis added). See N.Y.
CONST. OF 1777 art. 35 (continuing “the common law of England” in New York); Alien Tort
Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
957. THE CASE OF ELIZABETH RUTGERS, supra note 131, at 29.
958. See, e.g., supra note 61; JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF MASSACHUSETTS 1772–1773, at 112 (1980) (“The Right of Defence, which is necessary to guard and
preserve every other Right, is founded in natural Justice and COMMON LAW; which do not
suffer any one to be condemned without being first heard, and their Defence considered:
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States rose from long struggles to preserve the common law rights of
all people represented by the causes of Roger Williams and Anne
Hutchinson.959 The people of the United States began their journey by
lodging a Declaration of Independence within the jus gentium, a
branch of the preexisting common law ingeniously imported into
America with Wheatley’s books.960
Even under Wheaton, common law copyright interests—
whether pecuniary or moral—are and must be retained by authors
their heirs and assigns prior to first publication.961 After publication,
common law rights exist, whether express or implied, as a condition of

And of this Right they cannot be depriv’d, without being deprived at the same Time of their
political Existence.”) (emphasis added). But see 1 NATHANIEL PARKER WILLIS, AMERICAN
SCENERY 1 (1840) (presenting a popular but unsupported idea that the “Minerva-like birth
of the republic of the United States” was the product of European brilliance, as if the United
States occurred automatically, without struggle, as a natural extension of European
philosophies).
959. Isaac Backus, An Appeal to the Public for Religious Liberty 15–16, 25 [1773] (examining and rejecting the Puritanical combination of church and state, advocating for a
separation of church and state based on Roger Williams’ teachings about free speech and
the sword of spirit) (quoting ROGER WILLIAMS, THE BLOODY TENENT MADE YET MORE
BLOODY 192 (1652)). The collusion between the Puritans and the crown to destroy human
rights recognized in the common law are marked throughout history in inhumane and dastardly scenes that finally resulted in the separation of the United States from its mother
country. Id. They are symbolized by the Puritan censorship and destruction of Roger William’s book that advocated the common law rights of Native Americans. Roger Williams, A
Just and Generous Assertion of Indian Rights [1633?], mentioned in 1 WINTHROP’S JOURNAL,
supra note 819, at 116–17 (The Puritans destroyed all copies of this tract, and no known
copy survives.).
960. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). See THE CASE OF ELIZABETH RUTGERS, supra note 131, at 23; Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304, 310 (1795)
(“The preservation of property then is a primary object of the social compact, and, by the
late Constitution of Pennsylvania, was made a fundamental law.”).
961. Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 657–58 (affirming the common law property right in an author’s manuscript, but limiting its determination based on its difficulty in finding an
affirmation that the common law had been adopted by Pennsylvania as a condition of its
joining the Union); James Madison, Detatched Memoranda, ca., Jan. 31, 1820 (“Monopolies
tho’ in certain cases useful, ought to be granted with caution, and guarded with strictness
agst. abuse. The Constitution of the U.S. has limited them to two cases, the authors of
Books, and of useful inventions, in both which they are considered as a compensation for a
benefit actually gained to the community, as a purchase of property which the owner might
otherwise withhold from public use.”). The Wheaton Court might have come down differently if it had considered Vanhorne’s Lessee, a case that asserted federal jurisdiction to
review common law property rights under the U.S. social compact according to the first
constitution of Pennsylvania. Vanhorne’s Lessee, 2 U.S. at 309 (citing PA. CONST. OF 1776 pt.
1, arts. I, VIII, XI (“That all men are born equally free and independent, and have certain
natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life
and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.”)).
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first publication.962 Indeed, Phillis Wheatley’s common law basis for
attribution rights to the works of her hands, inspired by John Milton,
is the entire theory of U.S. copyright and patent law as well as a possible origin of the well known phrase no taxation without
representation.963
The question of whether our statutes impliedly destroy common
law rights (originally a matter of plaintiff’s choice) derives from the
deeper question of whether the common law rules of statutory construction still apply.964 This was the real dispute between the judges in
Millar v. Taylor and the Lords in Donaldson v. Beckett.965 In Millar
962. Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 657–58. See John Milton’s Publishing Contract for Paradise
Lost, Apr. 27, 1667; John Milton, Eikonoklastes 13 (2d ed. 1650) (referring to the monarch’s
stealing of the property of “every author” as an illegitimate taxation saying “any King heretofore that made a levy upon their wit, and seized it as his own legitimate” is an illegitimate
taxation that was “a trespass also more than usual against human right”); Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772,] in WHEATLEY, supra note 821, at 7 (Wheatley
included the condition of her attribution in the first publication of her book, an attestation of
her successful trial for attribution in 1772, something John Milton and every man after him
until Wheatley’s success failed to recieve as a right).
963. William Billings’ Second Petition, Massachusetts, May 27, 1772 (praying for a remedy for the “unfair advantage is about to be taken against him & that others are
endeavoring to reap the Fruits of his great Labour & Cost,” according to a proof that Billings
was “the real Author of the Book”) (implying reference to 2 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON
GOVERNMENT § 27); Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772,] in WHEATLEY, supra note 821, at 7 (where Billings’ legal struggles ended in failure, Wheatley’s ended
in success, she was the first author to benefit from copyright); THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). But see 17 THE PARLIAMENTARY, supra note 579, at 992–1001.
964. Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 696 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (“If there be a common law
right, there certainly must be a common law remedy. The statute contains nothing in terms,
having any reference to the common law right, and if such right is considered abrogated,
limited or modified by the acts of Congress, it must be by implication; and to so construe
these acts is in violation of the established rules of construction that where a statute gives a
remedy in the affirmative, without a negative expressed or implied, for a matter which was
actionable at common law, the party may sue at common law, as well as upon the statute.
This is a well settled principle, and fully recognized and adopted in the case of Almy v.
Harris.”) (citing Almy v. Harris, 5 Johns. 175 (N.Y., 1809) (per curiam) (“If Harris had possessed a right, at the common law, to the exclusive enjoyment of this ferry, then, the statute
giving a remedy in the affirmative, without a negative expressed or implied, for a matter
authorized by the common law, he might, notwithstanding the statute, have this remedy by
action at the common law.”)). Cf. Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. 85, 96–97 (1869) (emphasis added) (applying a common law rule of statutory construction: “Repeals by implication are not
favored. They are seldom admitted except on the ground of repugnancy; and never, we
think, when the former act can stand together with the new act.”) (rule repeated and extended in Felker v. Turpin).
965. Millar v. Taylor [1769] 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 227, 4 Burr. 2303, 2351 (Eng.) (“For, if a
statute gives a remedy in the affirmative, (without a negative, expressed or implied,) for a
matter which was actionable before by common law; the party may sue at common law, and
wave his remedy by statute, if he pleases.”); id. at 2409 (noting the House of Lords considered the question of whether to depart from the common law rules of statutory construction
in order to impliedly take away the common law right).

\\jciprod01\productn\F\FAM\15-1\FAM101.txt

2021

unknown

Seq: 177

LEVIATHAN GOES TO WASHINGTON

10-JAN-22

10:23

177

and Donaldson, the English Courts could have applied common law
construction to assuage the the political ruptures occurring in the
American colonies, the American colonies were then being led by Phillis Wheatley and James Otis in a cause for securing every colonists’
common law rights.966
Therefore, in America it was firmly decided in Rutgers v. Waddington, after the revolution swept New York, that under the U.S.
social compact the common law must apply to our statutes.967 Where
the common law was challenged in American courts, the rule in Dr.
Foster’s Case prevailed.968 The common law maxims of statutory construction required the implicit preservation and enlargement of
common law rights under positive laws by judicial presumptions of legislative grace.969
The presumption at common law assumes that legislators are
aware of preexisting common law rights and the legislators do not ordi966. The English Court in Millar and Donaldson could have preserved the common law
under the common law rule of construction that if a statute does not contain a negative then
ordinarily it should not be construed as an implied repeal of other statutes or the common
law. Dr. Foster’s Case [1614] 11 Co. Rep. 56b, 62b–63a (Eng.); Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et
al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772,] in WHEATLEY, supra note 821, at 7 (maintaining Wheatley’s
right of attribution, the denial of which was named by John Milton in his tract Eikonoclastes as an illegitimate and unjust tax on authors—Milton’s cause for authorial rights
was literally completed by Wheatley for the first time in history with this document); OTIS,
supra note 18, at 166 (the right to be free from taxes without representation “is part of the
common law, part of a British subjects birthright, and as inherent and perpetual, as the
duty of allegiance”); HUTCHINSON & OLIVER, supra note 826, at 16 (around the time Governor Hutchinson denied William Billings’ his copyright bill, Hutchinson was making plans
with the Lords Mansfield, North, and Bute to put an end to all American rights, “There
must be an abridgement of what are called English liberties.”).
967. THE CASE OF ELIZABETH RUTGERS, supra note 131, at 14–15 (while considering the
first question of “how far the common law is to be consulted, in the construction of statutes”
Judge Duane emphatically affirmed the use of the common law to determine statutory construction under the U.S. social compact, thereby establishing the original basis of federal
preemption as the application of common law principles upon state laws).
968. Id.; Almy v. Harris, 5 Johns 175, 175–76 (N.Y. 1809); Harford v. United States, 12
U.S. 109, 109–10 (1814); Case v. Humphrey, 6 Conn. 130, 141 (1826) (citing Dr. Foster’s
Case [1614] 11 Co. Rep. 56b, 62b–63a (Eng.)); Cope v. Cope, 137 U.S. 682, 686 (1891).
969. Markham, Jr., supra note 950, at 460–62 (citing Dr. Foster’s Case [1614] 11 Co.
Rep. 56b, 62b–63a (Eng.)) (“The presumption . . . often pays (probably) false homage to the
legislature by pretending that it must have thought its enactments through more carefully
than it really did. . . . Presuming [the legislature] had paid full attention to all of its earlier
enactments is by no means mandated by raw logic, but instead reflects the court’s determination to pay respect to the legislative branch.”). See, e.g., Almy, 5 Johns at 175; Yerger, 75
U.S. at 96–97; Millar v. Taylor [1769] 4 Burr. 2303, 2351 (Eng.); THE CASE OF ELIZABETH
RUTGERS, supra note 131, at 37, 46 (this case argued by Alexander Hamilton preempted a
state law that attempted to strip the property rights of loyalist Joshua Waddington according to an implication that the Treaty of Paris (1783) is an act of amnesty, which is an act of
perfect oblivion, and thus it cannot justify the total destruction of Waddington’s property
rights at common law, effectively limiting the statutory laws of New York).
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narily intend to revoke the rights absent an express negative.970
Furthermore, where a statute does contain a negative, the negative is
construed narrowly by the court as a matter of grace.971 Where judges
opine that if copyright did not exist at feudal law then copyright should
not exist at all, American lawyers may rightfully invoke the common
law cause of Phillis Wheatley.972
For the Wheaton Court’s apparent departure from the rule in
Dr. Foster’s Case inspired by Donaldson, also contained Lord Camden’s
970. Almy, 5 Johns at 175; Millar v. Taylor [1769] 4 Burr. 2303, 2351 (Eng.); Dr. Foster’s
Case [1614] 11 Co. Rep. 56b, 62b–63a (Eng.). See POM Wonderful v. Coca-Cola, 573 U.S.
102, 113–14 (2014).
971. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S.
22, 62 (1932)). See U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487–91 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). See also Dr. Foster’s
Case [1614] 11 Co. Rep. 56b, 62b–63a (Eng.); Markham, Jr., supra note 950, at 455–57 n.133
(the U.S. Supreme Court traditionally requires narrowness in order to preserve as much of
both statutes as possible).
972. Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 656–57 (citing Millar v. Taylor [1769] 4 Burr. 2303, 2351
(Eng.)) (relying upon the false count of the eleven judges given in the Burrows report, when
a majority of the eleven judges decided that the common law right was not taken away by
the statute, and therefore the House of Lords undoubtedly reversed them); id. at 661 (“Congress, then, by this act, instead of sanctioning an existing right, as contended for, created
it.”). See Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772,] in WHEATLEY, supra
note 821, at 7 (published before Lord Camden’s eyes); 17 THE PARLIAMENTARY, supra note
579, at 992–1001 (Argument of Lord Camden) (the two main misrepresentations of copyright law perpetuated by Lord Camden and others in Millar and Donaldson, was (1) that
the common law was the origin of perpetual copyright, when the origin of perpetual copyright was feudal law, and (2) that if common law copyright was not taken away by the
Statute of Anne or otherwise thrown out as if it never existed that a parade of horribles
would occur arising from the claims of perpetual copyrights made by authors and their proprietors that would ultimately arrest knowledge and learning in England—the absurdity of
this second point consists in the American Revolution that took place but two years after
Donaldson that represents the English loss of the seat of the Empire, to which, as Phillis
Wheatley wrote in her poem Liberty & Peace, England can thank the Revolutionaries for the
broad expansion of knowledge and learning in both England and America); THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). Cf. Mark Rose, supra note 907, at 53 (showing
that booksellers tried to claim perpetual copyright under the common law in order to keep
treating famous “works of Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Bunyan, and others” as “private
landed estates” perpetual by virtue of feudal law, not the common law); RIVINGTON, supra
note 269, at 33–36 (demonstrating how customs of keeping perpetual rights over literary
works arose from the feudal copyright and letters patent of the crown, and not the common
law by including a list of book burned, seized, banned, erased, or otherwise suppressed by
feudal copyright law—thus it was feudal law that arrested knowledge and learning, and it
was by proprietors of literary works attempting to copy this law that proprietors also arrested knowledge and learning according to their attempts to acquire the perpetual
copyrights of the crown); 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *182–83 (citing Statute of Monopolies
1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (Eng.)) (the common law was the source of limiting patents for numbers
of years—at the time this was written the idea of copyright inhered with patents for the use
of printing presses and thus this limit for years also applies to copyright as it began to
develop as a separate idea in the law).
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ironic affirmation of common law copyright.973 Common law copyright
was finally expounded in Folsom v. Marsh, to allow a descendible and
assignable common law right of first publication in letters private and
official.974 It was, after all, to common law copyright that “we owe, not
merely, the publication of the writings of Washington, but of Franklin,
and Jay, and Jefferson and Madison, and other distinguished statesmen of our own country.”975
Lord Camden demonstrated ignorance of the common law basis
of the Statute of Monopolies when he argued in Donaldson, “With respect to inventors, I can see no real and capital difference between
them and authors.”976 The similarity of copyright and patent law referenced by Lord Camden, which he thought to be a good reason to
preclude the common law, was actually a reason to apply common law;
over a century prior to Lord Camden’s Donaldson argument, Sir Edward Coke vindicated the common law basis of the Statute of
Monopolies here,
This Act having declared all monopolies to be void BY THE COMMON
LAW, hath provided by this clause, that they shall be examined,
heard, tried, and determined IN THE COURTS OF THE COMMON LAW
ACCORDING TO THE COMMON LAW, and not at the Council Table, StarChamber, Chancery, Exchequer chamber, or any other court of like

973. Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 657 (“That an author at common law has a property in his
manuscript, and may obtain redress against anyone who deprives him of it or by improperly
obtaining a copy endeavors to realize a profit by its publication cannot be doubted . . . . The
argument that a literary man is as much entitled to the product of his labor as any other
member of society cannot be controverted. And the answer is that he realizes this product
by the transfer of his manuscripts or in the sale of his works when first published.”);
Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772,] in WHEATLEY, supra note 821, at
7 (Wheatley placed bells upon her work, by placing her name upon it with an attestation of
the most respected characters of Boston that she was the author. The attribution of the
author is in the first publication, and upon the literary contract for publication, is the font of
all other interests pecuniary or moral at copyright law.). Cf. 17 THE PARLIAMENTARY, supra
note 579, at 997 (in the middle of appearing to lambaste common law copyright in a blustrous argument on the floor of Parliament, Lord Camden also stated “an action I allow will
lie for ink and paper,” admitting that authors have a common law right to “the ideas . . .
marked in black and white, on paper or parchment”).
974. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 346–47 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901). Cf. John
Milton, Eikonoklastes 13 (2d ed. 1650) (“every author should have the property of his own
work reserved to him after death as well as living”).
975. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 347.
976. 17 THE PARLIAMENTARY, supra note 579, at 999 (Argument of Lord Camden); id. at
982 (Opinion of Perrott, J.) (Judge Perrott misrepresented that “The right of exclusively
making any mechanical invention was taken away from the author or inventor by the Act
against monopolies . . . .” This is exactly the opposite of what Lord Coke stated in his Institutes, which held that the Statute of Monopolies vindicated common law rights against
those of the crown.).
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LAWS OF THE REALM,

That a “true and first inventor” should be granted a patent, and the
crown should not otherwise be able to grant any patents whatsoever,
was a reversal born out of common law and codified by Parliament’s
passage of the Statute of Monopolies.978 Though this legislation was
intended to defend the common law by stripping the crown of its feudal
power to grant monopolies through letters patent, the ascendant King
Charles I defied common law by continuing to issue patents by Privy
Council, and enforcing patents arbitrarily through the Star
Chamber.979
In response, Lord Coke drew up the Petition of Right, which
was begrudgingly accepted by the king.980 However, the Council of the
North paradoxically used the Petition of Right as a pretext to continue
administering odious monopolies.981 In defense of the Statute of Monopolies, Parliament passed the Habeas Corpus Statute 1640, to
abolish the Star Chamber and regulate the Privy Council according to
“the Common Law of the Land and in the ordinary course of
Justice.”982
Shortly thereafter the English Civil War began, in which the
Crown and Parliament went to war with one another.983 Parliament
defended the common law and Charles I defended his feudal power.984
The eventual result of this conflict was the rise of the absolute military
dictator, Oliver Cromwell, who was the original asserter of absolute
English sovereignty over the seas, conqueror of Jamaica, copycat of the
977. 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *182–83 (emphasis added) (citing Statute of Monopolies 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (Eng.)).
978. Id.; Statute of Monopolies 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (Eng.).
979. 17 THE PARLIAMENTARY, supra note 579, at 959.
980. Petition of Right 1628, 3 Car. I, c. 1 (Eng.).
981. See Sir Thomas Wentworth, First Earl of Stafford, Speech to the Council of the
North (Dec. 30, 1628) (“The authority of a king is the keystone which closeth up the arch of
order and government . . . .”). Cf. RACHEL ROBERTSON REID, THE KING’S COUNCIL IN THE
NORTH 372, 380, 383, 394–95, 406–08 (1921) [hereinafter ROBERTSON REID] (the Council of
the North was opposed “if only as the protector of monopolies”).
982. Habeas Corpus Act 1640, 16 Car. I, c. 10, pmbl. (Eng.).
983. Monty Python [i.e., John Cleese], Oliver Cromwell [1980/89] (this is a good place to
start for a common American, because it contains the proper disgust and disagreement with
Cromwell’s rise to power along with some historical facts—this disgust for Cromwell, while
it may be popular among ordinary English people, is not usually shared by English elitists
like John Maynard Keynes or Jeremy Bentham who reveled in Cromwell’s exploits).
984. Habeas Corpus Act 1640, 16 Car. I, c. 10, pmbl. (Eng.) (attempting to bring the
King and his Councils into the ambit of the common law); William R. Stacy, Matter of Fact,
Matter of Law, and the Attainder of the Earl of Stafford, 29 THE AM. J. OF L. HIST. 323, 325
(1985).
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legal positivism earlier asserted in Massachusetts Bay to commit genocide and other crimes against humanity, and the chief oppressor of
Holland and America.985
King Charles I was beheaded, in part, for his crimes of royal
appropriation of the author’s copyrights, which were an illegitimate
taxation “lev[ied] upon their wit.”986 Then Oliver Cromwell ironically
unleashed the worst taxation of all—the Navigation Acts.987 Therefore,
Phillis Wheatley’s trial and attestation was none other than the very
same struggle started by Coke and Milton contemporaneously emblazoned by Otis’s motto no taxation without representation.988
As James Otis was fighting for the rights of privacy in the papers and other effects of the colonists, Wheatley vindicated the
colonists’ legal interests in the content of those same papers; under the
common law attribution right to claim one’s papers as her own.989
Where Otis engaged in the physical, Wheatley vindicated the metaphysical or spiritual, complex, and the mysterious legal maxims of
copyright often hidden from human understanding.990 For as Justice
Story later wrote from the bench,
985. 20 HOWELL, supra note 802, at 283, 289 (“‘Jamaica was conquered by Oliver Cromwell’”) (statement of Lord Mansfield during the trial of Campbell v. Hall); Campbell v. Hall
[1774] 1 Cowp. 206, 208, 211–12 (Eng.); Arthur Lee et al., The American Commissioners:
Memorandum for the Dutch, [before Mar. 31, 1778]; Letter from John Adams to William
Tudor (June 1, 1818) (during Paxton’s Case, James Otis “gave a history of the navigation act
of the First of Charles II., a plagiarism from Oliver Cromwell”); Letter from John Adams to
William Tudor (July 14, 1818) (the Navigation Act “has ruined Holland, and would have
ruined America, if she had not resisted”); 2 SELDEN, OF THE DOMINION, supra note 805, at
202–03 (claiming Caligula’s conquest of the seas as the basis of English sea dominion—the
most important name for purposes of connecting the English domination of the seas to Oliver Cromwell is Marchamont Nedham, who translated this from Latin into English for
propaganda purposes); GEORGE LOUIS BEER, CROMWELL’S POLICY IN ITS ECONOMIC ASPECTS
47 (1902); GEORGE LOUIS BEER, THE ORIGINS OF THE BRITISH COLONIAL SYSTEM, 1578–1660,
at 377 (1908).
986. John Milton, Eikonoklastes 13 (2d ed. 1650).
987. An Act for increase of Shipping, and Encouragement of the Navigation of this Nation, [Oct. 9, 1651], in 2 ACTS . . . OF THE INTERREGNUM, supra note 792, at 559–62; The
Navigation Act 1660, 12 Car. 2 c. 18 (Eng.) (Cromwell’s Navigation Act reenacted under
Charles II).
988. SIMMONS, supra note 31, at 23 (“From the navigation act the advocate [James Otis]
passed to the Acts of Trade, and these, he contended, imposed taxes, enormous, burthensome, intolerable taxes; and on this topic he gave full scope to his talent for powerful
declamation and invective against the tyranny of taxation without representation. From the
energy with which he urged this position, that taxation without representation is tyranny,
it came to be a common maxim in the mouth of every one.”).
989. RIVINGTON, supra note 269, at 33 (noting the general warrants frequently issued
“to enter any house at any time to search for unlicensed presses or books”).
990. See, e.g., Phillis Wheatley, To the Rev. Dr. Thomas Amory on Reading his Sermons
on Daily Devotion, in which that Duty is Recommended and Assisted [1773] (“In vain would
Vice her works in night conceal, / For Wisdom’s eye pervades the sable veil.”).
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Patents and copyrights approach, nearer than any other class of
cases belonging to forensic discussions, to what may be called the
metaphysics of the law, where the distinctions are, or at least may
be, very subtle and refined, and, sometimes, almost evanescent.991

Wheatley’s 1772 trial and attestation are marvelous companions to
James Otis’s arguments in Paxton’s Case.992 It is fortunate that the
effects and nuances of other legal realities can be extrapolated reliably
from Wheatley’s metaphysical explorations of the capacities of human
thought.993 For where Otis’s arguments vindicated the private property in curtilage of the home, Wheatley’s writings vindicated the
underlying value of private property as essential to the human capacities of thought and creativity.994
The strength of Otis’s defense of curtilage depended upon Phillis Wheatley’s success in her trial, attestation, and her final claim of
copyright protection in England and America.995 For if Americans held
no valuable property in the papers kept in their homes, then it may be
reasonable for police to break in and search them.996 Phillis Wheatley
991. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
992. Compare Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772,] in WHEATLEY,
supra note 821, at 7, and Phillis Wheatley’s Registration, Sept. 10, 1773, TSC/1/E/06/09,
Register of entries of copies 1746–1773, with SIMMONS, supra note 31, at 9. Phillis Wheatley’s attestation, her copyright, and her importation of prints of her book for sale in Boston,
Massachusetts took a combined effort of international proportions—and thus her proprietorship over her own works required the freedom of the seas and the abolishment of the
Navigation Acts, as well as a trial and attestation to confirm that she was the original author of her poems. See Letter from John Andrews to William Barrell (Feb. 24, 1773); Letter
from Phillis Wheatley to David Wooster (Oct. 18, 1773); Wheatley, Liberty & Peace [1784]
(noting the requirement of the freedom of the seas to the development, sharing, and learning of science and the arts).
993. Letter from Phillis Wheatley to Samson Occom (Feb. 11, 1774); THE DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). See Phillis Wheatley, Thoughts on the Works of Providence [1773]; Phillis Wheatley, On Imagination [1773]; Phillis Wheatley, On Recollection
[1773]; Phillis Wheatley, An Hymn to Humanity [1773].
994. See, e.g., Phillis Wheatley, Thoughts on the Works of Providence [1773]; Phillis
Wheatley, To the Rev. Dr. Thomas Amory on Reading his Sermons on Daily Devotion, in
which that Duty is Recommended and Assisted [1773].
995. SIMMONS, supra note 31, at 4, 17 (“A Man, who is quiet, is as secure in his House, as
a Prince in his Castle.”) (referencing Semayne’s Case [1604] 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b (Eng.) (“the
house of every one is to him as his castle”)). Phillis Wheatley answered the inevitable question of what is actually secure in one’s house, by showing the property value individuals
have in their own ideas, writings, thoughts, etc. vindicated through her hard fought legal
gambit. Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772,] in WHEATLEY, supra
note 821, at 7; Phillis Wheatley’s Registration, Sept. 10, 1773, TSC/1/E/06/09, Register of
entries of copies 1746–1773.
996. See Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 29 (1821) (tracing the origin of New Jersey’s right
to regulate fisheries within three leagues from its shore to a public trust doctrine that derived from the Declaration of Independence, and so the court concluded of the revolution, “It
was not intended to take away, but to secure rights.”) (emphasis added); Phillis Wheatley,
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was the beginning of a unanimous shift in the Western World toward
the adoption of Lockean property creation, for she was the first to
demonstrate that it could be done.997
In 1774, the year after Wheatley successfully imported her
books into America, the House of Lords decided Donaldson denying
common law copyright, and then Lord Mansfield decided Campbell v.
Hall denying all common law rights in America.998The Campbell Court
determined that Englishmen who depart from England have no
rights!999 Thus, as an existential matter, the Boumediene and KirtLiberty & Peace [1784] (in this poem Wheatley most directly expounds the founding ideals of
liberty and peace as ultimately governing of the oceans in the public interest); Phillis
Wheatley, On Imagination [1773] (in this and others of Wheatley’s poems she expounded
the creative abilities of the human mind, of how we draw our dreams from the realm of
imagination into reality, as symbolized by the ocean and land as indicative of the epitome of
public trust law to the law of private property, this composes not only the theory of copyright and patent law, but is also the origin of property law itself arising from the Lockean
idea of mixing oneself with the elements of nature to acquire a personal property in something outside oneself). Compare Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772,]
in WHEATLEY, supra note 821, at 7, and Phillis Wheatley’s Registration, Sept. 10, 1773,
TSC/1/E/06/09, Register of entries of copies 1746–1773, with SIMMONS, supra note 31, at 9.
Cf. Carol Rose, supra note 244, at 727–30.
997. Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772,] in WHEATLEY, supra
note 821, at 7 (proving that a person can create private property through their own work).
See William Billings’ Second Petition, Massachusetts, May 27, 1772 (those who came before
her failed to get their private property rights legally recognized); Mark Rose, supra note
907, at 58, 78 (noting a seizmic shift toward author owned copyrights in the entire Western
World around the time Phillis Wheatley earned her copyright, but not examining Wheatley); 2 WILSON, THE WORKS, supra note 113, at 105 (after the revolution, asserting the
authors like Phillis Wheatley should own their own copyrights according to Lockean property creation through work, “On one hand the time which an author employs, the pains
which he takes, and the industry which he exerts, in the production of his literary performance, bear the nearest and the most marked resemblance to the industry exerted, to the
pains taken, and to the time employed, in the acquisition of property of every other kind.
This resemblance, so striking and so strong, between the labour bestowed in this, and the
labor bestowed in any other way, justifies the inference and the claim, that he, who bestowed the labour in this way, should be entitled to the same perpetual, assignable, and
exclusive right in the production of the labour thus bestowed; and should receive the same
protection of the law in the enjoyment of this perpetual, assignable, and exclusive right, as
is given and decreed to those who bestow their labour in any other manner.”).
998. 20 HOWELL, supra note 802, at 270 (citing Rex v. Cowle [1759] 2 Burr. 834, 835
(Eng.)) (in statement of Mr. Alleyne before the King’s Bench in support of Lord Mansfield’s
determination in Campbell); King George III, The King’s Speech of Nov. 30, 1774 [1775];
Thomas Hutchinson, Diary, Nov. 28, 1774, in 1 Hutchinson, The Diary, supra note 802, at
307–09 (confirming the timing of King’s Speech was contemporaneous with the ruling of
Campbell v. Hall, and that the Campbell case and the King’s Speech harkened back to
Cromwell’s conquest of Jamaica).
999. Campbell v. Hall [1774] 1 Cowp. 206, 208 (Eng.) (“An Englishman in Ireland, Minorca, the Isle of Man, or the plantations, has no privilege distinct from the natives.”); 20
HOWELL, supra note 802, at 289 (“‘It is absurd, that in the colonies they should carry all the
laws of England with them . . . .’”) (statement of Lord Mansfield during the trial of Campbell). It was exactly the cause of the American Revolution to overrule the feudal sentiment of
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saeng courts strictly distinguished Cowle, Donaldson, and Campbell;
and affirmed U.S. common law rights.1000 Phillis Wheatley did not become the origin of American antitrust law and public property trusts in
a vacuum, for as John Adams argued, “Knowledge monopolized, or in
the possession of a few, is a curse to mankind. We should dispense it
among all ranks. We should educate our children. Equality should be

Lord Mansfield in Campbell regarding the Americans. [James Otis,] Essay on the Writs of
Assistance Case, BOSTON GAZETTE, Jan. 4, 1762, reprinted in OTIS, supra note 18, at 16 (“The
people of this province formerly upon a particular occasion asserted the rights of englishmen; and they did it with a sober, manly spirit: they were then in an insulting manner asked
‘whether english rights were to follow them to the ends of the earth’—we are now told, that
the rights we contend for ‘do not belong to the English’—these writs, it is said, ‘are frequently issued from the exchequer at home, and executed, and the people do not complain of
it—and why should we desire more freedom than they have in the mother country[.]”) (quoting Jeremiah Dummer, A Defence of the New-England Charters 8, 23 [1715]). See also OTIS,
supra note 18, at 173–74 (The Massachusetts Legislature published a Memorial appended
to Otis’s tract that stated that “The absolute rights of Englishmen, as frequently declared in
parliament, from Magna Charta, to this time, are the rights of personal security, personal
liberty, and of private property. . . . By the laws of nature and of nations, the voice of universal reason, and of God, when a nation takes possession of a desert, uncultivated, and
uninhabited country, or purchases . . . the colonists transplanting themselves, and their
posterity, tho’ separated from the principal establishment, or mother country, natural become part of the state with its ancient possessions, and intitled to all the essential rights of
the mother country.”); Patrick Henry et al., The Virginia Resolves (May 30, 1765) (“[T]he
first adventurers and settlers of His Majesty’s colony and dominion of Virginia brought with
them and transmitted to their posterity [and to all later settlers] . . . all the liberties, privileges, franchises, and immunities that have at any time been held, enjoyed, and possessed
by the people of Great Britain.”); 2 WILSON, THE WORKS, supra note 113, at 4, 46–49 (giving
a defense of the common law and concluding, “And therefore it is utterly untrue that the law
of England cannot operate, but only within the bounds of the dominion of England.”) (citing
1 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *97). But see Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 597 (1823)
(citing to Campbell v. Hall approvingly saying, “The correctness of this decision cannot be
questioned, but its application to the case at bar cannot be admitted.”).
1000. See Rex v. Cowle [1759] 2 Burr. 834, 835 (Eng.), distinguished by Boumediene v.
Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 748 (2008) (The facts of Cowle and Donaldson are similar in that both
decided that respective common law rights to habeas corpus and to literary property do not
extend to Scotland. Boumediene denied extending Cowle’s denial of common law rights to
cases arising in Guantanamo Bay and other territories controlled or operated within by the
United States.); Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 538 (2013) (The Court
applied common law copyright rather than positive or feudal laws to international law, requiring limits on the restraint of alienation of chattels in international trade, impliedly
distinguishing Donaldson.) (quoting 1 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *223). Cf. Donohue, National Security, supra note 31 (Donohue quoted Winston Churchill, who perhaps
unwittingly confirmed this reality saying, “‘But we must never cease to proclaim in fearless
tones the great principles of freedom and the rights of man which are the joint inheritance
of the English-speaking world and which through Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the
Habeas Corpus, trial by jury, and the English common law find their most famous expression in the American Declaration of Independence.’”) (quoting Winston Churchill, Sinews of
Peace [1946]).
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preserved in knowledge.”1001 John Adams expanded this idea to all
property at common law because, “Property monopolized or in the possession of a few is a curse to mankind.”1002
John Adams also attacked the basis of Campbell v. Hall when
he protested “the instruments of arbitrary power.”1003 He observed the
fruits of arbitrary civil forfeiture laws, including “arbitrary distinctions” and treasonous constructions made by the British Admiralty
Court in Massachusetts Bay against his client, John Hancock.1004
Therefore, Adams vigorously argued for the principle of Dr. Foster’s
Case to be applied in America,
Here is the contrast that stares us in the face! The Parliament in
one clause guarding the people of the realm, and securing to them
the benefit of a trial by the law of the land, and by the next clause,
depriving all Americans of that privilege. . . . Is it not directly, a
repeal of Magna Charta, as far as America is concerned[?]1005

Then Adams proclaimed it was a wonder “that [such cases taken up as
civil forfeiture actions] are not confined to courts of common law
here.”1006 The Massachusetts Bay Admiralty Court’s departure from
the common law to establish arbitrary constructions of feudal law rising out of the sea were, in Adams’ words, “lost in the wild regions of
imagination and possibility, where arbitrary power sits upon her brazen throne and governs with an iron scepter.”1007
The question of common law statutory construction in federal
courts is an existential one in the United States.1008 For the principle
of Marbury v. Madison derives from Lord Coke’s common law decision
in Dr. Bonham’s Case, which first galvanized the American resistance
1001. John Adams, I. Fragmentary Notes for “A Dissertation on the Canon and the Feudal
Law”, May–Aug. 1765.
1002. Id. (indeed, the origin of absolute and perpetual property including perpetual copyrights and patents is the feudal law of the crown, which used copyright and patent law to
arbitrarily censor speech and religious practice).
1003. John Adams, Copy of the Information and Draft of His Argument, Court of Vice
Admiralty, Boston, Oct. 1768—Mar. 1769, in 2 ADAMS, LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 22, at
198–99.
1004. Id.
1005. Id. at 200.
1006. Id.
1007. Id. at 199.
1008. Id. at 208, n.54 (“If therefore the court is to adopt the common law, because the
jurisdiction was created by Act of Parliament; it ought to adopt it as a system.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted); THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 20 (U.S. 1776) (separating from England, in part, “for depriving us in many cases, of the benefit of Trial by
Jury”); MD. CONST. OF 1776 pt. 1, art. 3 (securing to “the inhabitants of Maryland” an entitlement “to the common law of England, and the trial by Jury, according to that law”).
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to British tyranny.1009 Without the ordinary common law principles of
statutory construction, the very idea of an overruling written constitution in America as “the sun of the political system” can only be a
delusion.1010
Thus, it is a concern that in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century
Fox, the U.S. Supreme Court impliedly repealed the same attribution
rights Phillis Wheatley enjoyed in 1772.1011 The Dastar Court knew
not what it did when it absurdly distinguished “origin of goods” from
“originality.”1012 For by this arbitrary distinction, the Supreme Court
accidentally unraveled the origin of antitrust law, as if Phillis Wheat-

1009. OTIS, supra note 18, at 175 (stating “that acts of parliament against natural equity
are void. That acts against the fundamental principles of the British constitution are void.”)
(extending Dr. Bonham’s Case [1610] 8 Co. Rep. 107a, 118a (Eng.)); Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. 137, 180 (1803). See SIMMONS, supra note 31, at 2 (the remedy for disposing of unjust
laws adopted by the Americans from Paxton’s Case going forward was, in part, “to confer on
the judiciary the power to declare unconstitutional statutes void”).
1010. Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304, 308 (1795) (“The Constitution fixes limits to the exercise of legislative authority, and prescribes the orbit within which it must
move. In short, gentlemen, the Constitution is the sun of the political system, around which
all Legislative, Executive and Judicial bodies must revolve. Whatever may be the case in
other countries, yet in this there can be no doubt, that every act of the Legislature, repugnant to the Constitution, is absolutely void.”—applying the federal general common law
against Pennsylvania, according to the first Pennsylvania Constitution.) (citing PENN.
CONST. OF 1776 pt. 1, arts. I, VIII, XI); Millar v. Taylor [1769] 4 Burr. 2303, 2351 (Eng.)
(“For, if a statute gives a remedy in the affirmative, (without a negative, expressed or implied,) for a matter which was actionable before by common law; the party may sue at
common law, and wave his remedy by statute, if he pleases.”).
1011. Dastar interpreted the Visual Artist Rights Act (VARA) (an act made to secure author’s rights) to strip authors of their ability to sue for attribution under the Lanham Act.
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34–36 (2003) (implying the
repeal of a previously existing cause of action for authors for attribution) (citing VARA, 17
U.S.C. § 106(a)(1)(A); Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)); Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651,
660 (1996) (“[r]epeals by implication are not favored”) (citing Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. 85,
105 (1869) (“Repeals by implication are not favored.”)). The rule that repeals by implication
are not favored appears to have a common root with the rule cited in Millar, that statutes do
not impliedly take away common law rights. Dr. Foster’s Case [1614] 11 Co. Rep. 56b,
62b–63a (Eng.) (“This act . . . is all in the affirmative, and therefore shall not repeal or
abrogate a precedent affirmative law before it is but a statute of addition to give a more
speedy remedy . . . yet the plaintiff may take which process he will, either at the common
law, or upon the said statute, because both are in the affirmative . . . .”); Millar v. Taylor
[1769] 4 Burr. 2303, 2351 (Eng.) (“For, if a statute gives a remedy in the affirmative, (without a negative, expressed or implied,) for a matter which was actionable before by common
law; the party may sue at common law, and wave his remedy by statute, if he pleases.”).
1012. Dastar, 539 U.S., at 37; Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772,]
in WHEATLEY, supra note 821, at 7. Cf. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519,
538 (2013) (Wheatley’s right of attribution could be extended under Kirtsaeng to distinguish
or overrule Dastar) (quoting 1 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *223).
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ley never existed, the subject of which the remainder of this article is
dedicated.1013
PART III: THE PUBLIC INTEREST

IN

FEDERAL JURISDICTION

The U.S. social compact mandates the rights of public property
inviolable, denominated by the term “public good.”1014 The U.S. Constitution secures the objects of the U.S. social compact set forth in its
preamble and creates the U.S. Government as a public trust.1015 All
inherently public properties may, therefore, be highly regulated for the
1013. Dastar, 539 U.S., at 37; Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772,]
in WHEATLEY, supra note 821, at 7; Phillis Wheatley Liberty & Peace [1784]; 3 EDWARD
COKE, INSTITUTES *182–83 (citing Statute of Monopolies 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (Eng.)); U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 3, 8; id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 8; United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1,
9–10 (1895) (citing 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *181; Statute of Monopolies 1623, 21 Jac. 1,
c. 3 (Eng.); The Case of Monopolies [1602] 11 Co. Rep. 84b (Eng.)), abrogated by Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 122, 127 (1942); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 51, 60
(1911) (quoting 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *181); United States v. Am. Bell Telephone Co.,
128 U.S. 315, 355, 357–58 (1888), declined to extend by Oil States Energy Servs. v. Greene’s
Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1371 (2018).
1014. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 3 (U.S. 1776).
1015. U.S. CONST. pmbl. & art. VI, § 3 (noting that the oath of office is a sign that government offices are held in “public trust”). See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 348, 602 (“They deemed that the Constitution was
immortal, and could not be forfeited; for it was prescribed by and for the benefit of the
people. But they deemed, and wisely deemed, that the magistracy is a trust, a solemn public
trust; and he who violates his duties forfeits his own right to office, but cannot forfeit the
rights of the people.” Story lifted this idea from English law as a fundamental principle in
America in accordance with our written constitutions, “The aim of every political constitution is . . . to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them [our rulers] virtuous
whilst they continue to hold their public trust.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 55 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) (advocating for frequent elections in the House of Representatives so
as to convince Representatives not “to betray the solemn trust committed to them”); PENN.
CONST. OF 1776 pt. 1, art. IV (“That all power being originally inherent in, and consequently
derived from, the people; therefore all officers of government, whether legislative or executive, are their trustees and servants, and at all times accountable to them.”) (emphasis
added); VA. CONST. OF 1776 pt. 1, § 2 (“That all power is vested in, and consequently derived
from, the people; the magistrates are their trustees and servants, and at all times amenable
to them.”) (emphasis added); MD. CONST. OF 1776 pt. 1, art. 4 (“That all persons invested
with the legislative or executive powers of government are the trustees of the public, and, as
such, accountable for their conduct; wherefore, whenever the ends of government are perverted, and public liberty manifestly endangered, and all other means of redress are
ineffectual, the people may, and of right ought, to reform the old or establish a new government. The doctrine of non-resistance, against arbitrary power and oppression, is absurd,
slavish, and destructive of the good and happiness of mankind.”) (emphasis added); VT.
CONST. OF 1777 pt. 1, art. 5 (“That all power being originally inherent in, and consequently
derived from, the people; therefore, all officers of government, whether legislative or executive, are their trustees and servants, and at all times accountable to them.”) (emphasis
added).
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public good and in the public interest according to provisions written
throughout the U.S. Constitution.1016
Where the positive laws are implied to countenance such public
rights and interests, as in Folsom v. Marsh, no resort to the U.S. Constitution is necessary.1017 Indeed, Folsom is the first case to punish the
invasion of the privacy of writings sent and received over a public network as an infringement of common law copyright.1018 Implying
common law rights into the positive laws can shine a light into the
darkened penumbra of the post-Griswold Court; and avoid arbitrary
dismissal under Murray’s Lessee.1019
However, the dogmas of legal positivism are so strong on the
federal bench that our judges often shirk all prudence, ignore constitutional avoidance doctrine, and refuse to admit the existence of natural

1016. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, 8; id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; id. amends. I–X. See Carol Rose,
supra note 244, at 770 (“The great commerce clause cases of the Marshall court reflect the
same view: a state cannot ‘privatize’ commerce for the benefit of its own citizens, but must
leave commerce open to the entire nation.”); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 233–34 (1824)
(Johnson, J., concurring) (“The practice of our Government certainly has been, on many
subjects, to occupy so much only of the field opened to them as they think the public interests require.”); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813); James
Madison, Detatched Memoranda, ca., Jan. 31, 1820; Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969). Cf. Steven G. Calabresi & Larissa C. Leibowitz, Monopolies and
the Constitution: A History of Crony Capitalism, 36 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 983, 985–86,
1005, 1016–26 (2013).
1017. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 346 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901); THE CASE OF
ELIZABETH RUTGERS, supra note 131, at 38, 45–46 (applying the rule from Dr. Foster’s Case
that “repeals by implication are disfavoured by law,” but still found “every such treaty in its
very nature implying a general amnesty” and according the federal compact Congress is
vested “with full and exclusive powers to make peace and war” and therefore “we are clearly
of opinion, that no state in this union can alter or abdridge, in a single point, the federal
articles or the treaty”).
1018. Folsom, 9 F. Cas., at 346.
1019. U.S. CONST. amend. IX; THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
The best way of implying broad, common law rights into positive laws in U.S. federal courts
is through constitutitonal avoidance doctrine. Compare Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288,
348 (1936) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)), with Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (“the First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is
protected from government intrusion”), and Oil States Energy Servs. v. Greene’s Energy
Grp., 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1371 (U.S. 2018) (denying federal jurisdiction over patents because
they are a “‘matte[r] of public rights’”) (quoting Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Imp.
Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1855)). Cf. OTIS, supra note 18, at 126, 142 (“There can be no prescription old enough to supersede the law of nature, and the grant of God almighty; who has
given to all men a natural right to be free, and they have it ordinarily in their power to make
themselves so, if they please.”); Matilda Joslyn Gage, The United States on Trial, not Susan
B. Anthony [1873], in ANON., AN ACCOUNT, supra note 80, at 179 (“The first principles of
government are founded on the natural rights of individuals; in order to secure the exercise
of these natural, individual rights our government professed to be founded.”).
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law.1020 It is often feigned by the federal bench that cases trying
human rights must be brought directly under the U.S. Constitution or
not at all.1021 This idea was initially brought about by judicial activism
in the U.S. Supreme Court; not merely by, as some presume, an “orgy
of statute making” in Congress.1022
The U.S. Supreme Court demonstrated its activism when it departed from Dr. Foster’s Case in Buckman and Dastar.1023 The Court
again departed from Dr. Foster in Credit Suisse, right before the 2008
market crisis, immunizing banks from antitrust liability.1024 Then, in
1020. Compare Scalia, supra note 567, at 89 (Scalia was clearly unaware of his radical,
Benthamite departure from common law principles of statutory construction when he rose
like a member of the late French Aristocracy in the days leading up to the French Reign of
Terror that would soon devour them whole, “Thus, the subject of statutory interpretation
deserves study and attention in its own right, as the principal business of lawyers and
judges. It will not do to treat the enterprise as simply an inconvenient modern add-on to the
judges’ primary role of common-law lawmak[ing]. Indeed, attacking the enterprise with the
Mr. Fix-it mentality of the common-law judge is a sure recipe for incompetence and usurpation.”), with Jeremy Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies [1796], reprinted in 2 BENTHAM, THE
WORKS, supra note 43, at 501 (Bentham encouraged the French Reign of Terror to swiftly
destroy the French people, for as he wrote, their rights are “rhetorical nonsense,—nonsense
upon stilts”).
1021. Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969) (broadcasting
corporations, being unnatural and artificial persons, cannot rely upon natural law and must
challenge FCC determinations under the public interest upon a very thin standard under
the First Amendment—this challenge failed); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339
(2010) (deciding that corporate money donations are free speech—a flimsy analogy that
could never exist in the natural law, because God did not create money). See Scalia, supra
note 567, at 89 (taking for granted there is no natural law, and sporting the unsupported
view that whenever a judge infers protection for a preexisting right of any kind, he is per se
usurping and violating the U.S. Constitution).
1022. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 73 (2009). See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965); Oil States Energy Servs. v. Greene’s Energy
Group, No. 16–712, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1371–72 (2018) (citing Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken
Land & Imp. Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1855); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 663–64 (1834)).
See also Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78–79 (1938) (repeating dicta similar to
Wheaton’s that there is “no federal general common law” to an equally destructive end,
malforming the Court’s construction of federal statutes and the U.S. Constitution itself with
judicial activism rather than implying legislative grace). Cf. 2 WILSON, THE WORKS, supra
note 113, at 442 (noting that orgies in statute making are nothing new to Republican governments, “The very best constitutions are liable to some complaints. What may be called
the rage of legislation is a distemper prevalent and epidemical among republican
governments.”).
1023. Buckman v. Plaintiff’s Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 352–53 (2001); Dastar Corp. v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34–37 (2003) (Justice Scalia authored a
departure from Dr. Foster’s Case common law rule of statutory interpretation without acknowledging the departure—the Dastar Court determined that the Visual Artists Rights
Act (an act created to grant artists rights) to repeal or limit formally recognized, overlapping rights cognizable under Trademark Law).
1024. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 276 (2007) (“the securities law impliedly precludes the application of the antitrust laws”). See Markham, Jr.,
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POM Wonderful, the Supreme Court refused to impliedly repeal previously existing legal grounds for action as the Court did in Buckman
and Dastar; appearing to realign the Court with Dr. Foster’s Case
again.1025
All four of these cases Buckman, Dastar, Credit Suisse, and
POM Wonderful, appear to be as unaware of each other as they were of
Dr. Foster’s Case; feigning a dearth of guidance from the law books.1026
Thus, these cases give future courts a pretext to depart from the common law rule of stare decisis and to destabilize the predictability of the
law with ad hoc rulings.1027 For when compared to each other, Bucksupra note 950, at 439 (explaining that Credit Suisse “lurched past the traditional narrow
confines of the doctrine” of implied repeal given in Dr. Foster’s Case). Cf. Alan Cowell, UBS
and Credit Suisse get urgent bailout funds, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2008), https://
www.nytimes.com/2008/10/16/business/worldbusiness/16iht-17swiss.17006058.html.
1025. POM Wonderful v. Coca-Cola, 573 U.S. 102, 113–14 (2014) (“No textual provision
in either statute discloses a purpose to bar unfair competition claims like POM’s. This absence is of special significance because the Lanham Act and the FDCA have coexisted since
the passage of the Lanham Act in 1946. If Congress had concluded, in light of experience,
that Lanham Act suits could interfere with the FDCA, it might well have enacted a provision addressing the issue during these 70 years. . . . Congress enacted amendments to the
FDCA and the Lanham Act including an amendment that added to the FDCA an express
pre-emption provision with respect to state laws addressing food and beverage misbranding.
Yet Congress did not enact a provision addressing the preclusion of other federal laws that
might bear on food and beverage labeling.”) (citing Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 574
(2009) (applying implied preemptions of state law narrowly)). There is no intelligible way to
make sense of Dastar after POM Wonderful applied the traditional rule to the same Lanham Act provision. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 37 (The Court claims there is a meaningful
difference between origin of goods and originality that is so strong that it destroyed the most
fundamental artist right of attribution under the Lanham Act while ignoring the presumption against implied repeals and failing consider whether the laws have an irreconcilable
conflict.). Buckman must be at the very least be called into doubt by POM Wonderful. Buckman, 531 U.S., at 352–53.
1026. POM Wonderful, 573 U.S. at 113–14; Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 276; Dastar, 539
U.S. at 37; Buckman, 531 U.S. at 352–53.
1027. Order Granting Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Schroeder v. Trader Joe’s Company, No.
3:17–cv–00184–DMS–BGS, Doc. 42, at 4 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (the contradiction between POM
Wonderful and Buckman gave enough wiggle room for this court to dismiss without
prejudice under Iqbal, requiring, ad hoc, that plaintiff refile his claim in such a way that
disclaims all equitable relief; there is nothing in the law repealing equitable relief and
courts are supposed to consider what kind of relief to grant at the end of a case; requiring a
plaintiff to disclaim relief that may granted at the end of a case in his complaint literally
cuts off the ability of the courts to keep developing precedent—appeal was denied by the
Ninth Circuit, in part, because the dismissal was not technically final); LULAC v. Wheeler,
899 F.3d 814, 817–18 (9th Cir. 2018) vacated on reh’g en banc, 914 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2019)
(The Ninth Circuit nevertheless confirmed the arbitrariness of the dismissal in Schroeder
by granting an equitable order against the EPA, directly under the FDCA, in a case brought
by private parties saying, “If Congress’s statutory mandates are to mean anything, the time
has come to put a stop to this patent evasion.”); LULAC v. Regan, 996 F.3d 673, 677 (9th
Cir. 2021) (agreeing with the rationale for the 2018 order). The U.S. caselaw that condones
this departure from stare decisis is as follows: Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community,
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man, Dastar, Credit Suisse, and POM Wonderful, appear wholly
arbitrary.1028
Furthermore, after Iqbal/Twombly the Rule 8 standard of “a
short and plain statement of a claim” is still good law, such that precedent applying this standard is untouched despite the fact that the
Court appears no longer bound by Rule 8 stare decisis.1029 Controversy
looms over the fate of Roe v. Wade under Casey’s vindication of stare
decisis, but it appears that the Court already chose its direction.1030
Stare decisis, which was “a foundation stone of the rule of law,” is on its
way out.1031
572 U.S. 782, 798 (2014) (“stare decisis is a foundation stone of the rule of law, necessary to
ensure that legal rules develop ‘in a principled and intelligible fashion’”); Harris v. Quinn,
571 U.S. 661, 669 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (Only weeks after Bay Mills, Kagan was
forced to quote her majority ruling about stare decisis as a foundation of the rule of law in
her dissent, “That doctrine, we have stated, is a ‘foundation of the rule of law.’”) (quoting
Bay Mills, 572 U.S., at 276); Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Mun.
Employees, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2497 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (Finally, when
Abood was overruled directly in Janus, Kagan was forced to cite once more to her battered
and disregarded stare decisis holding in Bay Mills, which in the end held no weight as a
stare decisis case on stare decisis itself, “But the worse part of today’s opinion is where the
majority subverts all known principles of stare decisis. . . . Consider first why these principles about precedent are so important. Stare decisis—‘the idea that today’s Court should
stand by yesterday’s decisions’—is ‘a foundation stone of the rule of law.’”) (quoting Bay
Mills, 572 U.S., at 276). Cf. Schroeder, America’s, supra note 212, at 884–85 (giving other
examples of the U.S. Supreme Court’s departure from stare decisis).
1028. See POM Wonderful, 573 U.S., at 113–14; Credit Suisse, 551 U.S., at 276; Dastar,
539 U.S., at 37; Buckman, 531 U.S., at 352–53. Cf. Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 573 U.S. 958,
960 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (in the face of a similar arbitrary determination, Justice Sotomayor dissented, “Those who are bound by our decisions usually believe they can
take us at our word. Not so today.”).
1029. It would be strange to make any other explanation of these cases, when defendants
still move for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) but the standard of Iqbal/Twombly is given
directly by the Court rather than by the Rules. Bell Atl. Co. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563
(2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46
(1957) (The dicta overruled by Twombly and Iqbal is actually in the rule statement that that
attempted to interpret Rule 8 & 12 that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to
state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts,” i.e.,
the claim must be possible. Iqbal and Twombly overruled this dicta and required plausible
facts instead—a judge made rule—and it required this new rule to be applied as an evidentiary proceeding before discovery which is out of order and awkward for litigators—but the
underlying rule from the Civil Rules was not touched—Rules 8 & 12 require the Court to
decide on the face of the complaint, without evidence, whether plaintiff failed to state a
claim—that rule, even as applied in Conley is not actually overruled by Iqbal or Twombly, it
is only disregarded and ignored.).
1030. Aaron Blake, Trump makes clear Roe v. Wade is on the chopping block, WASH. POST
(July 2, 2018, 12:23 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/07/02/
trump-makes-clear-roe-v-wade-is-on-the-chopping-block/; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
modified and aff’d by Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 854 (1992). See Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, No. 21A24, slip op. at 2 (2021).
1031. Bay Mills, 572 U.S., at 798. See supra note 1027 and accompanying text.
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The justice centered intentions of the Civil Rules in abolishing
arbitrary dismissals under the forms are being abandoned by the
Court whenever it uses the Rules to dismiss cases like the forms once
did.1032 This situation becomes even more glaring as Americans find
the Court arbitrarily dismissing more cases under Iqbal, than the official forms ever did prior to their closure under the Rules.1033 The
informality, ushered in by the federal rules, is not enjoyed by litigants,
but it is arbitrarily administered by judges.1034
For even the power to join cases under the Civil Rules, i.e., the
major change made by abolishing the forms, is so hated and discouraged by federal judges that joining cases is rarely done.1035 Judges no
1032. FED. R. CIV. P. 2 (abolishing the forms); FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be
construed so as to do justice.”); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double
Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L. REV. 1, 5 (2010) [hereinafter Miller,
From Conley] (“The Rules were intended to support a central philosophical principle: the
procedural system of the federal courts should be premised on equality of treatment of all
parties and claims in the civil adjudication process. It should abjure technical decision making and ‘promote the ends of justice.’ The simple but ambitious notion was that the legal
rights of citizens should be enforced. This idea was a baseline democratic tenet of the 1930s
and then of postwar America with regard to such matters as civil rights, the distribution of
social and political power, marketplace status, and equality of opportunity.”). Cf. SøREN
KIERKEGAARD, WORKS OF LOVE: KIERKEGAARD’S WRITINGS, XVI, at 94 (Howard V. Hong &
Edna H. Hong eds. & trans., 1995) (stating that the road to hell is paved on good intentions).
1033. Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Impact of Plausibility Pleading, 101 VA. L.
REV. 2117, 2171 (2015) (“Iqbal and Twombly are associated with a pleading regime in which
plaintiffs do worse at nearly every stage. They are more likely to have their case dismissed,
and less likely to proceed to discovery and adjudication of the merits of their claims. Even if
they survive dismissal, the cases are less likely to be successful in 2010 than in 2006. In this
light, it is difficult to see what value the new pleading standards have added to our civil
justice system.”). See BAKER, supra note 7, at 61–64, 67, 83 (the forms have an ancient history, but when they existed even when they were inflexible and frustrating, the form of
trespass on the case acted as a release valve that resulted in the development of most causes
of action we know about; the new strategy under Iqbal and Twombly also creates inflexible
and frustrating formalistic reasons for dismissing cases but without a release valve). See
also Rattlesdene v. Grunestone [1317] YB 10 Edw II (54 SS) 140 (Eng.) (even prior to the
English Court’s development of trespass on the case, it feigned facts and circumstances that
did not actually exist in order to maintain its jurisdiction in cases that should have been
dismissed under the forms to develop the implied warranty of merchantability starting with
a purchaser’s right to wholesome food and drink—showing that the forms did not uniformly
cause dismissals as Iqbal and Twombly may) Cf. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. 1805)
(this is a very well known trespass on the case decision in the United States, revealing the
flexibility of the Court to determine property rights under this form).
1034. See Miller, From Conley, supra note 1032, at 24 (Noting that in Iqbal Justice Souter “and three other dissenters argued that the majority’s classification was entirely
arbitrary and failed to guide the lower courts on how to draw the fact-conclusion
distinction.”).
1035. FED. R. CIV. P. 18(a) (“A party asserting a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or thirdparty claim may join, as independent or alternative claims, as many claims as it has against
an opposing party.”). Judges who don’t like complicated multi-pronged joinders of claims
can dismiss them and require a plaintiff to refile under one without guidance about which
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longer engage in the ordinary course of deciding in which form a case
ought to lie, but under Iqbal/Twombly litigants must still name the
correct form without judicial guidance that once clarified how to avoid
dismissal.1036 Present day litigants must plead under medieval forms
that are hidden, rigid, and frozen in the past; forms that our judges
refuse to clarify, because according to the Civil Rules the forms are not
supposed to exist.1037
The power expressly given to federal judges to correct simple
mistakes and proceed under ulterior causes of action for parties that
pleaded under the wrong form, is almost never asserted.1038 12(b) motions are granted in medieval fashion.1039 In every civil action,
plaintiffs are blindfolded by the plausibility standard and must “pin
the tail on a donkey” at the end of a complex maze of formalities that is
codified by every possible origin, including by clerks, judges, courthouses, districts, and circuits.1040
one; this could be worse than the pre-Rules forms, because at least the forms changed and
developed in a uniform way unlike ad hoc, judge-by-judge dismissals under the Rules. See,
e.g., United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725–26 (1966) (“It has consistently been recognized that pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff’s
right.”).
1036. Joshua J. Schroeder, Bringing America Back to the Future: Reclaiming a Principle
of Honesty in Property and IP Law, 35 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 1, 96–97 (2014) [hereinafter Schroeder, Bringing] (even though procedurally there is supposed to be only one form
of action after the Civil Rules were established, federal courts must still have jurisdiction to
properly discuss where a case ought to lie for purposes of the cases themselves which still
apply the elements of the forms) (citing The Shepherd’s Case Y.B. 2 Hen. 7, Hil. F. 11, pl. 9,
in C.H.S. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW: TORT AND CONTRACT 86–87
(1949)).
1037. BAKER, supra note 7, at 68 (the forms “‘still rule us from their graves’”) (quoting
FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 2 (1936)).
1038. Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8).
See also FED. R. CIV. P. 60(a).
1039. BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 15, at 567 (“Rolf challenged the writ in the case of
corrupt wine because one word had a letter too many.”) (emphasis added); BAKER, supra note
7, at 63 (“Suing by the wrong writ was fatal; and so different did trespass and case become
in the legal mind that they could not even be joined in one action.”); Miller, From Conley,
supra note 1032, at 24; Michelle Yeary, Plaintiff Loses in a Game of “What If . . .”, LEXOLOGY: DRUG AND DEVICE LAW BLOG (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=37460d47-0fad-410e-9e67-8fdb038dc9f9 (citing McDonald v. Schriner, No.
2:18-cv-02084-JFT-dkv, 2019 WL 1040978 (W.D. Tenn. 2019)).
1040. At any given level of authority, members may not agree about the formalities
promulgated by the whole—the situation for those trying to bring their cases before a single
district judge is highly confusing. See, e.g., Joe Patrice, The Seventh Circuit’s War With
Judge Posner Really Escalated Quickly: I mean, this really got out of hand fast, ABOVE THE
LAW (Oct. 31, 2017, 1:35 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2017/10/the-seventh-circuits-warwith-judge-posner-really-escalated-quickly/ (explaining how Judge Posner resigned and
published his tell all book Reforming the Federal Judiciary over internal politics over the
very sort of memos and orders ordinary litigators have to read through in matters involving
pleadings and other matters the Court wants to organize on their own).
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This arbitrary system is facilitated through boldfaced judicial
relativism.1041 When the Westboro Baptist Church was sued for shouting obscenities at a soldier’s funeral, the Supreme Court held it was
legitimate, i.e., non-licentious, free speech.1042 This line of precedent
symbolized by Virginia v. Black, binds courts not to see a legal difference between hate speech of Neo-Nazis, who murdered Heather Heyer,
and the performances of the choir who sang: This Little Light of Mine
against the hatred of Neo-Nazi protesters.1043
Relativism pervades First Amendment precedent so completely,
that a federal district judge decided an anti-SLAPP statute immunized
President Donald Trump’s speech threatening Stormy Daniels as presumptively protected speech under the First Amendment.1044 The most
shocking part of this case was not the substance of the case itself, but
that the court did not find a waiver of anti-SLAPP statute in Trump’s
political diatribes against state anti-SLAPP statutes.1045 For the Court

1041. See R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 393 (1992).
1042. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460 (2011).
1043. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 356–57 (2003); Heim, supra note 150 (“At 9:30 am,
about 30 clergy members clasped arms and began singing ‘This Little Light of Mine.’
Twenty feet away, the white nationalists roared back, ‘Our blood, our soil!’”). See Tess
Owen, Neo-Nazi who killed Heather Heyer in Charlottesville was just charged with 29 hate
crimes, VICE NEWS (June 27, 2018, 12:55 PM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/evkeza/neonazi-who-killed-heather-heyer-in-charlottesville-was-just-charged-with-29-hate-crimes. Cf.
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“The question in every case is whether the
words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent.”).
1044. Order Granting Defendant Donald J. Trump’s Special Motion to Dismiss/Strike
Complaint at 11, Clifford v. Trump, 2:18-cv-06893-SJO-FFM, Doc. 36, at 11 (C.D. Cal. 2018)
(“If this Court were to prevent Mr. Trump from engaging in this type of ‘rhetorical hyperbole’ against a political adversary, it would significantly hamper the office of the
President.”) (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19 (1990)). Cf. Biden v.
Knight First Amendment Institute, 141 S. Ct. 1220, 1221 (2021) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(defending Donald J. Trump’s use of Twitter and suggesting that Congress should require
Twitter to give Trump back his account even after Trump’s speech, including Trump’s legendary use of Twitter, had at least some sort of role in causing a violent insurrection across
the street from Justice Thomas’s office at the Capitol Building).
1045. Luis Gomez, Libel laws: What are they and why is Trump talking about them,
again?, SAN DIEGO TRIBUNE (Jan. 10, 2018, 12:03 PM), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.
com/opinion/the-conversation/sd-what-are-libel-laws-and-why-trump-talking-about-them20180110-htmlstory.html (Trump called limitations on libel laws, including anti-SLAPP
statutes, a “sham and a disgrace” among other things). Collectively his many statements in
public life against such limitations should be legally interpreted as (1) a waiver of the use of
anti-SLAPP statutes in his favor and (2) consent to be sued directly under libel law by individuals like Stormy Daniels. See id.
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to interpret State anti-SLAPP statutes to ignore all legally significant
speech as irrelevant is a recipe for chaos.1046
When former President Donald Trump, for example, declared a
national emergency, in violation of the separation of powers, to use
public funds for construction of a border wall without congressional approval; such words hold legal significance.1047 Within his words and
deeds is a potential waiver, express or implied, of judicial grace for-

1046. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 993–95 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (“Any
such rigid doctrinal framework is inadequate to resolve the sometimes contradictory claims
of the libel laws and the freedom of the press.”). The Courts cannot justly ignore all legally
significant speech. See, e.g., Adam Forrest, Trump ‘directed me’ to pay Stormy Daniels hush
money and knew it was wrong, Michael Cohen claims, INDEPENDENT (Dec. 14, 2018, 12:31
PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/trump-michael-cohenstormy-daniels-hush-money-payment-prison-sentence-lawyer-court-a8683186.html; Transcript: Donald Trump’s Taped Comments About Women, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2016), https://
www.nytimes.com/2016/10/08/us/donald-trump-tape-transcript.html; Danny Cevalos, If the
latest report is true, which crimes might Trump have committed?, NBC NEWS (Jan. 18, 2019,
4:27 PM) (perjury is perjury—so is solicitation, attempt, and conspiracy with a perjury);
Chris Riotta, Trump admits withholding aid to Ukraine while asking country’s leader to
investigate 2020 rival Joe Biden, INDEPENDENT (Sept. 24, 2019, 3:56 PM), https://
www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/trump-ukraine-aid-impeachmentjoe-biden-son-2020-election-a9118456.html (a confession is a confession); Justin Wise, CNN
airs montage of Trump saying there was ‘no collusion’ with Russia after Giuliani comments,
THE HILL (Jan. 17, 2019, 3:05 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/425894cnn-airs-montage-of-clips-of-trump-saying-there-was-no-collusion-with (a confession is a
confession); Darren Samuelsohn, The circular firing squad: Mueller targets turn on each
other, POLITICO (Jan. 17, 2019, 8:36 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/01/17/giulianimueller-collusion-investigation-1110671.
1047. Remarks by President Trump on the National Security and Humanitarian Crisis on
our Southern Border (Feb. 15, 2019), https://perma.cc/5SE7-FS7F [hereinafter Remarks by
President Trump] (Trump admitted that the national emergency was a sham when he announced the emergency: “I could do the wall over a longer period of time. I didn’t need to do
this. But I’d rather do it much faster. And I don’t have to do it for the election.”); Kevin
Liptak et al., Trump threatens he will declare national emergency if shutdown talks crumble,
CNN POLITICS (Jan. 11, 2019, 4:56 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/10/politics/trumpsouthern-border-visit/index.html [hereinafter Liptak et al., Trump] (President Trump’s
words here appear to amount to the crime of attempted extortion of public money—just
because Congress has the power to deny him the money, and it appears that they will deny
him, does not immunize his crime of attempted extortion.). See Sierra Club v. Trump, 977
F.3d 853, 862, 888–90 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Donald Trump’s words “that he was ‘not
happy’ with the amount of border wall funding he had obtained” and declaring his actions to
try and get around Congress’s “power of the purse” unconstitutional and void) (quoting Remarks by President Trump).
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merly enjoyed by the executive branch.1048 For as Richard Nixon
discovered, everything a president does is legally significant.1049
State courts are also relativizing legally significant words and
actions, for example, a New York judge recently ordered that Kesha
Sebert’s alleged rape at the hands of a Sony record producer would not
repudiate her contract.1050 One conclusion reached from the outcome of
Kesha’s case, is when rape victims speak out, their underlying employment contracts will not be struck down, or modified, to disgorge an
employer’s unjust enrichment for crimes the employer oversaw, including but not limited to assault, battery, and rape.1051 Instead, Kesha is
1048.
See Sierra Club v. Trump, 977 F.3d 853, 862, 888–90 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Remarks by President Trump); see also Donald Trump’s file, POLITIFACT, https://
www.politifact.com/personalities/donald-trump/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2019) (containing
many of Trump’s statements); Read Trump’s phone conversation with Volodymyr Zelensky,
CNN POLITICS (Sep. 26, 2019, 4:41 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/25/politics/donaldtrump-ukraine-transcript-call/index.html [hereinafter Read Trump’s phone]; 1 MUELLER,
supra note 362, at 110, 185; id. at 124–26; id. at 130 (noting that “a very minor ‘wink’ (or
slight push) from [former president Donald Trump]” could have triggered an international
crisis); id. at 132–40 (Paul Manafort, who was Chairman of Trump’s 2016 Campaign, also
led Victor Yanukovych’s successful 2010 Presidential campaign in the Ukraine.
Yanukovych, who was discovered to be a Russian plant with no loyalty to the Ukrainian
people, was ousted during the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution and he now lives in exile in Russia. He is still wanted by Ukraine for high treason. Furthermore, Paul Manafort’s longtime
employee Konstantin Kilimnik, with whom Manafort shared polling and other Campaign
data with throughout his service to Donald Trump, is almost certainly a Russian operative,
with direct links into Russian intelligence. Manafort almost certainly knew the data he sent
to Kilimnik was also being shared with a Russian oligarch named Oleg Vladimirovich Deripaska, to whom Manafort is legally indebted, for whom he is politically compromised, and
with whom he formerly kept a close working relationship.); id. at 149 (When Trump won the
2016 election the CEO of the Russian sovereign wealth fund and Putin insider Kirill Dmitriev received a message: “Putin has won.”); 2 MUELLER, supra note 362, at 12, 100–03
(Trump purposely and knowingly attempted to cover up the subject of the June 9 meeting,
“The President told Hicks to say only that Trump Jr. took a brief meeting and it was about
Russian adoption.”); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 (defining treason).
1049. Sierra Club, 977 F.3d at 862. Compare Richard Sutton, Frost/Nixon: The Original
Watergate Interview, YOUTUBE (Aug. 12, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=9OCOn3yKmwQ (“Well, when the president does it, that means it is not illegal.”),
with David A. Graham, Trump: When the President Says It, That Means It’s True, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/03/trump-timeinterview-ex-post-facto/520551/.
1050. Gottwald v. Sebert [i.e., Dr. Luke v. Kesha], No. 653118/2014, 2016 WL 1365969, at
*4, *9, *11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016) (Opinion of Shirley Werner Kornreich, J.) (committing clear
error by not to allowing Kesha to even attempt to impugn her contract with Dr. Luke, especially if it was possible that the basis of the bargain for Dr. Luke was a contractual pretext
to commit a crime against Kesha).
1051. Id.; Jen Yamato, Inside Kesha’s Battle Against Dr. Luke: Allegations of Rape,
Sketchy Deleted Photos, and More, THE DAILY BEAST (April 13, 2017, 3:24 AM), https://
www.thedailybeast.com/inside-keshas-battle-against-dr-luke-allegations-of-rape-sketchydeleted-photos-and-more; Suzy Byrne, Lady Gaga defends Kesha’s sexual assault claims in
deposition for Dr. Luke lawsuit, YAHOO! ENTERTAINMENT (Jan. 20, 2019), https://
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forced to defend herself in court against her abuser’s allegations of defamation and slander.1052
In order to resist the prevailing insensitivity of the courts in
matters of violence against women, especially in matters involving female artists and creatives, American courts should declare judicial
relativism illegitimate and reassert trespass on the case to provide a
better definition to existing forms.1053 The “one form of civil action,”
required by Civil Rule 2, existed throughout American legal history
under the writ of trespass on the case; through which virtually every

www.yahoo.com/now/lady-gaga-defends-keshas-sexual-assault-claims-deposition-dr-lukelawsuit-150540970.html. See KESHA, Praying, in RAINBOW (Sony 2017). It offends the most
basic sense of human decency, propriety, and justice that profits made from selling and
performing this song inspired by Kesha’s journey of overcoming criminal abuse should profit
the person Kesha says committed the criminal abuse that inspired the song.
1052. Compare Gottwald v. Sebert [i.e., Dr. Luke v. Kesha], 2018 WL 4181723, at *2
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016) (Opinion of Jennifer G. Schecter, J.) (Allowing Dr. Luke to amend his
claims of defamatory statements against Kesha, when Kesha’s case against Dr. Luke was
dismissed without leave to amend: “It is well established that leave to amend should be
granted freely unless the proposed amendment is palpably devoid of merit or would cause
undue prejudice.”), with Order Granting Defendant Donald J. Trump’s Special Motion to
Dismiss/Strike Complaint, Clifford v. Trump, 2:18-cv-06893-SJO-FFM, Doc. 36, at 11 (C.D.
Cal. 2018). Cf. Stillman, Why are Prosecutors, supra note 763 (in criminal court, a rape
victim who refuses to testify may be held in prison until she does).
1053. Gottwald v. Sebert [i.e., Dr. Luke v. Kesha], 2016 WL 1365969, at *4, *9, *11 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2016) (Opinion of Shirley Werner Kornreich, J.) (Judge Kornreich’s relativistic
worldview (a view held by most judges in America) reduces everything—including justice
and artistic freedom—to a dollar amount. The judge was, therefore, unable to perceive a
problem with an artist being criminally abused by her employer if it makes her a profit at
the end of the day. Judge Kornreich’s opinion was, therefore, rife with statements indicating
why Kesha had nothing to complain about, (1) “Kesha earned millions of dollars.”; (2)
“Kesha’s First Album, and her debut song, Tik Tok, went platinum”; (3) “Kesha gained international recognition.”; and (4) “[Sony], through Kemosabe, has invested more than $11
million in Kesha’s career.” The Court ultimately pilfered Kesha’s chance to take back her
artistic freedom through the courts by making up ad hoc formalities to dismiss her case
based upon where, when, and why the alleged rape occurred. In reality, none of these considerations are relevant to decide the jurisdiction of the court to review a contract’s basis in
crime, which is itself ripe for review wherever such a contract persists.). See, e.g., Millar v.
Taylor [1769] 4 Burr. 2303, 2305 (Eng.) (Millar’s bill against Taylor was “a plea of trespass
upon the case” in order to countenance a property right that was “not all at once known to
the common law, or to the world . . . yet are now established to be such.” The common law
copyright was first established in this way, by considering the basis of book contracts.); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison) (implicitly endorsing the finding of a common law right
through trespass on the case saying, “The copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged
in Great Britain, to be a right at common law.”); Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 182 (1805)
(this is probably the most known American trespass on the case action); United States v.
Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 762–64 (2013) (attempting to fashion a way to address “an injustice
that they had not earlier known or understood” directly through the U.S. Constitution—
which is the style of language formerly used in cases involving trespass on the case).
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other common law cause of action was developed.1054 As symbolized by
Windsor, it is still within the ambit of federal jurisdiction to review
new problems, not previously known to common law, in order to protect
the equal rights of women.1055
The Supreme Court is not willing to correct past injustices,
however, for Chief Justice Roberts remains caught in the gyre of The
Slaughterhouse Cases.1056 The travesty of Slaughterhouse consists in
falsely stating that bad precedent was overruled in the past, when it
was not, and then paradoxically reasserting the rationale of the very
case the Supreme Court pretended was overruled.1057 The Court re1054. FED. R. CIV. P. 2; BAKER, supra note 7, at 61–64, 67, 83 (“The expansion of trespass,
and especially of the flexible action on the case, provided the common law with a temporary
escape from the formulary system, an opportunity to melt down the medieval law and recast
it in new moulds. Most of the law as we know it was shaped by this process. After the
redistribution, the commonest types of trespass and case became the basis of a new scheme
of actions: assumpsit (for breach of parol contracts and restitutionary claims), trover (for
interference with personal property), actions on the case for torts (such as defamation and
negligence), and ejectment (to recover real property). But the flexibility inherent in trespass
and case prevented any recurrence of the restrictiveness and procedural nicety which beset
the praecipe actions. For most purposes the new remedies were but subdivisions of ONE
FORM OF ACTION.”) (emphasis added).
1055. Windsor, 570 U.S., at 762–64; FED. R. CIV. P. 2; BAKER, supra note 7, at 61–64, 67,
83 (noting the language “one form of action,” that appears in Civil Rule 2, was originally a
reference to trespass on the case).
1056. Compare Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2617 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Dred Scott’s holding was overruled on the battlefields of the Civil War and by
constitutional amendment after Appomattox, but its approach to the Due Process Clause
reappeared.” The Chief Justice then identified Lochner v. New York as the most prominent
example of the reemergence of Dred Scott—a doubtful comparison to be sure, for it was not
the African American right to contract that was vindicated in Dred Scott, but the property
rights of slaveholders to force African American labor without contract express or implied.)
(citing Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 432 (1857); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905)), and Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (“Korematsu was gravely wrong
the day it was decided, has been overruled in the court of history, and—to be clear—‘has no
place in law under the Constitution.’”) (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
248 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting)), with The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 73 (1872)
(deciding that the Fourteenth Amendment “overturns the Dred Scott decision by making all
persons born within the United States and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the United
States,” but in the very same breath making a travesty of the Fourteenth Amendment by
interpreting it to affirm Dred Scott’s reading of the U.S. social compact, which was that
prior to the Fourteenth Amendment black people were justly considered non-citizens, that
the removal or degradation of their citizenship was not unconstitutional or illegal but for
the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore concluding that the U.S. social compact holds no
power to secure the fundamental rights of Louisiana butchers through the U.S.
Constitution).
1057. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 73, 80 (1872) (This case was a “celebrat[ion
of] Dred Scott” in spite of its acknowledgement that the Fourteenth Amendment “overturns
the Dred Scott decision by making all persons born within the United States and subject to
its jurisdiction citizens of the United States.”). See Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27–30,
gutted by Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. 581, 595 (1871) (the Court gutted the Civil Rights
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cently created new travesties, like Slaughterhouse, in Busk, Shelby
County, and Trump v. Hawaii; to flourish, this sort of judicial travesty
needs only that the Supreme Court depart from the common law principle of stare decisis.1058
The fate of Hensley v. Municipal Court revealed why it is important to overrule bad precedent as wrongly decided at common law.1059
For after the Hensley Court expressly decided that Wales v. Whitney
was outdated and “may no longer be deemed controlling” without affirmatively overruling it at common law, the Rumsfeld v. Padilla Court
resurrected Wales from the grave.1060 Other unjust decisions not afAct to let an ax murderer loose, because the only witnesses were black folk), and Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. at 82–83 (Slaughterhouse gutted the Civil Rights Act regarding the very
rights of life, i.e., the right to make a living, which is the primary right enjoyed by free
people no longer enslaved or indentured to work for no pay); id. at 96–97 (Field, J., dissenting) (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27–30, § 1).
1058. Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, 135 S. Ct. 513, 514–15 (2014) (“respondents’ claim that the screenings are compensable because Integrity Staffing could have
reduced the time to a de minimis amount is properly presented at the bargaining table, not
to a court in an FLSA [Fair Labor Standards Act] claim”—this opinion effectively reversed
the presumption in all free societies that all work must be paid work, i.e., that one cannot by
contract or by lack of contract subject themselves to indentured servitude); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct., at 2423 (this case could only overrule Korematsu if the Court was willing to
admit that it was touching on the same subject—the Court refused to admit this, and so it
held that Korematsu “has been overruled in the court of history”—this is itself a strange
holding, and a departure from stare decisis which would have held the case as overruled in
the United States Court and not an imaginary court of history); id. at 2447 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (“Today’s holding is all the more troubling given the stark parallels between the
reasoning of this case and that of Korematsu.”); Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 544
(2013) (“Not only do States retain sovereignty under the Constitution, there is also a ‘fundamental principle of equal sovereignty’ among the States. . . . The Voting Rights Act sharply
departs from these basic principles.”) (citing Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 n.6 (1845)). Like
Shelby County, slavery cases like Dred Scott and The Antelope were also based in part upon
“the equal rank and rights” of each state with those “possessed by the others.” See Dred
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 490–92 (1857) (Opinion of Daniel, J.); The Antelope, 23 U.S.
66, 122 (1825) (“No principle of general law is more universally acknowledged than the perfect equality of nations.”).
1059. Hensley v. Municipal Court, San Jose, 411 U.S. 345, 350–51, n.8 (1973) (“Thus, we
have consistently rejected interpretations of the habeas corpus statute that would suffocate
the writ in stifling formalisms or hobble its effectiveness with the manacles of arcane and
scholastic procedural requirements.” The Court thus decided that Wales v. Whitney could be
disregarded, without overruling it.)—the strategy of disregarding without overruling did
not work, because Wales was resurrected in Padilla v. Rumsfeld.
1060. Hensley, 411 U.S. at 350–51, n.8 (“Insofar as former decisions [including Wales v.
Whitney], may indicate a narrower reading of the custody requirement, they may no longer
be deemed controlling. In none of the decisions on which we today rely . . . are these earlier
cases even cited in the opinions of the Court.”); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 437
(2004) (“Padilla seems to contend, and the dissent agrees, that because we no longer require
physical detention as a prerequisite to habeas relief, the immediate custodian rule, too,
must no longer bind us, even in challenges to physical custody. That argument, as the Seventh Circuit aptly concluded, is a ‘non sequitur.’ That our understanding of custody has
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firmatively overruled by common law stare decisis and awaiting
release from the underworld of U.S. history include: Minor, Plessy, and
Buck v. Bell.1061
The Supreme Court dogmatically vindicates the rights of corporations and disdains the rights of natural human beings; failing to
remember that King George III’s tyranny was based on the former and
the cause of the American Revolution was built on the latter.1062
Therefore, the the Roberts Court forgot that the first U.S. Supreme
Court refused to erode human rights with corporate rights by saying a
corporation is a “feigned and artificial person,” such that “we should
never forget that, in truth and nature, those who think and speak and
act are men.”1063 Citizens United and Hobby Lobby wantonly disowned

broadened to include restraints short of physical confinement does nothing to undermine
the rationale or statutory foundation of Wales’ immediate custodian rule where physical
custody is at issue.”).
1061. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205–08 (1927); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162,
165–66, 178 (1875); Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300, 304 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (demonstrating how to resurrect the dead past from its grave to destroy the rights of the American
Samoans) (citing Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404–05 (1857)). Cf. O’CONNOR, THE
MAJESTY, supra note 704, at 105 (strongly defending Oliver Wendell Holmes despite his
totalitarian opinion in Buck v. Bell saying, “But this is the part of Holmes’s jurisprudence
that exerts the least influence today. The Court has never cited Buck v. Bell, for instance, as
support for any important proposition. In this sense, then, this part of Holmes’s jurisprudence has indeed become ‘obscure’; it may still be recalled, but it no longer possesses any
vitality.”—This is not only a lie, but it is advocacy for the Court to choose the vindication of
a dead man’s legacy rather than overruling his opinions in cases presently arising before the
Court where the common law doctrine of stare decisis requires them to be overruled as unjust and violative of the rights of humankind.).
1062. Compare BG Group, PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1208–09 (2014),
and Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250, 2255 (2014), with Daimler
v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 141–42 (2014). Compare Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751,
2760 (2014), and Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 573 U.S. 958, 960 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting), with Employment Div. Dep’t of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
890 (1990). Cf. 2 WILSON, THE WORKS, supra note 113, at 426 (“A corporation is described to
be a person in a political capacity created by the law, to endure in perpetual succession. Of
these artificial persons a great variety is known to the law. They have been formed to promote and to perpetuate the interests of commerce, of learning, and of religion. It must be
admitted, however, that, in too many instances, those bodies politick have, in their progress,
counteracted the design of their original formation.”).
1063. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 455–56 (1793) (Opinion of Wilson, J.) (Finding
that a corporation, even one that embodies the State itself, “is an artificial person. It has its
affairs and its interests; it has its rules; it has its rights; and it has its obligations. It may
acquire property distinct from that of its members. It may incur debts to be discharged out
of the public stock, not out of the private fortunes of individuals. It may be bound by contracts, and for damages arising from the breach of those contracts. In all our
contemplations, however, concerning this feigned and artificial person, we should never forget that, in truth and nature, those who think and speak and act are men.”); THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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this wisdom of Chisholm, the Supreme Court’s oldest constitutional
precedent, in favor of judicial relativism.1064
These and other violations of the public trust by federal judges,
reflect the failure of even America’s highest federal jurists to understand the public interest origin of the powers of Congress, president,
and court.1065 For example, few remember that U.S. telecom law began
in response to the sinking of the RMS Titanic.1066 In the era the Titanic
sank, Congress recognized its duty to vindicate the public interest in
protecting mail delivery ships, and so Congress founded telecom law
upon a robust public interest standard to protect both domestic and
foreign postal administrators.1067
As telecom law and technology continued to flux and converge,
Congress imported terms from the common law of navigable waterways; specifically drawing the term “common carrier” from it.1068
Telecom companies are common carriers when they offer their services
1064. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 351 (2010) (analogizing corporate money to
natural human speech—since money funds the speech in question, the Court decided the
money itself has First Amendment protections attached to it); id. at 335 (going so far as to
compare FEC regulations to the royal copyright licenses of England circa the Sixteenth and
Seventeenth Centuries); Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 692–93 (where a natural person may
face federal charges under Smith for completing religious rites that involve controlled substances, Hobby Lobby allows private for-profit corporations to violate federal laws without
consequence).
1065. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 2–3 (U.S. 1776) (requiring that our
laws tend to secure each member of the public in their pursuit of happiness and to assent to
laws for “the public good”); U.S. CONST. pmbl. & art. VI, § 3 (noting that the oath of office is
a sign that government offices are held in “public trust”). Government seats in the United
States were always held in public trust. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 348, 602; THE FEDERALIST NO. 55 (Alexander Hamilton or
James Madison) (noting that government seats are held in public trust); PA. CONST. OF
1776, pt. 1, art. IV; VA. CONST. OF 1776, pt. 1, § 2; MD. CONST. OF 1776, pt. 1, art. 4; VT.
CONST. OF 1777, pt. 1, art. 5.
1066. Radio Act of 1912, Pub. L. No. 264, 37 Stat. 302 (repealed 1927). See Mathew
Lasar, How the Titanic Disaster Pushed Uncle Sam to Rule the Air, ARSTECHNICA (July 7,
2011, 5:00 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/07/did-the-titanic-disaster-let-uncle-sam-take-over-the-airwaves/.
1067. Radio Act of 1912, Pub. L. No. 264, 37 Stat. 302 (repealed 1927); Communications
Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064; Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
110 Stat. 56. See Smithsonian: National Postal Museum, Fire & Ice: Hindenburg and Titanic: Titanic’s Mail Clerks, https://postalmuseum.si.edu/exhibition/fire-ice-hindenburgand-titanic-exhibition-ice-the-titanic-disaster/titanic%E2%80%99s-mail-clerks (last visited
Aug. 8, 2021) (“Titanic had five sea post clerks aboard: three Americans and two British.”).
1068. 47 U.S.C. §§ 201–76 (1938); Bukton v. Tounesende or The Humber Ferry Case
[1348] KB 27/354, m. 85 (Eng.), in BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 15, at 399. See Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 130 (1876) (expounding common carrier common law to justify state
regulations); Carol Rose, supra note 244, at 771 n.284 (Professor Rose indicated that Munn
was an example of the Court’s acknowledgement and adjudication over what she termed
inherently public property—Rose’s groundbreaking work reliably set forth the principles by
which such inherently public property operates).
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to the public and are thus subject to robust, national regulation in the
public interest.1069 As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in Munn v.
Illinois,
Common carriers exercise a sort of public office, and have duties to
perform in which the public is interested. Their business is, therefore, “affected with a public interest,” within the meaning of the
doctrine which Lord Hale has so forcibly stated. But we need go no
further. Enough has already been said to show that, when private
property is devoted to a public use, it is subject to public
regulation.1070

National and international telecommunication companies including internet services are, as a matter of fact, common carriers covered by
federal law.1071 Under common carrier common law discussed in Brand
X, a court may require that internet service providers adhere to net
neutrality principles as a matter of public interest under the First
Amendment, Equal Protection Clause, and other portions of the U.S.
Constitution.1072
The court may also strike down, override, or ignore the FCC’s
recent classification of internet services, as non-common carrier ser-

1069. 47 U.S.C. §§ 201–76 (1938); Bukton v. Tounesende or The Humber Ferry Case
[1348] KB 27/354, m. 85 (Eng.), in BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 15, at 399 (this case appears to be the beginning of common carrier law); id. at 304 (Humber Ferry Case was
extended in Southcote’s Case [1601] 4 Co. Rep. 83b (Eng.)); id. at 416 (Southcote’s Case was
cited in Coggs v. Barnard [1703] KB 122/5, m. 435 (Eng.)); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1,
208–09 (1824) (invalidating a monopoly on the use of a steam engine in ferry boats operating in interstate commerce).
1070. Munn, 94 U.S. at 130.
1071. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 383–84 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Munn, 94 U.S.
at 130; 47 U.S.C. §§ 201–76.
1072. U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 383–84 (“The Act requires treating telecommunications providers as common carriers presumptively subject to the substantial regulatory
obligations attending that status. Common carriers, for instance, generally must afford neutral, nondiscriminatory access to their services, and must avoid unjust and unreasonable
practices in that connection.”) (citing National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand
X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 975–76 (2005)); id. at 388 (“An ISP has no First Amendment right to engage in those kinds of practices” that violate net neutrality principles.);
Munn, 94 U.S. at 130; 47 U.S.C. §§ 201–76. See U.S. Const. amends. I, V, XIV; Schroeder,
Choosing, supra note 485, at 50 (the three basic net neutrality principles are (1) transparency, (2) no blocking, and (3) no unreasonable discrimination against websites and
content—these simple principles could be adopted by the court in the public interest); Brodkin, supra note 585. Cf. Congressional Review Act, Pub. L. No.104–121, 110 Stat. 847 (1996)
(the Senate voted to undo the FCC reversal of net neutrality, but there were not enough
votes in the House); Harper Neidig, FCC chairman applauds Congress for not reinstating
net neutrality, THE HILL (Jan. 2, 2019, 2:05 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/
423533-fcc-chair-applauds-congress-for-not-reinstating-net-neutrality.
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vices; according to a de novo review of the facts.1073 Indeed, the
Supreme Court recently preserved a role for the States in regulating
the internet in lieu of the federal government; whenever the federal
government fails to regulate.1074 Under cy pres doctrine, courts may
seek to divest telecom networks from corporations that violate the public trust upon which private corporate interests in public
communications networks were originally granted.1075
Private rights of telecom companies to monopolize and monetize
U.S. telecom networks originally sprang from the public trust for the
security of our mail sent and received over the Atlantic.1076 Unlike the
old copyright and patent systems of England, that were all choked by
the weeds of feudal power, U.S. telecom law was never besieged by any
sort of feudal pretense.1077 The public interest in common law copyright must, therefore, also sound in the regulation of telecom
networks.1078
Even so, most valid public interest suits will not survive the arbitrary legal theories of Griswold and Murray’s Lessee.1079 For
1073. FCC Restoring Internet Freedom, 83 Fed. Reg. 7852–7922 (Feb. 22, 2018) (to be
codified at 47 C.F.R. pts 1, 8, and 20) (repealing FCC net neutrality rules); U.S. Telecom
Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 383–84, 388–89 (refusing to interpret the First Amendment as a full bar
to net neutrality rules); Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 387–88 (1969)
(demonstrating how First Amendment rights to access broadcasts can be extended to networks like the internet, which may include a form of equitably administered net neutrality
rules); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 346 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) (common law
copyright protection of letters sent through the postal service can be extended to emails and
other internet communications); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932) (this case calls
for a de novo review of agency rules and adjudications wherever fundamental rights
depend).
1074. Mozilla v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“in any area where the Commission
lacks the authority to regulate, it equally lacks the power to preempt state law,” striking
down the FCC’s attempt to preempt state net neutrality laws for being ultra vires).
1075. See infra note 1084 and accompanying text.
1076. Radio Act of 1912, Pub. L. No. 264, 37 Stat. 302 (repealed 1927) (this law, which
became the standard for telecommunication laws, was enacted after the sinking of the RMS
Titanic, because life saving ships were in radio distance from the Titanic but there were no
regulations to facilitate distress calls at the time).
1077. Id.; Millar v. Taylor [1769] 4 Burr. 2303, 2314 (Eng.).
1078. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 346 (protecting the privacy interests of George Washington in
his letters official and private as a descendible and assignable right, individually suable,
and implied into federal law); Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110
Stat. 56; Proceedings in the Lords on the Question of Literary Property [in Donaldson v.
Becket], Feb. 4–22, 1774, in 17 THE PARLIAMENTARY, supra note 579, at 992–1001 (Argument
of Lord Camden) (the reason Lord Camden argued that the Statute of Anne took away common law copyright was because in England copyright was besieged by feudal law—this logic
simply cannot work in the United States).
1079. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965); Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken
Land & Imp. Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1855).
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Murray’s Lessee requires that public rights be secured solely through
congressional law, and Griswold snuffed out the light of the Ninth
Amendment in favor of its penumbra.1080 The general result is a court
that conflates fact and law and abandons stare decisis; all to appease
the liberal cowards of Griswold and the slaveholding rebels of Murray’s
Lessee.1081
The public interests of every individual person’s fullest possible
access and participation in telecom networks is a public good intended
to be secured through the courts.1082 The court is meant to secure common law common carrier goals of minimizing barriers to access,
ensuring universal service, and preserving net neutrality.1083 Wherever private owners of properties created in public trust violate the
1080. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 487–91 (Goldberg, J., concurring); Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. at
284.
1081. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483; Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. at 282–84. See, e.g., Oil States
Energy Servs. v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1371–72, 1375 (2018) (denying its
jurisdiction over patent invalidation suits due to the America Invents Act—ensuring that
there will be potentially no patent invalidation case that will go to a jury again) (citing
Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. at 284); Teva Pharm.’s USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318,
323–28 (2015) (the Seventh Amendment concern in Markman hearings regarding the judiciary’s decision to make judges rather than juries factfinder regarding the metes and
bounds of patents, though swatted away by this Court like a mosquito, was the most important concern at issue in Teva—it was similarly swatted away like a pest in Oil States—the
Court’s impatience with attempts to claim a right to a jury over facts involving patents is
likely due to the court’s knowing decision not to respect an express constitutional right—
this inspires the court to create a scattershot of bad precedent that refuses to admit any
association with other similar precedents so that there is no clear line of precedent to overrule, consider, or to even discuss).
1082. Carol Rose, supra note 244, at 770 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824);
Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 953–54 (1982)); Red Lion Broad. Co.,
Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 387–88 (1969); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 346 (C.C.D. Mass.
1841) (No. 4,901).
1083. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 387–88; Susan Crawford, America Needs More Fiber,
WIRED (Feb. 8, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/america-needs-more-fiber.
(making the case for nationalizing telecommunications without calling it “nationalization”);
Matt Stevens, Verizon Throttled California Firefighters’ Internet Speeds Amid Blaze (They
Were Out of Data), N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/22/us/verizon-throttling-california-fire-net-neutrality.html; Josh Horwitz, The Trump Team’s Idea to
Counter China with Nationalized 5G is Just what China Would Do, QUARTZ (Jan. 28, 2018),
https://qz.com/1191154/the-trump-teams-idea-to-counter-china-with-nationalized-5g-isjust-what-china-would-do/ (citing a Trump Administration memo suggesting a nationalized
telecommunications system). Cf. The Kingsbury Commitment [Dec. 19, 1913] (to avoid antitrust suit, AT&T abdicated its attempts to monopolize without regard to the public trust
protected by the U.S. Government, including a guarantee of universal service); Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 214(e), 254(e) (creating the Universal Service Fund to
subsidize telecommunications companies for extending basic telephone service “so far as
possible, to all the people of the United States, without discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, national origin, or sex, a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire
and radio communications service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges”).
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public trust, the court may reform the public trust under cy pres doctrine to better serve the public.1084
The nature of government regulation of property held in the
public trust should modulate on a case by case basis, with the public
interest in the property at issue.1085 If a private property right is suffered in inherently public property, it ought to be subject to strong
antitrust regulation.1086 Violations of antitrust law are punishable concurrently under both common and positive laws and are justiciable to
protect most members of the public who can show that they are the
intended beneficiaries of public property rights.1087
1084. See James Madison, Detatched Memoranda, ca., Jan. 31, 1820 (Noting that the
plans for a national bank were objected to as a monopoly, and that it would therefore be
held in public trust, revocable, and highly regulated by the government: “As a remedial Plan
of a Bank the Directors might be . . . disabled from holding Bank Stock & from borrowing
directly or indirectly from the Institution, and might take a customary Oath of Office. Under
these regulations, they might without bias, at least without the temptations before them,
exercise the functions required from them & fulfill the ends of the Institution.”). The Court
has a wide latitude to safeguard property held in public trust, including telecom networks,
patents, and copyrights. Perin v. Carey, 65 U.S. 465, 497, 506–08 (1860) (“All property held
for public purposes is held as a charitable use, in the legal sense of the term charity.”);
Jennifer Anglim Kreder, The “Public Trust”, 18 J. OF CONST. L. 1425, 1463 (2016) (“The cy
pres doctrine ‘allows the court to change the terms for the gift while remaining as close as
possible to the donor’s original charitable purpose.’”) (quoting Patty Gerstenblith, Acquisition and Deacquisition of Museum Collections and the Fiduciary Obligations of Museums to
the Public, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 409, 421–22 (2003)); Edith L. Fisch, The Cy Pres
Doctrine and Changing Philosophies, 51 MICH. L. REV. 375, 375–77, 388 (1953) (giving a
history of cy pres from Justinian all the way through to the time when the Courts started
applying the doctrine frequently); Hope M. Babcock, The Public Trust Doctrine: What a Tall
Tale They Tell, 61 S.C. L. REV. 393 (2009) (“Despite continuing hostility towards the public
trust doctrine because of its potential to defeat private property rights and the will of
elected representatives, the doctrine refuses to die.”); U.S. CONST. pmbl. (stating that the
entire government is created by the people for the protection, tranquility, social justice, welfare, and freedom of the people); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES § 459 (noting that the entire U.S. Constitution should be interpreted in
the light of the preamble, such that an interpretation that runs against it should not be
permitted); U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
1085. See, e.g., Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 394 (“differences in the characteristics of new media
justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them”).
1086. Public property exists in our town squares, roads, bridges, railroads, airways,
sewer systems, garbage dumps, energy, water, telecommunications networks including the
air, access routes to navigable waterways. Carol Rose, supra note 244, at 770 (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S.; Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 953–54 (1982)). But see
Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City Corp., 425 F.3d 1249, 1256 (10th Cir. 2005) (this
decision defies the entire idea of public property, which cannot be purchased away from the
public by paying a city for it if the city’s sale is against the public interest—Salt Lake City’s
sale of its historic town square to the Mormon Church was emphatically against the public’s
interest and it clearly violates their First Amendment rights of the public, which the city is
bound to protect.).
1087. See Evan Caminker, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L. J. 341,
343 (1989) (This article discusses the False Claims Act as part of the “trend towards policing
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To find the proper line between the realms of public and private
property, Americans must repair once more to the marvelous song of
Phillis Wheatley.1088 For knowledge and learning in science and the
arts are inherently public goods, of which Wheatley was the chief advocate in her day.1089 Phillis Wheatley was the first to create private
property out of a public commons; something John Locke dreamed of
but never himself accomplished.1090
The ways in which matters of race, gender, and religion touch
upon the rights and interests of authorship and copyright, were wondrously expounded by Phillis Wheatley on behalf of each American.1091
Americans are the fortunate beneficiaries of her work; undertaken in

the public interest through citizens’ suits.”); 1 WILSON, THE WORKS, supra note 113, at 50
(“Property is of two kinds; publick and private. Under publick property, common highways,
common bridges, common rivers, common ports are included. In the United States, and in
the states composing the Union, there is much land belonging to the publick.”). But see
Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 276 (2007) (“the securities law
impliedly precludes the application of the antitrust laws”). See generally 3 EDWARD COKE,
INSTITUTES *181 (explaining that antitrust is a robust common law, that is and should be
concurrently secured by the positive laws); The Sherman Act, Pub. L. No. 51-647, 26 Stat.
209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–15); The Clayton Act, Pub. L.No. 63-323,
38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27); The False Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 3767, 12 Stat. 696 (1863) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 317, 322 (1819) (this case was essentially brought as an action of debt
under a Maryland qui tam statute, but John James’ standing to sue in federal court was
entirely implied by the federal courts into the Judiciary Act, and this ground for standing
must still exist).
1088. John Rochfort, The Answer [by the Gentleman of the Navy] [1774] (“For softer
strains we quickly must repair / To Wheatly’s [sic] song, for Wheatly [sic] is the fair; / That
has the art, which art could ne’er acquire: / To dress each sentence with seraphic fire.”).
1089. Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772,] in WHEATLEY, supra
note 821, at 7; Phillis Wheatley’s Registration, Sept. 10, 1773, TSC/1/E/06/09, Register of
entries of copies 1746–1773. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13,
1813). Cf. Schroeder, Choosing, supra note 485, at 56–57.
1090. 2 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 27; Justin Hughes, Locke’s 1694
Memorandum (and more incomplete copyright historiographies), 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 555, 559–63 (2010); Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772,] in
WHEATLEY, supra note 821, at 7; Phillis Wheatley’s Registration, Sept. 10, 1773, TSC/1/E/
06/09, Register of entries of copies 1746–1773. See 2 WILSON, THE WORKS, supra note 113, at
105 (Commenting upon precisely the type of work that Phillis Wheatley undertook, bringing
Locke’s vision into completion for the first time for literary property, and concluding that
the same principle applies “in the acquisition of property of every other kind” such that it
should be given an “exclusive right, as is given and decreed to those who bestow their labour
in any other manner.”).
1091. Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772,] in WHEATLEY, supra
note 821, at 7; Phillis Wheatley’s Registration, Sept. 10, 1773, TSC/1/E/06/09, Register of
entries of copies 1746–1773 (Phillis Wheatley’s copyright was thus secured through English
law, unlike William Billings or anyone else in America, because no author in America had
access to a legal process for copyrighting their works at that time).
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the wake of William Billings’ legal failures.1092 By Wheatley’s marvelous successes in securing her rights, American laws were held to grant
“by implication to the author, or legal proprietor of any manuscript
whatever, the sole right to print and publish the same.”1093
As James Wilson wrote, the copyright vindicated by Phillis
Wheatley during the American Revolution applies “in the acquisition
of property of every other kind.”1094 The work undertaken by such an
author confers the same “exclusive right, as is given and decreed to
those who bestow their labour in any other manner.”1095 Without Phillis Wheatley, the Americans, and perhaps the entire world, would have
no example of pure Lockean property creation to aspire to.1096
Therefore, if Americans are to continue as a nation of individuals that create private property out of the public weal, Americans
should submit to the conditions upon creating private property set out
by the founder who established it, i.e., Phillis Wheatley1097 The public
1092. Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772,] in WHEATLEY, supra
note 821, at 7; JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF MASSACHUSETTS 1772–1773,
at 134–35, 137 (1980); SIMMONS, supra note 31, at 9; Millar v. Taylor [1769] 4 Burr. 2303,
2314, 2337–38 (Eng.) (citing MILTON, AREOPAGITICA, supra note 259, at 187); John Milton’s
Publishing Contract for Paradise Lost, Apr. 27, 1667.
1093. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 347 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). See Letter
from Phillis Wheatley to David Wooster (Oct. 18, 1773) (“Since my return to America my
Master, has at the desire of my friends in England given me my freedom. . . . I am now upon
my own footing and whatever I get by this [sale of books] is entirely mine, & it is the Chief I
have to depend upon.”—Wheatley was made free to be the proprietor of her own works! No
one including privileged, white men in America had this freedom when she first acheived
it.).
1094. 2 WILSON, THE WORKS, supra note 113, at 105.
1095. Id. See Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772,] in WHEATLEY,
supra note 821, at 7; Phillis Wheatley’s Registration, Sept. 10, 1773, TSC/1/E/06/09, Register of entries of copies 1746–1773.
1096. Compare 2 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT § 27, with Thomas
Hutchinson, C.J., et al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772,] in WHEATLEY, supra note 821, at 7, and
Phillis Wheatley’s Registration, Sept. 10, 1773, TSC/1/E/06/09, Register of entries of copies
1746–1773. Cf. LANDERS, supra note 912, at 217 (noting her influence extended into Latin
America).
1097. 2 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT § 27; Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et
al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772,] in WHEATLEY, supra note 821, at 7; Phillis Wheatley’s Registration, Sept. 10, 1773, TSC/1/E/06/09, Register of entries of copies 1746–1773. See
Schroeder, The Body, supra note 121, at 28–30 (noting that prior to the American Revolution, “The people of Britannia, who were not granted titles and land, were owned incident to
the land as trees and rocks are owned.”); id. at 9 (noting Phillis Wheatley’s precient leadership in America to help the entire English empire resist slavery). Cf. 2 WILSON, THE WORKS,
supra note 113, at 105 (by placing literary property as the prime example of Lockean property creation Wilson revealed that Wheatley accomplished the deed that established the
beginning of property law in America); Mark Rose, supra note 907, at 54 (“‘It was not for
Gain, that Bacon, Newton, Milton, Locke, instructed and delighted the World; it would be
unworthy such Men to traffic with a dirty Bookseller for so much as a Sheet of Letter-press.
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interest objects of property creation set forth by Phillis Wheatley include: the expansion of our minds and souls, the rights of life to earn a
living wage, to engage in free trade and travel, and the freedoms of
speech and worship.1098 Her goals echoed those of Coke, Milton, and
Locke, but Wheatley added her own twist on their earlier
expositions.1099
When the Bookseller offered Milton Five Pounds for his Paradise Lost, he did not reject it,
and commit his Poem to the Flames, nor did he accept the miserable Pittance as the Reward
of his Labor; he knew that the real price of his Work was Immortality, and that Posterity
woudl pay it.’”) (quoting Lord Camden in Donaldson v. Becket, confirming that the law of
England did not give authors literary property in their own works; the quote Professor Rose
repeated is here: 17 THE PARLIAMENTARY, supra note 579, at 1000).
1098. Wheatley’s causes of creating literary property in her poems are found in her letters and the poems themselves; a nonexhaustive showing follows: Phillis Wheatley, To the
Right Honorable William, Earl of Dartmouth [1773] (the Earl of Dartmouth was made English Secretary of State in 1772, which put him in charge of running all the English
American colonies, and Wheatley successfully delivered this poem to him through a man
named Thomas Wooldridge—in the poem that was delivered to the top government official
over America at the time, Wheatley placed her primary purposes for writing poetry, because
at the time she sought to vindicate her right and ability to publish her forthcoming book,
her writing this poem directly in front of Wooldridge occurred directly prior to her trial and
was published about in the papers—in this poem she basically puts words in the Earl of
Dartmouth’s mouth stating how he would end slavery “[n]o longer shalt thou dread the iron
chain,” and then she explained “[w]hence flow these wishes for the common good” and stated
that it came from her experience being kidnapped and enslaved and that by writing her
poetry she hoped that “[o]thers may never feel tyrannic sway”—she vitally connected the
idea that her free speech and expression would be part of what unchained American slaves
from their slavery, and that through it the top leaders of either English or American government would comply and establish justice); Phillis Wheatley, An Hymn to Humanity [1773]
(exercising her own freedom of worship to witness a message from God the father to Christ
or Prometheus stating “Descend to earth, there place thy throne / To succour man’s afflicted
son / Each human heart inspire”—the ingeniousness of this verse, which is vague enough to
read into it both Christian and ancient Greek symbolism of fire coming down from heaven to
fill humanity with inspiration, contemporaneously revealed that the poetry Wheatley was
writing was this fire from heaven—Wheatley herself is Christ-like or Prometheus-like and
is inspiring humanity); Phillis Wheatley, To the University of Cambridge [1767] (Wheatley
exhorted Harvard students to “[i]mprove your privileges while they stay”—she wrote at
length about how “sons of science” should keep studying and learning, and her poetry
cheered them on to new discoveries); Phillis Wheatley, On Being Brought from Africa to
America [1773] (presenting her belief that the possibility of the salvation of any human
being proved the equality of all humans); Phillis Wheatley, Liberty & Peace [1784] (celebrating free trade and the expansion of knowledge and learning brought about by the American
Revolution); Letter from Phillis Wheatley to David Wooster (Oct. 18, 1773) (noting her existence as an author whose entire subsistence was based upon the sale of her books).
1099. Compare Letter from Phillis Wheatley to David Wooster (Oct. 18, 1773), with 3
EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *181, and MILTON, AREOPAGITICA, supra note 259, at 187. See
Karla V. Zelaya, Sweat the Technique: Visible-izing Praxis Through Mimicry in Phillis
Wheatley’s “On Being Brought from Africa to America” 51 (2015) (Ph.D. dissertation) (available on Scholarworks of University of Massachusetts, Amherst) (“Phillis Wheatley actively
illustrated in her poems—particularly in ‘On Being Brought from Africa to America’—that
‘it ain’t about what you cop, it’s about what you keep’ (‘Final Hour’). Her poems were not
blind and unquestioning acts of absorption and regurgitation of ‘white bourgeois sentiment
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The property rights enjoyed by Phillis Wheatley extended to her
in her capacity as a working woman, mother, wife, African, former
slave, and a person who spoke English as a second language.1100 It is a
wonder that she imported the rights expounded in the Case and Statute of Monopolies into the United States for the benefit of all.1101 For
she did this on behalf of the individual and against the rights of the
monopolist so Americans might make something of their own to
enjoy.1102
Phillis Wheatley wondrously convinced the English speaking
world that the author, rather than the government or proprietor, is the
font of all copyrights.1103 Constitutional avoidance doctrine and the
rule in Dr. Foster’s Case overlap in the construction of copyright and
patent laws to ensure the correct application of the “authors and inven-

and understanding’ but dexterous sleights of hand that made it appear as if she had uncritically ‘copped’ or taken the literary ‘hand-me-downs’ of her age. She knew that ‘the captors
owned the masters of what [she was] writing’ but with each act of copping—with each ‘sip’
from the literary chalice of whiteness that she took, she ‘[baptized] her lips’—making everything anew. Her poetic mask may have grinned, but it also bared lies.”) (quoting from
Lauryn Hill, Final Hour (1998)).
1100. WHEATLEY, supra note 821, at 5–7; Phillis Wheatley, On Being Brought from Africa
to America [1773].
1101. Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772,] in WHEATLEY, supra
note 821, at 7; Phillis Wheatley’s Registration, Sept. 10, 1773, TSC/1/E/06/09, Register of
entries of copies 1746–1773; The Case of Monopolies [1602] 11 Co. Rep. 84b (Eng.); Statute
of Monopolies 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (Eng.). See 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *181–83.
1102. Wheatley stood up against the worst monopolists—the slave traders—whom she
called “our modern Egyptians” in reference to the Israelite Exodus. Letter from Phillis
Wheatley to Samson Occom (Feb. 11, 1774). These are the same rights of life that Coke
vindicated for the English people. 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *181. James Otis and the
American Revolutionaries conspicuously agreed with Wheatley about this. OTIS, supra note
18, at 147 (“That the colonists, black and white, born here, are free born British subjects,
and entitled to all the essential civil rights of such, is a truth not only manifest from the
provincial charters, from the principles of the common law, and acts of parliament; but from
the British constitution, which was reestablished at the revolution [i.e., the so called Glorious Revolution of 1688], with a professed design to lecture the liberties of all the subjects to
all generations.”—Soon after Otis said this it became clear that England did not agree that
these common law rights were meant for all British subjects in the world, and the founders
reasserted that the purpose of immigrating to America was to preserve them against British
abuse.).
1103. Matilda, On Reading the Poems of Phillis Wheatley, the African Poetess [1796]. See
Zach Petrea, An Untangled Web: Mapping Phillis Wheatley’s Network of Support in America
and Great Britain, in NEW ESSAYS ON PHILLIS WHEATLEY 297 (John C. Shields & Eric D.
Lamore eds., 2011) (attesting that Wheatley’s “work also appeared in Ireland, Scotland,
Sweden, Germany, England, and even France”—and we are still peicing together the full
extent of Wheatley’s influence abroad, but we know she had a worldwide effect); LANDERS,
supra note 912, at 217 (appearing to show that Professor Petrea’s estimation of Wheatley’s
global effect was also too conservative, citing evidence of Wheatley’s book in Latin America
as well).
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tors” requirement of the Patent & Copyright Clause.1104 Thus, the
inherent authorial and inventor’s rights, as opposed to those of the proprietor or head of state, was strongly vindicated by implication into the
federal laws by Justice Story in Folsom.1105
The inherent, preexisting rights of inventors and authors to the
works of their own hands remain, as regarded in Coke’s Institutes, the
common root of IP and antitrust law.1106 The right of authorial attribution is Phillis Wheatley’s right to make a living; i.e., the very right of
life and the primary policy goal defended by Coke’s vision of antitrust
law.1107 Preexisting literary property rights are like any other private
property right, because they sound in the common law and are secured
by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments; and ultimately by the separation of powers, which are examined below.1108
Federal Antitrust Common Law
The foundations of the Republic are fixed upon the principles of
“the consent of the governed” and no taxation without representation
that were derived from common law.1109 The common law that formed
1104. 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *181; THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison) (“The
copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain, to be a right at common
law.”). See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346–48 (1936); Dr. Foster’s Case [1614] 11 Co.
Rep. 56b, 62b–63a (Eng.).
1105. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 347 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
1106. 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *181; Folsom, 9 F. Cas., at 347. The spirit of both
Constitutional Avoidance and the rule against implied repeals in Dr. Foster’s Case is essentially the same—in each, the Judiciary is presuming that the Legislature would not
unwittingly or accidentally destroy preexisting rights. The only significant difference is that
if the Legislature did repeal a common law right under Dr. Foster’s Case the Legislature
would repeal the law or right, but under Constitutional Avoidance the Court must finally
overrule the law in favor of the preexisting right protected by the overriding constitution.
Compare Dr. Foster’s Case [1614] 11 Co. Rep. 56b, 62b–63a (Eng.), with Ashwander, 297
U.S. at 346–48.
1107. Compare Letter from Phillis Wheatley to David Wooster (Oct. 18, 1773) (noting
that she was a fully-fledged author expecting to make her living solely on her works), with 3
EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *181 (noting it is a fundamental right of life to be able to earn a
living). This right can be extended in future cases under the international common law
affirmed in Kirtsaeng, because Wheatley’s right was applied to books imported from England to which she firmly requested that others not violate to protect her rights to life, and
to our knowledge the printing presses of America respected her request for a limited time so
that she could monetize her work. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519,
538–39 (2013) (quoting 1 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *223).
1108. U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V.
1109. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (all just laws arise from
the consent of the governed); SIMMONS, supra note 31, at 2 (the remedy for disposing of
unjust laws adopted by the Americans from Paxton’s Case going forward was, in part, “to
confer on the judiciary the power to declare unconstitutional statutes void”); U.S. CONST.
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the basis of the legitimacy of all law in the United States may also be
referred to as federal antitrust common law.1110 For common law of
antitrust in the United States was borne of the revolution as a rejection of English monarchy,
King George III, like James I, imposed a double burden on his people by both taxing his people directly and by indirectly taxing them
through the issuance of royal monopolies. The colonists were both
taxed on imports and subjected to British control over foreign trade
without representation in Parliament.1111

Thus, even while the American colonists contended common law was
transplanted by the first colonists to America as “the ‘palladium of
their civil liberties,’ ” they nevertheless created their own bases of
American antitrust common law that inhered in the principle of no taxation without representation.1112 For it was by any means necessary
that American Revolutionaries ultimately secured their natural rights
and extended them to posterity by common, positive, and natural
laws.1113
As Justice Story wrote in his Commentaries, the Declaration
was treated as paramount law and accordingly the first U.S. Supreme
Court overruled feudal law in America.1114 The Marshall Court afpmbl.; JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 158
(noting that the common law “protected our infant liberties, it has watched over our mature
growth, it has expanded with our wants, it has nurtured that spirit of independence which
checked the first approaches of arbitrary power, it has enabled us to triumph in the midst of
difficulties and dangers threatening our political existence; and, by the goodness of God, we
are now enjoying, under its bold and manly principles, the blessings of a free, independent,
and united government.”).
1110. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); SIMMONS, supra note 31,
at 2; U.S. CONST. pmbl.
1111. Calabresi & Leibowitz, supra note 1016, at 1008.
1112. Id. at 1005 (quoting Theodore F.T. Plucknett, Bonham’s Case and Judicial Review,
40 HARV. L. REV. 30, 62 (1926)); Eric M. Freedman, Milestones in Habeas Corpus: Part I, 51
ALA. L. REV. 531, 587 (2000) (“As William R. Casto accurately states, the Judiciary Act was
written in a world in which all lawyers ‘believed [that] the common law existed independently from the state. Neither kings nor legislators nor even judges were necessary to create
the common law. Instead, it was part of the law of nature. . . . [having] existence outside and
independent of the court.’”) (quoting WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY
REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 34–35 (1995)).
1113. Markham, Jr., supra note 950, at 460–62; THE CASE OF ELIZABETH RUTGERS, supra
note 131, at 14–15; Almy v. Harris, 5 Johns 175, 175–76 (N.Y., 1809); Harford v. United
States, 12 U.S. 109, 109–10 (1814); Case v. Humphrey, 6 Conn. 130, 141 (1826) (citing Dr.
Foster’s Case [1614] 11 Co. Rep. 56b, 62b–63a (Eng.)); SEDGWICK, supra note 950, at 127;
Cope v. Cope, 137 U.S. 682, 686 (1891). Cf. Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936)
(quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
1114. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 211;
The Bankers Case [1696] 14 How. St. Tr. 1, 32 (Eng.), distinguished and delegitimized by
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firmed this common law in Marbury v. Madison,1115 but controversially
issued doubts of federal common law in Johnson v. McIntosh;1116 followed by Wheaton v. Peters.1117 Building on these doubts, the Taney
Court attempted to redefine property without common law; ultimately
triggering the Civil War.1118
The Taney Court attempt to administer general federal law devoid of common law rights was a feudal reversion.1119 Indeed, shortly
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 470 (1793) (Opinion of Jay, C.J.) (citing THE DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776)).
1115. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803) (applying the common law from Dr.
Bonham’s Case as the lynch pin in our system of constitutional law). See McGirt v.
Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2459, 2477 (2020) (extending Worcester to find, “On the far end
of the Trail of Tears was a promise.”) (citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 557 (1832));
Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1400 (2020).
1116. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 594–600 (1823) (relying upon Campbell v.
Hall—a case overruled by the U.S. social compact under the maxim no taxation without
representation, a holding disputed on the field of battle during the American Revolution for
blocking potentially all common law rights outside of the physical borders of England; the
shameful implications of Johnson, which essentially sided with the English understanding
of American rights rather than the American understanding, were soon felt when the Court
decided Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, allowing greedy Georgians to steal federally appropriated Cherokee lands, to force them down the Trail of Tears to what is present day
Oklahoma. Regret was, perhaps, felt when Georgia started locking up white, male missionaries among the Cherokee people, but once it decided Worcester v. Georgia, which finally
readopted the American conception of rights, it was too little, too late.).
1117. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 658 (1834) (expressing doubts in obiter dictum as
to whether common law copyright exists in the United States by virtue of its crossing the
Atlantic with the original Colonists—the Court nevertheless held that there was an assignable and descendible literary property right in an author’s manuscript).
1118. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 401, 430 (1856) (Opinion of Taney, C.J.) (“But,
in making this objection, we think the peculiar and limited jurisdiction of courts of the
United States has not been adverted to. This peculiar and limited jurisdiction has made it
necessary, in these courts, to adopt different rules and principles of pleading, so far as jurisdiction is concerned from those which regulate courts of common law in England and in the
different States of the Union which have adopted the common law rules. . . . The case of
Capron v. Van Noorden strikingly illustrates the difference between a common law court
and a court of the United States.” Then, citing to Capron, which dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the Court ordered Dred Scott’s case reversed because Dred Scott was a slave and not
a citizen and thus could not fit into the jurisdiction provided by the Judiciary Act, which
required diversity jurisdiction between two citizens.).
1119. Id. at 485–86 (Opinion of Daniel, J.) (denying the rule from Somerset’s Case because it only applied to slaves within the realm of England—this is exactly the holding the
English applied to deny American rights during the revolution, and the American Revolutionaries vigorously asserted that common law rights did extend to America by virtue of
Magna Charta—Dred Scott thus ironically matched the feudal holdings from Cowle and
Donaldson, which denied common law copyright and the privilege of habeas corpus to Scotland because it is outside the realm of England, and Campbell, which asserted England’s
right of conquest on Grenada to justify taxing it without representation). Cf. Campbell v.
Hall [1774] 1 Cowp. 206, 208 (Eng.) (“An Englishman in Ireland, Minorca, the Isle of Man,
or the plantations, has no privilege distinct from the natives.”); 20 HOWELL, supra note 802,
at 289 (“‘It is absurd, that in the colonies they should carry all the laws of England with
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before the Civil War broke out, Chief Justice Taney applied a feudal
pretext in Ex parte Merryman, while ironically chastising Lincoln; and
comparing Lincoln to the King of England.1120 Chief Justice Taney’s
boldness in asserting the judicial power was not wrong, but his interpretations of the U.S. Constitution were so affected with feudalism
that they cannot be trusted as legitimate.1121
them . . . .’”) (statement of Lord Mansfield during the trial of Campbell). But see OTIS, supra
note 18, at 16 (“The people of this province formerly upon a particular occasion asserted the
rights of englishmen; and they did it with a sober, manly spirit: they were then in an insulting manner asked ‘whether english rights were to follow them to the ends of the earth’—we
are now told, that the rights we contend for ‘do not belong to the English’—these writs, it is
said, ‘are frequently issued from the exchequer at home, and executed, and the people do not
complain of it—and why should we desire more freedom than they have in the mother country . . . .”) (quoting Jeremiah Dummer, A Defence of the New-England Charters 8, 23 [1715]
(Speaking of English oppressors of America: “And to complete the oppression, when they
upon their trial claimed the rights of Englishmen, they were scoffingly told, those things
would not follow them to the ends of the earth. Unnatural insult; must the brave adventurer,
who with the hazard of his life and fortune, seeks out new climates to enrich his mother
country, be denied those common rights, which his countrymen enjoy at home in ease and
indolence? Is he to be made miserable, and a slave by his own acquisitions? Is the laborer
alone unworthy of his hire, and shall they only reap, who have neither sowed nor planted?
Monstrous absurdity! Horrid inverted order!”)).
1120. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 150 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487) (Opinion of
Taney, C.J.) (following habeas corpus law as provided by Sir William Blackstone saying,
“The great and inestimable value of the [Habeas Corpus Act 1679] is, that it contains provisions which compel courts and judges, and all parties concerned, to perform their duties
promptly, in the manner specified in the statute,” and finding that the Fifth Amendment “is
nothing more than a copy of a like provision in the English constitution, which had been
firmly established before the declaration of independence”) (citing Habeas Corpus Act 1679,
31 Car. 2 c. 2 (Eng.); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *137)); id. at 152 n.3 (in Merryman, Chief Justice Taney stated that “the people of the United States are no longer living
under a government of laws,” because President Lincoln like “‘(the king) had affected to
render the military independent of, and superior to, the civil power’”).
1121. Dred Scott, 60 U.S., at 423 (Taney attempted to rewrite the U.S. social compact so
that “the African race were not included . . . and were not in the contemplation of the framers of the Constitution.”). See OTIS, supra note 18, at 147 (“That the colonists, black and
white, born here, are free born British subjects, and entitled to all the essential civil rights
of such, is a truth not only manifest from the provincial charters, from the principles of the
common law, and acts of parliament; but from the British constitution, which was reestablished at the revolution [i.e., the so called Glorious Revolution of 1688], with a professed
design to lecture the liberties of all the subjects to all generations.”); Letter from George
Washington to Phillis Wheatley (Feb. 28, 1776) (“If you should ever come to Cambridge, or
near Head Quarters, I shall be happy to see a person so favored by the Muses, and to whom
nature has been so liberal and beneficent in her dispensations. I am, with great Respect,
Your obedt humble servant.”); FOR LOVE OF LIBERTY: THE STORY OF AMERICA’S BLACK PATRIOTS, part 1 (PBS 2010) (Southern slaveholders did not seem to mind when they avoided the
requirements of fighting in the Revolutionary War by allowing their slaves to fight for them
in exchange for their freedom—the idea that those who fought in the American Revolution
to free themselves from slavery were not included in the minds of the founders and that the
cowards who would not fight were included simply because they were white is about one of
the most horrible and contracted opinions that one could have, but that was Taney’s opinion
and the South attempted to secede based upon it.).
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This does not mean that all Taney Court opinions are wrong,
nor does it mean that there is nothing to learn from reading these opinions.1122 For example, the opinion of Chief Justice Taney in Holmes v.
Jennison helped inspire The Amistad and Ex parte Milligan.1123 Indeed, Taney’s rationale from Holmes could be extended to invalidate
the U.K. – U.S.A. Communication Intelligence Agreement (“UKUSA
Agreement”), also known as the “five eyes” agreement, for selling out
U.S. communications to foreign nations without a treaty.1124
That said, the Taney Court’s restriction of the U.S. social compact in Dred Scott inspired The Slaughterhouse Cases to subvert and
misconstrue federal antitrust common law under the consent of the
governed and no taxation without representation.1125 The Slaughterhouse Court, thus, upheld a monopoly merely because it was made by a
State legislature in which the plaintiffs were represented.1126 The U.S.
social compact was meant to be the floor of antitrust common law, but
Slaughterhouse made it into a limitation; a ceiling,
But it is to be observed that all such references are to monopolies
established by the monarch in derogation of the rights of his sub1122. However, there are things that the Taney Court got objectively and provably
wrong, including that in Dred Scott it overruled the Missouri Compromise after it was already repealed by Congress, and it misrepresented Justice Chase’s words in Ware v. Hylton
to insinuate that there was not real Union established by the Declaration of Independence—and that’s just Dred Scott. Taney’s reading of the law as full of obvious mistakes as
his colleagues readings were, which is a simple but worthy reason why his opinions should
not be trusted as legitimate, especially his opinions regarding the U.S. social compact. Dred
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 455 (1857) (Opinion of Wayne, J.) (announcing that six of the
justices “declare that [the Missouri Compromise] was unconstitutional,” including Chief
Justice Taney); id. at 502 (Opinion of Campbell, J.) (misquoting Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199,
224 (1796) (Opinion of Chase, J.)).
1123. United States v. The Amistad, 40 U.S. 518, 552–53 (1814) (quoting Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 569 (1840) (Opinion of Taney, C.J.)); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 113
(1866) (quoting Holmes, 39 U.S., at 564 (Opinion of Taney, C.J.)).
1124. Holmes, 39 U.S., at 574 (Opinion of Taney, C.J.) (“the general government has entered into no treaty stipulations upon this subject since the one above mentioned [which was
expired], and in every instance where there was no engagement by treaty to deliver and a
demand has been made, they have uniformly refused, and have denied the right of the executive to surrender, because there was no treaty and no law of Congress to authorize it”). See
UKUSA Agreement Release 1940–1956, NSA: DECLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS, https://
www.nsa.gov/news-features/declassified-documents/ukusa/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2019) (this
agreement does not have an official name, because it was never formalized into law by
treaty and remains a secret agreement that the public was never supposed to know about—
the unofficial name is as noted above, the U.K. – U.S.A. Communication Intelligence Agreement); Newly released GCHQ files: UKUSA Agreement, THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES, https://
www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukusa/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2019) (“Files released in June
2010”).
1125. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 42–43, 65–66 (1872) (adopting Chief Justice
Taney’s view of the U.S. social compact as a compact of only white men after the Civil War).
1126. Id. at 65–66.
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jects, or arise out of transaction in which the people were
unrepresented, and their interests uncared for. The great Case of
Monopolies, reported by Coke and so fully stated in the brief, was
undoubtedly a contest of the commons against the monarch. . . . But
we think it may be safely affirmed that the Parliament of Great
Britain, representing the people in their legislative functions, and
the legislative bodies of this country, have, from time immemorial
to the present day, continued to grant to persons and corporations
exclusive privileges—privileges denied to other citizens—privileges
which come within any just definition of the word monopoly, as
much as those now under consideration, and that the power to do
this has never been questioned or denied.1127

Make no mistake, one can legitimize the despotisms of King George III,
Robespierre, and Adolf Hitler upon this upside down interpretation of
the U.S. social compact.1128 The Slaughterhouse Court derogated
American common law rights of life, that are expressly protected by
the U.S. Constitution; then, it proceeded to gut the application of the
Civil Rights Act under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
against the states.1129 Among other betrayals of trust, Slaughterhouse
departed from the intention of the founders that antitrust common law
must apply to state governments.1130
1127. Id.
1128. Id.; King George III, The King’s Speech of Nov. 30, 1774 [1775] (Parliament affirmed and called forth the King’s unbounded, royal powers in America); 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *156–57; Gesetz zur Behebung der Not von Volk und Reich
[Ermächtigungsgesetz] [Enabling Act of 1933], Mar. 23, 1933, RGB? I at 141 (Ger.) (a monopoly in power was made in Hitler by the legislature of Germany, i.e., the Reichstag, in
whom the people’s interests were presumably cared for). The Slaughterhouse Court not only
degraded the U.S. social compact, but it also disrespected the English people, because it is a
fact that British Parliament does not and never did care for the English people, as noted by
the first U.S. Suprem Court. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 462 (1793) (Opinion of Wilson,
J.) (“The Parliament form the great body politic of England! What, then, or where, are the
People? Nothing! Nowhere! They are not so much as even the ‘baseless fabric of a vision!’
From legal contemplation they totally disappear! Am I not warranted in saying that, if this
is a just description, a government, so and justly so described, is a despotic government?”);
OTIS, supra note 18, at 240 (strongly rebuking Englishmen who argued that no representation for Americans in Parliament was permissible because large portions of England in
Manchester, Birmingham, and Sheffield did not have representation in Parliament saying:
“No good reason can, however, be given in any country, why every man of a sound mind,
should not have a vote in the election of a representative. If a man has but little property to
protect and defend, yet his life and liberty are things of some importance.”).
1129. Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S., at 72, 78–83.
1130. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. The process of granting and enforcing monopolies through
the Council Table, Exchequer Chamber, or the Star Chamber, were quintessentially not
Republican because they were administered outside of the common law. See id.; RIVINGTON,
supra note 269, at 33. Monopolies outside of the common law were intended to be ousted in
America at the state level by the Guarantee Clause as was originally affirmed under the
original state constitutions themselves—these same monopolies were not legitimately issued by Parliament except for by the common law, which included only limited patents for
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A silver lining of Slaughterhouse is that it recognized and asserted a robust antitrust jurisdiction to review monopolies for restraint
“if exercised so as to produce a public mischief.”1131 The Supreme
Court, thus, did not dismiss the Slaughterhouse case and similarly situated cases, and continued reviewing state granted monopolies.1132
However, even after the Supreme Court severely cut back on Gibbons’
basis for invalidating monopolies (which would not be revived until
Wickard v. Filburn), the Court found a separate strategy for invalidating state granted monopolies in Ex parte Young through habeas corpus,
[The Eleventh Amendment] was adopted after the decision of this
court in Chisholm v. Georgia, where it was held that a State might
be sued by a citizen of another State. Since that time, there have
been many cases decided in this court involving the Eleventh
Amendment, among them being Osborn v. United States Bank,
which held that the Amendment applied only to those suits in
which the State was a party on the record. In the subsequent case of
Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, that holding was somewhat enlarged, and Chief Justice Marshall, delivering the opinion of the
court, while citing Osborn, said that, where the claim was made, as
in the case then before the court, against the Governor of Georgia
as Governor, and the demand was made upon him not personally,
but officially (for moneys in the treasury of the State and for slaves
in possession of the State government), the State might be considered as the party on the record, and therefore the suit could not be
maintained.1133

Under this rule, the Supreme Court dismissed the habeas petitions of
the Minnesota Attorney General, Edward T. Young, for lack of jurisdiction, ultimately refusing to immunize state violations of federal
railroad regulations.1134 Therefore, Slaughterhouse could not preclude
inventors. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. See James Madison, Detatched Memoranda, ca., Jan. 31,
1820, (hoping that “judges of the highest grade might perhaps be relied on for the control on
these local legislatures” when they violate the common law of monopolies) (citing U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8); 2 WILSON, THE WORKS, supra note 113, at 492 (“the common law
abhors all monopolies, which forbid any from working in any lawful trade”) (paraphrasing
The Case of Monopolies [1602] 11 Co. Rep. 84b (Eng.)). Slaughterhouse embarrassed the
American idea that Republics are a superior form of government by stating that the U.S.
Congress, and our State Legislatures regularly pass monopolies like the English Monarchy
did, making American Republics seem no different than Constitutional Monarchies and
threatening to render the Guarantee Clause meaningless. Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S., at 66
(equating the Republican governments of the states with the Parliament of Great Britain).
1131. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 208–09 (1824); Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S., at 63 (quoting
Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 203).
1132. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 127–28 (1876).
1133. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 150 (1908).
1134. Id. at 168 (the “cause is discharged and the petition for writs of habeas corpus and
certiorari is dismissed”).
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“prospective injunctive relief” for federal antitrust common law.1135
Slaughterhouse, however, prefigured and paralleled Judge Robert
Bork’s activist views on antitrust policy that ultimately derogated
American common law rights of life, including enforcement through Ex
parte Young equitable relief.1136
In the shadow of Slaughterhouse, Congress passed the Sherman
Act of 1890, expressing doubt that there was any U.S. common law on
the subject of monopolies.1137 In response, the Supreme Court affirmed
that there was U.S. common law on the subject.1138 The contemporane1135. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (“Ex parte Young gives life to the
Supremacy Clause.”).
1136. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 60–75 (1872) (even though the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments abolished slavery and established our federal rights of life
even against the states, that does not mean we have a right to make a living at a lawful
trade—under this ruling that appeared to outright overrule the Case of Monopolies in
America, Black Codes flourished in the Southern States such that black folk were targeted
by reason of their race to be practically reenslaved for idleness and other non-criminal behavior); id. at 119–20 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (“The keeping of a slaughterhouse is part of,
and incidental to, the trade of a butcher—one of the ordinary occupations of human life. To
compel a butcher, or rather all the butchers of a large city and an extensive district, to
slaughter their cattle in another person’s slaughterhouse and pay him a toll therefor is such
a restriction upon the trade as materially to interfere with its prosecution. It is onerous,
unreasonable, arbitrary, and unjust. . . . The granting of monopolies, or exclusive privileges
to individuals or corporations is an invasion of the right of others to choose a lawful calling,
and an infringement of personal liberty.”); ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A
POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 54, 110, 145, 405–07 (1978) [hereinafter BORK, THE ANTITRUST]
(arguing that the right to earn a living is not a proper antitrust policy without even acknowledging the existence of the common law Case of Monopolies that extended the law of
God from Deuteronomy to decide that human beings have a right to life, i.e., to make a
living). See Matsushita v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986) (quoting BORK, THE
ANTITRUST, supra note 1136, at 145), aff’d and extended in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 560–61 (2007) (adopting the plausibility standard from Matsushita that is now
applied in potentially all federal 12(b)(6) motions). Cf. Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682,
686–87 (2019) (invalidating Black Codes or potentially any other such product of judicial
infidelity arising from The Slaughterhouse Cases).
1137. Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S., at 65 (limiting antitrust common law to “monopolies established by the monarch in derogation of the rights of his subjects, or . . . transactions in
which the people were unrepresented, and their interests uncared for”—but this is too narrow because it does not contemplate our rejection of the writ of assistance program that was
administered by local governments prior to the revolution in support of monopolies in
America). Slaughterhouse caused the very existence of antitrust common law to be doubted
because it failed to extend the Case of Monopolies vindication of our rights to life and liberty
against the states. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 2, 50 (1911) (From the
syllabus: “The debates in Congress on the Anti-Trust Act of 1890 show that one of the influences leading to the enactment of the statute was doubt as to whether there is a common
law of the United States which governed that subject in the absence of legislation was
among the influences leading to the passage of the act governing the making of contracts in
restraint of trade and the creation and maintenance of monopolies in the absences of
legislation.”).
1138. Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S., at 51 (quoting 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *181);
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1895) (citing 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTI-
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ous, widespread dicta that there was no general common law copyright
in America, however, created a schism in legal thought between antitrust law and IP law for the first time in U.S. history.1139
Another change occurred in the post-Slaughterhouse Court that
was ironically inspired by Taney Court feudalism, i.e., the Supreme
Court no longer considered Chisholm v. Georgia a rightly decided
case.1140 In Hans v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court began to characterize Chisholm as overruled by the Eleventh Amendment, which is a
reading expressly refuted by many Marshall Court cases.1141 The Su*181; 8 Statute of Monopolies of 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (Eng.); The Case of Monopolies
[Darcy v. Allen] [1602] 11 Co. Rep. 84b (Eng.)), abrogated by Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111, 122, 127 (1942).
1139. Copyright cases arising around the same time as Standard Oil and Knight regularly affirmed Wheaton v. Peters’ dicta regarding the House of Lords’ decision in Donaldson
v. Becket that the Statute of Anne took away Scottish common law rights as reason to believe that there is no federal general common law, which explicitly conflicted the ordinary
practice exemplified in antitrust cases like Standard Oil and Knight that applied the common law and statute law concurrently. See White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209
U.S. 1, 15 (1908) (“In the last analysis this case turns upon the construction of a statute, for
it is perfectly well settled that the protection given to copyrights in this country is wholly
statutory.”) (citing Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834)); Thompson v. Hubbard, 131 U.S.
123, 151 (1889) (“This right of action, as well as the copyright itself, is wholly statutory, and
the means of securing any right of action in Hubbard are only those prescribed by Congress.”) (citing Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 591). When the Patent & Copyright Clause was drafted
these rights were considered as a direct consequence of antitrust common law by the father
of the U.S. Constitution James Madison. James Madison, Detatched Memoranda, ca., Jan.
31, 1820 (“Monopolies tho’ in certain cases useful, ought to be granted with caution, and
guarded with strictness agst. abuse. The Constitution of the U.S. has limited them in two
cases, the authors of Books, and of useful inventions . . . .”); Letter from James Madison to
Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788); THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison) (“The copyright
of authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain, to be a right at common law.”).
1140. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 12, 17 (1890) (neither Hans, nor Beers, the Taney
Court case that Hans relied upon, explained the Court’s departure from Marshall Court
cases like Cohens v. Virginia and Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee that strongly asserted jurisdiction over state matters—also, the holding in Beers was extremely doubtful, because without
precedent it removed federal jurisdiction from belligerent and rebellious states right before
the Civil War so that what might have been resolved peacefully in the federal courts had to
be decided on the field of battle) (citing Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. 527, 529 (1857)).
1141. Id. at 11–12, 21 (refusing to “subject[ ] sovereign States to actions at the suit of
individuals,” saying “It is not necessary that we should enter upon an examination of the
reason or expediency of the rule which exempts a sovereign State from prosecution in a
court of justice at the suit of individuals. It is enough for us to declare its existence.”); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 406 (1821) (The Eleventh Amendment’s “motive was not to
maintain the sovereignty of a State from the degradation supposed to attend a compulsory
appearance before the tribunal of the nation.”) (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. CONST.
amend. XI); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 374 (1816) (The sovereignty of the
States is submitted to a central compact of Union “to remove all ground for jealousy and
complaint, they [i.e., the States] relinquish the privilege of being any longer the exclusive
arbiters of their own justice where the rights of others come in question or the great interests of the whole may be affected by those feelings, partialities, or prejudices, which they
meant to put down forever.”).
TUTES
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preme Court found against Hans in Nevada v. Hall, but Hall was
overruled by Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt, which confused the role of Chisholm even more than Hans.1142
Under the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court reengaged with
common law and affirmed earlier cases, applying the common law “rule
of reason” standard to antitrust cases.1143 The Supreme Court was,
however, weighed down once more by the Taney Court’s pro-slavery
determinations when reevaluating the Court’s common law jurisdiction in United States v. E. C. Knight.1144 The Knight Court initially
bowed out of its duty to invalidate state granted patents according to,
in part, a faulty interpretation of the common law.1145
Around this time, the state police power idea was so preclusive
that the national railroad program almost failed but for Ex parte
Young.1146 Some states attempted to enact their own railroad standards, which conflicted with federal law.1147 The federal courts only
upheld federal laws as preemptive against conflicting state statutes after the federal government jailed a state attorney general for contempt
and forced the state to file a writ of habeas corpus.1148
As Carol Rose observed, “Nineteenth-century jurists had a propensity to slide easily between police power and public property
terminology.”1149 This sliding, that may have provided pretext to dismiss public interest cases, finally subsided when Wickard v. Filburn
1142. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 415 (1979) (Distinguishing Hans by saying, “The
King’s immunity [which is the origin of state sovereign immunity doctrine] rested primarily
on the structure of the feudal system, and secondarily on a fiction that the King could do no
wrong. We must, of course, reject the fiction. It was rejected by the colonists when they
declared their independence from the Crown, and the record in this case discloses an actual
wrong committed by Nevada.” Thus, according to California’s sovereign choice not to extend
immunity to Nevada a suit in tort lied in California Court—this choice is incident to California’s sovereign “‘right to govern’” as defined by Chief Justice Jay in Chisholm.) (quoting
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 472 (1793) (Opinion of Jay, C.J.)), overruled on other
grounds by Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt, 139 S.Ct. 1485, 1492, 1499 (2019)
(the opinion in this case is extremely unclear; it begs many questions and answers none; if
fully reinstating Hans’ dicta was as easy as waiving the Court’s wand to overrule Nevada v.
Hall then the Court might have done so, but it could not).
1143. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911).
1144. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895) (citing The License Cases,
46 U.S. 504 (1847)), abrogated by Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 122, 127 (1942).
1145. Id. (“That which belongs to commerce is within the jurisdiction of the United
States, but that which does not belong to commerce is within the jurisdiction of the police
power of the state.”).
1146. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 150 (1908). See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64,
68 (1985).
1147. See Young, 209 U.S. at 126.
1148. Id.
1149. Carol Rose, supra note 244, at 773.
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expressly abrogated Knight and expanded federal jurisdiction to every
blade of grass.1150 Thus, Wickard officially ended Slaughterhouse’s
skirting of federal jurisdiction to disband monopolies.1151
From here those in favor of the states’ rights rationale from
Slaughterhouse were put on the defensive; civil rights legislation successfully moved forward for the first time and the Court began to
dismantle longstanding injustices involving racism and misogyny.1152
Those opposed to national legislation for social justice shifted strategies, resolving to accomplish by judicial activism what they failed to
accomplish by law.1153 Their two most vocal leaders in the effort to justify activism from the bench to reach their goals were Robert Bork and
Paul M. Bator.1154
Bork managed to influence the Court to adopt the “plausibility
standard” for dismissal; first applying only in antitrust law, and later
to all civil suits in Twombly and Iqbal.1155 Bator wrote an article that
eventually convinced the Court to maximize federal habeas dismissals
for cases that review state courts.1156 Bork and Bator’s rationalist
strategies for dismissing cases on grounds ulterior to the law had a
profound effect on U.S. judicial practice.1157 Perhaps fittingly, their
strategy of supplanting the common law with rationalism is the infa-

1150. See Knight, 156 U.S. at 21, abrogated by Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 122, 127
(1942).
1151. Id.
1152. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9–12 (1967); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78
Stat. 241, 42 U.S.C. §1983.
1153. See, e.g., Adam Cohen, Psst . . . Justice Scalia . . . You Know, You’re an Activist
Judge, Too, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/19/opinion/psstjustice-scalia-you-know-youre-an-activist-judge-too.html; Reuters Staff, Factbox: Robert
Bork – judge, activist and verb, REUTERS (Dec. 19, 2012, 8:04 AM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-usa-bork-facts/factbox-robert-bork-judge-activist-and-verbidUSBRE8BI10620121219.
1154. Bork Nomination Day 10, Part 5, C-SPAN (Sept. 28, 1987), https://www.c-span.org/
video/?10184-1/bork-nomination-day-10-part-5 (Bator firmly defended his ally before
Congress).
1155. Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L. J. 710, 728 (2018) (“Citing
to Bork’s The Antitrust Paradox, the Court concluded that predatory pricing schemes were
implausible and therefore could not justify a reasonable assumption in favor of Zenith.”)
(citing Matsushita v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986) (quoting BORK, THE ANTITRUST, supra note 1136, at 145)).
1156. Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 452–53 (1963) [hereinafter Bator, Finality].
1157. See, e.g., Matsushita v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986) (quoting BORK,
THE ANTITRUST, supra note 1136, at 145)); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 754 (1991)
(making the determination to abrogate Fay not on the law or to vindicate justice, but deciding upon an “allocation of costs”—this is Bator’s theories in action).
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mous strategy employed in the Salem Witch Trials of Massachusetts
Bay.1158
As things now stand, the ultimate success or failure of public
interest suits usually depend on whether a judge rationally recognizes
the public interest as a fundamental object of government or as a mere
drain on judicial resources.1159 Although federal courts retain the
power to defend individual rights, it is difficult to convince federal
judges to assert their power.1160 Even after prevailing over a motion to
dismiss, the court is known to create new reasons to dismiss cases even
after a jury has already spoken.1161
1158. The Puritan witch hunters were proud Rationalists. JOSEPH GLANVILL [& HENRY
MORE], SADUCISMUS TRIUMPHATUS 45 (4th ed. 1726) (“considering Man in the general, as a
rational Creature”); Samuel Willard, Some Miscellany Observations on our Present Debates
Respecting Witchcrafts 2, 11 [1692] (“We are willing to hearken to reason.”); Cotton Mather,
The Wonders of the Invisible World 7, 68 [1693] (“It is not irrational, to ascribe the late
stupendous growth of witches among us, partly to the bitter discontents, which affliction
and poverty has fill’d us with” – “A Devil is a spiritual and a rational substance”). From
Puritan Rationalism came the Puritan theory of legal positivism, which began in Massachusetts Bay and was copied unsuccessfully by Cromwell’s Parliament of Saints. Massachusetts
Body of Liberties 94.2 [1641] (“If any man or woman be a witch, . . . they shall be put to
death.”); The Lawes and Liberties of Massachusetts [1648] (largely a reproduction of the
original Body of Liberties, updated and revised from time to time and published as Laws
and Liberties); WOOLRYCH, supra note 801, at 271–73, 300. See also John Maynard Keynes,
Newton, the Man [1946], in JMK/PP/60, The Papers of John Maynard Keynes, King’s College, Cambridge (unveiling a revelation after purchasing Newton’s private papers at auction
that Newton the world renowned rationalist to be a magician and occultist). Finally, legal
positivism was transmitted into the secular world through Jeremy Bentham who was
deeply inspired by Cromwell. BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT, supra note 39, at 141.
1159. See, e.g., Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001, 1005–06 (1983) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (arguing against the breakup of Ma Bell for reasons of “the availability of the
Department’s resources for other cases”) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1961)
(Baker is the most ordinary way the U.S. Courts justify avoiding the assertion their powers
in public interest suits)).
1160. Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 573 U.S. 958, 960 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(“Those who are bound by our decisions usually believe they can take us at our word. Not so
today.”). See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2760 (2014) (in granting the Wheaton
Injunction, the Court defied the ruling it made in Hobby Lobby). See also Shelby County v.
Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 556–57 (2013) (essentially finding that old laws are unconstitutional
merely for being old according to O’Connor’s utopian race prophesy and in defiance to the
better lights given off by the American people in Michelle Alexander’s work The New Jim
Crow, and in the confession of Harper Lee in her first and last work Go Set a Watchman
that refuted O’Connor’s race theory as mere fatalism—it would behoove the Court to pick up
on the sea changes in American culture brought about by women like Alexander and Lee).
1161. Bixby v. KBR, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 1224, 1246 (D. Or. 2010) (denying motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the nonjusticiable political question
doctrine, the government contractor exemption (i.e., sovereign immunity for contractors),
and the combat operations exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act); Bixby v. KBR, Inc.,
893 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1096 (D. Or. 2012) (denying motion for summary judgment); Bixby v.
KBR, Inc., No. 3:09–CV–632–PK, 2012 WL 6616987, at *2 (D. Or. 2012) (not reported) (jury
verdict was in favor of Bixby, and KBR’s request to review was denied); Bixby v. KBR, Inc.,
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The doubtfulness of rationalism as a proper basis for decisionmaking was recently featured in the 2008 market crisis.1162 After the
crisis, Mother Jones ran an article entitled Alan Shrugged, quoting
Alan Greenspan’s testimony before Congress; where he asserted his
shock at the failure of self-interested rationalism to secure the economy in 2008.1163 The 2008 market crisis, therefore, confirmed the
Nobel prize winning work of Daniel Kahneman, which tends to show
that people are not inherently rational as was long presumed by the
rationalists that doomed us.1164
The Rise of Dead Hand Rationalism
Daniel Kahneman’s studies support the position of American
Revolutionaries who revolted against Rationalism, and who argued
that the fountain of justice is common sense, i.e., human emotion.1165
No. 653118/2014, 2013 WL 12319909, at *10 (D. Or. 2013) (despite the jury determination,
defense attorneys were successful in their suit for sanctions against plaintiff’s attorneys to
the tune of $15,031.72); Bixby v. KBR, Inc., 603 Fed. Appx. 605, 606 (9th Cir. 2015) (after all
the litigation that went on in Bixby, KBR got the case kicked out based on a new SCOTUS
precedent that appeared to modify federal jurisdiction) (quoting Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S.
277, 285–86 (2014)). See also Hosana-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v.
E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171, 190–91 (2012) (the unanimous court invented a ministerial exception under the First Amendment to dismiss employment law claims), extended in Our Lady
of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S.Ct. 2049, 2055 (2020); Integrity Staffing Solutions v. Busk, 574 U.S. 27, 37 (2014). Cf. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007);
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 696 (2009).
1162. Alan Greenspan, Address to the Committee of Oversight and Reform (Oct. 23,
2008) (transcript available at https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/migrated/20081023100438.pdf) (“those of us who have looked
to the self-interest of lending institutions to protect shareholder’s equity (myself especially)
are in a state of shocked disbelief”).
1163. David Corn, Alan Shrugged, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 24, 2008), https://
www.motherjones.com/politics/2008/10/alan-shrugged/.
1164. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 377–78, 381 (2011) (debunking Bentham’s theory that human beings are capable of rationally pursuing happiness and avoiding
pain, and giving strong evidence that what we call Rationalism is based upon “the tyranny
of the remembering self”).
1165. Id; Isaac Backus, Truth is Great, and Will Prevail 3–5 [1781] (“Unassisted reason
could never go any farther in this respect, than to move men to imbue their hands in the
blood of their own children, by offering the fruit of their body for the sin of their soul . . . .
And it is a common thing for these reasoners, to claim a power for themselves which they
deny to JEHOVAH; and daily to practice that, under his name, which, with reverence be it
spoken, was never in HIS POWER to do!”); 1 WILSON, THE WORKS, supra note 113, at 119 (“I
can only say, I feel that such is my duty. Here investigation must stop; reasoning can go no
faurther.”); ADAMS, DISCOURSES, supra note 142, at 61–69 (quoting SMITH, supra note 759,
at 80–90); Nathaniel Niles, Two Discourses on Liberty, I. THOMAS & H.W. TINGES, June 5,
1774, at 44 [1774] (We are “incapable of tracing the heart through all its dark and intricate
labyrinths.”); Susanna Wright, [Untitled], in Milcah, supra note 77, at 130–32 (“Then trembling reason shall confess thy pow’r / And low in dust, lie prostrate, & adore, / Shall in thy
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When Thomas Paine abandoned his Common Sense and published his
Age of Reason in France, the Americans to whom he dedicated that
piece answered back.1166 From Phillis Wheatley’s 1773 poem Thoughts
on the Works of Providence, they learned counter-rationalist principles
that later helped bring about their revolution:
Among the mental pow’rs a question rose,
“What most the image of th’ Eternal shows?”
When thus to Reason (so let Fancy rove)
Her great companion spoke immortal Love.
“Say, mighty pow’r, how long shall strife prevail,
And with its murmurs load the wisp’ring gale?
Refer the cause to Recollection’s shrine,
Who loud proclaims my origin divine,
The cause whence heav’n and earth began to be,
And is not man immortaliz’d by me?
Reason let this most causeless strife subside.”
Thus Love pronounc’d, and Reason thus reply’d.
“Thy birth, celestial queen! ‘tis mine to own,
In thee resplendent is the Godhead shown;
Thy words persuade, my soul enraptur’d feels
Resistless beauty which thy smile reveals.”
Ardent she spoke, and, kindling at her charms,
She clasp’d the blooming goddess in her arms.1167
light her narrow limits see, / And own that none art great & wise but Thee.—”); Ann
Bleecker, On the Immensity of Creation [before 1783], in BLEECKER, supra note 652, at
210–11 (“The greatest seraph in his bright abode / Can’t comprehend the labours of a God. /
Proud reason fails, and is confounded here; / —Man how contemptible thou dost appear!”).
1166. Thomas Paine, Common Sense 2 [1776] (laying the foundation of his argument
upon “the power of feeling,” saying that a people cannot love a ruler who lays their “country
desolate with fire and sword”); Letter from Thomas Paine to his Fellow Citizens of the
United States of America, Pulvoise 8, 1794, in THOMAS PAINE, THE AGE OF REASON 3 (1877)
(arguing that reason is “the weapon against errors of every kind”); id. at 86 (declaring his
allegiance to the rationalism of Newton and Descartes).
1167. Phillis Wheatley, Thoughts on the Works of Providence [1773]. Sources that answered Thomas Paine’s Age of Reason directly in defense of the American position first set
out by Wheatley include: G.W. SNYDER, THE AGE OF REASON UNREASONABLE 8 (1798) (“Passions are not given to man in vain; they are useful and salutary when guided by reason.
What reason would be, without being blended with passions, is, I believe, not easily to be
determined. Reason, abstractedly considered, could scarcely ever attempt anything with activity, nor, when begun, complete it with any success. The deistical writers in general, but
especially Shaftsbury, Hume, Voltaire and Gibbon, have exerted themselves to strip reason
of all passions, and thus to lead men to indifference and coldness of heart. What is reason
without the feelings of heart; without compassion, benevolence and love, which, when prop-
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Wheatley argued that the proper place of human reason is as an obedient servant to the saving commands of natural human love.1168
Therefore, the common law rule of reason that ordinarily governs antitrust law must consult human emotion as a compass; a worthy struggle
for the bench requiring a de novo review of the facts.1169 When applied
properly on a case-by-case basis, antitrust law may give momentary
shelter to the rights of individuals from the voracious greed of the
monopolist.1170
The proper heads of federal jurisdiction trace back through the
U.S. Constitution and Judiciary Act to Lord Coke’s vindication of the
antitrust common law of England.1171 Bator and Bork’s unoriginal expositions of pride and fatalism, ultimately, also trace back to the
feudalism established by the sycophants of the king.1172 For the ratioerly directed by reason (for this is reason’s province) constitute the most essential part of
human happiness? But what is truly paradox, is, that they themselves, at the same time
they extolled reason, are governed by such passions, as commonly fail to the lot of frail
mortals, from the number of whom it appears, the most refined deists cannot be excepted.”);
Anon., The Folly of Reason 8, 20, 23 [1794] (“the pretense of the absolute perfection of
human reason is absurd”—“he who is made the most positive of the sufficiency of his own
reason, will be the most likely to be governed by the blindness of his own passions”); ELIAS
BOUDINOT, THE AGE OF REVELATION 30 (1801).
1168. Phillis Wheatley, Thoughts on the Works of Providence [1773].
1169. Id.; SNYDER, supra note 1167, at 8; Anon., The Folly of Reason 8, 20, 23 [1794];
BOUDINOT, supra note 1167 at 30.
1170. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 68 (1911).
1171. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 233 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring) (invalidating a
New York State granted Livingston-Fulton steamboat patent saying “the abstract right of
commercial intercourse . . . is common to all”); Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. at 60 (quoting 3
EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *181); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (the origin of U.S. antitrust
law, besides arising from the common law and in conjunction with the Commerce Clause
may also be observed in cases arising under the express limitations of Patent & Copyright
Clause). See 1 CAMPBELL, supra note 24, at 282–86, 292, 294 (presenting a showdown between the king and Coke regarding the king’s prerogative use of commendams twelve
sycophants to crown “threw themselves on their knees and prayed for pardon,” but Lord
Coke remained on his feet and answered, “WHEN THE CASE HAPPENS, I SHALL DO THAT WHICH
SHALL BE FIT FOR A JUDGE TO DO.” This “sublime answer” caused the sycophants to become
“ashamed of their servility” and even commanded the respect of the king himself.). Justice
Jackson was inspired by Lord Coke when he wrote his iconic defense of the separation of
powers in Youngstown saying, “Such institutions may be destined to pass away. But it is the
duty of the Court to be last, not first, to give them up.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 655 n.27 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“We follow the judicial
tradition” that was started by Lord Coke, when he resisted the King’s influence on his independent judgment.); id. at 614 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting Letter from the
Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court to George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793) (refusing to make
advisory statements at the President’s request)).
1172. Bator, Finality, supra note 1156, at 448 n.12, 452, 487; Paul M. Bator, The State
Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 620 (1981) [hereinafter Bator, The State]; BORK, THE ANTITRUST, supra note 1136, at 50–51; 1 CAMPBELL,
supra note 24, at 282–86; see Jim Powell, Edward Coke: Common Law Protection for Lib-
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nalists dismissed the common law as mere relativism and boldly
asserted their novel views on jurisdiction and antitrust law; as the
Hobbesian “children of pride” that they were.1173
Thomas Hobbes theorized that men were so full of pride and
dejection—an oxymoron he labeled “Madnesse”—that they must by
their natures bow to an absolute monarch.1174 There are certain characters like Bork and Bator that seemed to be character examples of
Hobbesian madness—Bork tending toward pride, and Bator tending
toward dejection.1175 However, as revealed by Flannery O’Connor,
Hobbes’s focus on pride and dejection may be too simple.1176
The irony of Hobbesian feudalism is that its attempt to establish the crown’s irrebuttable legitimacy by forbidding challenges to the
crown in court actually destroys the legitimacy of the crown.1177 Similarly, Bork and Bator attempted to make efficiency the chief concern of
the federal courts by fashioning bases to dismiss cases and ironically

erty: Coke Contributed to America’s Independent Judiciary and Judicial Review,
FOUNDATION FOR ECONOMIC EDUCATION (Nov. 1, 1997), https://fee.org/articles/edward-cokecommon-law-protection-for-liberty/; Letter from Thomas Hutchinson to Richard Jackson
(Sept. 12, 1765), in QUINCY, JR., supra note 32, at 441 (“[O]ur friends to liberty take advantage of a maxim they find in Lord Coke that an act of Parliament against Magna Charta or
the peculiar rights of Englishmen is ipso facto void.”).
1173. HOBBES, supra note 6, at 231 (quoting Job 41:34); Bator, Finality, supra note 1156,
at 448 n.12, 452, 487; Bator, The State, supra note 1172, at 620; BORK, THE ANTITRUST,
supra note 1136, at 50–51 (his opinions are based on exactly the relativism he claims to
“dispute”). Cf. HUTCHINSON & OLIVER, supra note 826, at 16 (Governor Hutchinson scandalized America by saying, “There must be an abridgement of what are called English
liberties.”).
1174. HOBBES, supra note 6, at 46–48.
1175. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1372
(1990) (“Although Bork derides scholars who try to found constitutional doctrine on moral
philosophy, it should be apparent by now that he is himself under the sway of a moral
philosopher. His name is Hobbes, and he too thought that the only source of political legitimacy was a contract among people who died long ago.”); Wythe Holt, Introduction: Law vs.
Order, or Habeas vs. Hobbes, 51 ALA. L. REV. 525, 527 (2000) (When introducing Eric M.
Freedman’s research that refuted Bator’s fatalistic attacks on habeas corpus, Professor Holt
wrote, “Thus, habeas (in the United States) is one of those few evidences that democracy in
civilization has benefitted the average human being—that Hobbes is wrong.”).
1176. The Hobbesian framework of humanity simultaneously prideful and dejected may
be supplemented with Flannery O’Connor’s observations of mental instability as a struggle
with vice generally. FLANNERY O’CONNOR, A PRAYER JOURNAL 22 (2013) (“I will always be
staggering between Despair & Presumption, facing first one & then the other, deciding
which makes me look the best, which fits most comfortably, most conveniently.”).
1177. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S.
410, 415 (1979), overruled on other grounds by Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt,
139 S. Ct. 1485, 1492 (2019)). See, e.g., 1 CAMPBELL, supra note 24, at 282–86; Powell, supra
note 1172.
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maximized judicial inefficiency.1178 Bork’s inspiration of the plausibility standard caused the rise of arguably the biggest, unchecked
monopolies in U.S. history,1179 and Bator’s ideas about finality arguably contributed to the over-incarceration of criminals that increased
the workload of federal habeas courts in sorting out the numerous
claims of the incarcerated masses.1180
Professor Paul M. Bator enjoyed chastising judges who dared
exercise federal jurisdiction in pursuit of justice or truth.1181 He
imagined that overtaxing judicial resources with highfalutin pursuits,
like truth or justice, might drown the entire project of American government in needless work.1182 Bator reasoned that the pursuit of truth
and justice is a waste of resources, because even if truth or justice exist
they are beyond human comprehension and thus federal courts can
only promulgate an appearance of them.1183
Bator’s rationalism ironically interpreted prudence to require
something less than justice in federal court (i.e., a mere appearance of
justice), which ironically leaves judicial resources vulnerable to executive attack.1184 Bator’s rationalism advocated the preservation of
1178. See, e.g., Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944) (observing the
argument that dismissals are more efficient than hearing cases long before it was adopted
by Bator and Bork and responding, “here is another instance of judicial haste which in the
long run creates waste”).
1179. Khan, supra note 1155, at 728 (“Citing to Bork’s The Antitrust Paradox, the Court
concluded that predatory pricing schemes were implausible and therefore could not justify a
reasonable assumption in favor of Zenith.”) (citing Matsushita v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 589 (1986) (quoting BORK, THE ANTITRUST, supra note 1136, at 145)).
1180. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 754 (1991) (making the determination to abrogate Fay not on the law or to vindicate justice, but deciding upon an “allocation of costs”—
this is Bator’s theories in action) (citing McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491[–92] (1991)
(quoting Bator, Finality, supra note 1156, at 452–53) (abrogating Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963)); id. at 759 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (justly labeling Coleman another addition to “a
Byzantine morass of arbitrary, unnecessary, and unjustifiable impediments to the vindication of federal rights” created by the court). Cf. Schroeder, The Body, supra note 121, at
109–10 (“unjustly procured convictions are an ultimate waste of everybody’s time and
resources”).
1181. Bator, Finality, supra note 1156, at 448 n.12, 452, 487 (Bator gave up on the objectivity of truth and justice and gave into what he deemed superior interests of efficiency,
saying, “we have tried hard enough and thus may take it that justice has been done.”).
1182. Id.
1183. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 724 (1991) (“The Fay standard was based on a
conception of federal/state relations that undervalued the important interest in finality
served by state procedural rules and the significant harm to the States that results from the
failure of federal courts to respect them.”) (citing McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491[–92]
(1991) (quoting Bator, Finality, supra note 1156, at 452–53)) (abrogating Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391 (1963)).
1184. Compare Bator, Finality, supra note 1156, at 512 (Characterizing federal habeas
review in civil court as a “waste of resources, strain in federal-state relations and damage to
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judicial resources by relinquishing the very jurisdiction the court may
have asserted in NTEU v. United States to defend its basic judicial resources.1185 For the federal courts were recently on the verge of losing
funding due to the 2019 Trump Border Wall shut down.1186
Bator infected the bench with a fatalism that swept out the legs
of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction.1187 In Fay v. Noia, Bator’s article
on finality was cited disapprovingly, but in proceeding cases it ultimately justified the overruling of Fay in piecemeal fashion.1188 The
the fabric of criminal law which bear so acutely on the decision whether we should superimpose collateral review on the Supreme Court’s direct supervisory jurisdiction.”), and Bator,
The State, supra note 1172, at 620 (Arguing that asserting federal jurisdiction over affirmative action cases “appears presumptively inefficient and wasteful—even unaesthetic—to
carve up what seems like a single controversy between the state and its citizen, and to have
two lawsuits, rather than one, devoted to its resolution.”), with NTEU v. United States, Nos.
19–50, 19–51, 19–62, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9305, at *3 (D.D.C. 2019), aff’d, 444 F. Supp. 3d
108 (D.D.C. 2020). Bator’s fatalism was preempted by the founder that breathed life into the
American Revolution, James Otis. See OTIS, supra note 18, at 142 (“Neither the riches of
Jamaica, nor the luxury of a metropolis, should ever have weight enough to break the balance of truth and justice.”).
1185. Bator, The State, supra note 1172, at 620 (arguing for the expansion of political
question doctrine to destroy federal jurisdiction, “it is obvious that especially sensitive political nerve are likely to be touched if federal judges are free to enjoin—or to declare
unconstitutional—state court enforcement proceedings on the basis of claims which could be
adjudicated in those proceedings”). See NTEU v. United States, Nos. 19–50, 19–51, 19–62,
2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9305, at *3 (D.D.C. 2019), aff’d, 444 F. Supp. 3d 108 (D.D.C. 2020)
(characterizing the necessity of keeping the courthouse lights on and the use of unpaid labor
in essential positions in the federal government including courthouses as a nonjusticiable
political question).
1186. NTEU v. United States, Nos. 19–50, 19–51, 19–62, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9305, at
*3 (D.D.C. 2019), aff’d, 444 F. Supp. 3d 108 (D.D.C. 2020) (A District Court denied jurisdiction to review claims that certain employees were being forced to work without pay in
violation of the Thirteenth Amendment saying that the president can do whatever he wants
without any consequences. It was extremely ironic for the Court to state, “But I want and
need to make something very clear: the Judiciary is not just another source of leverage to be
tapped in the ongoing internal squabble between the political branches. We are an independent, co-equal branch of government, and whether or not we can afford to keep our lights on,
our oath is to the Constitution and the faithful application of the law. In the final analysis,
the shutdown is a political problem. It does NOT, and can NOT, change this Court’s limited
role. Of that I am very certain.” The failure of the court to act here is also a political act
especially if the court’s failure to assert jurisdiction helped the political branches undermine
the court’s power to stop political squabbles from ending the independent judiciary.).
1187. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 724 (1991) (citing McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S.
467, 491[–92] (1991) (quoting Bator, Finality, supra note 1156, at 452–53)) (abrogating Fay
v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963)). See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 150–51 (1908) (abrogating
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887)) (citing Osborn v. U.S.
Bank, 22 U.S. 738, 846, 857 (1824); Governor of Ga. v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. 110, 122–23
(1828)).
1188. Fay, 372 U.S., at 421–22 n.30 (noting that Bator’s advocacy for the finality of state
court proceedings was a departure from the norm) (citing Bator, Finality, supra note 1156,
at 450); id. at 449 n.1 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Bator, Finality, supra note 1156, at
441).
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oxymoron of Bator’s defense of efficiency was that it attacked the
habeas jurisdiction that made American national railroads, highways,
postal service, telephone and cable networks, and other efficiency enhancing services possible.1189
Judge Robert Bork paralleled Bator’s irony in his acclaimed
book The Antitrust Paradox, writing that predatory pricing was so beneficial to consumer welfare and so implausible a basis for a monopoly,
that it should not be reviewed by federal courts.1190 This idea, which
now contradicts the obvious realities beheld in Lina Khan’s note Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, was adopted as a rule in Matsushita v. Zenith
Radio Corp.1191 It was then repurposed as the plausibility standard for
dismissal in Twombly and Iqbal.1192
The Iqbal/Twombly plausibility standard is a pretended law
crafted out of reversed Conley dicta; it is an inference on an inference, a
dream upon a dream.1193 Iqbal and Twombly are perhaps the worst
departures from Dr. Foster’s Case and stare decisis made by the U.S.
Supreme Court to date.1194 This fact is demonstrated by the frayed precedent of Rule 8 cases left behind, including Dioguardi v. Durning and
pre-rules cases like Maty v. Grasselli Chemical Co.; all of which remain
good law.1195
1189. Young, 209 U.S. at 150–51. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (“Ex parte
Young gives life to the Supremacy Clause.”).
1190. Khan, supra note 1155, at 728 (“Citing to Bork’s The Antitrust Paradox, the Court
concluded that predatory pricing schemes were implausible and therefore could not justify a
reasonable assumption in favor of Zenith.”) (citing Matsushita v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 589 (1986) (quoting BORK, THE ANTITRUST, supra note 1136, at 145)).
1191. Id.
1192. Matsushita, 475 U.S., at 589 (quoting BORK, THE ANTITRUST, supra note 1136, at
145), aff’d and extended in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 560–61 (2007), aff’d
and extended in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 696 (2009).
1193. Twombly, 550 U.S., at 562–63; Iqbal, 556 U.S., at 679.
1194. Twombly, 550 U.S., at 563; Iqbal, 556 U.S., at 679. See FED. R. CIV. P. 2, 8.
1195. Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8);
Maty v. Grasselli Chem. Co., 303 U.S. 197, 200 (1938) (“Pleadings are intended to serve as a
means of arriving at fair and just settlements of controversies between litigants. They
should not raise barriers which prevent the achievement of that end.”). See Leimer v. State
Mut. Life Assur. Co. of Worcester, Mass., 108 F.2d 302, 306 (8th Cir. 1940) (“Lawsuits also
often prove to have been groundless; but no way has been discovered of relieving a defendant from the necessity of a trial to establish the fact.”) (quoting Myers v. Bethlehem Corp.,
303 U.S. 41, 51 (1938)); Continental Collieries v. Shober, 130 F.2d 631, 635 (3d Cir. 1942)
(quoting Leimer, 108 F.2d, at 305–06)); Sparks v. England, 113 F.2d 579, 581–82 (1940)
(“This Court has consistently disapproved of the practice of terminating litigation, believed
to be without merit, by the dismissal of complaints for informality or insufficiency of statement. If it is conceivable that, a plaintiff can, upon a trial, establish a case which would
entitle him to the relieved prayed for a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of statement
ought not to be granted.”) (citing Leimer, 108 F.2d, at 305); Tahir Erk v. Glenn L. Martin
Co., 116 F.2d 865, 869 (4th Cir. 1941) (citing Karl Kiefer Mach. Co. v. U. S. Bottlers Mach.
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The Court also managed to decide Twombly according to Borkian rationalism right before it was revealed to be almost certainly
wrongheaded.1196 The predation of wide swathes of businesses that
Judge Bork argued implausible by companies such as Amazon, Google,
and Facebook, are now painfully obvious.1197 In the struggle over the
plausibility standard between the young Ms. Lina Khan and the dead
hand control of Robert Bork, the courts should declare Ms. Khan the
winner and overrule Matsushita and Twombly.1198
For as Coke declared in his Institutes, violations of the public
trust that were protected and even required by the qualified immunities accompanied by the letters patent of the crown were punishable at
common law.1199 The crown as representative of the English State
could not resist this punishment or shield any other person from it.1200
For the basic premise of antitrust law is that the people are sovereign

Co., 113 F.2d 356, 357 (7th Cir. 1940). See also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506,
515 (2002) (“Because we review here a decision granting respondent’s motion to dismiss, we
must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.”—Deciding
whether a factual allegation is plausible is the same as determining the likelihood that it
will be shown to be true at trial, so it is a departure from the ordinary standard that all
factual allegations should be taken as true. Yet, these cases are still good law—untouched
and disregarded by Twombly and Iqbal.) (citing Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics
Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993)).
1196. Examples of the threat of Antitrust principles posed by Amazon that were declared
implausible by the Twombly Court are no longer hard to find. Benny Evangelista, How ‘Amazon factor’ killed retailers like Borders, Circuit City, SF GATE (July 13, 2015, 11:20 AM),
https://www.sfgate.com/business/article/How-Amazon-factor-killed-retailers-like6378619.php (Borders went out of business in 2011, and Circuit City went out of business in
2008—this article was written before Toys ‘R Us went out of business—Twombly was decided in 2007); Alina Selyukh, Game Over For Toys R Us: Chain Going Out Of Business,
NPR (Mar. 14, 2018, 6:17 PM), https://news.wbfo.org/post/game-over-toys-r-us-chain-goingout-business; Mary Hanbury, Sears, once the largest retailer in the world, has narrowly
avoided liquidation. Here’s how its downfall played out., BUSINESS INSIDER (Feb. 7, 2019,
5:31 PM), https://www.businessinsider.nl/sears-bankruptcy-reports-downfall-photos-201810/?international=true&r=us. See Khan, supra note 1155, at 716; David Streitfeld, Amazon’s Antitrust Antagonist Has a Breakthrough Idea, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/09/07/technology/monopoly-antitrust-lina-khan-amazon.html; Dioguardi, 139 F.2d, at 775 (According to the simple fact that online market players like
Amazon are laying waste to old market fixtures, it may also be said of Twombly, “here is
another instance of judicial haste which in the long run makes waste.”).
1197. Khan, supra note 1155, at 762.
1198. Id. at 728; Streitfeld, supra note 1196. Cf. KAHNEMAN, supra note 1164, at 377–78,
381.
1199. 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *181–83.
1200. Id.; JOHN MILTON, A DEFENSE OF THE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND 194–95 (Joseph Washington trans., 1692) [hereinafter MILTON, A DEFENSE].
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and that each individual holds an equal share of the state’s right to
control public property.1201
Antitrust common law vindicates the equal sovereignty of each
person individually, which is a fundamental ingredient in the United
States form of government.1202 Equal sovereignty is the “vis vitae of
power” in the United States, i.e., “the vital principle” according to
James Wilson, which is implicated in any suit over the origins, ends,
limitations, and powers arising from public trusts.1203 The law of public trusts traces back to Carta Foresta, i.e., the Charter of the Forest in
England, which was expanded in America to include what Carol Rose
termed “inherently public property.”1204
Accordingly, the Americans adopted Lord Coke’s decision in Dr.
Bonham’s Case under bold new written constitutions as a matter of the
U.S. social compact of July 4, 1776.1205 The movement of creating a
1201. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 455–56 (1793); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 415
n.8 (1979) (citing THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776)).
1202. 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *181–83 (“the monopolist that taketh away a mans
trade, taketh away his life”); 1 WILSON, THE WORKS, supra note 113, at 13 (“In the United
States the doors of publick honours and publick offices are, on the broad principles of equal
liberty, thrown open to all.”). See Carol Rose, supra note 244, at 714; McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 317 (1819). Cf. Chisholm, 2 U.S., at 462 (Opinion of Wilson, J.) (“The
Parliament form the great body politic of England! What, then, or where, are the People?
Nothing! Nowhere!”).
1203. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 233–34 (1824) (Johnson, J., Concurring) (“The practice of our Government certainly has been, on many subjects, to occupy so much only of the
field opened to them as they think the public interests require.”); 1 WILSON, THE WORKS,
supra note 113, at 17–19, 50 (naming the public trust “the vital principle”); OTIS, supra note
18, at 320–21 (arguing that the government is held in trust for the people, and that it is to
the people that the government should be answerable for abuses of that trust, and arguing
that the freedom of speech goes far in securing this end). See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14
U.S. 304, 324–25 (1816) (asserting federal jurisdiction to secure the “public welfare” over
“pride of opinion”).
1204. Carol Rose, supra note 244, at 770 (“The great commerce clause cases of the Marshall court reflect the same view: a state cannot ‘privatize’ commerce for the benefit of its
own citizens, but must leave commerce open to the entire nation.”); Carta de Foresta [1217];
2 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES a proeme (“a King cannot avoid his charter”). Cf. 3 EDWARD
COKE, INSTITUTES *181–83 (It was according to these principles that Coke was able to cry
out against the favorites of the crown: “Against these inventors and propounders of evil
things, the holy ghost hath spoken, inventores malorum, digni sunt morte [inventors of evil
things deserve death].”) (quoting Romans 1:29–32); 2 WILSON, THE WORKS, supra note 113,
at 6–7, 29–32 (“The very idea of a traditionary law, transmitted from generation to generation merely by custom and memory, may be considered as derived, in part at least, from the
practice of the Druids, who considered it as unlawful to commit their religious instructions
to writing.” This common law was besieged and “disfigured” by the feudalism of the
Normans.).
1205. OTIS, supra note 18, at 175 (citing Dr. Bonham’s Case [1610] 8 Co. Rep. 107a, 118a
(Eng.)); SIMMONS, supra note 31, at 2–3 (quoting QUINCY, JR., supra note 32, at 540); William Wetmore, Wetmore’s Minutes of the Trial, Essex Inferior Court, Newburyport, Oct.
1773, Caesar v. Greenleaf, in 2 ADAMS, LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 22, at 64–67 (“An act of
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robust judicial branch in America, invested with the power to say what
the law is and to declare unconstitutional laws void as a check in the
balance of powers, began in the courthouses of Massachusetts Bay;
where James Otis first made his stand.1206 It was therefore recorded
that, “The remedy adopted by the Colonies was to throw off the yoke of
Parliament; to confer on the judiciary the power to declare unconstitutional statutes void; to declare general warrants unconstitutional in
express terms; and thus to put an end here to general Writs of
Assistance.”1207
This remedy was later advocated in John Adams’ Thoughts on
Government, as a check in the separation of powers according to which
the separation of powers was adopted in the first written constitutions
of America.1208 The power of the court to overrule unjust laws and to
equitably roll back unjust executive interpretations of law, as an independent check in the separation of powers, was finally established by
the U.S. Supreme Court in the iconic case Marbury v. Madison.1209
This common law principle, taken for granted in the United States today, is the lynch pin in the U.S. separation of powers system.1210
Ever thereafter, general warrants were ruled unconstitutional
for departing from the ordinary practice of investigating individuals for

parliament against natural Equity, as to make one Judge in his own cause is void.”) (quoting Day v. Savadge [1614] Hob. 85, 87 (Eng.)).
1206. SIMMONS, supra note 31, at 2–3 (quoting QUINCY, JR., supra note 32, at 540). See
George P. Smith, II, Dr. Bonham’s Case and the Modern Significance of Lord Coke’s Influence, 41 WASH. L. REV. 297, 314 (1966).
1207. SIMMONS, supra note 31, at 2–3 (quoting QUINCY, JR., supra note 32, at 540).
1208. John Adams, Thoughts on Government 21 [1776]; THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James
Madison) (drawing support from the constitutions of a number of the states including Virginia, Maryland, and Massachusetts requiring a separation of powers); VA. CONST. OF 1776,
§ 5 (“That the legislative and executive powers of the States should be separate and distinct
from the judiciary. . . .”); id. at para. 24 (“The legislative, executive, and judiciary department, shall be separate and distinct, so that neither exercise the powers properly belonging
to the other; nor shall any person exercise the powers of more than one of them, at the same
time . . . .”); MASS. CONST. art. XXX; U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, III; MD. CONST. OF 1776 art. 6
(“That the legislative, executive and judicial powers of government, ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other.”).
1209. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803).
1210. Id.; Gibbons, 22 U.S. 1 at 233–34 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring) (noting the “vis
vitae of power” to vindicate the public interest including by asserting jurisdiction to overrule
unjust laws, interpreting the laws so that they are justly subservient to the public interest,
saying, “[t]he practice of our Government certainly has been, on many subjects, to occupy so
much only of the field opened to them as they think the public interests require.”); Carol
Rose, supra note 244, at 770. See also Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304, 310–11,
319–20 (1795) (referring to the U.S. social compact as accepted by Pennsylvania to assert
jurisdiction to declare a state law void for violating rights of property).
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known crimes committed in the past.1211 For the warrants inappropriately open the field of investigation to include any person, for any
reason.1212 General warrants also facilitate police harassment according to the prejudices of individual officers; a reality observed by the
American Revolutionaries in their annual commemorations of the
death of Crispus Attucks on King’s Street.1213
Even in the context of ordinary criminal law, there is no method
of issuing warrants that can successfully rein in the military or police
if no one plans on charging a suspect.1214 Beginning with Mapp v.
Ohio, Fourth Amendment judicial restraint of reasonable searches and
seizures depended upon the exclusionary rule alone.1215 In Mapp and
its progeny, the Supreme Court regrettably presumed the rational selfinterest of the police to get convictions in court was so strong, that it
may be treated as absolute.1216

1211. Laura K. Donohue, Laura Donohue on NSA Surveillance, C-SPAN (Dec. 22, 2015),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4569637/laura-donohue-nsa-surveillance.
1212. Id.
1213. Id.; SIMMONS, supra note 31, at 18; John Hancock, An Oration . . . to Commemorate
the Bloody Tragedy of the Fifth of March 1770, EDES & GILL, Mar. 5, 1774, at 11 (“Tell me
this, you bloody butchers . . . . Do not the injured shades of Maverick, Gray, Caldwell, Attucks and Carr . . . fill even your dreams with terror?”); HEZEKIAH NILES, REPUBLICATION OF
THE PRINCIPLES AND ACTS OF THE REVOLUTION IN AMERICA 15 (1876) (In 1770, an anonymous
black man lit the spark that fanned into a revolutionary flame in Boston when he called an
occupying British red coat a “Lobster,” and was beaten for it. A common white man (who is
thought to be Samuel Gray) stepped in and defended the unknown black man’s honor by
beating up the soldier. Then the British soldiers revenged their wounded pride by murdering Attucks, Gray, Caldwell, Carr, and Maverick in the street. This incident became known
as the Boston Massacre.).
1214. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659–60 (1961). Cf. San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S.
Ct. 1765, 1773–75 (2015) (the police used deadly force and violence here without any probable cause for a crime—the exclusionary rule does not carry any weight in the police decision
to nearly kill Sheehan); Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650 (2014) (per curiam) (the police used
deadly force and violence here without any probable cause for a crime—the exclusionary
rule, once again, does not encourage the police to abstain in such a case); ABC News (Australia), WARNING: Graphic violence – real-time events of Walter Scott shooting, YOUTUBE
(Apr. 9, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YM4tE0SQCZY.
1215. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659–60; Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2060 (2016) (interpreting the discovery of an outstanding warrant to be an intervening circumstance sufficient to
cut off the exclusionary rule—the easy digitization and searchability of these outstanding
warrants make them easily accessible).
1216. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656 (affirming that the exclusionary rule was “‘the only effectively available way’” to maintain police compliance with the Fourth Amendment). See, e.g.,
Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 537–39 (2014) (holding that the police may violate
the written letter of the law as long as they do so reasonably, as a matter not only under the
exclusionary rule, but as a matter of the Fourth Amendment itself).
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Then, under the exclusionary rule in Smith v. Maryland, a massive, global, dragnet surveillance apparatus grew in darkness.1217
Before Edward Snowden unveiled this spy machine, Americans did not
know that the government was using Smith as a pretext to pull in massive amounts of user data.1218 Nor did Americans know that
government contractors, including Booz Allen Hamilton and AT&T,
were making billions of dollars selling out the public to the government
without their consent.1219
Interestingly, a previous opinion of Judge Robert Bork provides
support in justifying a broader scope of judicial involvement in the protection of civil liberties following these disclosures.1220 Even Robert
Bork recognized the need for judicial expansion of constitutional rights
to rein in police abuses during his tenure as a judge on the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.1221 In fact, then Judge Ruth Bader Gins1217. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979) (finding that a telephone user has
no reasonable expectation of privacy from a pen register, and therefore that it is not a
“search” under the Fourth Amendment for exclusionary rule purposes).
1218. CITIZENFOUR (Praxis Films Nov. 28, 2014). See In re Application of the FBI for an
Ord. Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. 13-109, 2013 WL
5741573, at *2 (FISA Ct. 2013) (“production of telephone service provider metadata is
squarely controlled by the U.S. Supreme Court decision Smith v. Maryland”).
1219. A GOOD AMERICAN (El Ride Productions Feb. 3, 2017) (we knew following the 9/11
attacks that the U.S. Government was developing technology for spying called Thin
Thread—we did not know that the Government would contract this work to companies like
Booz Allen and AT&T); EUR. PARL. DOC. (A5–0264/2001) 147 (2001) (“No effective public
control mechanism of secret services and their undemocratic practices exists globally. It is
in the nature of secret services that they cannot be controlled. They must therefore be abolished. . . . Every society must make a fundamental decision whether or not to live under
permanent control.”); Lesley Stahl, CEO of Israeli Spyware-Maker NSO on Fighting Terror,
Khashoggi Murder, and Saudi Arabia, CBS NEWS (Mar. 24, 2019, 11:54 AM), https://
www.cbsnews.com/news/interview-with-ceo-of-nso-group-israeli-spyware-maker-on-fighting-terror-khashoggi-murder-and-saudi-arabia-60-minutes/ (prior to this report we did not
know how, or who, was providing the technology to hack connected devices—the spyware is
called Pegasus—our tax dollars go to support this kind of controversial technology linked to
the death of Jamal Khashoggi and working around the U.S. Judiciary in San Bernardino,
California).
1220. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 993–95 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring)
(“[U]nless we continue to develop doctrine to fit first amendment concerns, we are remitted
to old categories which, applied woodenly, do not address modern problems. . . . Thus, we
have a judicial tradition of a continuing evolution of doctrine to serve the central purpose of
the first amendment. . . . Judges given stewardship of a constitutional provision—such as
the first amendment—whose core is known but whose outer reach and contours are ill-defined, face the never-ending task of discerning the meaning of the provision from one case to
the next.”).
1221. Id. at 996 (Bork, J., concurring) (“But if, over time, the libel action becomes a threat
to the central meaning of the first amendment, why should not judges adapt their doctrines?
Why is it different to refine and evolve doctrine here, so long as one is faithful to the basic
meaning of the amendment, than it is to adapt the fourth amendment to take account of
electronic surveillance, the commerce clause to adjust to interest motor carriage, or the first
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burg concurred with Judge Bork in this opinion that would foreshadow
the Kyllo rule,
The fourth amendment was framed by men who did not foresee
electronic surveillance. But that does not make it wrong for judges
to apply the central value of that amendment to electronic invasions of personal privacy. The commerce power was established by
men who did not foresee the scope and intricate interdependence of
today’s economic activities. But that does not make it wrong for
judges to forbid states the power to impose burdensome regulations
on the interstate movement of trailer trucks. The first amendment’s
guarantee of freedom of the press was written by men who had not
the remotest idea of modern forms of communication. But that does
not make it wrong for a judge to find the values of the first amendment relevant to radio and television broadcasting.1222

Here Judge Bork clearly applied the idea of a living constitution to a
question of constitutional law.1223 Thus, Bork advocated in Ollman
that the court ought to apply the original intent, i.e., the “first principles,” of the Commerce Clause, First Amendment, and Fourth
Amendment to the present problems of the day.1224 This perspective, if
reaffirmed today, would require the Court to update the judicial opinions of the bench, especially regarding its exclusionary rule
precedent.1225
The prevailing attitude of telecom companies regarding the
public interest took central stage in the context of the ongoing crisis of
California wildfires.1226 As California’s firemen were attempting to use
cell phones to access real time data, Verizon violated net neutrality
amendment to encompass the electronic media? I do not believe there is a difference. To say
that such matters must be left to the legislature is to say that changes in circumstances
must be permitted to render constitutional guarantees meaningless.”).
1222. Id. at 995–96 (Bork, J., concurring). Though Scalia dissented from this evolving
idea of the provisions of the constitution in Ollman, he eventually adopted it, albeit impliedly, in Kyllo in regard to the Fourth Amendment on the U.S. Supreme Court. Kyllo v.
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34–40 (2001) (opinion authored by Justice Scaila).
1223. Ollman, 750 F.2d at 993–96 (Bork, J., concurring). But see ROBERT BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH 123–53 (1996) [hereinafter BORK, SLOUCHING] (calling for
censorship of all musicians saying, “Sooner or later censorship is going to have to be considered as popular culture continues plunging to ever more sickening lows.”).
1224. Ollman, 750 F.2d at 993–96 (Bork, J., concurring).
1225. Id. (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483, 492–95 (1954)) (“We must never hesitate to apply old values to
new circumstances, whether those circumstances are changes in technology or changes in
the impact of traditional common law actions Sullivan was an instance of the Supreme
Court doing precisely this, as Brown v. Board of Education, was more generally an example
of the Court applying an old principle according to a new understanding of a social
situation.”).
1226. Brodkin, supra note 585; Stevens, supra note 1083.
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principles, common carrier common law, and their own unlimited data
contracts, by throttling the cell phone data access of the firemen.1227
Thus, it is very unsurprising that Verizon and other telecom companies
regularly sell their customer’s private data to the government.1228
In light of recent events, it appears the exclusionary rule alone
cannot possibly be effective to contain the executive branch within the
bounds of the Fourth Amendment.1229 Cases for equitable orders must
now be entertained to dismantle unconstitutional executive programs.1230 It can no longer be reasonably presumed, merely because
the exclusionary rule is upheld in Court, that police and military investigations are adhering to the U.S. Constitution under Kyllo v. United
States.1231
1227. Brodkin, supra note 585; Stevens, supra note 1083. See Schroeder, Choosing, supra
note 485, at 50 (explaining the three basic principles of net neutrality).
1228. Kenneth Lipp, AT&T is Spying on Americans for Profit, DAILY BEAST (Oct. 25,
2016, 1:13 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/atandt-is-spying-on-americans-for-profit
(describing the Hemisphere Project, which is a system AT&T uses to sell out its customers
to state and local police authorities and perhaps other private entities); Ryan Gallagher &
Henrik Moltke, The Wiretap Rooms: The NSA’s Hidden Spy Hubs in Eight U.S. Cities, THE
INTERCEPT (June 25, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://theintercept.com/2018/06/25/att-internet-nsaspy-hubs/ (“The NSA considers AT&T to be one of its most trusted partners and has lauded
the company’s ‘extreme willingness to help.’ It is a collaboration that dates back decades.”).
See also Kim Zetter, Yahoo Publishes National Security Letters After FBI Drops Gag Orders,
WIRED (June 1, 2016, 4:41 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/06/yahoo-publishes-nationalsecurity-letters-fbi-drops-gag-orders/ (NSLs usually come with a payoff as well). Cf. Kashmir Hill, Lavabit’s Ladar Levison: ‘If You Knew What I Know About Email, You Might Not
Use It’, FORBES (Aug. 9, 2013, 5:35 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/08/
09/lavabits-ladar-levison-if-you-knew-what-i-know-about-email-you-might-not-use-it/
?sh=196b9ea4648a.
1229. Snowden Archive – The SIDtoday Files, THE INTERCEPT, https://theintercept.com/
snowden-sidtoday/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2019) [hereinafter Snowden Archive]; Feinstein,
Floor Speech, supra note 621; Exec. Order No. 13,841, 50 Fed. Reg. 29,435 (June 20, 2018);
Executive Grant of Clemency for Joe Arpaio (Aug. 25, 2017).
1230. See Melendres v. Arpaio, 989 F. Supp. 2d 822, 910–12 (D. Ariz. 2016) (declaring
Sherriff Arpaio’s concentration camp for immigrants unconstitutional); Ms. L. v. ICE, 310 F.
Supp. 3d 1133, 1149–50 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (ordering that separated children be reunited with
their parents). United States v. Arpaio, No. CR-16-01012-001-PHX-SRB, 2017 WL 4839072,
at *1–3 (2017) (the acceptance of a pardon is also acceptance of guilt). See also LULAC v.
Wheeler, 899 F.3d 814, 817 (9th Cir. 2018), vacated on reh’g en banc, 914 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir.
2019) (“If Congress’s statutory mandates are to mean anything, the time has come to put a
stop to this patent evasion.”); LULAC v. Regan, 996 F.3d 673, 677 (9th Cir. 2021) (agreeing
with the rationale for the 2018 order).
1231. Staks Studios, “I Can’t Breathe” – Eric Garner Dies After NYPD Chokehold (Full
Video Compilation), YOUTUBE (Dec. 3, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=OWoZ4Mj9028; Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2071 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“no one can breathe in this atmosphere”); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659–60
(1961). But see Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 537–39 (2014) (finding that unreasonable searches and seizures are constitutional as long as they are a reasonable mistake—
whatever that means). Cf. Snowden Archive, supra note 1229; Feinstein, Floor Speech,
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The mass suspicionless and warrantless surveillance of U.S. citizens that was only yesterday covered up, is now common knowledge;
abuses such as the one overruled in Kyllo can no longer be reasonably
characterized as exceptions.1232 Whatever deterrence the exclusionary
rule was supposed to accomplish, it has unequivocally failed.1233 Americans are surrounded by rampant, undeniable Fourth Amendment
violations and abuses that demand equitable action by the Supreme
Court far more robust than mere exclusion.1234
The failure of the exclusionary rule was revealed in 2002, the
year after Kyllo was decided, when the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”) broke its silence, after twenty-four years of
operation in near-absolute secrecy, to respond to the 2002 FISA
supra note 621; Exec. Order No. 13,841, 50 Fed. Reg. at 29,435; Executive Grant of Clemency
for Joe Arpaio (Aug. 25, 2017).
1232. Thomas Brewster, Cartapping: How Feds Have Spied On Connected Cars For 15
Years, FORBES (Jan. 15, 2017, 1:10 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2017/
01/15/police-spying-on-car-conversations-location-siriusxm-gm-chevrolet-toyota-privacy/
?sh=438aa5c32ef8; Erin Biba, How connected car tech is eroding personal privacy, BBC
(Aug. 9, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/autos/story/20160809-your-car-is-not-your-friend (“just
like your mobile phone, which has been spying on you for years, your car is not your friend”).
The government ordinarily lies to the court in order to preserve its use of technology that
violates Kyllo from judicial challenge. Cale Guthrie Weissman, How an obsessive recluse
blew the lid off the secret technology authorities use to spy on people’s cellphones, BUSINESS
INSIDER (June 19, 2015, 5:04 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/how-daniel-rigmaidendiscovered-stingray-spying-technology-2015-6?utm_source=reddit.com (telling the story of
Daniel Rigmaiden). The result is a lot of judicial beating around the bush, and a failure of
the court to create rules to deal with what is really going on. See, e.g., United States v.
Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 414–15 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“Nonetheless, as Justice
Alito notes, physical intrusion is now unnecessary to many forms of surveillance. With increasing regularity, the Government will be capable of duplicating the monitoring
undertaken in this case by enlisting factory- or owner-installed vehicle tracking devices or
GPS-enabled smartphones.”); id. at 429–30 (Alito, J., concurring) (“In the pre-computer age,
the greatest protections of privacy were neither constitutional nor statutory, but practical.
Traditional surveillance for any extended period of time was difficult and costly, and therefore rarely undertaken. The surveillance at issue in this case—constant monitoring of the
location of a vehicle for four weeks—would have required a large team of agents, multiple
vehicles, and perhaps aerial assistance. Only an investigation of unusual importance could
have justified such an expenditure of law enforcement resources. Devices like the one used
in the present case, however, make long-term monitoring relatively easy and cheap.”); Utah
v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2071 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“We must not pretend
that the countless people who are routinely targeted by police are ‘isolated.’”).
1233. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656; In re Application of the FBI for an Ord. Requiring the Prod.
of Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *2 (FISA Ct. 2013)
(“The production of telephone service provider metadata is squarely controlled by the U.S.
Supreme Court decision Smith v. Maryland”—using exclusionary rule case law to justify,
not deter, unconstitutional government searches and seizures); United States v. Moalin, 973
F.3d 977, 1000 (9th Cir. 2020).
1234. CNN, Combined videos show fatal Castile shooting, YOUTUBE (June 21, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=85Y_yOm9IhA; Snowden Archive, supra note 1229.
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Amendments.1235 FISC revealed that the wall between international
and domestic FBI enforcement had broken down, and thus ordered
that the wall be rebuilt.1236 Not long after, however, FISC abrogated
its first public opinion and reversed its position.1237
The very existence of FISC is a violation of the separation of
powers, for it is the chief of American Star Chambers.1238 It is only by
FISC’s decision to break its silence that Americans even know it exists.1239 It is also only by FISC’s decision to publish an opinion that
Americans know that a fairly innocuous amendment to FISA allowed
the FBI to treat U.S. citizens as foreign enemies by investigating domestic crime in the same fashion as foreign war crimes.1240
There is nothing in the U.S. Constitution that allows Congress
to create an Article I FISC to work around the rule in Kyllo.1241 Nor is
the FISC beholden to Crowell v. Benson, or any of the foundations of
administrative law that allow adjudicative agencies to exist; and it is
therefore presumptively unconstitutional.1242 It is unconstitutional on
its face because it embodies a secret convergence of judicial, executive,
and legislative powers that is totally prohibited by the U.S.
Constitution.1243
1235. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intel. Surveillance Ct., 218 F. Supp. 2d
611, 624–25 (FISA Ct. 2002).
1236. Id.
1237. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 733 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002). See also In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [Redacted],
No. 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *17 (FISA Ct. 2013) (saying that the FISA Court minimization procedure “comports well with the Fourth Amendment”).
1238. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34–40 (2001); Laura K. Donohue, Technological
Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes of
Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407, 524–25 (2012) [hereinafter Donohue, Technological].
1239. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intel. Surveillance Ct., 218 F. Supp. 2d
at 624–25.
1240. See Donohue, Technological, supra note 1238, at 524–25 (recounting all the
drama); In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intel Surveillance Ct., 218 F. Supp. 2d
611, 624–25 (FISA Ct. 2002); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34–40 (the FISC grants licenses, not official
Article III warrants, to use technology not in general public use to spy on U.S. citizens in
their homes—thus its powers and its authorities are all presumptively unconstitutional
under Kyllo.).
1241. U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, III.
1242. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 58–65 (1932). See Donohue, National Security,
supra note 31. Cf. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 504 (2011) (citing generally Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932)); id. at 506 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that Crowell was a
watershed opinion, and fearing the majority underestimated it).
1243. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1813; USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001);
In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intel. Surveillance Ct., 218 F. Supp. 2d at 624–25;
U.S. CONST. art. III (vesting the Congress with the power to delegate the Article III power to
“one Supreme Court”—not to multiple conflicting federal jurisdictions).
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The Mueller Report was a product of secret FISC orders and
warrants.1244 By design, the Report appeared to cover for President
Trump’s bad behavior in two fundamental ways:1245 (1) it did not investigate for the treason of President Donald Trump, his campaign
personnel, or his family;1246 and (2) it failed to hold that an act of presidential obstruction of justice is an abandonment of Article II duties to
be the chief administrator of justice, and is per se illegitimate and impeachable presidential behavior.1247
The Mueller Report did not ask or answer the question of
whether President Trump was legitimately elected; his legitimacy was
presumed by feudal law.1248 By design, feudalism is poison and will
1244. 1 MUELLER, supra note 362, at 1–3, 13. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S.
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, REVIEW OF FOUR FISA APPLICATIONS AND OTHER ASPECTS OF THE FBI’S
CROSSFIRE HURRICANE INVESTIGATION xiii (2019).
1245. Cf. Jeffrey Toobin, Why the Mueller Investigation Failed, NEW YORKER (June 29,
2020), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/07/06/why-the-mueller-investigationfailed (“Mueller did not use the F.B.I. information as a catalyst for a deeper examination of
Trump’s history and personal finances. Nor did he demand to see Trump’s taxes, or examine
the roots of his special affinity for Putin’s Russia. Most important, Mueller declined to issue
a grand-jury subpoena for Trump’s testimony, and excluded from his report a conclusion
that Trump had committed crimes. These two decisions are the most revealing, and defining, failures of Mueller’s tenure as a special counsel.”).
1246. 1 MUELLER, supra note 362, at 2 (“the investigation did not establish that members
of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian government in its election interference activities,” and implicit exhonoration).
1247. 2 MUELLER, supra note 362, at 159–81 (citing Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, at
752–53 n.32 (1982)) (refusing to argue that presidential obstruction of justice is an abandonment of the President’s Article II duties, an abdication of his office, and an implicit request
for impeachment—adopting Nixon v. Fitzgerald’s dicta likely proffered by the president’s
counsel that executive immunity should be generally granted wherever an investigation
would “hinder his ability to perform his Article II duties,” impliedly adopting the view that
stopping the President from obstructing the government could cause a “chilling effect” on
the President’s ability to carry out his Article II duties to administer the government.).
1248. 2 MUELLER, supra note 362, at 159–81 (citing Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S., at
752–53 n.32) (distinguishing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. from the feudal balancing test
in the Fitzgerald cases saying, “Only in a few instances has the Court applied a different
framework.”); Nixon v. Adm’r Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443–45, 451–55 (1977) (the proper
question in this case was not whether Nixon had the power, but whether he had the right to
block congressional production and archival of the Nixon Tapes). See Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. at 766 (White, J., dissenting) (“Attaching absolute immunity to the Office of the
President, rather than to particular activities that the President might perform, places the
President above the law. It is a reversion to the old notion that the King can do no wrong.
Until now, this concept had survived in this country only in the form of sovereign immunity.”); Nixon v. Adm’r Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. at 443 (“Rather, in determining whether the
Act disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate branches, the proper inquiry focuses
on the extent to which it prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions. Only where the potential for disruption is present must we then
determine whether that impact is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within
the constitutional authority of Congress.”) (emphasis added); id. at 516 n.12 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (arguing that United States v. Nixon could not be distinguished, that circum-
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obstruct any future attempts to secure the nation from foreign attacks
upon our elections, past or future.1249 The Mueller Report was written
under the influence of the feudal law expressed in The Fitzgerald Cases
that the president can do no wrong, and thus in so far as it was influenced by those cases it may be considered an unqualified endorsement
of those in power.1250
The holes in the Mueller Report became conspicuous when a
whistleblower outed the president’s solicitation of Ukraine for dirt on
Joe Biden to the House as an impeachable crime.1251 The Mueller Report did not consider the supposed solicitation of Russia for dirt on
Hillary Clinton as a viable “underlying crime related to Russian election interference.”1252 The absolute and qualified immunity set forth in
stances were not sufficiently different in this case, and that it should be applied in full). Cf.
OTIS, supra note 18, at 166 (“‘the question here is not about power, but right’”) (quoting
Jeremiah Dummer, A Defence of the New-England Charters 43 [1715].
1249. Schroeder, The Body, supra note 121, at 18 (noting the distinct relationship between the Nixon v. Fitzgerald and Harlow v. Fitzgerald and the English feudal case known
as The Bankers Case, in which the well known phrase “the king can do no wrong” was established); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 766–67 (1982) (White, J., dissenting) (“It is a
reversion to the old notion that the King can do no wrong.”); The Bankers Case [1696] 14
How. St. Tr. 1, 32 (Eng.) (stating the king can do no wrong), distinguished and delegitimized
by Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 470 (1793) (Opinion of Jay, C.J.) (The Bankers Case is
not valid law in the United States, nor is any sort of feudalism). See 1–2 MUELLER, supra
note 362, passim (citing the qualified and absolute immunity theories of the Fitzgerald
Cases to justify not fully investigating the president, while failing to defend the Report’s
limited nature, perhaps unintentionally allowing Trump’s defenders to characterize it as a
full exhoneration); Barr’s “Principle Conclusions”, supra note 355 (“In making this determination, we noted that the Special Counsel recognized that ‘the evidence does not establish
that the President was involved in an underlying crime related to Russian election interference,’ and that, while not determinative, the absence of such evidence bears upon the
President’s intent with respect to obstruction.”) (quoting 2 MUELLER, supra note 362, at
157).
1250. 1–2 MUELLER, supra note 362, passim; THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2
(U.S. 1776) (asserting that all “just powers come from the consent of the governed”). Cf.
WINTER ON FIRE: UKRAINE’S FIGHT FOR FREEDOM (Netflix 2015).
1251. Steve Benen, Why this Trump scandal sparked an impeachment push (and Mueller
didn’t), MADDOWBLOG MSNBC (Sept. 25, 2019, 7:42 AM), http://www.msnbc.com/rachelmaddow-show/why-trump-scandal-sparked-impeachment-push-and-mueller-didnt (“Trump
Ukraine solicitation forces Pelosi’s hand on impeachment”); Read Trump’s phone, supra
note 1048 (President Trump said “I would like you to do us a favor though . . .” “There’s a lot
of talk about Biden’s son, that Biden stopped the prosecution and a lot of people want to find
out about that so whatever you can do with the Attorney General would be great. Biden
went around bragging that he stopped the prosecution so if you can look into it . . . . It
sounds horrible to me.” Then Zelenskyy promised that he, “will look into the situation, specifically to the company that you mentioned in this issue.”); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (defining
impeachment as including “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors”).
1252. 1 MUELLER, supra note 362, at 180 (“Schemes involving the solicitation or receipt of
assistance from foreign sources raise difficult statutory and constitutional questions. . . .
The Office ultimately concluded that, even if the principal legal questions were resolved
favorably to the government, a prosecution would encounter difficulties proving that Cam-
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The Fitzgerald Cases logically facilitated this brand of duplicity within
the government to throw public focus off the legal violations of corrupt
government officials.1253
In order to overcome the arbitrary, feudal measures used in the
federal courts to dismiss all manner of public interest cases, Americans
should begin by tracing the roots of U.S. antitrust law.1254 Antitrust
law has a dual basis; it grows concurrently from the common law and
statutory jurisdiction.1255 It cleaves between the Commerce Clause, the
Patent & Copyright Clause, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
as it throws its root deep into the rights “claimed by Americans from
the sacred sanctions of compact.”1256

paign officials or individuals connected to the Campaign willfully violated the law.”); 2
MUELLER, supra note 362, at 7.
1253. Schroeder, The Body, supra note 121, at 18. Compare The Bankers Case [1696] 14
How. St. Tr. 1, 32 (Eng.) (add explanatory parenthetical explaining what the author is comparing here), with Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 465 (1793) (Opinion of Wilson, J.)
(disagreeing with The Bankers Case); id.at 451 (Opinion of Blair, J.) (disagreeing with The
Bankers Case); id. at 468 (Opinion of Cushing, J.) (disagreeing with The Bankers Case); id.
at 475–78 (Opinion of Jay, C.J.) (disagreeing with The Bankers Case); id. at 437–45 (Iredell,
J., dissenting) (Iredell vigorously defended The Bankers Case, but it was refuted by the
other justices). Despite Chisholm’s overturning of the feudal law under the Bankers Case,
this law was reasserted in the Fitzgerald Cases that the Mueller Report expressly relied
upon in coming to its charging decision. 2 MUELLER, supra note 362, at 159–81 (citing Nixon
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 752–53 n.32 (1982)).
1254. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 208–09 (1824). See United States v. E.C. Knight Co.,
156 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1895) (citing 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *181; Statute of Monopolies
1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (Eng.)), abrogated by Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 122, 127 (1942)
(citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 210) (unleashing the Commerce Power from Knight’s limitations,
such that it now applies to potentially every blade of grass); Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1, 51, 60 (1911) (quoting 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *181); Carol Rose,
supra note 244, at 770. Cf. Thurlow v. Commonwealth (License Cases), 46 U.S. 504, 602
(1847) (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 199–200) (“In [Gibbons], a monopoly had been granted to
the inventors of machinery propelled by steam which, when applied to vessels, forced them
through the water. The law of monopoly of New York extended to the tidewaters, and for
navigating these with two steamboats belonging to Gibbons, a bill was filed against him,
and he was enjoined by the state courts of New York, and in his answer he relied on licenses
granted under the [New York law] . . . for enrolling and licensing ships and vessels to be
employed in the coasting trade, and for regulating the same. This was the sole defense. The
Court first held that the power to regulate commerce included the power to regulate navigation also, as an incident to and part of commerce. . . . And then the state law is declared void
as repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United States.”).
1255. Knight, 156 U.S. at 9–10 (citing 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *181; Statute of Monopolies 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (Eng.)), abrogated by Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 122,
127 (1942).
1256. 1 WARREN, supra note 35, at 136, 149; THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras.
2–3 (U.S. 1776); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, 8; id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. See 3 EDWARD COKE,
INSTITUTES *181; OTIS, supra note 18, at 276 (calling for “the demolition of all monopolies
great and small”).
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Federal antitrust jurisdiction exists to answer every sort of
claim a monopolist might raise to justify prior restraint on trade,
travel, and speech by ordinary American people.1257 The seminal case,
Gibbons v. Ogden, did not impliedly preempt state patent law, but it
expounded a plenary power idea regarding the Commerce Clause to
limit states or individuals engaged in interstate commerce.1258 While
Gibbons’ plenary power ideology all but passed away in the Twentieth
Century for its role in creating a chaotic system of conflicting state and
federal plenary powers,1259 federal grants of monopoly are still limited
by the Patent & Copyright Clause, and state grants of monopoly are
limited by the dormant Commerce Clause.1260
The room for states to continue granting monopolies under an
intrastate commerce idea was shrunk in Wickard v. Filburn, which applied the Commerce Clause to every blade of grass.1261 Even where a
case does not trigger the dormant Commerce Clause, the Privileges
and Immunities Clause still applies.1262 Under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and similar terms in State constitutions, attorneys

1257. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282–83 (6th Cir. 1898),
modified & aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). But see BORK, THE ANTITRUST, supra note 1136, at 424
(arguing that the First Amendment favors monopolies because he did not understand that
free speech requires a free and open forum or medium for speech to occur that might be
destroyed by monopolists).
1258. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 199–200 (showing how limiting the states can be done by reference to the Commerce Power, but it is unfortunate that the Gibbons Court named this
power “plenary” when it is not—for a more accurate example of proper, non-plenary dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence one must look to the 1940’s, especially the case
Edwards v. California). See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 355, 373–74 (1816)
(interpreting the state’s exclusive jurisdiction over these national matters as part of that
realm of power that states “meant to put down forever” in order to “prevent dissention and
collision, [because] each [state] surrendered those powers which might make them dangerous to each other”).
1259. See, e.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941) (rejecting the old plenary
power ideology expressed in New York v. Miln in favor of a dormant commerce clause rationale). Cf. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 199–200.
1260. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, 8; Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109; Copyright Act of
1790, 1 Stat. 124. See United States v. Am. Bell Telephone Co., 128 U.S. 315, 355, 357–58
(1888), declined to extend in Oil States Energy Servs. v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct.
1365, 1374 (2018).
1261. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127 (1942) (Congress can regulate “a nurse crop
of grass seedling”); id. at 121–22 (cutting off the Commerce Clause atrophy caused by the
Taney Court in cases like the License Cases to support slavery, which caused Knight to
stumble at first by interpreting its inherent antitrust jurisdiction too narrowly). But see
Mozilla v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1, 98 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“in any area where the Commission lacks
the authority to regulate, it equally lacks the power to preempt state law”).
1262. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of
Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 221–23 (1984).
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may raise the common law abolition of monopolies under The Case of
Monopolies; as vindicated in Lord Coke’s Institutes.1263
Constitutional grounds for maintaining the common law abolition of monopolies in America were expressly retained by the old
Congress of 1774.1264 The prior colonial grounds for maintaining common law jurisdiction to abolish monopolies was lifted into the Resolves
of Virginia and Massachusetts, the Declaration of Independence, many
of the original State constitutions, and the U.S. Constitution.1265 The
common law rationale for resisting monopolies was also expressly proclaimed by James Otis as a basis of the legal cause of Otis’s oration in
Paxton’s Case against writs of assistance under the English Navigation
Acts.1266

1263. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 465 U.S. at
221–23; 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *181–83 (a right at common law to restrict speech or
trade of others cannot be raised when the common law abolishes and punishes such rights);
Dyer’s Case [1414] 2 Hen. V, f. 5, pl. 26 (Eng.); The Case of Monopolies [1602] 11 Co. Rep.
84b (Eng.) (determining that monopolies are void at common law).
1264. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 592 (1834) (“[i]t is presumed that the copyright
recogized in the act of Congress and which was intended to be protected by its provisions
was the property which an author has by the common law in his manuscript”); id. at 688
(Thompson, J., dissenting) (“The old Congress, in the year 1774, unanimously resolved, that
the respective colonies are entitled to the common law of England.”) (citing JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 140).
1265. See supra note 61 (naming several of the resolves that claimed the rights of Englishmen in the colonies that became a context for understanding the rights addressed in
the Declaration of Independence); THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 2–3 (U.S.
1776); see also supra note 63 (naming many of the constitutional provisions ratified around
1776 to secure the rights announced as the bases of American government in the Declaration). Cf. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 62,
70 (Telling of how in the past Massachusetts surrendered “the odious extent of the monopolies granted to them,” which “infused new life into the colonies which sprung from it, by
freeing them from all restraint and supervisions by a superior power, to which they might
perhaps have been held accountable.”); id. at § 475 (noting that the preamble’s object of
creating a “‘more perfect union’” is meant to combat monopolies of trade); id. at §§ 962, 965
(Noting that taxation should be limited by trust “‘to provide for the common defence and
general welfare,’” to avoid its use as “a prerogative power to destroy competition, and secure
a monopoly to the government!”).
1266. OTIS, supra note 18, at 276 (advocating “the demolition of all monopolies great and
small, and throwing open all the ports of the world to the colonists, under proper restrictions”); SIMMONS, supra note 31, at 21 (England’s power to monopolize American resources
was exactly the matter at hand in Paxton’s Case and proceeding matters litigated by John
Adams and others on behalf of the colonists and against the crown.). See also Letter from
Joseph Reed to John Glover (Oct. 20, 1775) (“What do you think of a flag with a white
ground, a tree in the middle, the motto ‘Appeal to Heaven?’ This is the flag of our floating
batteries.”); Letter from John Adams, Second President of the U.S., to Marquis De Castries,
Marshal of France (Dec. 9, 1784) (Before the revolution, the colonies’ white “pine trees were
reserved to the crown,” and there were “a number of families, whose whole occupation has
been to cut, draw, and prepare, these kinds of trees, for the royal navy of England.”).
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If the federal courts firmly reassume this jurisdiction, copyright
and patent misuse actions may be opened for review under antitrust
principles, and unfair competition suits under trademark law (which
perhaps should be called trademark misuse colloquially) may be expanded.1267 The feet of internet companies may be held to the fire
through misuse and unfair competition actions as bases of antitrust
litigation under the writ of trespass on the case, or by an extension of
fraud upon the public actions, or by an application of Dr. Foster’s Case
to IP law.1268 State compacts may be established wherever the federal
government attempts to deregulate federal antitrust provisions; for in
the wake of the FCC repeal of net neutrality rules, the California Net
Neutrality Act of 2018 still lives.1269
1267. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917); Morton
Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger, 314 U.S. 488 (1942); Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d
970, 976 (4th Cir. 1990); Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 603–04 (9th Cir. 1981) (the broad
language of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act extends to “‘any person’”—any limitations on this
statute to matters of unfair competition are inferred into the statute by the court) (quoting
15 U.S.C. 1125(a)). See also Ilan Charnelle, The Justification and Scope of the Copyright
Misuse Doctrine and Its Independence of the Antitrust Laws, 9 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 167,
188–89 (2002) (showing how Copyright misuse is broader than the principles of the Sherman and Clayton Acts and other positive antitrust laws); Brett Frischmann & Dan Moylan,
The Evolving Common Law Doctrine of Copyright Misuse: A Unified Theory and Its Application to Software, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 865, 927 (2000) (“Software exposes discrete gaps
in the Copyright Act and creates a need to coordinate copyright law with patent and antitrust law.”).
1268. Khan, supra note 1155, at 772; Schroeder, Choosing, supra note 485, at 51 (reacting to Comcast’s purchase of NBC and Universal—a purchase of billions of dollars of
copyright portfolio); id. at 55 n.44 (noting that major copyright owning associations and
internet service providers openly colluded to take down copyrighted content from the internet without going through the takedown measures required by the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act); Schroeder, Bringing, supra note 1036, at 4–6 (noting the rise in popularity
among most companies of claiming massive amounts of intangible value); id. at 70–71 (examining the problem of internet service providers owning copyright and using it to police
the internet); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); Motion Picture Patents Co., 243 U.S., at 502; Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 150 (1908) (abrogating Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890); In re
Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887)). Trespass on the case can be invoked under Civil Rule 2 and
James Madison’s endorsement of England’s use of it in Millar to recognize other common
law copyright causes of action. FED. R. CIV. P. 2; Millar v. Taylor [1769] 4 Burr. 2303, 2305
(Eng.) (Millar’s bill against Taylor was “a plea of trespass upon the case” in order to countenance a property right that was “not all at once known to the common law, or to the world
. . . yet are now established to be such”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison) (Implicitly endorsing the finding of a common law right through trespass on the case saying, “The
copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain, to be a right at common
law.”). Cf. Sarah Ludington, Reining in the Data Traders: A Tort for the Misuse of Personal
Information, 66 MARYLAND L. REV. 140, 187 (2006). But see Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 668–69 (1999).
1269. Mozilla v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2019); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (Congress’s consent is required for such compacts, but one may argue an implied consent in
Congress’s inaction and neglect.).
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Antitrust Enforcement of the Separation of Powers
Antitrust law is a common law that shares its root and origin
with Intellectual Property Law in England and America.1270 Edward
Coke, therefore, addressed the virtues of Parliament’s Statute of Monopolies as a vindication of the common law.1271 He wrote that the
Statute of Monopolies conspicuously secured the preexisting rights of
the English people by creating a statutory punishment of monopolists;
who stole the livelihoods of the English working class saying,
That monopolies are against the ancient and fundamental laws of
the realm (as it is declared by this Act) and that the monopolist was
in times past, and is much more now punishable, for obtaining and
procuring of them, we will demonstrate it by reason, and provide it
by authority. . . . This Act having declared all monopolies to be void
by the common law, hath provided by this clause, that they shall be
examined, heard, tried, and determined in the Courts of the Common law according to the Common law, and not at the Council
Table, Star Chamber, Chancery, Exchequer chamber, or any other
Court of like nature, but only according to the Common laws of this
Realm, with words negative, and not otherwise: For such boldness
the monopolists took, that often at the Council Table, Star-chamber, Chancery, and Exchequer chamber, petitions, informations and
bills were preferred in the Star-Chamber, pretending a contempt
for not obeying the commandments and clause of the said grants of
monopolies and of the proclamations, concerning the same: for the
preventing of which mischiefs this branch was added.1272
1270. 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *181–83; Statute of Monopolies 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3
(Eng.); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 51 (1911) (analyzing the Sherman Act:
“It is certain that those terms [i.e., regarding monopolies and contracts for restraint of
trade], at least in their rudimentary meaning, took their origin in the common law, and
were also familiar in the law of this country prior to and at the time of the adoption of the
act in question.”). See also United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 9 (1895) (noting that
the root of U.S. antitrust jurisdiction traces back to English common law: “‘It appeareth by
the preamble of this act (as a judgment in Parliament) that all grants of monopolies are
against the ancient and fundamentall laws of this Kingdome.’” (quoting 3 EDWARD COKE,
INSTITUTES *181). However, the Court limited its determination, saying “That which belongs
to commerce is within the jurisdiction of the United States, but that which does not belong
to commerce is within the jurisdiction of the police power of the states.” Id. at 12. This
limited view of the Commerce Power was expressly abrogated in Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111, 122 (1942) (extending the Commerce Power, including the common law principle
from the Case of Monopolies, to potentially every blade of grass, releasing antitrust common
law from the limitations asserted in Knight saying, “Even while important opinions in this
line of restrictive authority [i.e., Knight] were being written, however, other cases called
forth broader interpretations of the Commerce Clause destined to supersede the earlier
ones, and to bring about a return to the principles first enunciated by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden.”).
1271. 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *181–83.
1272. Id.
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The control of antitrust law upon all forms and offices of government
power to punish all those that seek to corrupt them were found in these
words.1273 The creation and enforcement of monopolies before the illegitimate Star Chamber and Council Table of the king did not make
monopolies legal or just, but it made them ever the more punishable
under the common law for violating the public trust.1274 Therefore,
Justice Jackson repeated Coke’s vindication of the Rule of Law as a
basis of the U.S. Separation of Powers in government by stating, “The
King ought not to be under any man, but he is under God and the
Law.”1275
Antitrust common law is fundamental to the enforcement of the
separation of powers, as expressed in the preamble of the U.S. Constitution, required by Article III, and recognized in “[t]he great commerce
clause cases of the Marshall Court.”1276 The ultimate foundation of federal public interest jurisdiction, however, surpasses the U.S.
Constitution.1277 It lies, ultimately, in the most final ground of jurisdiction there is—the compact of 1776—embodied by the Declaration of
Independence.1278
The Declaration of Independence defines the objects and ends of
government the United States must accomplish in order to establish
and maintain its legitimacy.1279 A government in the United States
that does not accomplish the objects and ends defined in the compact of
July 4, 1776, is at risk of violent unrest and an Appeal to Heaven.1280
1273. Id.
1274. Id.
1275. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 655, n.27 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (“We follow the judicial tradition instituted on a memorable Sunday in 1612
when King James took offense at the independence of his judges and, in rage, declared:
‘Then I am to be under the law—which it is treason to affirm.’ Chief Justice Coke replied to
his King: ‘Thus, wrote Bracton, The King ought not to be under any man, but he is under
God and the Law.’”) (quoting 1 CAMPBELL, supra note 24, at 272).
1276. Carol Rose, supra note 244, at 770. See, e.g., Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 208–09.
1277. Gibbons, 22 U.S., at 234 (Johnson, J., concurring) (attempting greater caution for
asserting jurisdiction, but still admitting that the Court ordinarily asserts jurisdiction
wherever it “think[s] the public interests require”); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 400 (1798)
(Iredell, J., concurring).
1278. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 3 (U.S. 1776) (proclaiming it illegitimate
to obstruct laws that are “wholesome and necessary for the public good”).
1279. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
1280. Id.; 2 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 168 (“And where the body of
the people, or any single man, is deprived of their right, or is under the exercise of a power
without right, and have no appeal on earth, then they have a liberty to appeal to heaven,
whenever they judge the cause of sufficient moment.”); Jeremiah Dummer, A Defence of the
New-England Charters 39, 43 [1715] (“some governors . . . have fallen victims on the spot,
not to the fury of a faction or rabble, but to the resentment of the whole body of the people,
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The goal of the separation of powers is the same as antitrust law; to
break up a monopoly of power.1281
Indeed, one way of looking at the original Thirteen Colonies,
and perhaps it is the most accurate way of looking at them, is as twelve
for-profit corporations and one non-profit corporation.1282 The first two
English Colonies in the world were the Plymouth and Virginia Companies, both founded in 1606 as England’s first joint-stock trading
companies as well.1283 Ever thereafter, the crown’s charter power was
used to incorporate new colonies, until in the American Revolution
these former corporations were declared independent states.1284
This is why the first seminal case in the United States to vindicate popular sovereignty, Chisholm v. Georgia, was also the first
seminal case to describe corporate law.1285 The American Revolution
rising as one man to revenge their wrongs” – “the question here is not about power, but
right”).
1281. In principle, the idea of the separation of powers is that none can have a monopoly
on government power. THE FEDERALIST NO. 77 (Alexander Hamilton) (advocating for the
separation of powers for the purpose of avoiding “a monopoly of all the principle employments of the government in a few families” that would lead “directly to aristocracy or
oligarchy”); 2 WILSON, THE WORKS, supra note 113, at 443–44 (“The contracted and debasing
spirit of monopoly has not been peculiar to commerce; it has raged, with equal violence, and
with equal mischief, in law and politics.”).
1282. BUTMAN & TARGETT, supra note 819, at 245–52. The only colony established with a
charitable purpose was the Colony of Georgia, founded on the no slavery principle. Georgia
Charter of 1732; Bubble Schemes, Colonies, Act 1740, 14 Geo. II, c. 37 (Eng.). See James
Narron & David Skeie, Crisis Chronicles: The Mississippi Bubble of 1720 and the European
Debt Crisis, LIBERTY STREET ECONOMICS: BLOG OF THE NY FED. RESERVE BANK (Jan. 10,
2014), https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2014/01/crisis-chronicles-the-mississippi-bubble-of-1720-and-the-european-debt-crisis.html (last visited on Mar. 15, 2019). New
York was a for-profit Dutch Company known as New Amsterdam, which the English Crown
claimed in Breda as the seat of its Empire. Treaty of Breda, Eng.-Neth., July 31, 1667.
Florida, however, was a Spanish Colony that sought to undermine the English economy and
thus offered African American slaves their freedom in giving rise to a precursor to the
Under Ground Railroad that ran South and gave rise to the first settlement of freed African
slaves in America called Garcia Real de Santa Teresa de Mose. Jane Landers, Spanish
Sanctuary: Fugitives in Florida, 1687–1790, 62 FLA. HIST. Q. 296, 311 (1984) (“Finally, on
May 17, 1790, even the possibility of limited freedom was denied new fugitives, for the king
bowed to pressure from the United States government and abandoned the century-old policy
of sanctuary for fugitive slaves.”); Jane Landers, Garcia Real de Santa Teresa de Mose: A
Free Black Town in Spanish Colonial Florida, in 95 AM. HIST. REV. 9, 9–10 (1990).
1283. Virginia Company of London, ENCYCLOPEDIA VIRGINIA, https://encyclopediavirginia.org/entries/virginia-company-of-london/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2021);
Plymouth Company, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Plymouth-Company
(last visited Aug. 13, 2021); BUTMAN & TARGETT, supra note 819, at 245–52.
1284. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
1285. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 462–63 (1793) (Wilson, J., opinion) (All the justices applied corporate law to the question of State sovereignty saying things like: “A state I
cheerfully admit, is the noblest work of Man. But, Man himself, free and honest, is, I speak
as to this world, the noblest work of God.”); id. at 446 (Iredell, J., dissenting) (“There is no
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was, therefore, fought against monopolies as a double-tax on the inhabitants of the thirteen original colonies.1286 Following James Otis’s lead,
the founders looked to the strategies of Edward Coke for the abolition
of unjust monopolies (i.e., those that serve private interests rather
than the public interest) in America.1287
Federal courts have jurisdiction to secure their own legitimacy
under the separation of powers by reviewing private property wherever
it is used to make “public mischief.”1288 As James Madison wrote, “Perpetual monopolies of every sort, are forbidden not only by the genius of
free Govts: but by the imperfection of human foresight. . . . [J]udges of
the highest grade might perhaps be relied on for the control on these
local legislatures” to limit state and local government grants of
monopoly.1289
James Madison directly linked this antitrust power to “the noble merit of first unshackling the conscience from persecuting laws,”
later embodied by the First Amendment freedoms of religion and
speech.1290 Similarly, James Wilson engaged in free thought on the
very existence of human ideas and remarked, “Monopoly and exclusive
privilege are the bane of every thing—of science as well as of commerce.”1291 Wilson continued,
The citizen under a free government has a right to think, to speak,
to write, to print, and to publish freely, but with decency and truth,
concerning public men, public bodies, and public measures. . . . The
contracted and debasing spirit of monopoly[, however,] has not been
peculiar to commerce; it has raged, with equal violence, and with
equal mischief, in law and politics.1292

other part of the common law, besides which I have considered, which can by any person be
pretended in any manner to apply to this case but that which concerns corporations.”).
1286. OTIS, supra note 18, at 276 (calling for “the demolition of all monopolies great and
small”); Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 455 (“Let a state be considered as subordinate to the people.
But let everything else be subordinate to the state. The latter part of this position is equally
necessary with the former. For in the practice, and even at length, in the science of politics,
there has very frequently been a strong current against the natural order of things, and an
inconsiderate or an interested disposition to sacrifice the end to the means.”).
1287. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 455; see also Letter from Thomas Hutchinson to Richard Jackson (Sept. 12, 1765), in QUINCY, JR., supra note 32, at 441 (“Our friends to liberty take
advantage of a maxim they find in Lord Coke that an act of Parliament against Magna
Charta or the peculiar rights of Englishmen is ipso facto void.”).
1288. Gibbons, 22 U.S., at 208–09. See also Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17
U.S. 518, 698 (1819) (Story, J., concurring).
1289. James Madison, Detatched Memoranda, ca., Jan. 31, 1820.
1290. Id.
1291. 1 WILSON, THE WORKS, supra note 113, at 265.
1292. 2 WILSON, THE WORKS, supra note 113, at 443–44.
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Here, James Wilson, like his colleague James Madison, confirmed that
the spirit of monopoly must be resisted in government, as well as in
commerce.1293 The spirit of monopoly must be resisted so that First
Amendment freedoms to speak, print, and worship, are vindicated
throughout the land, for every individual.1294 Wilson went even further, writing that aliens, as well as citizens, should enjoy these
antitrust rights to life, freedoms of speech, and property protections
from monopoly.1295
James Wilson based his revolutionary reversal of feudal law on
a maxim created by Terence, an ancient African artist who wrote
“homo sum; Nihil humani alienum a me puto” meaning “I am human, I
consider nothing human alien to me.”1296 James Otis earlier explained
to his fellows how this maxim “was attended with a thunder-clap of
applause through the whole Roman theatre.”1297 The founder that
most embodied these human rights and liberties, however, was Phillis
Wheatley, who wrote:
The happier Terence all the choir inspir’d,
His soul replenish’d, and his bosom fir’d;
But say, ye Muses, why this partial grace,
To one alone of Afric’s sable race;
From age to age transmitting thus his name
With the finest glory in the rolls of fame?1298

Both Wheatley and Terence were African slaves taken from their native home, and both mastered the cultures and languages of their
oppressors.1299 Thus, as surely as Terence engaged in the Ciceronian
discourse to convince his adopted people of ancient Rome that “we are
all of one Flesh and Blood,”1300 Phillis Wheatley followed suit and es1293. Id. See also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 475 (noting that the preamble’s object of creating a “‘more perfect union’” is meant
to combat monopolies of trade) (quoting U.S. CONST. pmbl.); id. at §§ 965–76 (noting that
taxation should be limited by trust “‘to provide for the common defence and general welfare,’” to avoid its use as “a prerogative power to destroy competition, and secure a
monopoly to the government!”) (quoting U.S. CONST. pmbl.).
1294. 2 WILSON, THE WORKS, supra note 113, at 443–44.
1295. Id.
1296. Id. (quoting Terence, Heauton Timorumenos I.1.25)
1297. JAMES OTIS, supra note 18, at 64 (quoting Terence, Heauton Timorumenos I.1.25).
1298. Phillis Wheatley, To Mæcenas [1773].
1299. Id; Zelaya, supra note 1099, at 129.
1300. OTIS, supra note 18, at 64 (paraphrazing Terence’s ancient anti-slavery wisdom
that was given through the medium of theatrical plays: “He who don’t consider himself as
related to every one of the human Race, is unworthy of the Name Man.”); see Cicero, De
Amicitia 7.24 (adopting wisdom he observed in ancient Roman plays about the nature of
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tablished patent and copyright law upon her rights of life and became a
voice of the American Revolution, and the primary inspiration of the
Patent & Copyright Clause (see Part II, supra, The Trial of Phillis
Wheatley).1301
The greatest defender of the Patent & Copyright Clause during
the framing of the U.S. Constitution was the father of the Constitution
himself, James Madison, who impliedly acknowledged that art. I, § 8,
cl. 8 embodied the balance earlier struck by the Statute of Monopolies
and Statute of Anne in England under the common law.1302 Therefore,
James Madison wrote of the public interest served by patents and
copyrights—such that all patents and copyrights are held in public
trust;
Monopolies tho’ in certain cases useful, ought to be granted with
caution, and guarded with strictness agst. abuse. The Constitution
of the U.S. has limited them to two cases, the authors of Books, and
of useful inventions, in both which they are considered as a compensation for a benefit actually gained to the community, as a purchase
of property which the owner might otherwise withhold from public
use.1303

Accordingly, the antitrust jurisdiction to strike down restraints on
alienation of chattels, of free commerce and trade, and any other creation of patents that make “public mischief” was robustly asserted in
Gibbons v. Ogden.1304 James Madison also acknowledged that certain
corporations like the National Bank should be objectionable in court
for their implication of a qualified monopoly.1305 However, over this objection, the Supreme Court affirmed Congress’s choice of means to
charter a National Bank in McCulloch v. Maryland.1306
Thus, natural monopolies and charitable trusts were not meant
to be abolished, but are reviewable under cy pres doctrine when they
love and sacrifice); id. at 24.89, 25.93, 26.98 (citing and quoting Terence numerous times);
Lencha Sanchez, Dr. Maya Angelou – I Am Human, YOUTUBE (Mar. 4, 2013), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=epodNjrVSsk (Dr. Angelou stated: “I would like everbody to
think of a statement by Terence. The statement is: ‘I am a human being, nothing human can
be alien to me.’”). Cf. Kastely, supra note 186, at 7–9 (noting that the Ciceronian discourse
is still happening today, and naming why it is so essential to the U.S. system of laws).
1301. OTIS, supra note 18, at 64; WHEATLEY, supra note 821, at 7; Phillis Wheatley’s Registration, Sept. 10, 1773, TSC/1/E/06/09, Register of entries of copies 1746–1773.
1302. James Madison, Detatched Memoranda, ca., Jan. 31, 1820; Letter from James
Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788); THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison).
1303. James Madison, Detatched Memoranda, ca., Jan. 31, 1820.
1304. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 208–09 (1824).
1305. James Madison, Detatched Memoranda, ca., Jan. 31, 1820.
1306. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 409–25 (1819).
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violate the public interest upon which they were instituted.1307 Accordingly, Americans established their state and local governments as
natural corporations founded in public trust; such that antitrust law
applies to them as well.1308 This principle was vindicated in Chisholm
v. Georgia, the very first U.S. Supreme Court case to oust feudal sovereignty in America.1309
The Eleventh Amendment limited the jurisdiction the federal
courts may exercise over the states, making it impossible to reverse or
overrule Chisholm at common law.1310 The principles of Chisholm regarding the extent of federal review of corporate violations of the public
trust, nevertheless, remain part of the backbone of antitrust law in
America.1311 The principles of Chisholm were preserved in Ex parte
Young, unleashed in Wickard v. Filburn, reaffirmed in Nevada v. Hall,
and nearly used to overrule Obamacare in Sebelius.1312
The federal court, therefore, has a robust and fundamental antitrust power to review, reform, break up, and even to abolish private
property, where private property makes public mischief tending to1307. James Madison, Detatched Memoranda, ca., Jan. 31, 1820 (“Among such [objectional] monopolies, cannot be included the grants in perpetuity of public lands to
individuals, the grants being made according to rules of impartiality, for a valuable consideration; and all lands being held equally by that tenure from the public, the vital principle of
monopoly is lost.”); Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 698 (1819)
(Story, J., concurring); Perin v. Carey, 65 U.S. 465, 497, 506–08 (1860) (“All property held
for public purposes is held as a charitable use, in the legal sense of the term charity.”).
1308. U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, III. See also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 348, 602.
1309. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 462–63.
1310. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 150 (1908) (the Court is literally powerless under the
Eleventh Amendment to hear another case on the same facts as Chisholm, which is a requirement for overruling it at common law and establishing a new precedent. Unless the
Eleventh Amendment is repealed, overruling Chisholm and creating a new stare decisis in
its place is something that the Court can never do) (citing U.S. CONST. amend XI; Chisholm,
2 U.S., at 419).
1311. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 419–20 (1979) (citing Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 419), overruled on other grounds by Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt, 139 S.Ct. 1485, 1492
(2019).
1312. Young, 209 U.S. at 150; United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 9–12 (1895),
abrogated by Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 122, 127 (1942) (expressly extending the
Commerce Power including the common law principle from the Case of Monopolies to potentially every blade of grass) (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 210 (1824)); Hall, 440 U.S. at
419–20; NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 647–50 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito,
JJ. dissenting) (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) and Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196);
id. at 660 (Opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (arguing that if he required the states to enter into the
healthcare mandate that “the failure of some to eat broccoli may be found to deprive them of
a newly discovered cancer-fighting chemical which only that food contains, producing
health-care costs that are a burden on the rest of us—in which case . . . moving against
those inactivities will also come within the Federal Government’s unenumerated problemsolving powers”).

\\jciprod01\productn\F\FAM\15-1\FAM101.txt

2021

unknown

Seq: 251

10-JAN-22

LEVIATHAN GOES TO WASHINGTON

10:23

251

ward monopolistic practices.1313 There is nowhere else to turn, because
not even Congress or the president can revoke public moneys or property federally granted to private individuals to be used in public
trust.1314 In the words of Justice Story,
The only authority remaining to the government is judicial, to ascertain the validity of the grant, to enforce its proper uses, to
suppress frauds, and, if the uses are charitable, to secure their regular administration, through the means of equitable tribunals, in
cases where there would otherwise be a failure of justice.1315

This puts special weight on the Court’s decision to hear cases brought
in the public interest to vindicate our rights to life, liberty, and property, against the monopolist or tyrant; whether in commerce or in
politics.1316 This jurisdiction is the very foundation of judicial legitimacy and is retained at common law.1317 Asserting federal antitrust
jurisdiction in the public interest comes down to the three elements: (1)
the prudent (2) use of power (3) in pursuit of justice under the U.S.
Constitution.1318
This jurisdiction is often asserted in federal court; however,
lately it was turned against the public interest for the benefit of the
monopolist.1319 The hubris on the federal bench is so pervasive that the
judiciary regularly vindicates the private rights of monopolists that do
not serve public interest.1320 The delusive oxymoron behind such a be1313. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 208–10. This power ultimately inheres in the judicial power at
common law to define property. Schroeder, Bringing, supra note 1036, at 66 (courts have
the power to strip claims of intangible property of the legal attribute of property when they
are based upon fraud, whether accidental or intentional).
1314. Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 698 (1819) (Story, J.,
concurring).
1315. Id.
1316. Id.
1317. See Id.; Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 208–10; Schroeder, Bringing, supra note 1036, at 66.
1318. Schroeder, The Body, supra note 121, at 71 (“[T]raditional jurisdictional analysis
. . . considers whether the Court is prudently exercising its powers in pursuit of justice.”).
1319. Schroeder, Bringing, supra note 1036, at 13 (commenting on the Ginsburg concurrence in Sebelius “[t]he federal government . . . should be accorded the authority to coerce
lower class, impoverished Americans to purchase insurance to ensure that doctors always
get paid. With this cart before the horse view, poor people that depend on free medical
services from licensed professionals are seen as trespassers.”) (citing NFIB v. Sebelius, 567
U.S. 519, 593 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
and dissenting in part) (“[T]he uninsured ‘free ride’ on those who pay for health
insurance.”)).
1320. See Matsushita v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986) (quoting BORK, THE
ANTITRUST, supra note 1136, at 145); Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431, 451
(2014) (oxymoronically using copyright common law to destroy a new and emerging business to arbitrarily preserve cable monopolies).
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trayal of public trust on the bench arises directly from the sort of
embarrassments symbolized by the Salem Witch Trials.1321
For example, in Citizens United v. FEC, the Supreme Court
characterized money as speech in order to invalidate anti-corruption
election laws as a violation of free speech.1322 Then in Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby, owners of a large for-profit corporation were granted a religious
liberty exemption from the Affordable Care Act.1323 Then, Wheaton
College was granted a preliminary injunction from the U.S. Supreme
Court to flout duly enacted federal law to control its employees from
receiving health coverage for contraception.1324
Emboldened, Wheaton College fired its first female African
American tenured professor, Larycia Hawkins, for asserting her rights
of life and freedom of speech, confirming the reemergence of the Puritan right to destroy the rights of others in American Christian
Colleges.1325 The Puritans of Boston similarly declared it their corpo1321. See HUTCHINSON, 1767 THE HISTORY, supra note 801, at 11–61 (giving a history of
the progression of the Salem Witch Trials). The Puritans of Massachusetts Bay interpreted
religious liberty as the liberty of the strong man to take away the liberty of the weak, as
exemplified in the Trial of Anne Hutchinson. HUTCHINSON, 1765 THE HISTORY, supra note
801, at 70–77, 190–95 (“The other side were deluded also by a zeal, for the punishment, for
the honour of God, of such of his creatures as differed in opinion from themselves. It is
evident, not only by Mrs. Hutchinson’s trial, but by many other public proceedings, that
inquisition was made into men’s private judgments as well as into their declarations and
practice. Toleration was preached against as a sin in rulers which would bring down the
judgments of heaven upon the land.” This zeal brought about the genocide of the Pequot
Nation of Mystic.); EVE LAPLANTE, AMERICAN JEZEBEL 192 (2004) [hereinafter LAPLANTE,
AMERICAN] (“Her [Anne Hutchinson’s] fundamentally Calvinist doctrine—that in a sinful
world Christ redeems people without their merit and then in some way joins with them—
challenged colonial society at its very foundation.”); JOHN WINTHROP, A SHORT STORY OF THE
RISE, REIGN, AND RUINE OF THE ANTINOMIANS 57 (1692) (Hutchinson argued that salvation
could not come from being sanctified by good works, and that none were born sinless, vigorously arguing that “Christ is our sanctification.”); Romans 3:23. Cf. Schroeder, America’s,
supra note 212, at 882–83.
1322. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 351 (2010).
1323. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. 682, 692 (2014).
1324. Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 573 U.S. 958, 960 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(“Those who are bound by our decisions usually believe they can take us at our word. Not so
today.”).
1325. Ruth Graham, The Professor Wore a Hijab in Solidarity—Then Lost Her Job, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/16/magazine/the-professor-wore-ahijab-in-solidarity-then-lost-her-job.html. See also Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church and Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171, 181 (2012) (giving churches and religious schools
the First Amendment freedom to break their promises and their contracts with employees
without consequence—this First Amendment right to avoid contractual damages for fraud,
i.e., a right for churches to lie with impunity, runs directly against the First Amendment
purposes of encouraging truth telling as laid out by Judges Bork and Ginsburg in Ollman—
it also runs against the stated purposes of the Christian religion, which is likely a pretext by
which to review such firing decisions under the stated goals of nonprofit charters); Ollman
v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (“It is common ground
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rate religious right to banish infidels including Roger Williams and
Anne Hutchinson.1326 Then they marched an army to Mystic and committed genocide upon the Pequot Nation.1327
The colony unrepentant then murdered many of its own people
as witches, after which only Judge Sewall repented.1328 The Mason
family litigated for their property rights in the case Mohegan Indians
v. Connecticut all the way up to the time of the American Revolution
when their property by conquest claims were invalidated.1329 Mason’s
strategy in Mohegan Indians appears to be the proto-guardianship
case that black and Native Americans struggled against in Oklahoma
many genations later.1330 However, the American Revolution was a rethat the core function of the first amendment is the preservation of that freedom to think
and speak as one pleases which is the ‘means indispensable to the discovery and spread of
political truth.’”) (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring)). Along with the agreement between loyalists and revolutionaries that Phillis
Wheatley was the rightful author of her poems, there was also agreement about the illegitimacy of the Salem Witch Trials and the Puritan genocide of the Pequots of Mystic. See
HUTCHINSON, 1765 THE HISTORY, supra note 801, at 70–77, 190–95 (calling the Puritan zeal
against witches and Native Americans a delusion); John Adams, Diary no. 19, [Dec. 16,
1772—Dec. 18, 1773], at 16 (in his entry for March 5, 1773 after defending the Boston red
coats at trial, John Adams wrote that he defended his enemies in open court because not to
do so would “have been as foul a stain upon this country as the executions of the Quakers or
Witches, anciently.”).
1326. HUTCHINSON, 1765 THE HISTORY, supra note 801, at 70–77.
1327. Id.; MASON, supra note 801, passim.
1328. HUTCHINSON, 1767 THE HISTORY, supra note 801, at 61 (“Mr. Sewall, at a public
fast, gave in to the minister a bill, acknowledging his error in the late proceedings, and
desiring to humble himself in the sight of God and his people.”); LAPLANTE, SALEM, supra
note 113, passim (telling the story of the repentant Witch Judge Samuel Sewall, and reprinting his antislavery tract The Selling of Joseph and his anti-misogyny tract Talitha
Cumi an Aramaic phrase meaning “Woman Rise”).
1329. Roger Sherman, Remarks on a Pamphlet Entitled, “A Dissertation on the political
Union and Constitution of the Thirteen States of NORTH-AMERICA.” 16–17, 40–42 [1784] (The
founder Roger Sherman of Connecticut made clear that the Native American title to property is where the American Colonists got all their legitimate rights in America. Sherman
was a drafter and signatory of the Declaration of Independence.); Mohegan Indians v. Connecticut (1705–1773); Letter from Roger Williams to Major [John] Mason (June 22, 1670), in
ROGER WILLIAMS, THE LETTERS OF ROGER WILLIAMS 342 (John Russell Bartlett ed., 1874)
[hereinafter WILLIAMS, THE LETTERS] (Roger Williams revealed that the Mohegan Indians
were a straw purchaser to justify their sale of the land to the Mason family, who committed
genocide against the actual owners, the Pequots.). Cf. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543,
598–99 (1823) (applying John Mason’s case before the Star Chamber Mohegan Indians v.
Connecticut to steal the Pequot lands as if it were a legitimate case in the United States).
1330. Memorial Detailing Conveyance of Mohegan Land to Major John Mason (May 3,
1715). After stealing the Pequot land in Mystic by absolute conquest in 1637–38, John Mason later had the Pequot land conveyed to him in a series of deeds dated Aug. 15, 1659, May
20, 1661, and Dec. 14, 1669 by straw purchasers Sachem Uncas and the Mohegan Tribe so
that Mason could legitimize his ownership of the stolen Pequot land in English Court. Id. It
appears that Mohegan Indians was a precursor to other guardianship cases in Oklahoma
and elsewhere. See David Remnick, The Newspaperman Who Championed Black Tulsa,
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pentance from the horrible Puritan oxymoron of asserting a human
right to destroy the rights of others; it was abolished in Chisholm v.
Georgia, and reversed again in The Amistad.1331
Massachusetts Bay neighbored and eventually merged with
Plymouth Colony; one of the two original joint stock corporations in the
world.1332 As it turned out, while Roger Williams was contending for
the common law rights of Native Americans, his friend Edward Coke
was in a heated struggle to secure the rights of Williams and others
among the new English working class.1333 Lord Coke made his cause
against the very corporate, monopolistic censorship Williams experienced in Massachusetts Bay.1334
NEW YORKER RADIO HOUR (June 18, 2021), https://www.newyorker.com/podcast/the-newyorker-radio-hour/the-newspaperman-who-championed-black-tulsa. Cf. Mark D. Walters,
Mohegan Indians v. Connecticut (1705–1773) and the Legal Status of Aboriginal Customary
Laws and Government in British North America, 33 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 785, 804 (1995)
(defending the jurisdiction of Mason’s appeals to the Star Chamber and Privy Council as the
guardian of the Mohegans).
1331. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2
U.S. 419, 465 (1793) (Opinion of Wilson, J.) (quoting U.S. CONST. pmbl. and U.S. CONST. art.
I. § 10, cl. 1); Le Louis [1817] 2 Dodson 210, 255 (Eng.) (Opinion of Sir William Scott) (affirming the legality of slavery according the oxymoron of the free trade in human flesh—a
later version of the original Puritan oxymoron), aff’d and extended by The Antelope, 23 U.S.
66, 118 (1825) (showing the lower court’s flouting of federal law requiring the slave trader to
be hanged as pirate and the slaves to go free and instead made his own law requiring the
casting of lots to decide who should go free—the U.S. Supreme Court cited directly Le Louis
and decided “[i]t was not piracy,” flouting federal law that says it was. The speech of John
Quincy Adams before the U.S. Supreme Court on behalf of the Africans of The Amistad
vigorously showed that this was so), overruled by The Amistad, 40 U.S. 518, 561, 594 (1841)
(overruling The Antelope’s reliance upon Le Louis; the Court agreed with John Quincy Adams). Cf. QUINCY ADAMS, ARGUMENT, supra note 114, at 123 (in his review of The Antelope,
John Quincy Adams wrote that the Court “leaned almost entirely upon a decision of Sir
William Scott in the case of the Louis”—Scott was “the most fervent champion of the slave
trade and of the unqualified exemption of all merchant vessels from visitation or search by
the armed ships of every nation other than their own”).
1332. BUTMAN & TARGETT, supra note 819, at 245–52, 303–04, 308 (distinguishing the
Pilgrims of Plymouth and the Puritans of Massachusetts Bay, though in 1691 the provinces
of Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay were merged as one colony of Massachusetts Bay by
royal charter—the idea of a working class with interests in the corporations for which they
worked, rather than a mere serfdom, began in the Colonies of Plymouth and Virginia).
1333. Roger Williams, A Just and Generous Assertion of Indian Rights [1633?], mentioned in 1 WINTHROP’S JOURNAL, supra note 819, at 116–17; Letter from Roger Williams to
Major [John] Mason (June 22, 1670), in WILLIAMS, THE LETTERS, supra note 1329, at 342; 3
EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *181–83. See also 1 WINTHROP’S JOURNAL, supra note 819, at 57
n.1 (Roger Williams “was connected as a boy with Sir Edward Coke, a great lawyer, through
whom he became a scholar at the Charterhouse and afterwards of Pembroke College,
Cambridge.”).
1334. 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *181–83; Roger Williams, A Just and Generous Assertion of Indian Rights [1633?], mentioned in 1 WINTHROP’S JOURNAL, supra note 819, at
116–17 (Williams’ book was burned or otherwise destroyed for violating the Colony’s strict
censorship of the press—this is the exact sort of state run monopoly that the Case of Monop-
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It is an understatement to say that Coke’s struggle to secure the
wellbeing of the working class through antitrust law merely implicated
the separation of powers.1335 For making his successive stands on the
side of the people, the crown censored Coke’s Reports by crown copyright, removed Lord Coke from the bench, and made him prisoner in
the Tower to be tried in the Star Chamber.1336 In defiance, Coke arose
like a phoenix giving off fiery bursts of light before his people.1337
By the time Parliament passed its first Habeas Corpus Statute
1640, Coke was already proven a worthy advocate of the English common law, the overriding British Constitution, and the rights of the
English people.1338 Therefore, when Judge Hobart became Chief Justice in Coke’s place, he reaffirmed Lord Coke’s principle from Dr.
Bonham’s Case several times.1339 Then Parliament and crown went to
war with each other, King Charles I lost his head, and Oliver Cromwell
rose to absolute power.1340

olies, the Statute of Monopolies, the Statute of Anne, and finally Phillis Wheatley’s Trial
and Attestation were accomplished to abolish).
1335. See 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *181–83; The Case of Monopolies [1602] 11 Co.
Rep. 84b (Eng.); Statute of Monopolies 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (Eng.). See also 1 CAMPBELL,
supra note 24, at 273 (“‘That the King by his proclamation cannot create any offence which
was not an offence before, for then he may alter the law of the land by his proclamation in a
high point; for if he may create an offence where none is, upon that ensues fine and imprisonment. Also the law of England is divided into three parts: common law, statute law, and
custom; but the King’s proclamation is none of them.’”) (quoting Case of Proclamations
[1610] 12 Coke Rep. 74 (Eng.)); id. at 285–86. Cf. Max Radin, The Doctrine of the Separation
of Powers in Seventeenth Century Controversies, 86 U. PENN. L. REV. 1842, 848–50 (1938).
1336. 1 CAMPBELL, supra note 24, at 289–302 (“‘A thunderbolt has fallen upon my Lord
Coke in the King’s Bench, which has overthrown him from the roots.’”) (statement of John
Castle).
1337. Id. at 295 (“Coke was supposed by mankind and by himself to be disgraced and
ruined. Nevertheless, his story is more interesting, and he added more to his own fame as
well as conferred greater benefits on his country, than if he had quietly continued to go
through the routine of his judicial duties till his faculties decayed.” Coke successfully defended his life against the crown and so we are happy to read that “Coke’s energy and
integrity triumphed.”).
1338. Id.
1339. See, e.g., Day v. Savadge [1614] 80 ER 235 (Eng.). Cf. QUINCY, JR., supra note 32, at
524–25.
1340. Unlike in American history, the history of written constitutions in England was
short, violent, and ridden with contradiction. See Instrument of Government [Dec. 16, 1653],
in 2 ACTS . . . OF THE INTERREGNUM, supra note 792, at 813–822 (England’s first written
constitution, installing Oliver Cromwell as Lord Protector with supreme legislative and executive powers); Humble Petition and Advice [May 25, 1657], in 2 ACTS . . . OF THE
INTERREGNUM, supra note 792, at 1049–57 (England’s last written constitution granted Oliver Cromwell absolute power for life, like a king though attempting unsuccessfully to
control the Lord Protector to abide by the precedents of English Monarchy set forth by Lord
Coke to limit the executive power of the crown).
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Oliver Cromwell attempted to abort the nascent ideal of a separation of powers in England by investing all power within himself,
inventing the Navigation Acts and writs of assistance, and establishing
the British Empire by the conquest of Jamaica.1341 The Americans contended against Cromwellian madness; first in open court, then in open
battle.1342 The Americans strongly reasserted the principles of Coke
and Milton, England reaffirmed Cromwell and Hobbes, and the Americans marvelously prevailed.1343
The English people abandoned Lord Coke’s most glowing decisions and followed Sir William Blackstone’s banal declaration of
parliamentary omnipotence.1344 Blackstone’s Commentaries were published after and refuted by James Otis’s arguments in Paxton’s Case,
as well as Otis’s tracts published in England and America.1345 There1341. An Act for increase of Shipping, and Encouragement of the Navigation of this Nation, [Oct. 9, 1651], in 2 ACTS . . . OF THE INTERREGNUM, supra note 792, at 559–62 (the
original navigation act); Oliver Cromwell, Underneath—Writ of Assistance [May 9, 1648] &
Letter from Oliver Cromwell to General Desbrowe (Mar. 11, 1654–55), in 3 CARLYLE, supra
note 792, at 385, 462–64; Instrument of Government [Dec. 16, 1653], and Humble Petition
and Advice [May 25, 1657], in 2 ACTS . . . OF THE INTERREGNUM, supra note 792, at 813–822,
1048–56; The Navigation Act 1660, 12 Car. 2 c. 18 (Eng.) (Cromwell’s Navigation Act reenacted under Charles II). See 20 HOWELL, supra note 802, at 283, 289 (“‘Jamaica was
conquered by Oliver Cromwell’”) (statement of Lord Mansfield during the trial of Campbell
v. Hall); SIMMONS, supra note 31, at 20 (noting that the Navigation Act was “a plagiarism
from Oliver Cromwell”).
1342. SIMMONS, supra note 31, at 2–3 (quoting QUINCY, JR., supra note 32, at 540); THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). See also Letter from John Adams to
William Tudor (June 1, 1818) (During Paxton’s Case, James Otis “gave a history of the navigation act of the First of Charles II., a plagiarism from Oliver Cromwell.”); John Adams,
Letter from John Adams to William Tudor (July 14, 1818) (the Navigation Act “has ruined
Holland, and would have ruined America, if she had not resisted”). During the time of the
American Revolution, the precedents of the interregnum were all suppressed, but had they
been open knowledge the Americans may have found the origin of English writs of assistance were the same as that of the Navigations Acts. Oliver Cromwell, Underneath—Writ of
Assistance [May 9, 1648] & Letter from Oliver Cromwell to General Desbrowe (Mar. 11,
1654–55), in 3 CARLYLE, supra note 792, at 385, 462–64.
1343. OTIS, supra note 18, at 175 (The Americans vindicated the rule “that acts of parliament against natural equity are void. That acts against the fundamental principles of the
British constitution are void.”) (citing Dr. Bonham’s Case [1610] 8 Co. Rep. 107a, 118a
(Eng.)); Phillis Wheatley, To a Gentleman of the Navy [1774] (directly addressing the Miltonic influence over her work); Campbell v. Hall [1774] 1 Cowp. 204, 208, 211–12 (Eng.)
(basing English Empire ultimately upon Cromwell’s conquest of Jamaica, which was later
emulated in King Charles II’s conquest of New York at Breda), aff’d and extended in R. v.
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Ex parte Bancoult [2008] UKHL
61, ¶¶ 32, 36, 81–84, 87, 125, 146–49 (Eng.); THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2
(U.S. 1776).
1344. King George III, The King’s Speech of Nov. 30, 1774 [1775]; 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *156–57.
1345. SIMMONS, supra note 31, at 2–3 (quoting QUINCY, JR., supra note 32, at 540); OTIS,
supra note 18, at 124–25 (refuting the omnipotence of any government official based upon
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fore, founder James Wilson charitably said of Blackstone, “He deserves
to be much admired; but he ought not to be implicitly followed.”1346
The theories of Coke and Milton represented in America by Otis
and Wheatley were put to the test on July 4, 1776.1347 It cannot be
denied that from this day forward Wheatley and Otis prevailed over
the many sycophants of the king, including Bentham and Blackstone.1348 For the American Revolutionaries so embarrassed
Blackstone’s theory of parliamentary omnipotence that in its place
Bentham was able to champion his Panopticon as the new seat of government omnipotence writ large.1349
As Bentham inevitably realized, the sheer reality of the American Revolution destroyed any pretention throughout the entire world
that the English Parliament was inherently omnipotent.1350 So too, the
the idea that only God is omnipotent—this directly rebukes Blackstone’s idea of parliamentary omnipotence before the American Revolution proved parliamentary impotence on the
field of battle and by an undoubted, permanent separation from the English Empire).
1346. 1 WILSON, THE WORKS, supra note 113, at 22.
1347. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); Dr. Bonham’s Case [1610]
8 Co. Rep. 107a, 118a (Eng.); MILTON, A DEFENSE, supra note 1200, at 194–95 (Milton invoked the same “fundamental maxim in our law, which I have formerly mentioned, by
which nothing is to be accounted a law, that is contrary to the laws of God, or of reason.”).
See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *156–57; [Jeremy Bentham,] Short Review of
the Declaration [1776], in BENTHAM & LIND, supra note 38, at 132 (“[T]he nation will unite
as one man, and teach this rebellious people, that it is one thing for them to say, the connection, which bound them to us, is dissolved, another to dissolve it; that to accomplish their
independence is not quite so easy as to declare it: that there is no peace with them, but the
peace of the King: no war with them, but that war, which offended justice wages against
criminals.—We too, I hope, shall acquiesce in the necessity of submitting to whatever burdens, of making whatever efforts may be necessary, to bring this ungrateful and rebellious
people back to that allegiance they have long had it in contemplation to renounce, and have
now at last so daringly renounced.”); OTIS, supra note 18, at 124–25; Phillis Wheatley, To
His Excellency General Washington [1775].
1348. Berger, supra note 30, at 522–26 n.10 (noting that the omnipotence of parliament
was first formally adopted in Blackstone’s Commentaries and that the Americans successfully refuted this doctrine).
1349. Bentham’s prison project possessed a hideous strength on the side of despotism in
Russia, Mexico, Cuba, and other Latin American nations where they hailed Bentham as
“the light of Westminster.” WILLIFORD, supra note 44, at 30 (In a letter from José de Valle to
Jeremy Bentham, de Valle wrote: “‘How I envy my cousin—with how much delight would I
change my fate with his, that I might dwell in the abode of the best legislator of the world! I
shall take care to give circulation to your Constitutional Code. The light from Westminster
shall illumine these lands.’”); 1 BENTHAM, PANOPTICON, supra note 42, at i, 139–40; Letter
from Jeremy Bentham to the Duke of Wellington (Mar. 23, 1829), in 11 BENTHAM, THE
WORKS, supra note 43, at 14 (“I want to make you do what Cromwell tried at, and found it
was too much for him.”).
1350. King George III, The King’s Speech of Nov. 30, 1774 [1775] (in this speech, the King
and Parliament united in its decision to force Massachusetts Bay into submission); THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (the colonies united in common defense
of Massachusetts Bay).
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pretension that the king can do no wrong was refuted by the American
Revolutionaries; who sounded their testimony that the king did wrong
in America.1351 Thereby the oldest Crown Colonies in the world separated themselves from the English Empire under a new social
compact.1352
The Borkian myth that there is no federal IP and antitrust common law to punish monopolists today did not come from a principled
look at the roots of U.S. constitutional law.1353 For the only American
union that tried to reverse the common law was the feudal Dominion of
New England.1354 Against the English attempts to strip American Colonists of their common law rights under the Charter of Dominion in
1680–90, Jeremiah Dummer stood forth to defend Americans’ common
law rights.1355
Dummer rejected the patents of the crown and stated that the
only “fair and just” title to property in America is “derived from the
native lords of the soil,” i.e., the Native Americans.1356 The Native
American title “is what the honest New-England planters rely on, hav-

1351. OTIS, supra note 18, at 124–25.
1352. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1–32 (U.S. 1776).
1353. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 660 (1834). See also Alan J. Meese, Robert Bork’s
Forgotten Role in the Transaction Cost Revolution, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 953, 965–66 (2014)
(“Unlike Taft, who borrowed the list of ancillary restraints from the common law, however,
Bork asserted that the line between naked agreements and ancillary restraints turned on
the probable impact of a restraint on ‘consumer welfare.’”); 2 WILSON, THE WORKS, supra
note 113, at 492 (Borkian rationalism is a departure from the antitrust common law, which
not only sought to protect consumers, but also sought to protect those “who formerly maintained themselves and their families by the same profession or trade,” because they “are
impoverished, and reduced to a state of beggary and idleness.”) (paraphrasing The Case of
Monopolies [1602] 11 Co. Rep. 84b (Eng.)).
1354. The Charter of the Dominion of New England [1686] (This was an attempted
merger of Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New York, and New
Jersey, abandoned and officially dissolved in 1689, because of the resistance. The Connecticut Charter Oak and the Great Boston Revolt of 1689 signaled its downfall.). See OTIS,
supra note 18, at 162 (quoting Jeremiah Dummer, A Defence of the New-England Charters
29 [1715]).
1355. Jeremiah Dummer, A Defence of the New-England Charters 28–29 [1715] (“The
right of the courts of common law within the province of the Massachusetts, to restrain the
excesses of the admiralty jurisdiction, are not derived from their charter, but from subsequent laws of the province, confirmed afterwards by the crown; which power therefore,
whether the charters stand or fall, will remain unhurt, and still the same.”).
1356. Jeremiah Dummer, A Defence of the New-England Charters 8 [1715] (“The Indian
title therefore, as it is decried and undervalued here, seems the only fair and just one; and
neither Queen Elizabeth by her patents, or King James by his afterwards, could give any
more than a bare right of preemption.”). See also Roger Williams, A Just and Generous Assertion of Indian Rights [1633?], mentioned in 1 WINTHROP’S JOURNAL, supra note 819, at
116–17.
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ing purchased it with their money.”1357 This became the accepted basis
of common law property rights in America and the foundation of American Independence.1358 In the words of founder Roger Sherman,
[Let]North-America, be considered as the property of the aboriginal
natives, who were the first discoverers and have the right of prime
occupancy. . . . North-America was distributed to them [the Na-

1357. Jeremiah Dummer, A Defence of the New-England Charters 8 [1715]. See also Letter from John Adams to William Tudor (Sept. 23, 1818); 1 ISAAC BACKUS, A HISTORY OF NEW
ENGLAND 58–60 (1777). Cf. Samuel Cooper, Sermon on the Commencement of the Constitution, T. & J. FLEET, & J. GILL, Oct. 25, 1780, at 14–15 [1780] (“one internal mark of their
divine original, and that they come from him ‘who hath made of one blood all nations to
dwell upon the face of the earth,’ whose authority sanctifies those governments that instead
of oppressing any part of his family, vindicate the oppressed, and restrain and punish the
oppressor”) (quoting Acts 17:26).
1358. See Letter from John Adams to William Tudor (Sept. 23, 1818) (The founders of
Massachusetts Bay Colony “do not seem to have had any confidence in their charter, as
conveying any right, except against the king, who signed it. They considered the right to be
in the native Indians. And in truth all the right there was in the case, lay there. They
accordingly respected the Indian wigwams and poor plantations; their clambanks and musclebanks and oysterbanks, and all their property. . . . Our ancestors . . . considered the
Indians as having rights; and they entered into negotiations with them, purchased and paid
for their rights and claims, whatever they were, and procured deeds, grants, and quit claims
of all their lands, leaving them their habitations, arms, utensils, fishings, huntings and
plantations. There is scarcely a litigation at law concerning a title to land, that may not be
traced to an Indian deed. I have in my possession, somewhere, a parchment copy of a deed of
Massasoit of the township of Braintree, incorporated by the legislature in one thousand six
hundred and thirty nine. And this was the general practice through the country, and has
been to this day through the continent.”); 1 BACKUS, supra note 1357, at 58–60. See also
Letter from Roger Williams to Major [John] Mason (June 22, 1670), in WILLIAMS, THE LETTERS, supra note 1329, at 342 (Roger Williams roared like Jesus Christ with a whip in hand
overturning tables in the outer courts of the Temple, “Your selves pretend liberty of Conscience, but alas, it is but self (the great God Self) only to Your Selves.” From Rhode Island,
Williams protested John Mason’s illegitimate theft of Native American lands and his attempts to legitimize this land through the feudal laws of England in the longstanding legal
disputes denoted under the case title Mohegan Indians v. Connecticut. The Mohegans in
this case were certainly a straw purchaser to legitimize the Mason’s seizure of lands from
the Pequots they took when they committed genocide on them. The final determination of
Mohegan Indians v. Connecticut, which should hold no weight in American law today, came
from the King’s Privy Council in 1773 right before the American Revolution.); MASON, supra
note 801, at 14, 21 (witnessing his men “burning them [the Pequots] up in the Fire of His
Wrath, and dunging the ground with their Flesh: It was the Lord’s Doings, and it is marvelous in our Eyes! It is He that hath made his Work wonderful, and therefore ought to be
remembered. . . . Thus the Lord was pleased to smite our Enemies in the hinder Parts, and
to give us their Land for an Inheritance.”). The general antislavery and pro-Native American rights tenor of the American Revolutionaries was undeniable; their revolution was
repentance from the former and present horrors of America. Compare Samuel Cooper, A
Sermon Preached before his Excellency John Hancock . . . [on] the Commencement of the
Constitution, T. & J. FLEET, & J. GILL, Oct. 25, 1780, at 14 [1780] (quoting Acts 17:26), and
Lemuel Haynes, Liberty Further Extended [1776], in Bogin, supra note 64, at 95 (quoting
Acts 17:26), with OLAUDAH EQUIANO, THE INTERESTING NARRATIVE 29 (9th ed., 1794) (quoting Acts 17:26).
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tives], “when the Most High divided unto the NATIONS their
INHERITANCE when he separated the sons of ADAM.”1359

The U.S. Supreme Court horribly damaged these revolutionary principles, built upon centuries of American custom, by falsely claiming that
Europeans were the first discoverers of America in Johnson v. McIntosh and Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.1360 For the common law is
common to all human beings in America and preexisted the English
crossing the Atlantic.1361 If the U.S. Supreme Court simply required
1359. Roger Sherman, Remarks on a Pamphlet Entitled, “A Dissertation on the political
Union and Constitution of the Thirteen States of NORTH-AMERICA.” 16–17, 40–42 [1784]
(Sherman further concluded, “That God hath made of one blood, all nations of the earth, and
hath determined the bounds of their habitation.”) (quoting Deuteronomy 32:8; Acts 17:26).
See also John Adams, Minutes of the Argument, Surveyor General v. Loggs, Court of Vice
Admiralty, Boston, March 8, 1773, in 2 ADAMS, LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 22, at 267, 269
(John Adams argued in open colonial court that “Indian Natives had under God a right to
the soil,” and “that no good title could be acquired by sovereign or subject, without obtaining
it from the Natives.”).
1360. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 597–98 (1823) (citing Campbell v. Hall [1774] 1
Cowp. 206, 208, 211–12 (Eng.) (approvingly as if taxation without representation is constitutional,This horrible, terrible case, made a lie of the U.S. social compact. Thus, it should be
overruled because the ruling misrepresents Mohegan Indians v. Connecticut, as if that were
a legitimate case, when it was a case of a straw purchase made by the Mohegans to cover up
the Puritan crime of genocide against the Pequots) () (overruled by the American Revolution)); Walters, supra note 1330, at 787; see also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 22
(1831) (falsely representing that property law came from European discovery rather than
the Native American title; as if the American Revolution never reversed it: “It cannot be
questioned that the right of sovereignty, as well as soil, was notoriously asserted and exercised by the European discoverers. From that source we derive our rights, and there is not
an instance of a cession of land from an Indian nation in which the right of sovereignty is
mentioned as a part of the matter ceded.” This is a horrible, terrible and false aggrandizement of European rights in America. Justices Story and Thompson dissented.). But see
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 546 (1832) (upholding the correct American law: “The
charter to Georgia professes to be granted for the charitable purpose of enabling poor subjects to gain a comfortable subsistence by cultivating lands in the American provinces ‘at
present waste and desolate.’ . . . These motives for planting a new colony are incompatible
with the lofty ideas of granting the soil and all its inhabitants from sea to sea. They demonstrate the truth that these grants asserted a titled against Europeans only, and were
considered as blank paper so far as the rights of the natives were concerned. The power of
war was giving only for defense, not for conquest.”) (emphasis added). Cf. Thomas Hutchinson, Diary, Nov. 28, 1774, in 1 Hutchinson, The Diary, supra note 802, at 307–09
(confirming the timing of the King’s Speech was contemporaneous with the ruling of Campbell v. Hall, and that the Campbell case and the King’s Speech harkened back to the
conquest of Jamaica); King George III, The King’s Speech of Nov. 30, 1774 [1775] (this
speech, published in the colonies, declared parliamentary omnipotence and Parliament’s
support of the king’s efforts to bring the Americans to heel); THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1–2 (U.S. 1776).
1361. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 600–04 (1823) (deciding the question of “whether the King’s
subjects carry with them the common law wherever they may form settlements” in favor of
the crown and against the Native American title as if the American Revolution never happened); Jeremiah Dummer, A Defence of the New-England Charters 8, 23 [1715] (“And to
complete the oppression, when they upon their trial claimed the rights of Englishmen, they
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the State of Georgia to abide by these founding principles, the inherent
rights of the Cherokee people would have precluded their forced departure down the Trail of Tears.1362
The Wheaton Court was perhaps the first to raise a full throated
doubt of the existence of U.S. common law, but it was not the last.1363
Decades later, in the seminal antitrust case Standard Oil, the Supreme Court acknowledged that “doubt as to whether there is a
were scoffingly told, those things would not follow them to the ends of the earth. Unnatural
insult; must the brave adventurer, who with the hazard of his life and fortune, seeks out
new climates to enrich his mother country, be denied those common rights, which his countrymen enjoy at home in ease and indolence? Is he to be made miserable, and a slave by his
own acquisitions? Is the laborer alone unworthy of his hire, and shall they only reap, who
have neither sowed nor planted? Monstrous absurdity! Horrid inverted order!”); Roger Williams, A Just and Generous Assertion of Indian Rights [1633?], mentioned in 1 WINTHROP’S
JOURNAL, supra note 819, at 116–17 (Roger Williams firmly vindicated the preexisting Native American rights to property, and their freedoms of speech, religion, and assembly.
Williams’ cause began as a resistance, but eventually became adopted unanimously in
America.).
1362. The U.S. Supreme Court certainly gave in to the political goals of the president and
the injustice of selfish Georgian buffoons based on a sham gold rush and thus allowed them
to transgress the federal apportionment of lands to the Cherokee Nation in violation of the
supremacy of the U.S. Constitution. See Cherokee, 30 U.S. at 22. See also Brian Hicks, The
Cherokees vs. Andrew Jackson, SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE, (Mar. 2011), https://
www.smithsonianmag.com/history/the-cherokees-vs-andrew-jackson-277394/. The gold
rushes in America—especially the one in Georgia that infused illiterate white Georgians
with the political will to banish their bilingually literate neighbors the Cherokee—were
shams driven by magicians known as treasure diviners. Id. In Cherokee Nation the U.S.
Supreme Court bowed the nation’s sovereignty to these selfish magic men of Georgia. David
Williams, Gold Rush, NEW GEORGIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, (Jan. 21, 2003), https://
www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/history-archaeology/gold-rush; JOHN L. BROOKE, THE
REFINER’S FIRE 28, 272, 282–83 (1996) (a very clear and evenhanded look into the origins
and activities of treasure diviners in the United States, especially its connection with the
Mormon Cosmology and the founding of Utah, and the “discovery” of gold at Sutter’s Mill in
California—which was actually iron pyrite, known as false gold); 1 WILSON LUMPKIN, THE
REMOVAL OF THE CHEROKEE INDIANS FROM GEORGIA 96, 107, 128 (1907) (Senator Lumpkin
and those like him took advantage of the sham for political gain: “The existence alone of the
rich gold mines utterly forbids the idea of a state of quiescence on this all engrossing subject.”); id. at 193–94 (telling President Andrew Jackson that Georgia was rightly extending
its “laws and jurisdiction over the Cherokees” in order to take advantage of their “land,
abounding in rich gold mines”); id. at 311 (noting measures taken to force white people into
compliance with the removal of the Cherokee—for which the missionary Samuel Worcester
was convicted as a criminal in Georgia).
1363. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 660 (1834); Johnson, 21 U.S. at 600–04 (this case
only impliedly found there was no U.S. common law in order to degrade the property rights
of Native Americans—this implied doubt was repeated by Cherokee Nation and Worcester
leading up to the Court’s doubts in Wheaton v. Peters—the idea that Native Americans did
not have inherent common law rights was demonstrably violative of the U.S. social compact
and the centuries of American custom of purchasing, rather than conquering, Native American lands according to which the American Revolutionaries unanimously disputed the
English title over their property). See also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Walker, 210 U.S. 356,
362–63 (1908) (citing Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 591).
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common law of the United States governing the making of contracts in
restraint of trade” led to the enactment of the Sherman Act.1364 Then
in Erie, the Supreme Court stated that there is “no federal general
common law,” while ironically making a new federal stare decisis.1365
Judge Robert Bork was in favor of this sort of irony when he
presented the Sherman Act of 1890 as the beginning of antitrust
law.1366 But the beginning of antitrust law in the United States was
the Patent & Copyright Clause according to which “fraud upon the
public” antitrust claims could be raised.1367 Thus, it appears the first
1364. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 2, 50 (1911).
1365. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78–79 (1938). See also Craig Green,
Can Erie Survive as Federal Common Law?, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 813, 843–44 (2013).
1366. BORK, THE ANTITRUST, supra note 1136, at 15–16, 19–20. Bork directly mischaracterized the law as given in Standard Oil, misconstruing the common law previously
used to determine antitrust cases as itself a form of judicial activism, which is ironic because he was advocating judicial activism in the very same breath. Id.; Standard Oil Co.,
221 U.S. at 50–51 (antitrust common law “took [its] origin in the common law, and were also
familiar in the law of this country prior to and at the time of the adoption of the act in
question”); id. at 59–60 (“Let us consider the language of the first and section sections [of
the Sherman Act], guided by the principle that, where words are employed in a statute
which had at the time a well known meaning at common law or in the law of this country,
they are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels the contrary. . . . Thus, not specifying but indubitably contemplating and requiring a standard, it
follows that it was intended that the standard of reason which had been applied at the
common law, and in this country, in dealing with subject of the character embraced by the
statute, was intended to be the measure used . . . .”).
1367. United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 355–58, 373 (1888) (prior to the
Sherman Act concerns of monopoly sounded in “fraud upon the public” patent litigation,
stating, “It would be a strange anomaly in a government organized upon a system which
rigidly separates the powers to be exercised by its executive, its legislative, and its judicial
branches, and which in this emphatic language defines the jurisdiction of the judicial department, to hold that in that department there should be no remedy for such a wrong. . . .
There is nothing in these provisions expressing an intention of limiting the power of the
government of the United States to get rid of a patent obtained from it by fraud and deceit,
and although the legislature may have given to private individuals a more limited form of
relief by way of defense to an action by the patentee, we think the argument that this was
intended to supersede the affirmative relief to which the United States is entitled, to obtain
a cancellation or vacation of an instrument obtained from it by fraud, an instrument which
affects the hole public, whose protection from such a fraud is eminently the duty of the
United States, is not sound.”), declined to extend by Oil States Energy Servs. v. Greene’s
Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1371 (2018); see also James Madison, Detatched Memoranda,
ca., Jan. 31, 1820 (“Monopolies tho’ in certain cases useful, ought to be granted with caution,
and guarded with strictness agst. abuse. The Constitution of the U.S. has limited them to
two cases, the authors of Books, and of useful inventions, in both which they are considered
as a compensation for a benefit actually gained by the community, as a purchase of property
which the owner might otherwise withheld from public use.”); Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat.
109, § 1 (allowing “letters patent to be made out in the name of the United States” if an
invention is deemed “sufficiently useful and important”); Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124,
§ 6 (not defining the damages, but simply that an infringer will “suffer and pay . . . all
damages occasioned by such injury”). Cf. John D. Gordan, III, Morse v. Reid: The First Reported Federal Copyright Case, 11 AM. SOC. FOR L. HIST. 21, 21–23 (1993).
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real antitrust paradox in America arose in the Taney Court, when it
atrophied its antitrust jurisdiction to the point where the Union was
nearly destroyed in the Civil War.1368
Professor Bork ignored all U.S. history prior to 1890 and expected his readers to believe that the common law prior offered no
protection for restraints of alienation of chattels.1369 He, thus,
presented the common law interpretation of the Sherman Act in Standard Oil as anomalous relativism and judicial activism, and obscured
the line of restraint of trade cases that trace back to Gibbons v.
Ogden.1370 Bork also blinded himself to the rights of life vindicated by
Edward Coke and Phillis Wheatley.1371
Bork’s arbitrary policy shifts in federal antitrust law are not
only glaring, they are now on the verge of overcoming all individual
rights.1372 Our rights to life, our civil rights, our rights to access justice
1368. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895) (limiting the Court’s jurisdiction to hear antitrust through the Taney Court’s former police powers rationale, which
was then used to preserve slavery) (citing The License Cases, 46 U.S. 504 (1847)), abrogated
by Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 122, 127 (1942). See also Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken
Land & Imp. Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1855); Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. 527, 529 (1857).
1369. BORK, THE ANTITRUST, supra note 1136, at 10, 20, 405–07, 418–19 (positioning the
application of antitrust law as a question of the separation of powers saying, “At issue is the
question central to democracy: Who governs?” and lamenting courts’ use of common law
rather than deferring entirely to Congress even though abandoning the common law would
also destroy the courts’ ordinary imputation of legislative grace from Dr. Foster’s Case and
other common law rules for statutory construction). Cf. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons,
Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 538–39 (2013) (“The ‘first sale’ doctrine is a common-law doctrine with an
impeccable historic pedigree. In the early 17th century Lord Coke explained the common
law’s refusal to permit restraints on the alienation of chattels. . . . A law that permits a
copyright holder to control the resale or other disposition of a chattel once sold is similarly
‘against Trade and Traffi[c], and bargaining and contracting.’”) (quoting 1 EDWARD COKE,
INSTITUTES *223).
1370. BORK, THE ANTITRUST, supra note 1136, at 38–47, 405–06; Knight, 156 U.S. at 12
(citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 210 (1824)), abrogated by Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111, 122, 127 (1942) (“Even while important opinions in this line of restrictive authority
[i.e., Knight] were being written, however, other cases called forth broader interpretations of
the Commerce Clause destined to supersede the earlier ones, and to bring about a return to
the principles first enunciated by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden.”) (citing
Knight, 156 U.S. at 1; Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 210).
1371. BORK, THE ANTITRUST, supra note 1136, at 46, 405–07 (arguing against a “case-bycase resolution” of antitrust disputes because a judge might side with the idea that worker/
laborer rights ought to be vindicated); 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *181–83 (a right at common law to restrict speech or trade of others cannot be raised when the common law
abolishes and punishes such rights); Dyers Case [1414] 2 Hen. 5 f. 5, pl. 26 (Eng.); The Case
of Monopolies [Darcy v. Allen] [1602] 11 Co. Rep. 84b (Eng.) (determining that monopolies
are void at common law); Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772,] in
WHEATLEY, supra note 821, at 7; Phillis Wheatley’s Registration, Sept. 10, 1773, TSC/1/E/
06/09, Register of entries of copies 1746–1773.
1372. BORK, THE ANTITRUST, supra note 1136, at 54, 110, 145, 405–07; Khan, supra note
1155, at 740.
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and participate meaningfully in society, are all on the line.1373 For the
Borkian departure from antitrust common law adopted by the federal
courts allowed the patient strategy of Amazon, and similar players in
the online marketplace, to establish unchecked dominance.1374
The government and the U.S. Supreme Court is specifically endowed with the power to assert its jurisdiction to control such actors as
Amazon, AT&T, Comcast, Google, and similarly situated companies,
from restraining the speech and trade of ordinary American people.1375
It is the same power the court may assert against state governments
and individuals alike; as was done in Gibbons v. Ogden.1376 Thus, the
court extended a similar principle in Red Lion regarding equal access
to public telecom networks.1377
Indeed, it is possible to petition the U.S. Courts under Red Lion
to fashion common law net neutrality out of federal antitrust common
law principles regardless of FCC rules.1378 For under Crowell v. Benson, Congress is not permitted to block the courts from making de novo
determinations of fact “wherever fundamental rights depend.”1379 Such
a common law net neutrality ruling, would preserve the very network
benefits whence internet broadcast networks draw their entire
value.1380
1373. See Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, 135 S. Ct. 513, 514–15 (2014) (appearing to unanimously overrule our rights to life as defined by Lord Coke on behalf of
Amazon contractors); Calabresi & Leibowitz, supra note 1016, at 1042–56 (explaining how
Lochner-type right to work cases like Busk destroy antitrust jurisdiction).
1374. Matsushita v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986) (quoting BORK, THE
ANTITRUST, supra note 1136, at 145); id. at 604 (White, J., dissenting) (“The Court, in discussing the unlikelihood of a predatory conspiracy, also consistently assumes that
petitioners valued profit-maximization over growth.”). See Khan, supra note 1155, at 753
(noting that Amazon established its dominance by preferring growth to profit maximization,
which is the very thing that allows it to forgo antitrust scrutiny under the Borkian theory
adopted in Matsushita).
1375. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. at 355–58, 373; Red Lion Broadcasting. Co., Inc. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969).
1376. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 208–09.
1377. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386.
1378. Id. at 383–86. See also U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 383–84 (D.C. Cir.
2017).
1379. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 57 (1932).
1380. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 383–86 n.14 (quoting The Proxmire Amendment, 105 Cong.
Rec. 14457) (turning to legislative history to define the Telecom Act’s public interest standard: “‘[B]ut nothing in this sentence shall be construed as changing the basic intent of
Congress with respect to the provisions of this act, which recognizes that television and
radio frequencies are in the public domain, that the license to operate in such frequencies
requires operation in the public interest, and that, in newscasts, news interviews, news
documentaries, on-the-spot coverage of news events, and panel discussions, all sides of public controversies shall be given as equal an opportunity to be heard as is practically
possible.’”) (emphasis added). Cf. U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 383–86, 393 (“For all of
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As in Carol Rose’s article The Comedy of the Commons, these
networks and the air itself which carries the spectrum we use to talk
on cell phones and access the internet are inherently public goods.1381
So too the copyrighted content distributed over these networks are inherently public goods.1382 The costs to accessing them, therefore, were
meant to be minimized according to antitrust principles arising from
custom, prescription, and trust so that their value might be maximized
for the benefit of all.1383
The separation of powers is implicated in the efforts of telecom
giants to skirt such jurisdiction of federal courts.1384 From high technology companies to ordinary retail stores to nonprofits—corporations
are behind the most controversial and illegal activities of the government.1385 Indeed, Edward Snowden was allowed into the deepest
those reasons, broadband ISPs have no First Amendment entitlement to hold themselves
out as indiscriminate conduits but then to act as something different. The net neutrality
rule assures that broadband ISPs live up to their promise to consumers of affording them
neutral access to internet content of their own choosing. The rule, in doing so, does not
infringe the First Amendment.”).
1381. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 383–86 n.14; Carol Rose, supra note 244, at 720; U.S.
Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 383–89, 393 (broadband ISPs literally hold themselves out as
common carriers as a factual matter, they hold themselves out as “a ‘neutral, indiscriminate
conduit’—i.e., as a pathway to ‘all content on the Internet, without alteration, blocking, or
editorial intervention,’” and net neutrality rules merely “requires the ISP to abide by its
representation and honor its customers’ ensuing expectations”—in the absence of FCC rules
the federal courts can and should enforce them at common law.).
1382. Red Lion, 395 U.S., at 383–86 n.14. Telecom companies want to overrule Red Lion,
and the latest attempt was Minority Television. See Minority Television Project, Inc. v. FCC,
736 F.3d 1192, 1201 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). Cf. U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d, at 383–84.
1383. Red Lion, 395 U.S., at 383–86 n.14; Carol Rose, supra note 244, at 724; U.S.
Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d, at 383–84; The Kingsbury Commitment [Dec. 19, 1913] (to avoid
antitrust suit, AT&T abdicated its attempts to monopolize without regard to the public trust
protected by the U.S. Government, including a guarantee of universal service); Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 214(e), 254(e) (creating the Universal Service Fund to
subsidize telecom companies for extending basic telephone service “so far as possible, to all
the people of the United States, without discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion,
national origin, or sex, a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communications service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges”).
1384. Schroeder, Choosing, supra note 485, at 55 n.44 (noting that major content owning
companies are openly colluding with major telecom giants to create their own copyright
takedown procedures, flouting the safe harbor procedures required by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act).
1385. In re National Sec. Letter, 930 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2013); In re National Sec. Letter, 863 F.3d 1110, 1130 (9th Cir. 2017). See also Donohue, The Shadow,
supra note 416, at 92; Stillman, Get Out, supra note 763; Lipp, supra note 1228; Gallagher
& Moltke, supra note 1228; Twitter, Inc., v. Sessions, 263 F. Supp. 3d 803, 808–09 (N.D. Cal.
2017); Donohue, Technological, supra note 1238, at 435–36; Michael Corkery, Walmart ‘Surprised’ Old Store Is a Migrant Shelter. Records Hinted at the Possibility., N.Y. TIMES (June
20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/20/business/walmart-migrant-children-shelter.html (“A Walmart executive signed a document that indicated the buyer was purchasing
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bowels of national security clearance from a position at Booz Allen
Hamilton, where he developed many of the programs that we are now
suffering under.1386
The secret U.S. Government contracts and NSLs binding companies like Booz Allen Hamilton, Microsoft, AT&T, and others
resemble the very sort of odious monopolies that were formerly granted
at the Council Table.1387 While pampered with billions of U.S. dollars,
Booz Allen declared all nation states passé and boldly drew up a manifesto proposing a silent coup against all nations, including the United
States.1388 Then the U.S. Government prosecuted Booz Allen’s
whistleblowers and destroyed Aaron Swartz, especially making an example of Swartz by treating him as a foreign enemy for downloading
too many scholarly articles from JSTOR.1389
If it were not for sovereign immunity, the misuse of patents and
copyrights to profit from spying on the American people might be punished in court.1390 Judicial reluctance to review copyright and patent
the property with a $4.5 million loan from a nonprofit [Southwest Key Programs] that runs
shelters for migrant children.”); Stahl, supra note 1219.
1386. SNOWDEN (Open Road Films 2016) (this movie showcases the fact that Snowden
himself created many of the programs he exposed to the public).
1387. BGov List of 2018, BLOMBERG GOVERNMENT, https://about.bgov.com/bgov200/ (last
visited Nov. 8, 2018). See Stahl, supra note 1219 (Booz Allen types likely subcontract to
foreign intelligence companies like NSO Group—a highly controversial practice).
1388. Mark Gerencser, Reginald Van Lee, Fernando Napolitano, & Christopher Kelly,
The Megacommunity Manifesto 12, 14 [2008], published online by BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON
(“Nations and companies alike have undergone an irreversible shift toward what management theorist Charles Hampden-Turner calls ‘universalism.’ They move away from reliance
on connections and loyalty (typical of societies with selective law enforcement) and toward
such principles as merit and universal law.”) Thus, these megacommunity aficionados offer
governments a chance to allow big international corporations that they call a “megacommunity” to do the governing for them: “A megacommunity is a public sphere in which
organizations and people deliberately join together around a compelling issue of mutual
importance, following a set of practices and principles that will make it easier for them to
achieve results.” This is exactly what governments are, or should we say what governments
were?.
1389. Aaron Swartz, Guerilla Open Access Manifesto [2008], uploaded by Aaron Swartz
in Eremo, Italy; THE INTERNET’S OWN BOY (Participant Media 2014); CITIZENFOUR (Praxis
Films Nov. 28, 2014); IS THIS A ROOM: REALITY WINNER VERBATIM TRANSCRIPTION (Tina Satter/Half Straddle 2018). See also Schroeder, Choosing, supra note 485, at 48–49 (tracing the
movement Swartz led against SOPA, PIPA, ACTA).
1390. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001); Berger v. United States,
295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (“The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all, and whose interest. Therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a
peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the two-fold aim of which is that
guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor—
indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul
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misuse as a fraud upon the public is the only thing preserving the
claimed IP licensing rights behind dragnet surveillance programs.1391
Contract good faith and fair dealing principles provide proper jurisdiction to review these misuses according to Kyllo.1392
The best way to overcome the court’s reluctance, is to assert
strong prudential grounds for exercising jurisdiction.1393 It is the job of
plaintiff’s counsel to see past the smoke screen of prudential self-limitation, usually asserted on sovereign immunity or federalism grounds,
to explain why judicial review is prudent.1394 As Justice Story wrote in
his opinion in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, it is wise in most cases to

ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.”) (emphasis
added).
1391. Oil States Energy Servs. v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1371 (2018) (Oil
States’ reluctance to review fraud on the public suits under Patent Law is emphatically a
prudential matter, wholly in the power of the U.S. Supreme Court to undo without offending
the America Invents Act’s creation of Article I inter partes review), declining to extend
United States v. Am. Bell Telephone Co., 128 U.S. 315 (1888). See also Michael E. Rubinstein, Extending Copyright Misuse to an Affirmative Cause of Action, 5 AKRON INTELL. PROP.
J. 111, 132–34 (2011); Calabresi & Leibowitz, supra note 1016, at 1097 (noting the judicial
surrender to corporate interests); Schroeder, Choosing, supra note 485, at 55 n.44 (noting
that if copyright owner initiated suits are required for misuse to apply, big copyright owners
may, and in some cases are already, working around the courts altogether).
1392. Kyllo, 533 U.S., at 40; Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 538–39
(2013) (“A law that permits a copyright holder to control the resale or other disposition of a
chattel once sold is similarly ‘against Trade and Traffi[c], and bargaining and contracting.’”)
(quoting 1 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *223); United States v. Am. Bell Telephone Co., 128
U.S. 315, 355 (1888) (holding patent review to determine whether Bell “was guilty of such a
fraud upon the public that the monopoly which these patents grant him ought to be revoked
or annulled”); Schroeder, Bringing, supra note 1036, at 96–97 (discussing grounds to review
the honesty in property and IP law, and the proper remedy of stripping property rights from
dishonest or fraudulent claims of intangible value). It is becoming commonplace for corporations to assert copyright and patent rights to the extent of restraining their customers’
ability to freely use the products they purchase outright from the corporations; copyright
and patent misuse could become an affirmative cause of action through trespass on the case
as a stick in the bundle of the property rights of owners of physical property to use and
repair their property. See Chamberlain Grp. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc., 381 F.3d 1178,
1204 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Lexmark Int’l v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 550
(6th Cir. 2004); Kyle Wiens & Elizabeth Chamberlain, John Deere Just Swindled Farmers
Out of Their Right to Repair, WIRED (Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/johndeere-farmers-right-to-repair/.
1393. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, Co., 491 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (explaining that cases that test the boundary of federal versus state judicial
power are best “understood as simply invoking the comity and federalism concerns discussed in our abstention cases,” i.e., that they actually test a question of judicial prudence
rather than judicial power even if they speak in terms of power).
1394. Id.
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remind the Court of its duty to humbly accept and to firmly assert its
vested federal powers.1395
There is much to be gleaned from the prudential opinion of Justice Story in Martin.1396 For the reluctant Chief Justice Marshall was
so moved by the opinion of Joseph Story in Martin, that he characterized prudential dismissal in Cohens v. Virginia as an exception to the
rule, which now entails a “virtually unflagging obligation of the federal
courts to exercise the jurisdiction given to them.”1397 Marshall confirmed that the framers did not intend to create, in the words of
Alexander Hamilton, “ ‘a hydra in government from which nothing but
contradiction and confusion can proceed.’ ”1398
Such a hydra would exist if there was not power in the federal
courts to review state interpretations of federal laws, treaties, and the
U.S. Constitution.1399 A hydra would also exist if the Court was unable
to review fundamental rights effected by the administrative state.1400
Article III de novo review is thus required, under the seminal case
Crowell v. Benson, wherever agencies attempt “to establish a govern1395. See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 364–65 (1816) (“[I]n this Court,
every State in the Union is represented; we are constituted by the voice of the Union, and
when decisions take place which nothing but a spirit to give ground and harmonize can
reconcile, ours is the superior claim upon the comity of the State tribunals. It is the nature
of the human mind to press a favourite hypothesis too far, but magnanimity will always be
ready to sacrifice the pride of opinion to public welfare.”).
1396. Id. at 347–48 (“A motive of another kind, perfectly compatible with the most sincere respect for State tribunals, might induce the grant of appellate power over their
decisions. That motive is the importance, and even necessity, of uniformity of decisions
throughout the whole United States upon all subjects within the purview of the Constitution. Judges of equal learning and integrity in different States might differently interpret a
statute or a treaty of the United States, or even the Constitution itself; if there were no
revising authority to control these jarring and discordant judgments and harmonize them
into uniformity, the laws, the treaties, and the Constitution of the United States would be
different in different States, and might perhaps never have precisely the same construction,
obligation, or efficacy in any two states. The public mischiefs that would attend such a state
of things would be truly deplorable, and it cannot be believed that they could have escaped
the enlightened convention which formed the Constitution.”).
1397. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817–18
(1976) (citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 404 (1821)); Cohens, 19 U.S. at 264, 404, 423 (“To
this argument, in all its forms, the same answer may be given. Let the nature and objects of
our Union be considered; let the great fundamental principles on which the fabric stands be
examined; and we think the result must be that there is nothing so extravagantly absurd in
giving to the Court of the nation the power of revising the decisions of local tribunals on
questions which affect the nation as to require that words which import this power should
be restricted by a forced construction.”) (citing Martin, 14 U.S. at 304).
1398. Cohens, 19 U.S. at 415–16, 423 (citing Martin, 14 U.S. at 304; THE FEDERALIST NO.
80 (Alexander Hamilton)).
1399. Id.
1400. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50–51 (1932) (citing Ex parte Bakelite Corporation,
279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929)).
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ment of a bureaucratic character alien to the United States our system
wherever fundamental rights depend.”1401
Prudence can be difficult to raise in support of asserting federal
jurisdiction after the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent prudential decisions
that appear to administer the very hydra in government the Court is
supposed to abolish.1402 In Sebelius, Chief Justice Roberts argued that
Congress could not put “a gun to the head” of the states, and thus he
turned his back on the Court’s prudential interest in uniformity and
“let fifty flowers bloom.”1403 The Court also instituted a sovereignty-bysovereignty version of personal jurisdiction in Walden v. Fiore, and
state by state corporate barriers to jurisdiction in Daimler v.
Bauman.1404
Perhaps the most horrible prudential basis cited for destroying
federal jurisdiction over public interest suits is judicial creep stemming
from Murray’s Lessee.1405 The decision in Murray’s Lessee is doubtful
because shortly after it was decided the nation fell into Civil War, and
as Dred Scott revealed it was arbitrary in its jurisdictional aspects.1406
Nevertheless, judicial creep under Murray’s Lessee created a mass of
arbitrary barriers to public interest suits that unduly supplant ordinary standing requirements.1407
1401. Id. at 57.
1402. See, e.g., NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 581 (2012) (Opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
1403. Id.; Ann Marie Marciarille, Let Fifty Flowers Bloom: Health Care Federalism after
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 81 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 314, 343
(2012) (speaking of federal healthcare regulation as a “hydra-headed government funded
health insurance beast”).
1404. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285–86 (2014); Daimler v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117,
134–35 (2014).
1405. See Oil States Energy Servs. v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1371 (2018)
(quoting Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Imp. Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1855)).
1406. Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. at 285 (deciding that “of this necessity, Congress alone is
the judge,” to destroy federal jurisdiction); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 455 (1857)
(the Court appeared only to care about respecting Congress when it could use it as a pretense to destroy federal jurisdiction, because this Court decided that “the eighth section of
the act of 1820, known commonly as the Missouri Compromise law, . . . was unconstitutional”—also to destroy federal jurisdiction). The standard that should have been applied in
Murray’s Lessee was James Otis’s maxim of no taxation without representation and the
prohibition on general warrants that lack particularity and probable cause—when these
maxims were at issue the Murray’s Lessee Court alarmingly did not even mention them.
SIMMONS, supra note 31, at 23.
1407. See, e.g., Oil States Energy Servs. v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1371
(2018) (quoting Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Imp. Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1855));
Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 484 (2011) (distinguishing Murray’s Lessee, but not overruling it as it might have under Crowell); Wellness Intern. Network, Ltd. V. Sharif, 135 S.
Ct. 1932, 1963–64 (2015) (expounding the difference between public and private rights, a
distinction that originated in Murray’s Lessee to dismiss cases).
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For example, in 2018 the Oil States Court found antitrust common law unreviewable under Murray’s Lessee.1408 Inter partes patent
review proceedings were immunized in Oil States because they need
not “ ‘from its nature’ ” be reviewed by a court.1409 Thus, the Court ignored the separation of powers and reversed patent common law with
feudal law by approvingly citing “petition[s] to the Privy Council to vacate a patent,” as if the Patent & Copyright Clause was not inspired by
common law; as if the USPTO was not categorically different from an
English Privy Council; as if the U.S. Supreme Court were not tasked
with the paramount duty of defending its constitutionally mandated
common law jurisdiction against any such feudal intrusion.1410
The idea that when private property rights become “public
rights” they are unsuable without Congress’s consent, is simply another version of feudal immunity.1411 Such an avoidance of interbranch
dispute can only be administered as a prudential holding in U.S.
Courts, as “discussed in our abstention cases, although admittedly in a
slightly different voice.”1412 Thus, Murray’s Lessee should be over1408. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1371.
1409. Id. at 1372–73 (quoting Stern, 564 U.S. at 484 (citing Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. at
284)).
1410. Id.; THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison). This irony is all the more unbearable, because Murray’s Lessee was at least nominally derived from Lord Coke’s Institutes.
Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. at 276 (citing 2 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *50). See Graham v.
John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966) (“The clause is both a grant of power
and a limitation. . . . It was written against the backdrop of the practices—eventually curtailed by the Statute of Monopolies—of the Crown in granting monopolies to court favorites
in goods or businesses which had long before been enjoyed by the public.”) (citing U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8); Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 552 (2013)
(citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July
31, 1788) (arguing the U.S. Constitution should read “there shall be no monopolies”); Letter
from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788) (Defending the Patent & Copyright Clause saying, “With regard to monopolies they are justly classed among the greatest
nuisances in Government. But it is clear that as encouragements to literary works and ingenious discoveries, they are not too valuable to be wholly renounced?”)).
1411. Compare Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. at 283–85 (“no suit can be brought against the
United States without the consent of Congress”—but it is not so, for the United States was
sued without its consent by a private party in McCulloch v. Maryland—or else, one might
say in the style of Justice Story’s opinion in Martin, that Congress is constitutionally mandated to consent to the Court’s jurisdiction wherever the judicial power exists expressly or
impliedly through the Judiciary Act—for as Gibbons said, the Court has jurisdiction to hear
such cases wherever the public interest requires), with Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. 527, 529
(1857) (“It is an established principle of jurisprudence in all civilized nations that the sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts or in any other without its consent and permission
. . . .”—again, it is not so for the reasons explained in Chisholm v. Georgia and Nevada v.
Hall, and because Beers was a contributory cause of the Civil War by making the Southern
States immune from any legal challenge to their evil pro-slavery laws.).
1412. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 27 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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turned as imprudently decided because it, like Beers v. Arkansas,
precipitated the Civil War.1413
There are also strong, general reasons to loosen other cumbersome prudential standing requirements placed upon the shoulders of
most public interest litigants today.1414 For example, federal courts can
no longer reasonably presume that any federal agency is faithfully administering the law as former President Trump demonstrated, under
Executive Orders 13771 & 13777, executive policy can force agencies to
resist executing the law.1415 These arbitrary and capricious orders directed all administrative agencies to act ultra vires by violating the
agencies mandates.1416
The Ninth Circuit recently lessened prudential barriers for review under the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, by directly reversing a
FDA determination.1417 In so doing, the Court admitted that courts can
1413. Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. at 283–85; Beers, 61 U.S. at 529. See U.S. CONST. pmbl.
(avoiding war is one of the vital purposes of the Union, and peaceful resolution of conflict is
one of the central purposes for courts); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 325 (1816).
Cf. PAUL FINKELMAN, SUPREME INJUSTICE: SLAVERY IN THE NATION’S HIGHEST COURT passim
(2018) (what might have been resolved peacefully in the courts had to be resolved by war).
1414. See Martin, 14 U.S. at 325 (this case explains many prudential reasons for asserting a robust federal jurisdiction). The prudential reasons for asserting jurisdiction
explained in Martin are only expanded today, as decisions made in the federal government
intimately touch all our lives. LULAC v. Wheeler, 899 F.3d 814, 826–27 (9th Cir. 2018)
vacated on reh’g en banc, 914 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2019); LULAC v. Regan, 996 F.3d 673, 677
(9th Cir. 2021) (agreeing with the rationale for the 2018 order); WATER & POWER: A CALIFORNIA HEIST (National Geographic 2017).
1415. Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9,339 (Jan. 30, 2017), revoked by Exec. Order
No. 13,992, 86 Fed. Reg. 35391 (Jan. 20, 2021) (original order requiring any executive department or agency that plans to publicly announce a new regulation to propose at least two
regulations that will in turn be repealed); Exec. Order No. 13,777, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,285 (Feb.
24, 2017), revoked by Exec. Order No. 13,992, 86 Fed. Reg. 35391 (Jan. 20, 2021) (original
order mandating all federal agencies to begin arbitrary deregulation processes, which is a
direct violation of the executive duty to faithfully execute the laws that is ultra vires his
power unless the laws grant him power to deregulate the very regulations they require the
Executive Administration to make), flouting and violating U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (known as
the Take Care Clause); Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (requiring
federal courts to invalidate all agency action, findings, or rulings that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”). Cf. FDA, Regulatory
Reform Report: Completed Actions for Fiscal Year 2018.
1416. Executive Orders 13771 & 13777 directed all federal agencies to take action and
make findings and rulings that are arbitrary and capricious, and may be considered as ultra
vires per se if the agency appears to rely on these rules to take an action or make findings or
rulings. See APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (requiring federal courts to invalidate all agency action, findings, or rulings that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law”). If an agency does not expressly rely upon these Orders 13771,
13777, or other arbitrary or capricious statements of the President, the agency action can be
tested for the ultra vires limitation by comparing it with the scope of the enabling law.
1417. LULAC, 899 F.3d at 817–18, vacated on reh’g en banc, 914 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir.
2019) (“If Congress’s statutory mandates are to mean anything, the time has come to put a
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no longer reasonably presume that Congress intended to repeal Article
III grounds for relief under administrative law.1418 For even Chevron
and Auer deference cannot be considered prudent, when the president
flouts his duties of faithful execution of the laws of Congress.1419

stop to this patent evasion.”); LULAC, 996 F.3d at 677 (agreeing with the rationale for the
2018 order). See also U.S. EPA, Pesticide Program Dialogue Committee Meeting, Day Two:
May 4, 2017, at 2 (dedicating the morning to public input to Executive Order 13777 requiring the EPA to deregulate); id. at 76–77 (“First, I want to address President Trump’s
Executive Order 13771, which was in the materials. . . . That’s the one that proposes elimination of two existing regulations for each new regulation adopted. . . . I [don’t] think there’s
been . . . support for that from any speaker. . . . There’s no place for it in the FIFRA pesticide
context. For example, the tolerances for pesticides on foods are adopted by regulation. It’s
absurd to suggest that you should eliminate two tolerances for each new tolerance adopted.
So, we hope that your agency recognizes that the two for one idea is inherently arbitrary
and capricious, would violated underlying statutory standards and is going to lead to unnecessary litigation.”) (statements of Peter Jenkins with the Center for Food and Safety); id. at
81 (noting that the use of chlorpyrifos as a pesticide will contribute to adverse effects on
1,800 protected species).
1418. See Sierra Club v. Trump, 977 F.3d 853, 876, 888–90 (9th Cir. 2020); Proclamation
No. 9,844, 84 Fed. Reg. 4,949–50 (Feb. 15, 2019) (Interestingly, this proclamation does not
even mention the border wall, barrier, or fence, nor does it expressly direct the executive
branch to take money to build the wall, but it cites vaguely to the construction authority in
10 U.S.C. § 2808 and it is generally known and Trump himself said he is planning on taking
billions of dollars from other places to build his wall without Congressional approval according to this proclamation.); Jonathan Allen, Trump: I’ll ‘probably’ declare a national
emergency over border—just not yet, NBC NEWS (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/
politics/white-house/trump-says-he-probably-will-declare-national-emergency-over-bordern957161; Jordain Carney, McConnell: Senate Won’t Override Trump Veto on Shutdown
Fight, THE HILL (Jan. 15, 2019), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/425469-mcconnellsenate-wont-override-trump-veto-on-shutdown-fight. See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v.
Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 276 (2007) (using the SEC as an excuse to impliedly repeal banks that
were too big to fail—the stakes are even higher than they were right before the 2008 market
crisis).
1419. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120–21 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The
type of reflexive deference exhibited in some of these cases is troubling. And when deference
is applied to other questions of statutory interpretation, such as an agency’s interpretation
of the statutory provisions that concern the scope of its own authority, it is more troubling
still. . . . [I]t seems necessary and appropriate to reconsider, in an appropriate case, the
premises that underlie Chevron and how courts have implemented that decision.”). See
Kisor v. Wilkie 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2422–23 (2019) (Opinion of Kagan, J.) (attempting to deny
that Auer and Seminole Rock violate the separation of powers, but not speaking for the
Court) (citing Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945); Auer v. Robbins,
519 U.S. 452 (1997)); id. at 2424–25 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part) (only concurring with
Justice Kagan in portions of her opinion that did not consider whether Auer and Seminole
Rock violate the separation of powers, making those portions only an opinion); McCarthy v.
Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 146 (1992) (“‘Administrative remedies need not be pursued if the
litigant’s interests in immediate judicial review outweigh the government’s interests in the
efficiency or administrative autonomy that the exhaustion doctrine is designed to further.’”)
(quoting West v. Bergland, 611 F.2d 710, 715, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 821 (1980)).
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Over the centuries, Congress stepped in to secure our rights of
life when the federal courts failed to properly defend our rights.1420
Relevant laws passed to secure our rights of life and liberty include:
the Patent & Copyright Acts, the False Claims Act, the Sherman &
Clayton Acts, § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, and the RICO Statute, among
others.1421 Wherever a court is reluctant to assert its power on behalf
of the people directly under the U.S. Constitution, it may be pressured
into vindicating the common law under various statutes according to
the rules of statutory construction and legislative grace.1422 These
grounds are set forth in Ashwander v. TVA and Funk v. United States,
which were derived from Dr. Foster’s Case and Milborn’s Case
respectively.1423

1420. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27–30, gutted by Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S.
581, 595 (1871) (the Court gutted the Civil Rights Act to let an ax murderer loose, because
the only witnesses were black folk), and The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 82–83
(1872) (Slaughterhouse gutted the Civil Rights Act regarding the very rights of life, i.e., the
right to make a living, which is the primary right enjoyed by free people no longer enslaved
or indentured to work for no pay); id. at 96–97 (Field, J., dissenting) (quoting Civil Rights
Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27–30, § 1).
1421. U.S. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.; U.S. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.;
False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729; Sherman & Clayton Acts, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.; Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A–B); RICO, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et seq.—note for
litigators and researchers that there are numerous complicated prudential barriers to suit
under these laws, and I cannot cite to or explain them all here, but to say that though they
are many and though they are confusing and though they pretend to interpret the laws or
the intent of the laws, they are not insurmountable and once they are identified as prudential, they may be rebutted with prudential reasons for asserting jurisdiction as exemplified
by Joseph Story’s opinion in Martin. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 325, 347,
373–74 (1816). See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, Co., 491 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1989) (Stevens,
J., concurring).
1422. See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932).
1423. Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (quoting Crowell, 285 U.S. at 62);
Dr. Foster’s Case [1614] 11 Co. Rep. 56b, 62b–63a (Eng.); Funk v. United States, 290 U.S.
371, 385 (1933) (The maxim that cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex “means that no law
can survive the reasons on which it was founded. It needs no statute; it abrogates itself.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (referring to Milborn’s Case [1572] 7 Co. Rep. 6b, 7a
(Eng.) (“ratio legis est anima legis, et mutata legis ratione, mutatur et lex” (the reason for a
law is the soul of the law, and if the reason for a law has changed, the law is changed)). See
Markham, Jr., supra note 950, at 460–62; THE CASE OF ELIZABETH RUTGERS, supra note 131,
at 14–15; Almy v. Harris, 5 Johns 175 (N.Y., 1809); Harford v. United States, 12 U.S. 109,
109–10 (1814); Case v. Humphrey, 6 Conn. 130, 141 (1826) (citing Dr. Foster’s Case [1614]
11 Co. Rep. 56b, 62b–63a (Eng.)); SEDGWICK, supra note 950, at 127; Cope v. Cope, 137 U.S.
682, 686 (1891); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 459–60.
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The Pursuit of Justice and the Rights of Life
The pursuit of justice and the removal of barriers to the access
of justice are the foundations of federal antitrust common law.1424
However, Lord Coke’s remark that “monopolies in times past were ever
without law, but never without friends,” remains a present reality in
America.1425 America has yet to establish the fullness of Coke’s common law in favor of the rights of ordinary working people as a right of
life,
And the law of the Realm in this point is grounded upon the law of
God, which saith, Non accipies loco pignoris inferiorem & superiorem molam, quia animam suam apposuit tibi. Thou shalt not take
the nether or upper milstone to pledge, for he taketh a mans life to
pledge: Whereby it appeareth that a mans trade is accounted his
life, because it maintaineth his life; and therefore the monopolist
that taketh away a mans trade, taketh away his life, and therefore
is so much more odious, because he is vir sanguinis. Against these
Inventers and Propounders of evill things, the holy ghost hath spoken, Inventores malorum, digni sunt morte.1426

1424. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 465 (1793) (Opinion of Wilson, J.) (“Another declared object is, ‘to establish justice.’ This points, in a particular manner, to the judicial
authority. And when we view this object in conjunction with the declaration, ‘that no [s]tate
shall pass a law impairing the obligation of contracts,’ we shall probably think that this
object points, in a particular manner, to the jurisdiction of the court over the several
[s]tates.”) (quoting U.S. CONST. pmbl., art. I. § 10, cl. 1); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 475 (noting that the preamble’s object of creating a “‘more perfect union’” is meant to combat monopolies of trade) (quoting U.S. CONST.
pmbl.); id. at §§ 965–76 (noting that taxation should be limited by trust to “‘provide for the
common defence and general welfare,’” to avoid its use as “a prerogative power to destroy
competition, and secure a monopoly to the government!”) (quoting U.S. CONST. pmbl.).
1425. 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *182.
1426. Id. at *181 (quoting Deuteronomy 24:6; Romans 1:29–32); The Case of Monopolies
[1602] 11 Co. Rep. 84b (Eng.) (“This same leadeth to the impoverishing of divers Artificers
and others, who before by labor of their hands in their Art or Trade had kept themselves
and their families, who now of necessity shall be constrained to live in idleness and beggary. . . . And the Common Law in this point agreeth with the equity of the Law of God, as
appeareth in Deuteronomy 24:6, Non accipies loco pignoris inferiorem et superiorem molam,
quia animam suam apposuit tibi; You shall not take in pledge the nether and upper milstone, for the same is his life; by which it appeareth, That every mans Trade doth maintains
his life, and therefore he ought not to be deprived or dispossessed of it, no more than of his
life.”). See 2 WILSON, THE WORKS, supra note 113, at 492 (“we are informed in one of the
reports of my Lord Coke, that, at the common law, no man can be prohibited from exercising
his industry in any lawful trade” and that therefore “the common law abhors all monopolies,
which forbid any from working in any lawful trade”—this is exactly the opposite of the antitrust policies pushed by Robert Bork. Thus, originally, the abolition of monopolies now
known as antitrust law in America was not merely consumer protection but was made to
protect the laborers and workers “who formerly maintained themselves and their families
by the same profession or trade,” because they “are impoverished, and reduced to a state of
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This is the common law, the law of nature, and the law of God that
points to the proper policy of antitrust law.1427 As the government continues under the pretense that it was legitimate to unconditionally
subsidize corporate corruption with public funds in 2008; and as the
Supreme Court practically remade Lochner in the Court’s unanimous
opinion Integrity Staffing Solutions v. Busk, the opportunities for the
assertion of antitrust jurisdiction must rise in equal measure to correct
these blunders.1428
After Lord Coke’s pronouncement above, King Charles I’s arbitrary assertion of copyright and letters patent in contravention to the
law cost him his head.1429 The Americans overruled the qualified and
sovereign immunity asserted by Charles I & II in Chisholm v. Georgia.1430 The principle of Chisholm was reaffirmed after the Eleventh
Amendment and became the embattled heart of antitrust jurisdiction
asserted by every court thereafter.1431
The right of each person to make a living is not relative or arbitrary, but it goes down to the very root of the law itself.1432 As Edward
Coke believed, antitrust law is not merely a policy for consumer welfare, but for the rights of the common workers whose livelihoods are

beggary and idleness.”) (citing and paraphrasing The Case of Monopolies [1602] 11 Co. Rep.
84b (Eng.)).
1427. 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *181.
1428. Id.; Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, 574 U.S. 27, 30–31 (2014).
1429. John Milton, Eikonoklastes 2–3 (2d ed. 1650) (“Whereupon such illegal actions, and
especially to get vast sums of money, were put in practice by the King . . . it must necessarily be his undoing.”).
1430. The Bankers Case [1696] 14 How. St. Tr. 1, 32 (Eng.), distinguished and delegitimized by Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 465 (1793) (Opinion of Wilson, J.); id. at 451
(Opinion of Blair, J.); id. at 468 (Opinion of Cushing, J.); id. at 475–78 (Opinion of Jay, C.J.);
id. at 437–45 (Iredell, J., dissenting) (defending The Bankers Case, as it was delegitimized
by the other justices). Cf. Schroeder, The Body, supra note 121, at 24.
1431. See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738, 857–58 (1824); Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 150 (1908) (The Eleventh Amendment “was adopted after the decision
of this court in Chisholm v. Georgia . . . . Since that time, there have been many cases
decided in this court involving the Eleventh Amendment, among them being Osborn v.
United States Bank, which held that the Amendment applied only to those suits in which
the State was a party on the record.”).
1432. 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *181; Calabresi & Leibowitz, supra note 1016, at
1073–97 (“The right to compete, and, more fundamentally, the right to earn an honest living, is a basic right embodied in U.S. constitutional law. There is substantial evidence, from
the English and colonial history, from debates on the federal Constitution and its ratification, from the history of the Fourteenth Amendment, and from state constitutional law, to
support this thesis.” However, noting that “the courts have too often surrendered to a legislative process that is dominated by well-entrenched interest groups seeking monopoly rents
from the state.”).

\\jciprod01\productn\F\FAM\15-1\FAM101.txt

276

unknown

Seq: 276

FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW

10-JAN-22

10:23

Vol. 15:1:1

put in jeopardy by monopolies.1433 The monopolists suable under the
Case and Statute of Monopolies by ordinary workers in courts of common law were comparable to KBR in Bixby, who managed to escape
from justice through a technicality.1434
Americans should not despair in the face of horrible abuses of
judicial power; like the denial of justice in Bixby.1435 For Americans
may yet repair to Phillis Wheatley, whose position as a mother of our
patent and copyright systems, secures the special weight of her voice in
matters of U.S. Antitrust Law.1436 Under Wheatley’s auspices and as a
matter of principle, the U.S. Judiciary should remember the mistakes
of its past and endeavor to correct them by allowing memory’s counsels
to shine in its opinions.1437
In order to help the federal bench respect the sovereignty of the
people, the founding poetess, Phillis Wheatley, rose up on mighty
wings of faith.1438 She took flight into the very eye of the world to make
her cause for the public good known to all.1439 For those, she wrote in
1433. 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *181. See John Milton, Eikonoklastes 2–3 (2d ed.
1650). See also 2 WILSON, THE WORKS, supra note 113, at 492 (citing and paraphrasing The
Case of Monopolies [Darcy v. Allen] [1602] 11 Co. Rep. 84b (Eng.)).
1434. Bixby v. KBR, Inc., 603 F. App’x 605, 606 (9th Cir. 2015).
1435. Id.
1436. Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772,] in WHEATLEY, supra
note 821, at 7; Phillis Wheatley’s Registration, Sept. 10, 1773, TSC/1/E/06/09, Register of
entries of copies 1746–1773.
1437. Phillis Wheatley, On Recollection [1773]. Cf. E. Thomas Sullivan, The Confluence of
Antitrust and Intellectual Property at the New Century, 1 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1, 5–7
(2000) (noting that copyright and patents laws have the same legal origin as antitrust law,
i.e., that historically they are technically the same law).
1438. Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772,] in WHEATLEY, supra
note 821, at 7. You can hear her strong influence over Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, indeed, she may be the woman that Longfellow was thinking of when he personified the night
itself in sable skirts, “I heard the trailing garments of the Night / Sweep through her marble
halls! / I saw her sable skirts all fringed with light / From the celestial walls! / I felt her
presence, by its spell of might, / Stoop o’er me from above; / The calm, majestic presence of
the Night, / As of the one I love.” Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, Hymn to the Night [1839].
Cf. Phillis Wheatley, An Hymn to the Evening [1773].
1439. Phillis Wheatley became a champion of the movement taken up by others across
the globe, leading enlightenment thinkers such as George Washington, James Wilson,
James Beattie, Gilbert Imlay, and Henri Grégoire. See, e.g., GRÉGOIRE, supra note 823, at
44–45, 131, 230–41 (Wheatley’s racist enemies including Jefferson, Hume, and Kant unanimously argued that Africans were subhuman because they could not feel; that they did not
have very developed emotions. Men like Grégoire, Imlay, and Beattie disputed these horrible claims by remembering that “The sentimental Phillis . . . died of a broken heart.”); JAMES
BEATTIE, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND IMMUTABILITY OF TRUTH 479–81 (1770) (Wheatley
was the answer to James Beattie’s prayers, because her poetry was irrefutable proof that
David Hume was absolutely incorrect when he said there were “no arts” among the black
folk, which was the basis of his fatalistic racism; thus, Wheatley’s existence strongly bolstered Beattie’s refutation of Hume when he said “[t]he Africans and Americans are known
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her poem On Recollection, who “repent[ ] too late” only secure their
own doom, “But, O! what peace, what joys are hers t’impart / To ev’ry
holy, ev’ry upright heart!”1440 For humanity’s capacity of memory enables us to choose a better road by the light of experience.1441
For example, humans have the power to remember the time
when printing presses were treated as a newfangled and dangerous
technology.1442 The King’s Bench wrote of this saying, “it is certain,
that down to the year 1640, copies were protected and secured from
piracy, by a much speedier and more effectual remedy, than actions at
law, or bills in equity.”1443 The crown thus continued granting patents
to have many ingenious manufactures and arts among them”) (quoting David Hume, Of
National Characters [1748], reprinted in DAVID HUME, ESSAYS MORAL, POLITICAL, LITERARY
213 n.1 (1987) (1777)). Wheatley notoriously won Voltaire onto her side. Letter from
Voltaire to A M. Le Baron Constant de Rebecque (Apr. 11, 1774), in 16 VOLTAIRE, supra note
268, at 594–95 (praising Wheatley’s work). Wheatley captured the hearts of Latin America
as well. LANDERS, supra note 912, at 217. Wheatley was a fellow heir of Terence with James
Otis and combatted racial hatred with him throughout the globe. OTIS, supra note 18, at 64
(Otis confirmed that the origin of U.S. liberty and peace is natural human love, referring to
Terence’s verse “homo sum: humani nihil ane alienum puto” to justify his comments: “Let
not the Poor envy the Rich, nor the Rich despise the Poor: But let us remember we are all of
one Flesh and Blood: and that the Good of the whole is closely and intimately connected
with the Welfare and Prosperity of each Individual. The Love of our Neighbour is an evident
Principle of natural as well as revealed Religion.”) (quoting Terence, Heauton Timorumenos
I.1.25); Phillis Wheatley, To Mæcenas [1773] (referring to herself as the heir and friend of
the ancient African writer Terence) (quoting Terence, Heauton Timorumenos I.1.25). Then
as this movement eventually reverberated around the world and filtered back into the
United States through the conduit of Thomas Reid, it was vindicated in the first major U.S.
Supreme Court opinion. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 462 (1793) (Opinion of Wilson, J.)
(Accordingly, the Americans never stopped advocating for the people of England: “The Parliament form the great body politic of England! What, then, or where, are the People?
Nothing! Nowhere! They are not so much as even the ‘baseless fabric of a vision!’ From legal
contemplation they totally disappear! Am I not warranted in saying that, if this is a just
description, a government, so and justly so described, is a despotic government?”) (quoting
THOMAS REID, supra note 1179, at vi (paraphrasing Shakespeare, The Tempest IV.1 [1611])).
1440. Phillis Wheatley, On Recollection [1773].
1441. Id. See also Letter from Phillis Wheatley to Samson Occom (Feb. 11, 1774); Letter
from George Washington to Phillis Wheatley (Feb. 28, 1776) (declaring himself Phillis
Wheatley’s “humble servant,” inviting her to his headquarters in Cambridge, Massachusetts for a meeting); 1 BENSON J. LOSSING, THE PICTORIAL FIELD-BOOK OF THE REVOLUTION
556 (1860).
1442. Millar v. Taylor [1769] 4 Burr. 2303, 2314 (Eng.) (“in 1640, the Star-Chamber was
abolished”); Habeas Corpus Act 1640, 16 Car. I c. 10 (Eng.) (legally abolishing the Star
Chamber); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 670 (1834) (“The Stationers Company was incorporated in the year 1556, and from that time to the year 1640, the Crown exercised an
unlimited authority over the press which was enforced by the summary process of search,
confiscation, and imprisonment given to the Stationers Company and executed by the then
supreme jurisdiction of the Star Chamber.”).
1443. RIVINGTON, supra note 269, at 2–3, 26, 33–36 (The first charter of the Stationers
Company “prohibits any person from printing within the realm without the license of the
Company, except patentees, and grants to the Company power to search, seize, and destroy
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and copyrights for the use of printing presses in contradiction to the
common law policy of abolishing monopolies.1444 The policies behind
the general abolishment of monopolies were set forth by Lord Coke in
The Case of Monopolies as follows,
There are three inseparable incidents to every monopoly against
the commonwealth: (i) that the price of the same commodity will be
raised, for he who has the sole selling of any commodity may and
will make the price as he pleases . . . ; (ii) after the monopoly
granted, the commodity is not so good and so merchantable as it
was before, for the patentee, having the sole trade, regards only his
private benefit and not the common wealth; (iii) it tends to the impoverishment of various workmen and others, who had previously
maintained themselves and their families by the labour of their
hands in their art or trade, and who will now of necessity be constrained to live in idleness and beggary . . . .1445

The crown’s letters patent and copyrights vested in the Stationers
Company were unnatural, feudal monopolies that violated common
law.1446 The royal policy, furthered by feudal copyright and patent systems, stemmed from pretextual national security concerns; feudal
or appropriate all unlicensed books” and “to search for heretical books which had come from
abroad” – “The original Search Warrants . . . empowering the master and wardens to enter
any house at any time to search for unlicensed presses or books, and upon which they frequently acted, are preserved at Stationers’ Hall.” The seized books were either destroyed,
sold for profit, or distributed to the members of the Stationers Company.). See Millar v.
Taylor [1769] 4 Burr. 2303, 2313–15 (Eng.) (noting that civil forfeiture was used to enforce
copyright infringement as piracy during the Long Parliament—this was the time when
Cromwell’s Navigation Acts were invented—civil forfeiture was reenacted by Charles II’s
Parliament).
1444. RIVINGTON, supra note 269, at 33–36. Cf. Leach v. Money [1765] 19 How. St. Tr.
1021, 1009–10 (Eng.); Entick v. Carrington [1765] 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1035 (Eng.).
1445. The Case of Monopolies [1602] 11 Co. Rep. 84b (Eng.) (the Court thereby determined that Queen Elizabeth was mistaken in her grant because it was granted in the public
interest and it was clearly not in the public’s interest, thus the patent on playing cards here
was revoked—the Court also foreshadowed the inventor requirement by reasoning that it
would be a particularly dangerous precedent to grant a descendible monopoly right in playing cards to individuals that have no expertise in the creation or manufacture of play cards).
See Millar v. Taylor [1769] 4 Burr. 2303, 2311–12 (Eng.). See also Kerry MacLennan, John
Milton’s Contract for “Paradise Lost”: A Commercial Reading, 44 MILTON Q. 221, 227 (2010)
(“authors were neither recognized as the originators of property rights at large, nor vested
in the copyright of their work, and could not convey its underlying ownership”). Cf. Royal
Charter of the Company of Stationers [1557] (“In witness of which thing we have caused to
be made these our letters patent.”); Proceedings in the Lords on the Question of Literary
Property [in Donaldson v. Becket], Feb. 4–22, 1774, in 17 THE PARLIAMENTARY, supra note
579, at 959 (the first copyrights were “created by patent” in the Stationers Company, and
claimed by members of that company as proprietary rights).
1446. Millar v. Taylor [1769] 4 Burr. 2303, 2313–16 (Eng.); Royal Charter of the Company of Stationers [1557]; MILTON, AREOPAGITICA, supra note 259, passim. See Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813).
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copyright and patent laws had nothing at all to do with securing the
proper public policy of intellectual property, i.e., progress in knowledge
and learning.1447 All patents and copyrights originated from the
crown, not authors or inventors.1448
Feudal law appears to be the origin of the words “patent” and
“copyright.”1449 The crown and lords of England viewed infringers of
copyright and patents as pirates, and so infringers were vigorously
censored as pirates at the English border.1450 According to the practice
of prosecuting civil forfeitures in court, the rights of the owner were
ignored and the physical property itself (the books or papers) was
damasked as guilty of piracy, seized, and sold or destroyed, by the government without due process of law.1451
The common law in America was officially stripped of all such
feudalism.1452 America was never “conquered into the enjoyment of
true liberty,” like Wales, nor was America united to England by the
union of crowns and Act of Union like Scotland.1453 It was, by great
contrast, a universal holding of the American Revolution that “our an1447. RIVINGTON, supra note 269, at 2–3, 26, 33–36. See also Millar v. Taylor [1769] 4
Burr. 2303, 2394–95 (Eng.) (this policy goal appears to arise from the common law principle
of statutory construction that the purpose of a law is the spirit of the law and that a statute’s title or preamble usually provides its purpose such that any statutory provisions that
violate the statute’s spirit or purpose abrogate themselves—this rationale was used by
Judge Yates to dispute the existence of a perpetual copyright at common law). Cf. Funk v.
United States, 290 U.S. 371, 385 (1933) (The maxim that cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa
lex “means that no law can survive the reasons on which it was founded. It needs no statute;
it abrogates itself.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Milborn’s Case [1572] 7 Co. Rep.
6b, 7a (Eng.) (“ratio legis est anima legis, et mutata legis ratione, mutatur et lex” (the reason
for a law is the soul of the law, and if the reason for a law has changed, the law is changed)).
1448. Millar v. Taylor [1769] 4 Burr. 2303, 2316 (Eng.); RIVINGTON, supra note 269, at
2–3, 26, 33–36.
1449. Millar v. Taylor [1769] 4 Burr. 2303, 2313 (Eng.); Sir Henry Vane the Younger, A
Healing Question 4 [1656] (“The root and bottom upon which it stood, was not public interest, but the private lust and will of the Conqueror, who by force of arms did at first detain
the right and freedom which was, and is, due to the whole body of the people.”).
1450. RIVINGTON, supra note 269, at 2–3, 26, 33–36.
1451. Id.; Millar v. Taylor [1769] 4 Burr. 2303, 2313 (Eng.).
1452. Proceedings in the Lords on the Question of Literary Property [in Donaldson v.
Becket], Feb. 4–22, 1774, in 17 THE PARLIAMENTARY, supra note 579, at 1003 (the House of
Lords (a political body somewhat like the U.S. Senate with a peerage requirement) reversed
Millar upon its overriding feudal power); R. v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Ex parte Bancoult [2008] UKHL 61, ¶¶ 32, 36, 81–84, 87, 125, 146–49 (Eng.)
(in 2008 the House of Lords arbitrarily reversed the English Courts that decided in favor of
the Chagossians, emphasizing the lack of an independent, supreme judiciary in England).
1453. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *94–95, 97–98 (“notwithstanding the
union of crowns on the accession of their King James VI to that of England,” the Kingdom of
Scotland remained separate until the act of union was passed, which held as a condition
that the common law of England would not apply in Scotland).
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cestors, when they migrated to this country, brought with them the
English common law as part of their heritage.”1454
The Star Chamber was legally abolished in 1640, but the Star
Chamber did not finally fall into disuse until after the crown was restored by Charles II in 1660.1455 The Privy Council was never
abolished and as Parliament later recorded, “After the Star Chamber
was abolished . . . its authority indeed ceased, but its maxims subsisted
and survived it.”1456 For after feudal copyrights and patents were abol1454. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 658–59 (1834); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 157 (“That the universal principle has been (and
the practice has conformed to it) that the common law is our birthright and inheritance, and
that our ancestors brought hither with them, upon their immigration, all of it which was
applicable to their situation. The whole structure of our present jurisprudence stands upon
the original foundations of the common law.”) (emphasis added). Donaldson should be distinguished in America for the same reason that Cowle was distinguished, for arising under
the feudal law that subjected Scotland to feudal enslavement under the English Crown. See
Letter from Novanglus to the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay (Apr. 10,
1775), reprinted in ADAMS & SEWALL, supra note 777, at 129–31 (exposing Cowle as illegitimate feudal law, according to which the King of England established the union of Scotland,
Ireland, and Wales by holding them to the “imperial crown” while not respecting their independent systems of law, and while not annexing them to “the realm” for the purpose of
securing their independent rights) (citing Rex v. Cowle [1759] 2 Burr. 834, 835 (Eng.) (“Berwick, they said, was formerly part of Scotland, and was ours only by conquest, and remains
unincorporated with England, and is governed by its own former laws. It is in the very same
situation as Ireland was, immediately after its being conquered.”)); 2 WILSON, THE WORKS,
supra note 113, at 4, 49. See Rex v. Cowle [1759] 2 Burr. 834, 835 (Eng.), distinguished by
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 748 (2008).
1455. Habeas Corpus Act 1640, 16 Car. I c. 10 (Eng.) (abolishing the Star Chamber);
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1341 (noting
that despite the Habeas Corpus Act of 1640, the writ of habeas corpus was “eluded prior to
the reign of Charles the Second; and especially during the reign of Charles the First.” The
Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 enacted under Charles II, is often considered “another magna
charta in that kingdom.”). See ROBERTSON REID, supra note 981, at 411, 431–60 (One cannot
miss the reality, that the legal abolishment of the Star Chamber was not accomplished in
reality until after the English Civil War, and such books as this should be consulted to
understand the mechanizations of feudalism at work during that time such as the Council
in the North, which was itself a secret feudal court. Wresting the Star Chamber from the
hands of the crown, if that is what happened in 1640 onward, took more than passing a
single law in 1640.). But see Debate in the Commons on the Bill for explaining the Powers of
Juries in the Prosecutions for Libels, Mar. 7, 1771, in 17 THE PARLIAMENTARY, supra note
579, at 47–48 (statement of Edmund Burke) (saying that the “spirit of the Star Chamber
has transmigrated and lived again”).
1456. Walters, supra note 1330, at 808 (noting that even though the Star Chamber was
abolished in England, “the original jurisdiction of the Crown-in-council” was narrowed but
not abolished in the colonies and though it was not called a Star Chamber it “was an imperial court applying imperial law”). See Debate in the Commons on the Bill for explaining the
Powers of Juries in the Prosecutions for Libels, Mar. 7, 1771, in 17 THE PARLIAMENTARY,
supra note 579, at 47–48 (statement of Edmund Burke) (“The spirit of the Star Chamber has
transmigrated and lived again; and Westminster-hall was obliged to borrow from the Star
Chamber . . . .”).
THE
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ished in England, causing the English Civil War, seditious libel law
took its place.1457
In the years leading up to the American Revolution, Feudal libel law became symbolized by the case Wilkes v. Wood in England.1458
The American Revolutionaries declared support for John Wilkes and
defended the right of the press to divulge embarrassing missteps and
corruptions of government leaders for the common good.1459 The liberty
of the press defended during the American Revolution was expressly
extended under the protections of the First Amendment under the U.S.
Constitution.1460
Little is known about how printing presses were regulated in
America during the time of Roger Williams and Lord Coke, but the
presses were strictly censored, according to corporate law, in Virginia
and Massachusetts.1461 Roger Williams, who was an early proponent of
the free press, published a tract advocating the common law rights of
Native Americans entitled: A Just and Generous Assertion of Indian
Rights.1462 His book was censored by local religious copyright authorities for challenging the English crown’s doctrine of discovery, similar to

1457. Walters, supra note 1330, at 808; 17 THE PARLIAMENTARY, supra note 579, at
47–48.
1458. Donohue, The Original, supra note 786, at 1199, 1259, 1319 (analyzing and giving
an American perspective on the Wilkes v. Wood trial) (citing Wilkes v. Wood [1763] 19 How.
St. Tr. 1153 (Eng.) (a highly publicized seditious libel case occurring right before the American Revolution)).
1459. Letter from the Committee of the Boston Sons of Liberty to John Wilkes (June 6,
1768); Letter from the Committee of the Boston Sons of Liberty to John Wilkes (Nov. 4,
1769); John Adams, I. Fragmentary Notes for “A Dissertation on the Canon and the Feudal
Law”, May–Aug. 1765 (In the same breath, the founders denounced feudal copyright and
patent decrees as odious monopolies, saying, “Knowledge monopolized, or in the possession
of a few, is a curse to mankind.”).
1460. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
576 (1994) (“Thus expressed, fair use remained exclusively judge-made doctrine until the
passage of the 1976 Copyright Act, in which Justice Story’s summary is discernible.”) (citing
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901)); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 332, 341 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 267, 279
(1964). Cf. DENIAL (Bleecker Street 2016) (this film showcases the trial of Deborah Lipstadt,
who was sued by holocaust denier David Irving for libel in England where truth is not a
defense for libel tort). But see Clifford v. Trump, 339 F. Supp. 3d 915, 921, 925, 928, 929
(C.D. Cal. 2018) (protecting Trump’s “rhetorical hyperbole” that is almost certainly false
from suit under an anti-SLAPP statute—despite the First Amendment truth defense, the
U.S. Courts appear to have created a new way to make the truth meaningless in libel/slander law).
1461. Bracha, supra note 934, at 89–114. See, e.g., HUTCHINSON, 1765 THE HISTORY,
supra note 801, at 257–58, 355.
1462. Roger Williams, A Just and Generous Assertion of Indian Rights [1633?], mentioned in 1 WINTHROP’S JOURNAL, supra note 819, at 116–17.
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the way the Star Chamber would have censored it if Williams attempted to publish it in England.1463
The Rhode Island colony was established upon the dissents of
Anne Hutchinson and Roger Williams to Puritanical censorship, and so
became the first haven in America for freedoms of speech, assembly,
press, and religion.1464 Hutchinson and Williams’ suffering for the
cause of Christ gave rise to the resistance of Jeremiah Dummer
against Governor Andros, and the First Amendment freedoms championed by Isaac Backus during the American Revolution.1465 The
American Revolutionaries joined together to vindicate these rights on
July 4, 1776.1466
The English Star Chamber likely never had proper jurisdiction
in Colonial America, but similar abuses were accomplished in America
by the English Admiralty Court.1467 English impressment was officially abolished by the Americans in 1776.1468 Nevertheless, in the
same way the crown caused the English Civil War, by flouting Parlia1463. Id. at 116–17; RIVINGTON, supra note 269, at 33–34.
1464. The Portsmouth Compact [1638]; Rhode Island Parliamentary Patent [1643]; Rhode
Island Royal Charter [1663]. See LAPLANTE, AMERICAN, supra note 1321, at 192; Roger Williams, A Just and Generous Assertion of Indian Rights [1633?], mentioned in 1 WINTHROP’S
JOURNAL, supra note 819, at 116–17 (advocating that all the colonist’s property rights in
America came from purchase from the original Native American title); WILLIAMS, THE HIRELING, supra note 52, at 23–25 (“[It is] against the testimony of Christ Jesus, for the civil
state to impose upon the souls of the people, a religion . . . . Christ Jesus never called for the
sword of steel to help the sword of spirit.”); Letter from Roger Williams to John Winthrop
(Nov. 10, 1637), in WILLIAMS, THE LETTERS, supra note 1329, at 78 (“I have bought and paid
for the Island, and because I desired the best confirmation of the purchase to yourself that I
could, I was bold to insert your name in the original here enclosed.”).
1465. Jeremiah Dummer, A Defence of the New-England Charters 8 [1715] (accepting
Williams’ banished view as the cornerstone of the Colonial resistance to Governor Andros);
1 BACKUS, supra note 1357, at 58–60; Isaac Backus, An Appeal to the Public for Religious
Liberty 25–26 [1773] (Quoting from Roger Williams and saying, “How weighty are these
arguments against confounding church and state together? Yet this author’s appearing
against such confusion, was the chief cause for which he was banished out of the Massachusetts colony.”) (quoting ROGER WILLIAMS, THE BLOODY TENENT MADE YET MORE BLOODY 192
(1652)).
1466. Roger Sherman, Remarks on a Pamphlet Entitled, “A Dissertation on the political
Union and Constitution of the Thirteen States of NORTH-AMERICA.” 16–17, 40–42 [1784]
(strongly confirming that Jeremiah Dummer’s adoption of Williams’ cause for the Native
American title purchased by the Colonists was the cornerstone of American common law
rights asserted in the American Revolution). See also Thomas Jefferson, Virginia Statute for
Religious Freedom [1777] (“truth is great and will prevail if left to herself”); Isaac Backus,
Truth is Great, and Will Prevail 3–5 [1781].
1467. See SIMMONS, supra note 31, at 18 (writs of assistance were issued from the English
Courts of Admiralty in America). Cf. THE CASE . . . AGAINST ALEXANDER BROADFOOT, supra
note 794, at 11–12. But see Walters, supra note 1330, at 808 (explaining that the Privy
Council did assert jurisdiction in America, even after the Star Chamber’s demise).
1468. SIMMONS, supra note 31, at 18.
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ment’s abolishment of the Star Chamber a century prior, the crown
also caused the War of 1812 by flouting American independence and
pressing free born Americans into involuntary servitude for the British
Navy.1469
The U.S. Constitution abhors feudal laws as a form of slavery,
and the United States fought in not one, but two wars to secure the
nation from them.1470 Securing natural rights of human beings from
arbitrary feudal abuses, including civil forfeiture laws, was one fundamental purpose of the sacrifices made by the founders in the
Revolutionary War and the War of 1812; this fact was vigorously asserted by Mercy Otis Warren in her widely published books,
Firm and disinterested, intrepid and united, they stood ready to
submit to the chances of war, and to sacrifice their devoted lives to
preserve inviolate, and to transmit to posterity, the inherent rights
of men, conferred on all by the God of nature, and the privileges of
Englishmen, claimed by Americans from the sacred sanctions of
compact.1471

Thus, Americans cannot rightly turn a blind eye to the places where
feudal law is subsisting and surviving in the United States, because
feudal law defies the social compact of July 4, 1776.1472 Americans can1469. Id.; THE CASE . . . AGAINST ALEXANDER BROADFOOT, supra note 794, at 11–12; Benjamin Franklin, Franklin’s Remarks on Judge Foster’s Argument in Favor of the Right of
Impressing seamen [before Sept. 17, 1781]; President Thomas Jefferson, Proclamation 14—
Requiring Removal of British Armed Vessels From United States Ports and Waters (July 2,
1807); President James Madison, Special Message [to Congress asking it to declare war on
Great Britain], (June 1, 1812).
1470. The founding generation remembered how each generation before them resisted
arbitrary power, and so on behalf of their posterity they refused to bow to the arbitrary
dictates of the king. Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (Apr. 26, 1777) (“Posterity!
You will never know, how much it cost the present Generation, to preserve your Freedom! I
hope you will make a good Use of it. If you do not, I shall repent in Heaven, that I ever to
half the Pains to preserve it.”).
1471. 1 WARREN, supra note 35, at 136, 149 (the revolutionaries “determined, from a
sense of justice to posterity, and for the honor of human nature, to resist all infringements
on the natural rights of men”) (emphasis added).
1472. See, e.g., Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2198–99 (2015); Schroeder, The Body,
supra note 121, at 16–30 (explaining why Ayala and other recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court are fundamentally feudalistic). The readoption of the near irrebuttable, feudal
standards of absolute and qualified immunity originally overruled by Chisholm v. Georgia,
occured in the Fitzgerald Cases: Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 766–67 (1982) (White, J.,
dissenting) (commenting on the majority opinion: “It is a reversion to the old notion that the
King can do no wrong.”); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). See, e.g., Ashcroft v.
Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735, 743 (2011) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982)). Cf. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 439 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting) (citing The
Bankers Case [1696] 14 How. St. Tr. 1, 32–33, 57–58 (Eng.) (holding that “the king can do
no wrong” was the basis of both sovereign and qualified immunity)); U.S. CONST. amend. XI
(not overruling or reversing Chisholm on the matter of sovereign and qualified immunity,
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not deny the scene playing out before them of Trumpian loyalists
bowing before an arbitrary power of their own imagining.1473 Americans cannot ignore the Leviathan bursting forth from Boomer-led
selfishness; for Americans no longer face only one Star Chamber or Admiralty Court—American lawyers now face an entire constellation.1474
and only limiting the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisdiction in future cases); Hans v. Louisiana,
134 U.S. 1, 12 (1890) (bucking the ordinary progression of common law jurisprudence by
mere implication, Hans decided that the Eleventh Amendment’s effect on Chisholm was
such that the dissent should be treated as a majority opinion).
1473. House Impeachment Managers’ Video Compilation of January 6 Attack on the U.S.
Capitol, C-SPAN (Feb. 9, 2021), https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4944572/house-impeachment-managers-video-compilation-january-6-attack-us-capitol.
1474. See Torres v. Madrid, 141 S. Ct. 989, 997 (2021) (openly citing feudal Star Chamber
precedent to define Fourth Amendment review of allegedly unconstitutional executive officer behavior); Oil States Energy Servs. v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1377
(2018) (approvingly comparing the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (“PTAB”) to a modern day
Privy Council or Star Chamber stating “[t]he Privy Council was composed of the Crown’s
advisers” and expounding feudal law as the kind of law the PTAB administers in the United
States); Stillman, Taken, supra note 762 (discussing the difficult-to-impossible procedures
for attempting to recover property was civilly forfeited unlawfully). Other such American
Star Chambers include various military tribunals, FISC, EOIR, sealed Article III Court proceedings, and may include Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), which has also been
called a Global Super Court. Relevant enabling or related laws are here: War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1549; AUMF Against Terrorists, Pub. L. No. 107–40, 115 Stat.
224; NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–81, 125 Stat. 1298 (2012); FISA, 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1801–1813; USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272; CIPA, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1–16;
Immigration & Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 89–236, 19 Stat. 911. See Deborah E. Anker,
Determining Asylum Claims in the United States: A Case Study on the Implementation of
Legal Norms in an Unstructured Adjudicatory Environment, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. SOC.
CHANGE 433, 488–503 (1992) (explaining the non-adversarial, inquisitorial structure of
EOIR); Gene Quinn, USPTO admits to stacking PTAB panels to achieve desired outcomes,
IP WATCHDOG (Aug. 23, 2017), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/08/23/uspto-admits-stacking-ptab-panels-achieve-desired-outcomes/id=87206/; Chris Hamby, The Secret Threat that
makes Corporations More Powerful than Countries, BUZZFEED (Aug. 30, 2016, 6:00 AM),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/chrishamby/the-billion-dollar-ultimatum (reporting
on ISDS—see also Hamby’s other articles on the subject); Donohue, The Shadow, supra note
416, at 87–88 (Donohue’s far reaching article investigates “disputes related to government
contractors” covered up by state secrets doctrine including “Breach of contract, patent disputes, trade secrets, fraud, and employment termination,” which “prove remarkable in their
frequency, length, and range of technologies involved.” They also include “Wrongful death,
personal injury, and negligence cases [that] extend beyond product liability and include infrastructure and services, as well as an emerging area perhaps best understood as the
conduct of war.”). Administrative searches and seizures may also be counted a Star Chamber process—for it is difficult to track whether or when they secretly search or seize without
regard to the warrant requirement or in violation of any other constitutional right. See generally Jack M. Kress & Carole D. Iannelli, Administrative Search and Seizure Whither the
Warrant, 31 VILLANOVA L. REV. 706 (1986). Justice O’Connor cited to Administrative Law to
justify military tribunals as a legitimate avenue to securing due process; this move unwittingly delegitimized admin law as a kind of Star Chamber rather than a legitimate method
of executing Congress’s laws by resulting in the total destruction of a U.S. citizen’s rights.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (plurality opinion) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)). In the U.S., when a generation is blamed for being selfish, the
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The freedoms of speech and of the press are attempting to extend across the entire earth to defend humanity; indeed, there was
once a time that the freedoms of speech and press shared between the
United States and China benefited the citizens of both countries.1475 In
2012, the New York Times ran an exposé on the Chinese leader Wen
Jiabao.1476 The people of China were shocked and surprised to learn
that Wen was a billionaire because Chinese propaganda told the people
of China that he was an ordinary man of the people.1477
In retaliation, the Chinese government hacked the New York
Times, stealing the personal information of most of the personnel at
the Times.1478 In an attempt to respond, American news reporters
united to expose China’s great fire wall, once again, by characterizing
China’s internet as a giant cage.1479 The American news endeavored to
expose China’s internet as highly censored and lacking ordinary protections for free speech.1480
As these news articles were being published, Edward Snowden
travelled to Hong Kong and handed a trove of secret government documents to foreign based U.S. reporters Glen Greenwald and Laura
Poitras.1481 These documents, as well as those exposed by other
rubric of the Boomer generation who are the original “Me” generation, is often used. Compare Joel Stein, Millennials: The Me Me Me Generation, TIME (May 20, 2013), https://
time.com/247/millennials-the-me-me-me-generation/, with Tom Wolfe, The “Me” Decade and
the Third Great Awakening, N.Y. MAG. (Apr. 8, 2008), https://nymag.com/news/features/
45938/index1.html (reproduced online from the original Aug. 23, 1976 issue).
1475. U.S. CONST. amend. I; P.R.C. CONST. art. 35 (“citizens of the People’s Republic of
China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession, and of
demonstration”). Cf. Isaac Stanley-Becker, Top general was so fearful Trump might spark
war that he made secret calls to his Chinese counterpart, new book says, WASH. POST (Sept.
14, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/09/14/peril-woodward-costatrump-milley-china/; IN THE SAME BREATH (HBO 2021) (demonstrating that free speech is in
the interest of both the United States and China, and also something both countries are
struggling with in the context of COVID-19).
1476. David Barboza, Billions in Hidden Riches for Family of Chinese Leader, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 25, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/26/business/global/family-of-wen-jiabaoholds-a-hidden-fortune-in-china.html.
1477. The author was in China at this time, interning at Jun He, and can attest to the
general feeling expressed by his coworkers and other Chinese folks in Shanghai in response
to the exposé.
1478. Nicole Perlroth, Hackers in China Attacked The Times for Last 4 Months, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 30, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/31/technology/chinese-hackers-infiltrate-new-york-times-computers.html.
1479. Special Report, China’s Internet: A Giant Cage, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 6, 2013),
https://www.economist.com/special-report/2013/04/06/a-giant-cage.
1480. Special Report, The Machinery of Control: Cat and Mouse, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 6,
2013), https://www.economist.com/special-report/2013/04/06/cat-and-mouse.
1481. Glenn Greenwald, Ewen MacAskill, & Laura Poitras, Edward Snowden: The
Whistleblower behind the NSA Surveillance Revelations, THE GUARDIAN (June 11, 2013),
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whistleblowers or by mistake, confirmed that the U.S. internet was not
free or open either.1482 The very same techniques, criticized by U.S.
reporters against China, were confirmed by these documents and other
leaks as being used to condition American minds.1483
In the wake of Edward Snowden’s courageous stand the efforts
of U.S. news reporters to avenge themselves for the China hack almost
entirely failed.1484 Soon thereafter, relations between China and the
United States began to flux and converge.1485 President Xi traveled to
Seattle to explain the importance of cybersecurity to both nations, appearing to back the oppressive regimes proposed in SOPA, PIPA, and
ACTA that would cause his own people to suffer even more than the
people of the United States.1486
After giving President Xi a positive reception, the Obama Administration relinquished control over internet governance to a
California nonprofit corporation known as ICANN.1487 All the while,
major Chinese corporations are more open than ever to accepting massive infusions of U.S. capital.1488 Then, when Donald Trump was voted
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblowersurveillance.
1482. Snowden Archive, supra note 1229.
1483. Id.
1484. Id.
1485. Staff, President Xi welcomed by Obama as he arrives in Washington DC, CHINA
DAILY (Sept. 25, 2015), https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015xivisitus/2015-09/25/content_21976699_4.htm; Matt Day, Internet security a priority, Chinese president tells tech
executives, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 23, 2015, updated Sept. 24, 2015), https://
www.seattletimes.com/business/technology/china-us-tech-leaders-show-divergent-views-oninternet-interests/.
1486. Taylor Soper, Full text: China President Xi gives policy speech in Seattle, wants to
fight cybercrime with the U.S., GEEKWIRE (Sept. 22, 2015), https://www.geekwire.com/2015/
full-text-china-president-xi-gives-policy-speech-in-seattle-pledges-to-fight-cybercrime-withu-s/.
1487. Edward Moyer, US hands internet control to ICANN, CNET (Oct. 1, 2016, 5:55
PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/us-internet-control-ted-cruz-free-speech-russia-china-internet-corporation-assigned-names-numbers/; Jody Westby, 7 Days Before Obama Gives
Away Internet & National Security, FORBES (Sept. 24, 2016, 2:44 PM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/jodywestby/2016/09/24/7-days-before-obama-gives-away-internet-national-security/?sh=30343f0830d4 (“In one week, President Obama will allow what remains
of the United States’ control over the Internet to pass to a California non-profit organization, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).”); Swartz,
Keynote, supra note 599.
1488. Liyan Chen, Ryan Mac, & Brian Solomon, Alibaba Claims Title for Largest Global
IPO Ever with Extra Share Sales, FORBES (Sept. 22, 2014, 11:51 AM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/ryanmac/2014/09/22/alibaba-claims-title-for-largest-global-ipo-everwith-extra-share-sales/?sh=79365e348dcc; Martin Choi, Tesla boss Elon Musk says he loves
China, so Premier Li Keqiang offers him a green card, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 10,
2019, 8:32 PM), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2181556/tesla-boss-
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into the presidency, China gifted him a procession of Chinese trademarks beginning with a trademark in his name “Trump.”1489
The Trump administration pulled the U.S. out of President
Obama’s Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”) to renegotiate U.S. protections for American IP sold in China.1490 China never agreed to the
TPP, and now it appears the TPP survived but without the trans-Pacific’s two biggest players: China and the United States.1491 Then on
Feb. 15, 2019, President Donald Trump declared a national emergency
on our Southern Border and said,
And one of the things that I did with President Xi in China, when I
met him in Argentina, at a summit. Before I even started talking
about the trade, it was a trade meeting, it went very well, but
before I talked about trade I talked about something more important I said, ‘listen, we have tremendous amounts of fentanyl coming
into our country, kills tens of thousands of people, I think far more
than anybody registers, and I-I’d love you declare it, a lethal drug,
and put it on your criminal list,’ and their criminal list is much
tougher than our criminal list. They’re criminal list a drug dealer
gets a thing called THE DEATH PENALTY. Our criminal list a drug
dealer gets a thing called, how ‘bout a fine. And when I asked President Xi, I said, ‘you have a drug problem,’ no, no, no, I said, ‘you
elon-musk-says-he-loves-china-so-premier-li-keqiang. Cf. THE CHINA HUSTLE (Magnolia Pictures 2018) (dir. Jed Rothstein).
1489. Jeremy Venook, The Story Behind Trump’s Chinese Trademark, THE ATLANTIC
(Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/02/trump-chinese-trademark/517458/; Mark Moore, China’s gift to Trump raises constitutional concerns, NY POST
(Mar. 8, 2017, 10:40 AM), https://nypost.com/2017/03/08/china-grants-preliminary-approvalto-38-trump-trademarks/; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
1490. President Donald Trump, Presidential Memorandum Regarding Withdrawal of the
United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement, (Jan. 23,
2017), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/01/25/2017-01845/withdrawal-ofthe-united-states-from-the-trans—pacific-partnership-negotiations-and-agreement;
Charles Riley, Trump’s decision to kill TPP leaves door open for China, CNN BUSINESS (Jan.
24, 2017), https://money.cnn.com/2017/01/23/news/economy/tpp-trump-china/. Cf. America
Invents Act, 125 Stat. 284–341 (this statute, signed into law by President Obama, changed
the patent law from a first to invent to a first inventor to file system, in part to maximize
the amount of filings made for inventions to compete with the explosion in the amount of
Chinese patents in existence—it arguably departs from the “first inventor” requirement
that traces back to the Statute of Monopolies, and may thus be challenged under the limitations of the Patent & Copyright Clause, which requires that patents be granted to
inventors).
1491. Bala Ramasamy, Why China could never sign on to the Trans-Pacific Partnership,
THE CONVERSATION (Apr. 13, 2016), https://theconversation.com/why-china-could-neversign-on-to-the-trans-pacific-partnership-56361; Ian Bremmer, The Trans-Pacific Trade Deal
Survives, But the U.S. and China Matter More, TIME (Nov. 8, 2018, 6:16 AM), https://
time.com/5448808/trans-pacific-trade-deal-china/; Edward Helmore, Ivanka Trump won
China trademarks days before her father’s reversal on ZTE, THE GUARDIAN (May 28, 2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/may/28/ivanka-trump-won-china-trademarksdonald-trump-zte-reversal.
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have 1.4 billion people, what do you mean you have no drug problem, ‘no we don’t have a drug problem,’ I said, ‘why?’ — ‘death
penalty, we give death penalty to people that sell drugs.’ End of
problem. What do we do? We set up a blue ribbon committees.
Lovely men and women, they sit around a table, they have lunch,
they eat, they dine, and they waste a lot of time. So if we want to
get smart, we can get smart, you can end the drug problem, you can
end it a lot faster than you think but President Xi’s agreed to put
fentanyl on his list of deadly, deadly drugs, and it’s a criminal penalty, and the penalty is death. So that’s frankly one of the things
I’m most excited about in our trade deal.1492

Here, Donald Trump momentarily set aside his usual angst about
China, to use China as an example of why killing drug offenders can
cause our society to become better.1493 The influence of President Xi
over President Trump on this topic is further confirmation that policy
matters in China and the United States are joined at the hip.1494 At
least since the Nixon era, economists asserted the United States and
China will either rise together or fall together, and there are secret
forces at work to make sure that both fall under permanent authoritarian rule.1495
Americans saw these forces in full vigor when Aaron Swartz
took to the national stage and helped us fight against SOPA, PIPA, and
ACTA in 2012, for in the next year Swartz was killed and his death
was ruled a suicide.1496 When he died, both China and America lost a
1492. Remarks by President Trump, supra note 1047 (emphasis added).
1493. Id. Cf. HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 48 n.56, 74, 342–43 n.4,
375–76 nn.89–90, 355–56, 443 (2d ed., 1958) (Hitler fashioned the final solution out of a
similar utopic sentiment); HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM 198 (1994) (apearing
to describe the way Trump seemed to regard President Xi: “Brand had been told that ‘an
idealistic German’ was now talking to him, ‘an idealistic Jew’—two honorable enemies
meeting as equals during a lull in the battle.”).
1494. Peter Hayes, U.S.-China: Joined at the Hip, NAPSNET POLICY FORUM (June 27,
2013), https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/us-china-joined-at-the-hip/; Linda
Yueh, As China Rises, the U.S. Will Reap, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2013), https://
www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/07/25/if-china-rises-will-the-us-fall/as-china-risesthe-us-will-reap. See Michael Elliot, West Meets East, TIME (Oct. 10, 2004), http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,713163,00.html (remembering “Richard
Nixon whose visit to China in 1972 ended Beijing’s political isolation”).
1495. See, e.g., Feinstein, Floor Speech, supra note 621 (declaring a violation of the separation of powers); Stanley-Becker, supra note 1475 (reviewing allegations made in Bob
Woodward and Robert Costa’s new book Peril, which claimed access to secret government
documents that showed that Trump almost decided to go to war with China in hopes that it
would help him disrupt the 2020 election).
1496. Swartz, Keynote, supra note 599; THE INTERNET’S OWN BOY (Participant Media
2014). It is possible that Swartz committed suicide, but when considering all the evidence a
government coverup is at least as likely. John Schwartz, Internet Activist, a Creator of RSS,
Is Dead at 26, Apparently a Suicide, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/
2013/01/13/technology/aaron-swartz-internet-activist-dies-at-26.html; Matt Williams,
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champion brave enough to fight for them and effective enough to win
for them.1497 Then, as if by clockwork, the U.S. executive branch
hacked Congress to protect its illegal and unconstitutional use of torture black cites across the world (discussed in Part II supra, A Message
from Senator Dianne Feinstein).1498
The government had motive to kill Swartz in order to save face
because he likely would have won his case, which was frivolously and
abusively prosecuted.1499 A distinct, possible outcome of Swartz’s case,
due to the existence of the separation of powers, was a federal judge
declaring the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act unconstitutional.1500 If
Swartz lived long enough to challenge the law in court, the whole trajectory of the war on terror may have shifted.1501
Around the same time as Swartz’s death, other suspicious
deaths occurred.1502 For example, Michael Hastings published a conAaron Swartz’s Family condemns MIT and US government after his death, THE GUARDIAN
(Jan. 13, 2013, 11:08 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jan/13/aaronswartz-family-mit-government#comment-20583650.
1497. Swartz, Keynote, supra note 599.
1498. Feinstein, Floor Speech, supra note 621.
1499. Kennerly, Explaining, supra note 576 (a preliminary analysis done in real time
before Swartz’s death). See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (A State’s Attorney and U.S. Attorney alike “may prosecute with earnestness and vigor—indeed, he should
do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as
much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction
as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.”).
1500. Kennerly, Explaining, supra note 576; Mayfield v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 2d
1023, 1042–43 (D. Or. 2007) (holding portions of the Patriot Act unconstitutional), vacated,
Mayfield v. United States, 599 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that because Mayfield took
a settlement of money that there was no basis for equitably holding any part of the Patriot
Act unconstitutional, even though Mayfield believed he had preserved his constitutional
claims in his settlement by explicitly requesting and being granted the right to dispute the
law in his settlement with the government—this result revealed that if any part of a settlement is accepted the Court may toss out the entire case, even if the settlement itself
contained language to preserve constitutional claims for judicial review).
1501. THE INTERNET’S OWN BOY (Participant Media 2014). Cf. John Naughton, Aaron
Swartz stood up for freedom and fairness—and was hounded to his death, THE GUARDIAN
(Feb. 7, 2015, 5:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/feb/07/aaronswartz-suicide-internets-own-boy.
1502. See, e.g., Gonnerman, supra note 160; Robert Bridge, Five Years On, Death of Journalist Michael Hastings Remains a Mystery, STRATEGIC CULTURE FOUNDATION (Aug. 25,
2018), https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2018/08/25/five-years-death-journalistmichael-hastings-remains-mystery/. Nightcrawlers at the scene of Hastings’ death published highly controversial footage of the scene, which was never featured on mainstream
news sources. LoudLabs News, Journalist Michael Hastings Dies in Fiery Crash /
Hollywood RAW FOOTAGE, YOUTUBE (June 18, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=3LSY3wVuASg. Cf. Philip Bump, How the first statement from minneapolis police
made George Floyd’s murder seem like George Floyd’s fault, WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2021, 9:31
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/04/20/how-first-statement-minneapolis-police-made-george-floyds-murder-seem-like-george-floyds-fault/.
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troversial exposé on General Stanley McChrystal in Rolling Stone that
led to the General’s removal.1503 While working on another exposé,
Hastings’ car mysteriously exploded and hit a tree in Hollywood;
though the explosion was caught on camera and the car was burned
down to bare metal, the coroner found that Hastings drove while intoxicated to rule out further investigation.1504
The apparent tactics of the government to get Hastings and
Swartz to die deaths that cause the public to recoil from their activism
and journalism was accomplished.1505 Their deaths could be considered
a play on Michael Walzer’s Machiavellian strategy of convincing the
nation to dissociate with their deeds.1506 Protecting their lives may not
be worth losing the monopolies that Booz Allen Hamilton, AT&T, and
other similarly situated companies enjoy.1507
Antitrust law was designed to defend the free speech of Hastings and Swartz.1508 It was supposed to ensure that there is no
monopoly on the press in America, and that no one can lawfully take
the means of another person’s living, which is the same as taking away

1503. Hastings, supra note 742.
1504. Bridge, supra note 1502.
1505. Id.; Larissa MacFarquhar, Requiem for a Dream, NEW YORKER (Mar. 11, 2013),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/03/11/requiem-for-a-dream (articles and perspectives like this, which trace the “dark side” of Aaron Swartz, tend to let the government
off the hook for possible prosecutorial misconduct, conspiracy, and murder); Glenn Greenwald, Carmen Ortiz and Stephen Heymann: accountability for prosecutorial misconduct,
THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 16, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jan/16/ortiz-heymann-swartz-accountability-abuse (showing, by attempting to make the argument,
how much of an uphill battle it can be to prove prosecutorial misconduct when the victim
allegedly committed suicide).
1506. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 325 (1977) (copping Machiavellian realism and saying “we must look for people who are not good, and use them, and dishonor
them”).
1507. Kevin Poulsen, First 100 Pages of Aaron Swartz’s Secret Service File Released,
WIRED (Aug. 12, 2013, 5:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2013/08/swartz-foia-release/ (“‘On
1/11/13, Aaron Swartz was found dead in his apartment in Brooklyn, as a result of an apparent suicide,’ reads a January 17, 2013 Secret Service memo.”). Swartz is not the only one to
be smeared with the epithet of suicide, a decision that effectively ends the government investigation. See, e.g., Shawn Cohen & Daniel Prendergast, Death of judge found in Hudson
ruled a suicide, NY POST (July 26, 2017, 2:49 PM), https://nypost.com/2017/07/26/death-ofjudge-found-in-hudson-ruled-a-suicide/ (saying something was “ruled” so makes it sound
like there was process—but the police just decided it was, which is exactly what they would
do if they carried out the hit or wanted to cover it up for some other reason). Cf. Bump,
supra note 1502.
1508. 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *181(1644); John Milton, Eikonoklastes 2–3 (2d ed.
1650); Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772,] in WHEATLEY, supra note
821, at 7; Phillis Wheatley’s Registration, Sept. 10, 1773, TSC/1/E/06/09, Register of entries
of copies 1746–1773.
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their life.1509 The connection between the preservation of human life
and antitrust law was explicitly confirmed when the government censored Hastings and Swartz, destroyed their work, and literally caused
them to die.1510 American rights of life, to paying jobs and living wages,
are too often overlooked by judges that prefer rose colored glasses and
legal realism to natural justice and equity.1511
In great contrast to the government’s damnation of Hastings
and Swartz, in spite of their innocence, corporations deemed too big to
fail were bailed out by the Obama administration in 2008 despite their
crimes.1512 The U.S. system of trickledown economics, tax incentives,
and government bailouts is a failing socialist system for rich people.1513 It is no surprise that this lopsided socialism for the wealthy,
which violates the very public trust that enables the existence of the
government, is fraudulently branded as “capitalism.”1514
1509. 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *181.
1510. Letter from Phillis Wheatley to David Wooster (Oct. 18, 1773) (noting that she was
a fully-fledged author expecting to make her living solely on her works); 3 EDWARD COKE,
INSTITUTES *181 (1644) (noting it is a fundamental right of life to be able to earn a living).
See LoudLabs News, supra note 1503; Poulsen, supra note 1507.
1511. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 356–57 (2003); BORK, SLOUCHING, supra note 1223,
at 154–71 (appearing to pine for the days of eugenic laws which kept those he saw as unfit
for society in artificial decline especially in his chapter The Rise of Crime, Illegitimacy, and
Welfare while ironically comparing Roe v. Wade to Dred Scott in another chapter dedicated
in part to comparing the right to choose abortion to eugenics).
1512. See generally Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–343,
122 Stat. 3765. See James S. Henry, Socialism for Bankers, Savage Capitalism for Everyone
Else?, THE NATION (Sept. 23, 2008), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/socialismbankers-savage-capitalism-everyone-else/. See also Burgess Everett, ‘Like a Soviet-type
economy’: GOP free traders unload on Trump, POLITICO (July 24, 2018, 2:50 PM), https://
www.politico.com/story/2018/07/24/trump-farmers-bailout-reaction-republicans-congress737517 (Trump proposed a $12 billion bailout for farmers suffering from the tariffs he imposed on China.).
1513. See Kamala Kelkar, When labor laws left farm workers behind—and vulnerable to
abuse, PBS (Sept. 18, 2016, 4:47 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/labor-laws-leftfarm-workers-behind-vulnerable-abuse; deck0930, Reagan Government is not the solution to
our problem government IS the problem, YOUTUBE (Feb. 4, 2009), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=6ixNPplo-SU (such statements are usually indicative of support for the trickle
down, government subsidized capitalist socialism); Patricia Cohen, Profitable Companies,
No Taxes: Here’s How They Did It, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/03/09/business/economy/corporate-tax-report.html. See FILIPOVIC, supra note 614, at
13–14; GIBNEY, supra note 649, at xxv. Cf. RUTGER BREGMAN, UTOPIA FOR REALISTS: HOW
WE CAN BUILD THE IDEAL WORLD passim (2017).
1514. See FILIPOVIC, supra note 614, at 13–14; GIBNEY, supra note 649, at 2–26, 30–31
(noting numerous federal assistance programs that nursed the Boomer generation into existence, and the social engineering sort of attitude of the Greatest Generation that raised
them); THE CENTURY OF THE SELF (BBC 2002) (Edward Bernays helped his generation engineer the Baby Boomers to become what they are). See, e.g., Social Security Act, Pub. L. No.
74-271, 49 Stat. 620, litigated in King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 318–22 (1968) (States were
allowed to allocate New Deal funds according to their own standards, and so many of them
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The use of socialist systems as lifesupport for capitalist ideologies pervade the United States and traces at least back to the
establishment of eugenics in America.1515 Eugenic policies, which directly contradicted the free trade capitalism that the United States
professed, formed the ideological underpinnings of the post-WWII
Baby Boom, for which the entire Boomer generation is named.1516
awarded federal aid to only “legitimate” children living in “suitable” homes. The Greatest
Generation was social engineering their families through the State into what they wanted
them to be—and the racists and misogynists among them were perhaps the most heavyhanded participants in the government experiment. In this case, the “liberal” Warren Court
only reversed this Alabama law on the narrowest of grounds, not expressly extending it to
other State standards. The white, male adults in the States, here Alabama, were doing the
very social experiments to others that they would have decried as communist or socialist if
the same experiments were done to them. They even engineered their children to viscerally
fear all things communist, socialist, and even the color red—as if that wasn’t ironic.); Buck
v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (empowering the States to engineer the people of the
United States was all the rage, and it is what created the Boomer generation: “It is better
for all the world if, instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime or to let
them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from
continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough
to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes.”). Even Jackson Pollock’s success was ironically
propped up by the U.S. Government as propaganda against communism. Frances Stonor
Saunders, Modern art was CIA ‘weapon,’ INDEPENDENT (Oct. 22, 1995, 3:08 PM), https://
www.independent.co.uk/news/world/modern-art-was-cia-weapon-1578808.html.
1515. THE CENTURY OF THE SELF (BBC 2002); FILIPOVIC, supra note 614, at 13–14; GIBNEY, supra note 649, at 2–26, 30–31; Edward Bernays, The Engineering of Consent [1947], in
250 THE ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 113, 113–14 (1947) (claiming the
constitutional right to manipulate the American public, as if our constitutional system wereas indestructible). See Edward Bernays, Public Relations as Aid to Ethnic Harmony:
Hawaii—The Almost Perfect State [1950], reprinted in EDWARD BERNAYS, PUBLIC RELATIONS
308 (1945) (“Hawaii is . . . the melting pot of the Pacific, assimilating people of Oriental
ancestry, . . . It is of further significance to the continental United States because it is setting a successful pattern for the working out of maladjustments between people of diverse
ethnic backgrounds.”) (emphasis added); id. at 20–21, 27, 72–75, 78–79 (presenting the
methods of Bernays’ propaganda system that started as a project under the U.S. Government’s Committee of Public Information during World War I); Eleanor Roosevelt, My Day,
(Dec. 5, 1958), https://www2.gwu.edu/~erpapers//myday/displaydoc.cfm?_y=
1958&_f=MD004294 (feigning compassion for colored children that needed to be “adjusted”
psychologically to accept their place); EDWARD BERNAYS, BIOGRAPHY OF AN IDEA 652 (1965)
[hereinafter BERNAYS, BIOGRAPHY] (“Goebbels, said Wiegand, was using my book Crystallizing Public Opinion as a basis for his destructive campaign against the Jews of Germany.”);
Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, May 7, 1934, in
ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE 214 (Max Freedman ed., 1968) (Justice Frankfurter called Bernays and other prominent PR counsels “professional poisoners of
the public mind.”); Buck, 274 U.S., at 207.
1516. WENDY KLEIN, BUILDING A BETTER RACE: GENDER, SEXUALITY, AND EUGENICS FROM
THE TURN OF THE CENTURY TO THE BABY BOOM 155 (2001) (“Though the baby boom peaked in
1957, the ‘cultural imperative for large, planned families’ did not lessen until the mid-1960s,
when the birthrate began to drop.”). See DAVID STARR JORDAN, THE HUMAN HARVEST 31, 47
(1907) (advertising to the WWII generation that the decline in birth-rate is connected with
the downfall of society). Cf. American Experience: The Eugenics Crusade (PBS release Oct.
16, 2018) (noting that the Baby Boom was engineered with federal incentives for white, “fit”
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While eugenics is now described as an illegitimate psuedoscientific expression of racism and misogyny, its legal basis in Buck v. Bell is still
good law.1517
Buck v. Bell was reaffirmed in the 1970’s Ninth Circuit case
Madrigal v. Quilligan, which was followed by a eugenic sterilization
program in California women’s prisons in the early 2000’s, revealed by
the activism of Kelli Dillon and Cynthia Chandler.1518 Eugenics ideology hit the limelight of America once again in 2021, when the iconic
Millennial superstar Britney Spears contested her conservatorship in
California court saying,
I was told right now in the conservatorship I’m not able to get married or have a baby. I have an (IUD) inside of myself right now so I
don’t get pregnant. I wanted to take the (IUD) out so I could start
trying to have another baby, but this so-called team won’t let me go
to the doctor to take it out because they don’t want me to have children—any more children. So basically, this conservatorship is
doing me way more harm than good.1519

Britney Spears’s struggle to establish independence from her father
who received the support of a judge to monetize her image, music, and
work until she dies is symbolic of her generation.1520 Spears’s rights of
life that were legally stripped from her, for the likely duration of her
life, on the basis that she is too insane to manage the profits of her own
labor are the same rights that Phillis Wheatley championed and refamilies to bear more children than they naturally could support); BERNAYS, BIOGRAPHY,
supra note 1515, at 53–66, 85, 88, 101, 103, 187, 206, 287, 731–32 (The father of the Public
Relations industry Edward Bernays began his career representing the eugenics movement
by producing a play called Damaged Goods, which inspired the rest of his career: “In my
first few years on my own I carried out programs for a variety of clients, publicizing . . . the
eugenics movement . . . . I had no knowledge of what a press agent was or did before I helped
produce Damaged Goods in 1913.” It is well known that Damaged Goods was a pro-eugenics
propaganda play that was later reproduced as a movie and book.).
1517. Buck, 274 U.S., at 207.
1518. Madrigal v. Quilligan, No. 75–2057, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20423, at *1 (9th Cir.
1978) (directly affirming Buck without opinion); BELLY OF THE BEAST (PBS 2020) (explaining the activism of Kelli Dillon and Cynthia Chandler).
1519. Hannah Yasharoff, Read Britney Spears’ full statement from her conservatorship
hearing: ‘I am traumatized’, USA TODAY (June 24, 2021, 11:16 AM), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/entertainment/celebrities/2021/06/24/britney-spears-full-statement-conservatorship-hearing/5333532001/; G: Unfit, RADIOLAB (July 15, 2021), https://
www.wnycstudios.org/podcasts/radiolab/articles/g-unfit [hereinafter G: Unfit] (playing the
quoted portion of Spears’ court statement and reminding listeners that this “this is way
bigger than Britney,” noting the estimated 1.3 million people living under conservatorships
or guardianships).
1520. See Sara Luterman, For Women Under Conservatorship, Forced Birth Control Is
Routine, THE NATION (July 15, 2021), https://www.thenation.com/article/society/conservatorship-iud-britney-spears/; G: Unfit, supra note 1519 (demonstrating how easy it is for
guardians to sterilize their wards); Yasharoff, supra note 1519.
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ceived before 1776.1521 The failure of the Boomer generation to pass
down Wheatley’s well known rights to their children, as they might
have done to break the cycle of abuse, is perhaps the sole reason why
certain Millennials like Britney Spears and Kesha Sebert are presently
in a fight for their lives.1522
Instead of doing justice for future generations, a majority of
Boomers endorsed Donald Trump, who symbolizes the worst selfish
tendencies of the Boomer generation.1523 Donald Trump also quintessentially represents the irony of a false capitalism that is subsidized by
unspoken socialism.1524 Rather than address the issue in light of the
Russian support of the former president, prominent members of the
Silent Generation remained characteristically silent, for example, “I
have to say we’re capitalist, that’s just the way it is,” Nancy Pelosi
stated amid the Trump presidency.1525
Even after Watergate, the Pentagon Papers, the Iran-Contra
Affair, and the 2008 market crisis, most Americans still believe that

1521. Compare Yasharoff, supra note 1519, with Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et al., To the
Public, [Oct. 1772,] in WHEATLEY, supra note 821, at 7.
1522. Compare Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34–37
(2003) (declining to extend Wheatley’s attribution rights), with Yasharoff, supra note 1519
(Britney’s father earns the profits of Britney’s work), and Gottwald v. Sebert [i.e., Dr. Luke
v. Kesha], No. 653118/2014, 2016 WL 1365969, at *4, *9, *11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016) (Kesha’s
abuser continues earning profits from music inspired by Kesha’s survival of his abuse, and
his case against Kesha for naming his abuse is moving forward).
1523. John F. Harris, Donald Trump Is the Perfect Leader of the Worst Generation, POLITICO MAG. (January 14, 2021), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/01/14/trumpleader-worst-generation-459244; Ronald Brownstein, The Most Complete Picture Yet of
America’s Changing Electorate, THE ATLANTIC (July 1, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2021/07/2020-voter-demographics/619337/ (noting that Trump got most of
his support from the Boomers, but that in 2020 “the preponderantly white Baby Boomer
generation, which has aged from its 1960s roots into a Republican-leaning cohort, is receding”); An examination of the 2016 electorate, based on validated voters, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2018/08/09/an-examination-of-the2016-electorate-based-on-validated-voters/ (showing that a majority of Boomers aged from
around 52 to 70 at the time voted for Trump); Exit Polls, CNN POLITICS (last visited Setp.
26, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/election/2020/exit-polls/president/national-results. Cf.
Gabriel Debenedetti, They Always Wanted Trump, POLITICO (Nov. 7, 2016), https://
www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/11/hillary-clinton-2016-donald-trump-214428/ (“to
take Bush down, Clinton’s team drew up a plan to pump Trump up”).
1524. See Dana Milbank, Donald Trump, the welfare king, WASH. POST, (May 23, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/donald-trump-the-welfare-king/2016/05/23/
154310f4-2121-11e6-aa84-42391ba52c91_story.html.
1525. CNN, Pelosi: Democrats are capitalists, YOUTUBE (Jan. 31, 2017), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=MR65ZhO6LGA [hereinafter CNN, Pelosi] (here Pelosi actually
quoted to or paraphrased the Chairman of Standard Oil, a monopolist, as her example of
what capitalism should be).
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they are the beneficiaries of simple capitalism.1526 As Hannah Arendt
wrote in her piece Lying in Politics, such lies make a brittle foundation
for the Republic.1527 Perhaps the gerontocracy that is now empowered
in Congress underestimates the younger generations; who appear not
as easily convinced about oversimplified dichotomies that no longer
make sense of their world.1528
The fraud of a socialist supported capitalism continues facilitating eugenics-based intergenerational theft exemplified by the
experiences of Britney Spears, Kesha Sebert, Aaron Swartz, and
Michael Hastings.1529 Younger Americans have every ground to dispute this intergenerational theft in the courts under statutory law,
common law, natural law, and the law of God that vindicates their
rights of life, but the defense of future generations will not be accomplished without difficulty.1530 For Leviathan went to Washington in the
hearts of our elders, and there it will continue transcending the laws of
God and man to manifest horrors in American society.1531
CONCLUSION: THE NECESSITY

THAT

KNOWS NO LAW

In Youngstown, Justice Jackson wrote of a “necessity [that]
knows no law.”1532 He wrote that executive emergency powers would
tend to “kindle emergencies,” and thus the federal government has no
emergency powers “[a]side from suspension of the privilege of the writ
1526.
Id.; Nancy Pelosi, Pelosi Statement on Second Half of TARP Funds, (Jan. 15,
2009), https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/pelosi-statement-second-half-tarp-funds/; Sutton, supra note 1049; PENTAGON PAPERS, supra note 626; The Contras, supra note 405;
FILIPOVIC, supra note 614, at 13–14; GIBNEY, supra note 649, at 205, 329–30.
1527. Hannah Arendt, Lying in Politics [1972], in ARENDT, CRISES, supra note 187, at 7.
1528. CNN, Pelosi, supra note 1525 (lecturing a Millennial about capitalism); Blake,
More, supra note 618 (Millennials did not care one way or another whether Sanders referred
to himself as a “socialist,” and that’s all the Boomers seemed to care about).
1529. Yasharoff, supra note 1519; Gottwald v. Sebert [i.e., Dr. Luke v. Kesha], No.
653118/2014, 2016 WL 1365969, at *4, *9, *11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016); Swartz, Keynote, supra
note 599; LoudLabs News, supra note 1503.
1530. 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *181; John Milton, Eikonoklastes 2–3 (2d ed. 1650);
Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772,] in WHEATLEY, supra note 821, at
7; Phillis Wheatley’s Registration, Sept. 10, 1773, TSC/1/E/06/09, Register of entries of copies 1746–1773; OTIS, supra note 18, at 279 (calling for “the demolition of all monopolies
great and small”).
1531. HOBBES, supra note 6, at 46–48, 231. See Dan Zak, A Kraken is Loose in America,
WASH. POST (Dec. 10, 2020, 3:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/kraken-trump-election-powell-giuliani/2020/12/09/6f6944ea-381e-11eb-bc6896af0daae728_story.html.
1532. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
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of habeas corpus in time of rebellion or invasion.”1533 Therefore, President Trump did not have emergency powers under the plethera of
sham emergencies he declared to: (1) unilaterally appropriate money to
his border wall;1534 (2) to incite a coup d’etat to topple Congress on
January 6, 2021 to change an election result that he felt was unjust;1535 or (3) to exercise plenary parens patriae power to leverage the
Court to allow him to unconstitutionally oversee state run federal elections in his favor.1536
1533. Id. at 650 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2).
1534. Id. (an emergency, as defined under Milligan and extended in Youngstown, requires an actual invasion or insurrection that renders the courts unable to operate);
Remarks by President Trump, supra note 1047 (Trump admitted that his emergency declaration was a sham, saying: “I didn’t need to do this. But I’d rather do it much faster.”);
Liptak et al., Trump, supra note 1047; Gloria Borger, Trump sees the wall as a monument to
himself, CNN (Jan. 22, 2019, 12:27 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/22/politics/presidenttrump-border-wall-symbol-monument-legacy/index.html. See Proclamation No. 9,844, 84
Fed. Reg. 4,949–50 (Feb. 15, 2019) (the federal courts have the duty and the power to overrule this entire proclamation as a sham under Ex parte Milligan) (citing National
Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. 1631; Construction Authority in the Event of a Declaration of
War or National Emergency, 10 U.S.C. § 2808); Sierra Club v. Trump, 977 F.3d 853, 876,
888–90 (9th Cir. 2020) (“The ‘power to legislate for emergencies belongs in the hands of
Congress.’ Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 654 (Jackson, J., concurring). We cannon ‘keep power in
the hands of Congress if it is not wise and timely in meeting its problems,’ id., but where, as
here, Congress has clung to this power with both hands—by withholding funding for border
wall construction at great effort and cost and by attempting to terminate the existence of a
national emergency on the southern border on two separate occasions, with majority vote by
both houses—we can neither pry it from Congress’s grasp. For all ‘its defects, delays and
inconveniences,’ it remains critical in all areas, but particularly with respect to the emergency powers, that ‘the Executive be under the law, and that the law be made by
parliamentary deliberations.’ Id. at 655.”); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 127 (1866) (“Martial
law cannot arise from a threatened invasion. The necessity must be actual and present, the
invasion real, such as effectually closes the courts and deposes the civil administration.”); 10
U.S.C. § 2808(c) (in the case that a court decides that the presidential attempt to appropriate funds to a border wall is based upon a sham emergency, the Court can hold that the
presidential proclamation as dead upon arrival as “terminate[d] with respect to any war or
national emergency at the end of the war or national emergency”).
1535. Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot, AP NEWS (Jan. 13,
2021), https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27; Dan Barry et al., ‘Our president wants us here’:
The Mob that Stormed the Capitol, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/01/09/us/capitol-rioters.html.
1536. U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Reform, Selected Documents: President Trump Pressure Campaign on Dept. of Justice (June 2021) (Trump’s people
relied heavily upon the Hobbesian, patriarchal theory of parens patriae given in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), and the draft briefs they sent out confirmed an
organized plan to legitimize the fake Trump electors that were kept out of each state’s official vote). The sham emergency Trump proclaimed in support of his pressure campaign, was
based upon a very strange individual who called herself Michelle Roosevelt Edwards, among
other aliases, and falsely claimed to represent an Italian Airline company that pretended to
have information about spy satellites disrupting the U.S. 2020 election, which appears to
have been the primary if not sole basis for Trump’s kraken suit challenges. Id.; Transcript:
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The president does, however, possess inherent peace powers
under Article II to preserve peace and neutrality in the absence of an
official declaration of war.1537 This means that the federal courts unconstitutionally blocked President Obama’s amnesty order for
immigrants.1538 It also means that President Obama unconstitutionally abdicated his peace powers to Congress when he waited for
legislation rather than taking action to close military torture cites like
Guantanamo Bay on his own.1539
The president’s powers of peace are meant to be aided by every
citizen’s “freedom of speech and action.”1540 For wherever a president
determines it is in his best interest to repent from his former ways and
become an agent of peace and kindness, the people ought to speak out
encouragements to him or her.1541 However, whenever any branch of
government betrays its trust with the people, the people are free to
speak out and act against it; with virulence if they so choose.1542
In the words of the first champion of our freedom, James Otis,
the “freedom of speech . . . is what keeps the constitution in health and
vigour, and is in a great measure the cause of our preservation as a
free people.”1543 Otis continued, “[f]or should it ever be dangerous to
exercise this privilege, it is easy to see, without the spirit of prophesy,
slavery and bondage would soon be” our portion.1544 Therefore, Otis
marvelously concluded,
It is as much the duty of a member of society to oppose every encroachment on the subject, as it is to support the prerogative when
in danger, from the licentiousness of the people.—Without this
check, we should be liable to oppression, whenever a tyrant was in
power . . . .1545

The Rachel Maddow Show, 6/21/21, MSNBC (June 21, 2021, 6:00 PM), https://
www.msnbc.com/transcripts/transcript-rachel-maddow-show-6-21-21-n1271818.
1537. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 311 (1936).
1538. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016) (Mem) (The U.S. Supreme
Court affirmed a district court’s obstruction of President Obama’s peace powers with one
sentence, “The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court.”).
1539. Charlie Savage & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Obama Sends Plan to Close Guantánamo
to Congress, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/24/us/politics/
obama-guantanamo-bay.html.
1540. OTIS, supra note 18, at 320.
1541. See, e.g., Phillis Wheatley, To His Excellency General Washington [1775]; Phillis
Wheatley, To the King’s Most Excellent Majesty [1768].
1542. OTIS, supra note 18, at 320–21; Phillis Wheatley, America [1768].
1543. OTIS, supra note 18, at 320–21.
1544. Id.
1545. Id.
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Otis drew this vindication of the freedom of speech and of the press
directly from the natural law of social compact saying, “Mankind never
entered into society to aggrandize rulers, but rulers were invested with
power for the good of the people; & it is to them alone they ought to be
accountable for their conduct.”1546 Therefore, Otis encouraged anyone
among us who “nobly undertakes to support an injured people, and oppose the measures of those in power inimical to their rights.”1547
The moral relativism that now pervades the American society
causes most to forget the purposes of the First Amendment, which are
twofold: (1) the discovery of truth, and (2) the encouragement of
peace.1548 According to these principles certain types of speech are not
protected, including those that constitute fraud, and those that tend to
cause violence.1549 It is no coincidence that unprotected speech is the
very same as that which tends toward “Hobbesian maxims” of feudalism founded upon “force and fraud.”1550
1546. Id.
1547. Id.
1548. Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, [June 18, 1779] (The
First Amendment purposes of peace and truth are summarized in this bill, though they are
more thoroughly written throughout Roger Williams’ Bloudy Tenent tracts and Isaac
Backus’ tracts including Truth is Great and Will Prevail—quoting to the bill adopted by
Virginia here, “truth is great and will prevail if left to herself; that she is the proper and
sufficient antagonist to error, and has nothing to fear from the conflict unless by human
interposition disarmed of her natural weapons, free argument and debate; errors ceasing to
be dangerous when it is permitted freely to contradict them.”); WILLIAMS, THE BLOUDY,
supra note 52, at 2 (“It is the will and command of God that, since the coming of his Son the
Lord Jesus, a permission of the most Paganish, Jewish, Turkish, or anti-christian consciences and worships be granted to all men in all nations and countries: and that they are
to be fought against with that sword which is only, in soul matters, able to conquer: to wit,
the sword of God’s Spirit, the word of God.”).
1549. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“The question in every case is
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.”); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974)
(“[T]here is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie
nor the careless error materially advances society’s interest in ‘uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open’ debate on public issues.”) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
270 (1964); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942)); Ollman v. Evans,
750 F.2d 970, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (“It is common ground that the
core function of the first amendment is the preservation of that freedom to think and speak
as one pleases which is the ‘means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political
truth.’”) (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
See also Natali Wyson, Defining Fraud as an Unprotected Category of Speech: Why the
Ninth Circuit Should Have Upheld the Stolen Valor Act in United States v. Alvarez, 2012
B.Y.U. L. REV. 671, 673 (2012). Cf. JEFFERSON, NOTES, supra note 268, at 334 (“Printingpresses shall be subject to no other restraint than liableness to legal prosecution for false
facts printed and published.”).
1550. OTIS, supra note 18, at 241 (expounding on the force and fraud as the illegitimate
tenants of feudal law); see id. at 141, 157. Cf. Cicero, De Officiis 1.13.41 (“But let us remem-
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The U.S. Supreme Court was deluded when it held that cross
burnings did not amount to unprotected, dangerous speech.1551 The
reason for the delusion on the Court, other than actual racism, was the
false, intellectual belief that white power and black power are materially the same, when they are not.1552 For the idea of white power and
white supremacy of the type represented by the Nazis and the KKK, is
exclusive; it negates the power of every other group and ultimately destroys itself.1553
Black power, of the kind championed by the Black Panther
Party and especially Fred Hampton and Angela Davis, includes all
power to all the people.1554 The FBI assassinated Fred Hampton, because they were affraid of his ability to unify the masses on an
ber we must have regard for justice even towards the humblest. Now the humblest station
and the poorest fortune are those of slaves . . . . While wrong may be done, then, in either of
two ways, that is, by force or by fraud, both are bestial . . . .”) (emphasis added).
1551. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 347–48, 356–57 (2003) (overruling a Virginia statute for making cross burning prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate under the First
Amendment even though no person, ever, burns a cross in the United States other than to
intimidate and terrorize black folk—i.e., burning crosses are a terrorist icon of the KKK
symbolic for lynching, and it is meant to terrorize people; in this country, if someone burns a
cross for some other reason, they should be required to explain themselves to the police—for
prima facie evidence may be rebutted—the Virginia law that was overruled was not a violation of legitimate First Amendment rights).
1552. Id. at 356–57 (demonstrating a commitment to sheer relativism in this statement
“a burning cross does not inevitably convey a message of intimidation” and by presenting
the image of two white people getting married under a burning cross in full Klan regalia as
evidence that burning crosses can convey a non-terrorist message, as if burning a cross at
your wedding does not intimidate and effectively ward off all black people that value their
lives).
1553. Racism destroys the people who adopt it, like a slow motion suicide. Tim Folger,
Why Did Greenland’s Viking’s Vanish, SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE (Mar. 2017), https://
www.smithsonianmag.com/history/why-greenland-vikings-vanished-180962119/ (“Greenland’s Vikings . . . never gave up their old ways. They failed to learn from the Inuit. . . . They
kept their livestock, and when their animals starved, so did they. The more flexible Inuit,
with a culture focused on hunting marine mammals, thrived.”). See also Black, 538 U.S. at
347–48 (protecting free speech of statements that advertise the abandonment of people
outside of one’s racial group, which eventually causes the group to slowly die off like the
Greenland Vikings if they don’t attempted a violent political suicide like the Civil War);
National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 44 (1977) (per curiam)
(protecting the free speech of Nazis to protest and march); Minyvonne Burke & Marianna
Sotomayor, James Alex Fields Found Guilty of Killing Heather Heyer During Violent Charlottesville White Nationalist Rally, NBC (Dec. 7, 2018, 2:12 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/
news/crime-courts/james-alex-fields-found-guilty-killing-heather-heyer-during-violentn945186 (the sort of speech defended in Virginia v. Black and Village of Skokie tends toward
self-destructive violence); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 6 (1866) (petitioner was member of a
precursor of the KKK known as “the Order of American Knights” and was arrested for aiding an abetting the Confederacy’s attempt to demolish the United States—Milligan’s speech
literally aided and abetted movements to demolish his own country).
1554. BLACKKKLANSMAN (Focus Features 2018); Hampton, Sr., supra note 79.
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interracial basis known as the Rainbow Coalition.1555 But for Hampton’s assassination, the Black Panther strategy might have worked to
electrify a multicultural base, a playbook President Barack Obama
made use of on a later date, and on a less radical platform.1556
Americans only recently awoke from our longstanding delusion
of colorblindness, which peaked during the Obama administration.1557
With the help of Michelle Alexander, who was the likely agent to bring
about the late confession of Harper Lee, it is now possible to unite in
one understanding of Christ’s words, “For this people’s heart has become calloused; they hardly hear with their ears, and they have closed
their eyes. Otherwise they might see with their eyes, hear with their
ears, understand with their hearts and turn, and I would heal
them.”1558
Despite the fact that American eyes were openned, a willful delusion presses forward through cognitive dissonance into the debate
over Black Lives Matter.1559 For, once again, the movement of Black
Lives Matter includes all people, and all lives and blue lives matter
responses (which stemmed from the original Black Lives movement)
are only an attempt to convince America to be colorblind once more.1560
1555. Monique Judge, Fred Hampton’s Death Is Just One Example of the Government’s
Covert Disruption of Black Lives, THE ROOT (Dec. 4, 2018, 7:33 PM), https://
www.theroot.com/fred-hampton-is-just-one-example-of-the-states-history-1830865895
(“Hampton was considered a uniter . . . [Hampton] was known for uniting poor black, white
and Puerto Rican people.”); THE FIRST RAINBOW COALITION (PBS 2020). Cf. 2 THEODORE
ALLEN, THE INVENTION OF THE WHITE RACE 249 (1993) (the actual first rainbow coalition
was Bacon’s Rebellion in 1676, where the black and white working class in Virginia united
to overthrow the ruling, slaveholding class).
1556. Hampton, Sr., supra note 79. See Judge, supra note 1555; THE FIRST RAINBOW COALITION (PBS 2020); Simon Tisdall, Barack Obama Victory Comes Courtesy of Rainbow
Coalition, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 7, 2012, 9:43 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2012/nov/07/barack-obama-victory-rainbow-coalition.
1557. See, e.g., En Vogue, Free Your Mind [1992] (the colorblind era represented by this
song is over).
1558. Matthew 13:15; ALEXANDER, supra note 73, at 228–29 (quoting KING JR., supra note
73, at 45–48); LEE, supra note 73, at 181–82 (“Blind, that’s what I am. I never opened my
eyes. I never thought to look into people’s hearts, I looked only in their faces. . . . I need a
watchman to lead me around and declare what he seeth every hour on the hour.”) (referring
to Isaiah 21:6).
1559. Erin Griffith, The Black Lives Matter Founders Are Among the World’s Greatest
Leaders, FORTUNE (Mar. 24, 2016, 2:00 PM), https://fortune.com/2016/03/24/black-lives-matter-great-leaders/ (explaining that all these “lives matter” movements started with Alicia
Garza, Patrisse Cullors, and Opal Tometi).
1560. Andrew Wind, Speaker: ‘Colorblind’ ideal inadequate in a Black Lives Matter era,
THE COURIER (Feb. 25, 2017), https://wcfcourier.com/news/local/education/speaker-colorblind-ideal-inadequate-in-black-lives-matter-era/article_b861a58a-816e-5d94-8108e38566265498.html; David Smith, The backlash against Black Lives Matter is just more
evidence of injustice, THE CONVERSATION (Oct. 16, 2018), https://wcfcourier.com/news/local/

\\jciprod01\productn\F\FAM\15-1\FAM101.txt

2021

unknown

Seq: 301

10-JAN-22

LEVIATHAN GOES TO WASHINGTON

10:23

301

Now, with eyes wide open, Justice Stevens’ earlier refusal to sink into
the colorblindness of his colleagues is worth a review,
There is a cruel irony in The Chief Justice’s reliance on our decision
in Brown v. Board of Education. . . . The Chief Justice fails to note
that it was only black schoolchildren who were so ordered [to attend
black-only schools]; indeed, the history books do not tell stories of
white children struggling to attend black schools.1561

Americans cannot afford to fail in understanding how Justice Stevens
fought against colorblindness on the Court long before Harper Lee
made her confession.1562 We cannot afford to ignore the absurd race
prophesies of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor simply because she was
the first woman on the Court.1563 We can no longer afford to watch,
silent, as Chief Justice Roberts continues to whitewash American history in a strange attempt to secure Justice O’Connor’s dubious legacy
rather than administering real justice.1564
education/speaker-colorblind-ideal-inadequate-in-black-lives-matter-era/article_b861a58a816e-5d94-8108-e38566265498.html; White Lives Matter, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER,
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/group/white-lives-matter (last visited Feb. 2, 2019).
1561. Parents Involved Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 798–99
(2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1562. Id.
1563. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 310 (2003) (“The Court takes the Law School at
its word that it would like nothing better than to find a race-neutral admissions formula
and will terminate its use of racial preferences as soon as possible.”). It appears, at least for
now, that Chief Justice Roberts is committed to blindly affirming Justice O’Connor’s worst
opinions. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 569 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(noting the looming cloud of Grutter was part of why Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in the
majority overruled vital portions of the Voting Rights Act). Grutter’s time window will close
in 2028, and may, as noted by Justice Ginsburg in Shelby County, shut off a wide array of
longstanding racial protections dating back to Brown v. Board of Education on a theory that
race protections like Brown violate democracy and thus should be restrained. Id.; Michelle
Adams, Stifling the Potential of Grutter v. Bollinger: Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 88 BOSTON U. L. REV. 937, 951, 978 (2008) (discussing the thought lineage from O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter to Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion
in Parents Involved, and addressing possible grounds for pushing back against it); Cedric
Merlin Powell, The Rhetorical Allure of Post-Racial Discourse and the Democratic Myth,
2018 UTAH L. REV. 523, 523–24. See, e.g., Adele M. Stan, A Feminist Folk Hero?, CBS (July
5, 2005, 3:39 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/a-feminist-folk-hero/ (expressing the popular view that liberals should lament Justice O’Connor’s retirement, because “women will
lose a genuine advocate and protector” when her rationale about race and gender in Grutter
may potentially be the actual ideology that destroys women’s legal protections as pointed
out by Professor Adams above).
1564. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (the very reason the Court is not
willing to overrule cases like Korematsu is because Chief Justice Roberts refuses to admit
that cases like Trump v. Hawaii are materially similar to Korematsu—it shows how race
blindness inspires the Court to depart from the common law principle of stare decisis, which
ordinarily would require the Court to overrule similar cases when they no longer hold);
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2617 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (Chief Justice
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Unwritten lynch law held sway far too long in America, inspiring the murder and enslavement of those who carried our first
revolution into reality.1565 African American Revolutionaries like John
Marrant and Phillis Wheatley had their names for slaveholders calling
them, rightly, “modern Cains” and “modern Egyptians.”1566 It was not,
however, until recently that these epithets might be finally heard and
understood.1567
For the black revolutionaries contended for the redemption of
white folks.1568 They distinguished themselves from the future writings of W.E.B. Dubois about the Souls of White Folk,1569 when they
observed that white souls may yet be claimed for the side of heaven.1570
Black revolutionaries, therefore, rose up like the wondrous Cynthia Erivo in Bad Times at the El Royale to find their human dignity while
everything fell apart around them.1571 This motion was first marked
out by Phillis Wheatley to inspire human revolutions in
government.1572
Roberts appears to have the same attitude regarding Lochner and Dred Scott—refusing to
consider overruling them because they had already been overruled by history—this mindset
causes the court to repeat history—the Court could have used Obergefell as an opportunity
to officially overrule Osborn v. Nicholson as wrongly decided for limiting the fundamental
right of marriage to only after the Fourteenth Amendment was passed).
1565. Wells-Barnett, supra note 80, at 15; Billie Holiday, Strange Fruit [1939]; Dave
Chappelle, 8:46,
YOUTUBE (June 11, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=3tR6mKcBbT4 (describing and responding to the murder of George Floyd). See
FOR LOVE OF LIBERTY: THE STORY OF AMERICA’S BLACK PATRIOTS, part 1 (PBS 2010).
1566. John Marrant, A Sermon Preached on the 24th day of June 1789, THE BIBLE AND
HEART, June 24, 1789, at 9 [1789] (observing the oxymoron of slaveholders, which was that
“our modern Cains call us Africans the sons of Cain”); Letter from Phillis Wheatley to Samson Occom (Feb. 11, 1774) (“for in every human breast, God has implanted a principle,
which we call love of freedom; it is impatient of oppression, and pants for deliverance; and
by the leave of our modern Egyptians I will assert, that the same principle lives in us”).
1567. See, e.g., Zelaya, supra note 1099, at 113–14.
1568. Letter from Benjamin Banneker to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 19, 1791); Letter from
Phillis Wheatley to Samson Occom (Mar. 11, 1774) (“I desire not for their hurt”); John Marrant, A Sermon Preached on the 24th day of June 1789, THE BIBLE AND HEART, June 24,
1789, at 9 [1789].
1569. W.E.B. DuBois, The Souls of White Folk, in W.E.B. DUBOIS, DARKWATER 32 (1920)
(“After this the descent to Hell is easy. On the pale, white faces . . . I see again and again . . .
a writing of human hatred, a deep and passionate hatred, vast by the very vagueness of its
expressions.”).
1570. Phillis Wheatley, On Being Brought from Africa to America [1773]; Phillis Wheatley, To the Right Honorable William, Earl of Dartmouth [1773] (the cause of the common
good is “By feeling hearts best understood”).
1571. BAD TIMES AT THE EL ROYALE (20th Century Fox 2018) (This strategy worked in
reality just as it had worked for the fictional Darleen Sweet played by Cynthia Erivo.). Cf.
ON THE BASIS OF SEX (Focus Features 2018).
1572. Phillis Wheatley, On Being Brought from Africa to America [1773] (“Some view our
sable race with scornful eye, / ‘Their colour is a diabolic die.’ / Remember, Christians, Ne-
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Therefore, the courts should do what they should have done
ages ago, and acknowledge the place of Phillis Wheatley, as mother of
Patent and Copyright Law.1573 The ancestors of white men in America,
the sons of immigrants themselves, sacrificed greatly to make sure
that her star rose above any of those in Europe to vindicate our cause
for humanity.1574 It will only be an act of self-respect for those segments of white America still fooled by ideas of white superiority to
recognize the plain facts—that Wheatley loved white people and contended for their rights as if they were her own.1575
It is time for the considering minds of the nation to take account
of the areas where the U.S. Government is exercising illegitimate powers.1576 As populism, rage, and confusion continue to vie for our
attention, may the people of the United States turn away from it; like
Marsha P. Johnson and pay it no mind.1577 May Americans dedicate
their hands and hearts to work that will secure justice, liberty, and
gros, black as Cain, / May be refin’d, and join th’ angelic train.”—this may be read as a
magnanimous invitation written to prejudiced white people so that they may likewise refine
themselves and join the angelic train). See Flannery O’Connor, Revelation [1965], reprinted
in FLANNERY O’CONNOR, COMPLETE STORIES 508–09 (1989) (showing how even the most ugly
and selfish people among us can have the revelation needed to understand who among us is
leading the train back to heaven).
1573. Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772,] in WHEATLEY, supra
note 821, at 7.
1574. Id. See, e.g., Phillis Wheatley & William Billings, An Elegy, Sacred to the Memory
of that Great Divine, the Reverend and Learned Dr. Samuel Cooper, E. RUSSELL, Jan. 2,
1784, at 3–8 [1784] (appended to this elegy by Wheatley, was the lyrics to William Billings’
hymn written for Samuel Cooper’s funeral that is known by its first line Samuel the Priest
Gave Up the Ghost—Cooper himself was known as the preacher that baptized Phillis
Wheatley).
1575. William Billings’ Second Petition, Massachusetts, May 27, 1772 (for Wheatley globally succeeded where white men failed to protect their rights in America). Like Octavio
Paz’s ruminations on Sor Juana in his Nobel Prize winning work where he concluded that
Mexico should grieve for Sor Juana—so too, in a very similar way, the people of the United
States should also grieve for Phillis Wheatley. OCTAVIO PAZ, LABYRINTH OF SOLITUDE 109–16
(Lysander Kemp trans., 1985) (“We often hear reproaches against men who have not fulfilled their destinies. Should we not grieve, however, for the ill fortune of a woman who was
superior both to her society and her culture?”).
1576. Feinstein, Floor Speech, supra note 621; Swartz, Keynote, supra note 599. Compare
UKUSA Agreement, Aug. 14, 1941, with Iran Nuclear Deal, July 14, 2015, and Letter from
Senator Tom Cotton et al. to Leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Mar. 10, 2015) (signed
by a Rump Senate of 47 U.S. Senators, and unconstitutionally addressed to foreign dignitaries on behalf of the United States—the unconstitutionality of this letter does not mean that
agreements like the Iran Nuclear Deal or the UKUSA Agreement are constitutional or unconstitutional). Cf. supra notes 386–87 and accompanying text regarding the
unconstitutionality of Senator Cotton’s letter.
1577. THE DEATH AND LIFE OF MARSHA P. JOHNSON (Netflix 2017) (the STAR People of
America can still rise up to help save us from our impending doom, and we ought to pray
that they do what they can).
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equality in the United States and protect the sanctity of American
minds from everything else.1578
Hold things lightly, endeavor to change what can be changed,
forgive others and be kind to oneself, and say a prayer when there is
nothing left to do.1579 Bear witness to constitutional violations when
they spring forth, experience each betrayal with a considering mind
that is slow to anger, and transform each present crisis into a source of
remembered wisdom for the future.1580 For there is a day coming when
we will have a chance to set things right.1581
Today is a day for gathering oil, for making preparations, and
for observing things as they are with a clear and present mind.1582 For
though a revolutionary moment approaches it is not yet here, and so
we wait patiently with hope, faith, and love.1583 Heaven watches over
all of us, our trials cannot last forever; and it remains an ever-present
hope in this world God made, that our darkest hours may precede the
morning light.1584
1578. ALEXANDER, supra note 73, at 228–29 (quoting KING JR., supra note 73, at 45–48).
1579. Sara Groves, Say a Prayer [2007]. Useful prayers include: Matthew 6:9–13 (the
Lord’s Prayer); Luke 1:46–55 (Mary’s Canticle); 1 Samuel 2:1–10 (Hannah’s Prayer); Anon.,
Serenity Prayer (attributed to Reinhold Niebuhr); St. Thomas Aquinas, A Student’s Prayer.
1580. See, e.g., ON THE BASIS OF SEX (Focus Features 2018) (Justice Ginsburg, in her
time, gave an excellent example of this sort of demeanor that is required to be an effective
contender for justice.).
See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
1581.
1582. See Matthew 25:1–13.
1583. OTIS, supra note 18, at 142 (“Truth and faith belong to men as men, from men, and
if they are disappointed in their just expectations of them in one society, they will at least
wish for them in another. If the love of truth and justice, the only spring of sound policy in
any state, is not strong enough to prevent certain causes from taking place, the arts of fraud
and force will not prevent the most fatal effects.”); John Allen, The Watchman’s Alarm 10
[1774].
1584. Ann Bleecker, A Pastoral Dialogue [1780], in BLEECKER, supra note 652, at 253–59;
William Billings, Sing praises to the Lord [1794] (based on Psalm 30:4–5); [John Allen,] The
Watchman’s Alarm 10 [1774] (“But be not afraid, for the morning cometh; remember from a
night arose all the blessings of creation, the beauties of paradise, and all the happiness of
the life that now is, and the hope of that which is to come.”).

